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Abstract
This dissertation argues that Chile's history of computing is tightly interwoven with
the history of the Chilean state. It begins by documenting the government use of
mechanical tabulating machines during the 1920s and 1930s and concludes with the
disbanding of the state computer enterprise known as ECOM in 1991. The
dissertation pays particular attention to the period between 1964 and 1973, which
was marked by the presidencies of Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei Montalva and
Socialist Salvador Allende Gossens. The dissertation addresses three central
questions. First, it asks how Chilean economic policies and political events shaped
the country's technological history. Second, it asks what we can learn from
computers if we treat them as texts for understanding historical processes in Chile,
the Latin American region, and the developing world. Finally, it addresses how
Chile's political leaders used computing machines in their attempts to control Chile's
social, economic, and political development and to forward their plans to modernize
the Chilean nation. It argues that computers proved valuable not only in producing
the Chile of today but in articulating national goals that changed over time.
Government, use of computers both reflected and made possible the ideological
programs of developmentalism, socialism, and neoliberalism that dominated Chilean
politics during the period under study. Based predominantly on archival research
and oral history interviews, the dissertation follows a narrative format. It shows
how computing technologies contributed to the practice of statecraft, influenced
ideas of modernization, and reflected the tensions between Chile and the
industrialized nations of the developed world.
Thesis Supervisor: David A. Mindell




Years ago, when I was trying to decide where to attend graduate school, a friend of
mine commented, "well, if you want to study technology, you should follow the geeks
to their Mecca." He was referring to MIT and his logic, while a bit of stretch,
nonetheless proved persuasive. Now, as my time at the Institute comes to a close, it
is a pleasure to single out the many others who made this pilgrimage with me and
whose support was invaluable to my journey through graduate school.
I am first and foremost grateful to the members of my committee: Peter
Winn, Hugh Gusterson, and my advisor David Mindell. Each has brought their
distinctive expertise and perspective to this project and each used their ability to
challenge and inspire at critical moments. I thank them for their continued interest
in my research, for serving as mentors as well as teachers, and for reading and
discussing multiple drafts of this manuscript.
Apart from my committee, the following individuals read early excerpts of
this manuscript and/or commented on it in public forums or in private conversations:
David Kaiser, Sheila Jasanoff, Chappell Lawson, Mike Mahoney, Guillermo
Guajardo Soto, Andrew Pickering, and members of the STS writing workshop (in
particular Livia Wick, Bill Turkel, Rachel Prentice, Shane Hamilton, David Lucsko,
Virigina Eubanks, Wen-Hua Kuo, Hyun Gyung Im, and Sandy Brown).
Conversations with my two classmates, Aslihan Sanal and Kaushik Sunder Rajan,
enhanced the early years of my graduate education, as did classes with Deborah
Fitzgerald, Sherry Turkle, Joe Dumit, Peter Purdue, Sheila Jasanoff, Margarita
Ribas Groeger, David Mindell, Hugh Gusterson, and Peter Winn.
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A number of grants and fellowships funded this work at different times and
gave me the freedom to pursue the research important to me in the manner I
thought best. I am extremely thankful for a Predissertation Fellowship awarded by
the Social Science Research Council and the American Council of Learned Societies;
a Dissertation Improvement Grant from the National Science Foundation; and an
Adelle and Erwin Tomash Fellowship awarded by the Charles Babbage Institute.
The MIT Program in Science, Technology and Society generously provided three
years of tuition and stipend through fellowships and teaching assistantships. They
also funded travel to conferences where I presented early versions of my dissertation
work, as did the Kelly Douglas Fund, the MIT Graduate Student Council, and the
Society for the History of Technology. MIT must also be acknowledged for
supporting my final year of writing with a Provost's Fellowship.
I am similarly indebted to the Dibner Institute for the History of Science and
Technology, where I was a Graduate Fellow from 2002-2004. The Dibner provided
the best office space a graduate student could hope for and generously funded my
tuition and living stipend for this two-year period. I fondly remember the friendly
banter with fellow Dibner historians and with members of the Dibner staff, in
particular Trudy Kontoff, Carla Chrisfield, Rita Dempsey, and Bonnie Edwards.
George Smith, the venerable director of the Dibner Institute, was another solid
source of support and I appreciated seeing him in the audience whenever I spoke on
campus.
On the subject of administration, I am beholden to the expertise and helpful
disposition of the STS front office staff. They are an exceptional group of individuals
who tackled readily any paperwork emergency or question I threw their way. I
deeply appreciate the efforts of Debbie Meinbresse, Kris Kipp, Deb Fairchild, Judy
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Spitzer, Sarah Merrow, Chris Bates, May Maffei, Shirin Fozi, Ben Brophy, and
LeRoy Stafford. My time in the MIT Program in Science, Technology and Society
was marked by the able direction of Rosalind Williams, Merritt Roe Smith, and
Michael Fischer. I thank each of them for creating a stimulating learning
environment that fostered interdisciplinary scholarship.
While working on my dissertation, I was fortunate to receive a job offer from
the Indiana University School of Informatics and even more fortunate when they
graciously gave me a year to finish writing before beginning my teaching duties.
The luxury of writing on the beautiful Bloomington campus no doubt enhanced the
quality of the finished product and I benefited tremendously from IU's excellent
administrative, technological and institutional resources. Conversations with fellow
social informatics colleagues Chris Ogan, David Hakken, Jean Camp, Kalpana
Shankar, anrd Bill Aspray brightened the sometimes tedious writing process and the
informatics staff, Cheryl O'Brien, Christi Pike, Chris Murphy, Pete Bucklin, Shawn
Strahle, and Tami Martindale, all helped me feel at home. Very special thanks go to
Mike Dunn, Dean of the School of Informatics, for doing everything in his power to
make my appointment and the completion of my dissertation possible.
My decision to pursue this line of research was influenced by a number of
individuals, most notably my undergraduate advisor at Princeton, Angela Creager,
and Claire Moses at the University of Maryland. At MIT, Jeff Ravel introduced me
to Allende's Chile and several years later allowed me to teach this history to his
undergraduate students. Thanks and a wink to longtime friend Hari Manoharan,
whose attempts to dissuade me from graduate school clearly backfired and whose
quotable advice opened these acknowledgements.
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Many individuals contributed to the research and writing of this dissertation.
Doug Haynes granted me early access to the Stafford Beer Collection at Liverpool
John Moores University and invited me to stay at his house while I used the
collection. Peter Winn gave me access to his vast web of Chilean contacts and
provided essential advice on how to obtain archival materials and interviews.
Moreover, this manuscript profited from the copyediting talents of Polly Kummel
and Mary Ann Miller. In Chile, Professor Alfredo Rehren arranged for me to have a
visiting position in the Political Science Department at the Pontificia Universidad
Cat6lica de Chile. Professors Raul O'Ryan and Pablo Sierra similarly arranged for
me to have a visiting position in the Industrial Engineering Department of the
Universidad de Chile and generously provided an internet connection and office
space. Hugo Palmarola shared my enthusiasm for the history of Chilean technology
and proved to be a wonderful resource on the history of Chilean industrial design.
Alfredo Jocelyn-Holt helped frame this dissertation within the larger context of
Chilean history. Cristian Medina used his geology training to draw the map of Chile
found on page eleven. Most of the following pages were written in one of the
following locations: JP Licks, the Starbucks on Indiana and Fifth Street, the Legacy
of the Incas, Clavo Oxidado, and Montevideo Caf6. The owners and workers at these
fine establishments have my lasting gratitude for letting me stay for extended
periods while only purchasing a cup of coffee.
I was able to bring my dissertation research to a wider audience thanks to
the efforts of Bruno Latour, Peter Weibel and the staff of artists at the ZKM Center
for Digital Art and Media in Karlsruhe, Germany; Juan Andr6s Gizman from the
Chilean publication The Clinic; freelance journalist Virginia Rioseco; and journalists
working for National Public Radio and the Guardian. The MIT Western Hemisphere
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Project kindly invited me to present my findings to the members of the MIT
community. The Design School at the Pontificia Universidad Cat6lica de Chile and
the History Department at the Universidad Academia de Humanismo Cristiano
provided a public forum where I could present my work to a Chilean audience.
I had the privilege of employing three Chilean research assistants, all of
whom are first-rate historians in their own right. Maria Jose Schneuer and Karla
Fernandez waded through cabinets of microfilm at the National Library in Santiago.
Cecilia Riveros patiently transcribed interviews and energetically assisted with
tasks too numerable to list. Their extensive knowledge of their country and its
procedures assisted the research process immensely.
Successful work depends on time for play. As such, this dissertation owes a
tremendous debt to the almuerzos, onces, happy hours, and carretes spent with my
Chilean family and friends. My "mama chilena" Rosa Moscosa and my Chilean
sister Francisca "la flaca" Mancilla provided a home away from home. Claudio
Garvizo and. Jos6 Luis Navarrete were the best roommates a gringa could ask for
and fellow gringa Lea Newfarmer was the ideal partner in crime for navigating the
"Chilean jungle."
Nothing can replace the feeling of family, especially when far from home.
Pedro Medina and Marta Rubi Maldonado accepted me as their daughter with open
arms. Sunday afternoons spent with my Chilean brothers Tom and Hicho, their
wives Marisa and Marcela, and my "top" nieces and nephews Paula, Javiera, and
Felipito made my time in Santiago extra special.
To my friends, I thank you for sharing in the ups and the downs. I feel lucky
to have friends of the caliber of Maya Bendor, George Karayiannakis, Tanya Hen6,
Ellen Wong, Josh Stephens, Alison Coil, Snow Tempest, Kristin Vassallo, and Selen
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Altunata. Fellow grad student and close friend Pei-Lin Hsiung provided a model for
work ethic and the pursuit of a balanced life. It was an honor and a pleasure to live
with her for my five years in Boston and I honestly don't know what I would have
done without her camaraderie at the end of the day. Equally crucial was the love
and continued support from my "extended family"-Sara, Michael, Aaron, Sonia,
and Corey Baum. Grandma Maly was my ever-present inspiration for overcoming
obstacles.
To the individuals who generously opened their homes, trusted me to
document their experiences, and/or took a risk by giving me access to their web of
connections, I thank you. It is difficult to do justice to the lifetimes of
accomplishment that now reside on my interview tapes; I hope this text is worthy of
the confidence these individuals have shown its author.
To Cristian, I thank you for all you have sacrificed to make my work possible
and for teaching me to love your homeland. You are a constant reminder of what
makes Chile so special.
I dedicate this dissertation to my parents. It is a small acknowledgement for
the lifetime of love, support, and encouragement I have been so fortunate to receive.
I hope they see this work as the fruit of their labors just as it is of mine.
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Touch my shoulders. Feel that? They are different. After the National Stadium, they
have never been the same.
-Vicente Poblete, Santiago, Chile, July 2003
W TICENTE POBLETE spent 744 days incarcerated in a Chilean prison camp
during the military dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet (1973-90). As one of the
many detained in Chile's National Stadium, Poblete endured physical and
psychological torture, the effects of which are still evident more than thirty years
later. The military government detained him because he was a socialist, a label he
wore proudly during the presidency of socialist Salvador Allende (1970-73) but
distances himself from today. In a 2003 interview he insisted that he was not a
leftist but rather an academic who used his training in sociology to assist Allende's
Popular Unity government. Before Allende's election in 1970, Poblete had taught
sociology at the State Technical University and in Brazil as a visiting scholar. When
Allende came to power, the government decided to apply Poblete's academic prowess
to the restructuring of the Chilean industrial sector and assigned the former
professor to manage a recently nationalized textile factory. Poblete recalled bringing
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the small factory back from the dead. As his reward, the government appointed him
to serve as the general manager of the Yarur textile mill, the largest such plant in
the country and the first factory nationalized as a result of pressure from workers.
Figure 1: Vicente Poblete holding a text he has drafted of his experiences during the Pinochet dictatorship.
Photograph taken by the author.
In agreeing to take the job at Yarur, Poblete placed himself at the forefront of
the Chilean economic revolution. Although Yarur had not appeared on the
government's original list of factories that it intended to nationalize, political and
economic considerations, combined with mounting worker enthusiasm for
expropriating Yarur, made the mill appealing to the government, which was looking
for a test case for its power to requisition industry. Nationalizing the Yarur textile
mill was also important symbolically, as it was the first step toward eliminating the
private monopolies controlled by wealthy Chilean "capitalist" families-such as the
Yarurs-who were well known for exploiting workers and smaller businesses. In his
extensive study of the Yarur nationalization process, Peter Winn observed that "the
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socialization of the Yarur mill ... was both a symbolic and efficient way of beginning
the decisive phase of the Popular Unity's campaign 'to gain control of the
commanding heights of the economy.' " Thus Yarur became the flagship factory to
undergo the industrial transformation described in the Popular Unity economic
program; its success was critical.
The Chilean Economic Ministry gave the factory the best resources the
government could offer. Ministry officials took pains to secure qualified state-
appointed managers like Poblete. They met with worker representatives and
encouraged Poblete and his management team to apply new scientific management
techniques and technologies that were designed to increase production levels and to
introduce new forms of management that incorporated worker participation. The
government sent university-educated engineers to the Yarur mill, where they
created factory production models by applying techniques derived from cybernetic
science and operations research.
The Yarur mill became one of the first factories linked to an experimental
communications network that used the electronic computer to record and map daily
production activities with unprecedented speed and completeness. This system,
known as the Cybersyn Project, used a network of telex machines to connect
factories in the social property area (APS) to a central mainframe computer and
processed production data using a suite of customized software programs. Once
completed, the system would provide government officials and factory managers
alike with a tool capable of responding to the rapid fluctuations of the Chilean
economy and of predicting crises before they occurred. The project represented a
1 Peter Winn, Weavers ofRevolution: The Yarur Workers and Chile's Road to Socialism (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1986), 152.
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remarkable and innovative undertaking for the time period (1971-73), arguably
years ahead of its time. Its development seemed so extraordinary, in fact, that it
inspired me to explore its history for this dissertation and led me to Vicente
Poblete's doorstep.
Poblete is now an old man, retired and widowed, with a soft voice, impeccable
manners, and a tendency to freely link memories from different periods of his life
with an understandable nostalgia. During our three-hour interview the conversation
quickly transcended the themes one might consider typical for a history of
technology. Poblete's narrative tumbled out in a halting mix of recollection,
rambling, and uncertainty, a hybrid resulting from the confusion wrought by time
and old age, as well as the act of articulating memories long buried, forgotten, and
then remembered. As it turned out, Poblete did not recall the computer system that
had led me to him, although he did remember other episodes from his time at Yarur.
Our conversation, while not directly applicable to the history of the Cybersyn Project
presented in chapters 5 and 6, nonetheless proved illustrative of a larger
phenomenon that I encountered while pursuing this research topic.
Conducting the oral history interviews for a dissertation set in Chile in the
years under consideration transcended the general purpose of collecting information
about events from the past and main players' impressions of them; the interviews
contribute to the ongoing process of restoring the national memory.2 For three hours
my presence was the catalyst for Poblete's reclamation of disappeared, forgotten, or
silenced recollections of the past. My experience with him, as well as with many of
the oral history participants whose accounts are interwoven in this text, reflected
2 The events commemorating the thirtieth anniversary of the military coup also heightened the willingness
of Chileans to participate in this study, which in turn further fueled the process of national remembering.
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the exceptionality of the moment when I was conducting most of my research for this
study, namely, the thirtieth anniversary of the 1973 military coup that brought
Pinochet to power. I am grateful to the individuals who participated in the study for
allowing me to share in this process with them and for permitting me to record and
share their personal histories.
I opened with Poblete's story not only to put a human face on the study of
technology 'but also to illustrate the unique challenges of conducting historical
research in Chile. There, a history of computing will inevitably intersect with a
history of political violence and repression--or, at the very least, a history of
contentious politics; this had a fundamental effect on the research questions that I
addressed and the methodologies that I used for drawing conclusions. Any recent
history of Chile, technological or otherwise, will inevitably confront the controversies
of the Chilean historical landscape, where members of the political Right, Left, and
Center still negotiate how history should be remembered and how it should be
allowed to shape the present. These considerations have helped shape the
arguments that I make in the pages that follow as well as the methodological
approach that I chose and will present in greater depth later in this chapter.
The coup of September 11, 1973, undoubtedly created the greatest rupture in
recent Chilean history, yet it was one of many ideological shifts and political
upheavals that this slender South American country underwent in the twentieth
century. The swinging pendulum of ideological change that has characterized
Chilean politics and the aftershocks of international political events felt in the South
American region have helped form Chile's material landscape, set national
priorities, and define the range of options available for economic, political, and social
transformation. For these reasons a history of technology set in Chile will appear
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quite different from one set in the United States or other geographies of the
industrialized world.
Today Chile boasts the reputation of being one of the most wired nations in
Latin America. First-rate science and engineering programs channel an increasingly
skilled wor:kforce into flourishing high-tech industries nurtured by free-trade
agreements. Describing these achievements as the fruit of an "economic miracle"
obscures the economic, political, and ideological work that the country has
undertaken since the mid-1970s and the groundwork laid earlier in the twentieth
century. Chilean political leaders regularly assert that information technologies play
a vital role in creating the next generation of educated citizens, ensuring the present
and future successes of Chilean industries, and ultimately in surviving in the global,
privatized, neoliberal marketplaces of the twenty-first century. At the same time,
the government in recent years has maintained a strong position of economic and
technological neutrality, allowing the market, with no intervention from the state, to
act as the central force in determining the future of Chilean technological
development.3 Most Chilean computer professionals have spent their lives working
under the assumption that computerization and privatization occurred as
concurrent and mutually reinforcing phenomena. This was not always the case. The
history that I present here tells a different story of computer technology and the
Chilean state: a history of computers as technologies of the state, what I refer to as
"state machines."
3 Some argue, correctly I believe, that the idea of technological neutrality is an illusion. By refusing to
favor or even grant equal status to certain technologies, such as free software, the government is complicit
in Chile's economic dependence, which threatens the security of state computer systems. See Jens
Hardings and Werner Westermann, Neutralidad Tecnol6gica? Desencuentros de la politica tecnol6gica
chilena, 2004,
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The dissertation was inspired by and stands in contrast to a body of
literature about the history of computing that has focused almost exclusively on the
evolution of computing machines within the business, military, and academic
institutions of the United States. The chapters that follow implicitly examine the
Chilean history of computing in contrast to that of the United States. In so doing, I
address three central questions. First, I ask how computing machines have been
adopted and employed in parts of the developing world and explore how Chile's
economic and political dependency influenced the history of this technology. In the
process, I show the movement of these machines from one national context to
another and how bringing these technologies and related practices to another
continent required the formation of international networks that linked human and
nonhuman actors. The second question asks what we can learn from computers if we
treat them as historical texts for understanding historical processes beyond those
that pertain to technical and technological spheres. One recurring theme is how
these machines can be used as windows for examining state understandings of
modernity, the assumptions underlying state modernization efforts, and the practice
of bringing state-directed modernization programs to fruition. Anther recurring
theme is how Chilean officials used these machines as symbols to position Chile with
respect to the developed world and the models that they sought to emulate through
modernization. Finally, the dissertation asks how Chile historically has linked
computing machines to notions of controlling social, economic, and administrative
practices. Different uses of computers grew out of the distinctive goals and ideologies
of consecutive political administrations and contributed to Chile's changing ideas of
19
http://www.softvarelibre.cllmodules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=288&mode=thread
&order=O&thold=0, (8 March 2004).
nationhood, the international structure of power, and the relationships between the
Chilean government and its citizenry.
The dissertation is divided chronologically into four parts, beginning with the
arrival of the first IBM tabulating machines in Chile during the 1920s and
continuing through the Alliance for Progress government of President Eduardo Frei
Montalva (1964-70) and the brief socialist presidency of Salvador Allende (1970-73).
It concludes with a brief overview of state computing during the early years of the
Pinochet dictatorship and its relation to the neoliberal restructuring and social
repression that followed. Computer technologies assumed varying roles within the
state apparatus of each administration, advancing policies of state-led growth, state-
directed growth, and, finally, free-market economics. Within this context computing
machines have played an important role in Chile's formidable state bureaucracy,
helping it to push the limits of an interventionist state. These machines have also
served as canvases for differing ideological visions of modernity and modernization
while serving as tools for realizing policies grounded in an ideologically based set of
assumptions. Computing machines did not simply play a role in producing the
Chilean nation; they contributed to a particular articulation of the Chilean nation
that changed over time. This observation supports the larger argument that
examining the history of technology is especially valuable in enhancing our
understanding of Latin America.
State and Nation
Readers familiar with computer science or programming will no doubt recognize the
play on words in the title of this dissertation. Most computer science and
engineering students encounter the abstract model known as the finite state
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machine, or simply the state machine, in their first programming or logic design
course. A state machine has several different "states," and a set of rules governs the
transition from one state to the next. Given the computer-oriented focus of this
work, this double entendre seemed appropriate, even though I do not discuss the
finite state machine, either historically or as a conceptual model. I refer to
computers as "state machines" because their history is so closely bound with the
history of the Chilean state.4 Computers have assisted government agencies in
tackling such tasks as census taking, economic regulation, and coordination among
various state organs. The historian Jon Agar has shown how computing machines
made possible the expansion of the size and scope of the British government during
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. A similar story emerges in the Chilean case,
often in direct response to British activities occurring across the Atlantic.5
In Chile, government bureaucracy grew in tandem with the increasing state
emphasis on accurate record keeping. In addition to the long lines and reams of
paperwork that continue to plague relations between Chileans and their public
officials, the desire to quantify and record national activities spawned new forms of
state visibility and accountability. These new record-keeping technologies and
practices, including early computers and tabulating machines, in turn allowed state
4 Discussions of the use of machine metaphors in describing government operations have appeared in Leo
Marx, The Machine in the Garden: Technology and the Pastoral Ideal in America (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1967); Jon Agar, The Government Machine: A Revolutionary History of the Computer
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2003); and Yaron Ezrahi, The Descent of carus: Science and the
Transformation of Contemporary Democracy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990). Louis
Althusser has also equated the state with a "machine of repression." See Louis Althusser, "Ideology and
Ideological State Apparatuses," in Essays on Ideology (London: Verso, 1976).
5 Agar, The Government Machine. It is worth noting that Agar's book fits into a larger corpus of literature
on office technology and the growth of management in both business and government. See JoAnne Yates,
Control Through Communication: The Rise of System in American Management (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1989), and James R. Beniger, The Control Revolution: Technological and
Economic Origins of the Information Society (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986), for
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officials to plan economic policies and simulate their effects; map the national
population statistically with increasing accuracy; and keep detailed inventories of
national resources. The resulting databases in turn shaped future economic policies
and their underlying theoretical frameworks, the behavior of international lending
agencies, perceptions of government efficacy, and levels of public satisfaction. They
also created new forms of state control.
Like the creation of a national history, the teaching of a common language,
and the constructed demarcation between self and other, acts such as assigning
national identification numbers and categorizing populations through census data
contribute to the imagination and realization of a unified nation. Benedict Anderson
writes that a nation functions as an "imagined political community - and imagined
as both inherently limited and sovereign."6 However, national communities must
also be maintained. The vast networks of machines, public officials, and government
agencies responsible for the massive generation, collection, and distribution of data
contribute to not only the day-to-day operation of the state but also to its production.
This history, therefore, is not just a technological history but a history of the
changing social networks that connected these technologies to the function of the
state and its management.
The historian Mario G6ngora illustrates how the evolving character of the
state created the Chilean nation. Using his encyclopedic knowledge of Chilean
history, G6ngora traces the changing goals and infrastructure of the Chilean
alternative readings of how computers and other office technologies historically have increased
management capabilities of U.S. business and government.
6 Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism, rev. and extended ed. (New York: Verso, 1991), 6.
7 Mario G6ngora, Ensayo hist6rico sobre la noci6n de estado en Chile en los siglos XIXy XX, 2nd ed.
(Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, S.A., 1986).
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government from the war-oriented postindependence period, through the rise of the
"protectorate state" that was committed to collective well-being, and ends with a
strong critique of the current neoliberal status quo, which threatens to undermine
the state and, therefore, Chilean national identity. Because he limited the scope of
his analysis to the history of Chile, G6ngora's notion of nation is more concrete than
Anderson's. Gngora's work provides a useful starting point for thinking about
Chile's introduction of state rationalization techniques, which emerged in the 1920s
as the new basis for authority and state legitimacy. In contrast to a Marxist vision of
a state derived and produced from socioeconomic power structures, G6ngora
envisions the modern Chilean state in terms of utility, efficiency, and
competitiveness. This state is capable of configuring historical processes through its
organizational and moral power. G6ngora, however, never specifies how these
mechanisms of organization and rationalization contribute to the production of
national identity or how they express the changing ideological goals of the various
administrations. Moreover, he does not clarify which technologies, practices, and
methodological frameworks fall under the abstract heading of tcnica, a word that
translates as both technology and technique.8 The argument presented here
provides one possible response to this oversight.
Like G6ngora, Michel Foucault equates the historical creation and isolation
of categories such as "political economy" and "population" with a new form of
8 This is perhaps intentional, given G6ngora's scathing critique of government tendencies to give priority to
scientific techniques and private industries over culture and history. As he writes, "In Chile [the way of] the
firm seems much easier, tradition much more fragile. In globalization processes, the end result is a
massification of economics and technique, not a soul." G6ngora, Ensayo hist6rico sobre la noci6n de
estado en Chile, 270.
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government legitimacy.9 As he writes, "Thanks to the perception of the specific
problems of the population, and thanks to the isolation of the area of reality that we
call the economy, ... the problem of government finally came to be thought, reflected
and calculated outside of the judicial framework of sovereignty. .... Population
comes to appear above all else as the ultimate end of government."'0 State dominion
over the population and the national economy required techniques of management
and discipline, what Foucault terms the "governmentalization" of the state. By
"governmentality" Foucault means the complex web of institutions, practices,
techniques, calculations, and forms of knowledge that allow the state to exercise
power over its citizenry. Although Foucault does not refer to the role played by
technologies in the formation and maintenance of his governmental state, we can
easily envision how such a connection might be made, particularly with regard to
the office technologies-typewriters, calculators, filing systems, and later
computers--that came into being during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
Computers (a category that includes early tabulating machines) and their
related practices are not uniquely responsible for creating a Chilean national
identity, a new form of state legitimacy, or type of governance. However, the
computer technology used by the Chilean state from the 1920s to the 1980s fueled
new opportunities for expanding state power and governmentality and for
stimulating the public imagination of the Chile that was and the Chile that could be.
In addition to extending the reach of the state and its management capabilities,
these technologies played an important role in discussions of state modernization
9 See chapter 4 of Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller, eds., The Foucault Effect: Studies in
Governmentality: With Two Lectures by and an Interview with Michel Foucault (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1991), 87-104.
0' Ibid., 99-100.
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and national development. In combination with other key technological
interventions of the twentieth century, the data collection capabilities of early
computing machines helped unify a nation spread over a large and varied
geographical area. Like the physical mobility provided by the railroads, early
computer and tabulating systems made statistical information from the southern tip
of Patagonia to the northern reaches of the Atacama Desert mobile, collapsible, and
configurable,, fortifying the unified, connected national vision articulated by Chilean
political leaders and made possible by government technocrats."
Technology and Dependency
History has illustrated the numerous ways in which information collection, storage,
and transmission systems have arisen in response to ideologically grounded
problems and have offered ideologically grounded solutions. Examples include the
data-processing technologies responsible for generating the lists of Jews living in
Nazi-occupied territories during the Second World War and the computerized
databanks constructed by the military governments of Latin America to store
information about suspected political subversives.' 2 Within the U.S. context the
Cold War push to develop technologies of command, control, and containment
spurred well-known innovations such as digital computation, satellite imaging
systems, advances in computer simulation, and the Internet, as well as the
1 In the Latourian sense, they create new centers of calculation. See Bruno Latour, Science in Action: How
to Follow Scientists and Engineers Through Society (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987),
and Bruno Latour, "Drawing Things Together," in Michael Lynch, ed., Representations in Scientific
Practice (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990).
12 Edwin Black, IBM and the Holocaust: The Strategic Alliance Between Nazi Germany and America's
Most Powerful Corporation (New York: Crown, 2001); John Dinges, The Condor Years: How Pinochet
and His Allies Brought Terrorism to Three Continents (New York: New Press, 2004).
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interdisciplinary fields of cybernetics, systems theory, and operations research.13
Today, the rise in database, profiling, and encryption technologies represents the
ideological tug between the national need to find terrorists and criminals, a
corporate urge to increase customers and hence profits, and individuals' desire to
protect their privacy.l4 Internationally, the emphasis on bureaucratic statecraft,
with its numerous techniques of data collection, exchange, and representation, has
been tied to ideas of modernity, development, and progress for most of modern
history. 15
However, there exists a fundamental difference in how these techniques,
ideas, and practices are adopted in the developed and the developing worlds. The
history of twentieth-century information technologies has been dominated by the
U.S. success stories of invention and innovation and, to a lesser extent, such stories
in European contexts. However, the majority of the world has a different history.
Instead of leading innovation, most nations rely on trade and lending agreements
that enable them to adopt foreign technologies, often with the caveat that they apply
them much as the countries that developed them did, and then to adapt to the
changes wrought by these systems.
The almost deterministic relationship, whereby less-industrialized nations
find themselves following a technological trajectory blazed by their more
13 Paul N. Edwards, The Closed World: Computers and the Politics of Discourse in Cold War America
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996); National Research Council, Funding a Revolution: Government
Supportfor Computing Research (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1999); Agatha C. Hughes
and Thomas Parke Hughes, eds., Systems, Experts, and Computers: The Systems Approach in Management
and Engineering, World War II and After (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000); Arthur L. Norberg, Judy
E. O'Neill, and Kerry J. Freedman, Transforming Computer Technology: Information Processingfor the
Pentagon, 1962-1986 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); Janet Abbate, Inventing the
Internet (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1999).
14 See, for example, Simson Garfinkel, Database Nation, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, Mass. O'Reilly, 2001).
15 One example is James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human
Condition Have Failed (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1998).
26
industrialized neighbors, runs counter to the body of scholarship within the history
of technology that is dedicated to disproving the myth of technological
determinism.' 6 Certainly, it would be wrong to discount the role of human agency in
technological development, and indeed governments and citizens in developing
nations play a significant role in how technologies are purchased, applied, and
altered to fit; their national needs. However, it is also true that within the developing
world, factors of economic and technological dependence restrict the options and
confine the scope of human agency. The power of international economic and
political relations can cause the technological tail to wag the dog. However, these
relations may also generate a framework for developing nations to resist Western
hegemony by using imported technologies in original, innovative ways that have
symbolic significance. Chile, a tiny sliver of the South American continent framed by
the Pacific Ocean and the Andean cordillera, provides an illustrative setting for
exploring the relationship between technology and dependency.
The argument of Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto's classic text,
Dependency and Development in Latin America, is pertinent to this discussion, even
though subsequent scholarship has shown the limitations of its approach.'7
16 For an excellent collection of essays on the subject see Merritt Roe Smith and Leo Marx, eds., Does
Technology Drive History? The Dilemma of Technological Determinism (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,
1994).
17 Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, Dependency and Development in Latin America, trans.
Mariory Mattingly Urquidi (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979). I cite this text because it is
central to the ECLA dependency school, which evolved in Santiago during the 1960s. However,
Dependency and Development in Latin America, and the ideas found within its pages, cannot be taken out
of the wider history of structuralist and developmentalist economic thinking that shaped Cardoso and
Faletto's argument. See Rafil Prebisch, Towards a Dynamic Development Policyfor Latin America (New
York: United Nations, 1963); United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin America, The Economic
Development oJ'f Latin America and Its Principal Problems (Lake Success, N.Y.: United Nations
Department of Economic Affairs, 1950); and in the original Spanish, Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo
Faletto, Dependenciay desarrollo en America Latina (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1967). See
also the response to these models in Andre Gunder Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin
America: Historical Studies of Chile and Brazil (New York: Modern Reader Paperbacks, 1969), and Andre
Gunder Frank, "'The Development of Underdevelopment," in Peter F. Klaren and Thomas J. Bossert, eds.,
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Originally published in 1971, the book describes how nations at the center of global
capitalist markets exert economic power over those on the periphery, a collection of
ideas collapsed under the heading of dependency theory.l8 According to Cardoso and
Faletto, Latin American economies depend on the economies of the more industrially
developed nations because "the accumulation and expansion of capital cannot find
its essential dynamic component within the [Latin American] system." Less-
developed economies must therefore look to other parts of the developed world to
supply the new technologies and/or financial backing that allow for economic growth
and capital accumulation.' 9 Dependency theory frequently implies the study of how
imperialist power relations have determined the historical economic trajectory of
developing nations. Equally important, however, are relations at the domestic
level, which frequently unite local party or class interests with those of foreign
companies or lending agencies. This, in turn, opens the door to local social and
political movements that can resist the effects of these economic relations and even
challenge their structural underpinnings.
Promise of Development: Theories of Change in Latin America(Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1986). In more
recent years scholars have challenged dependency theory's framing of the Latin American condition in a
manner that overlooks the role played by Latin American elites, emphasizes class and ignores gender and
ethnic categories, demarcates the region into inflexible dichotomies of center and periphery, and overstates
the influence of international actors and institutions while understating the role of developing world
governments and citizens groups. Others have challenged dependency for its inability to account for
variations among developing nations, particularly the successes of the Asian tigers. Economists have
discarded dependency theory as a basis for economic policy, particularly calls for Latin American nations
to remove themselves from the global capitalist system or to pursue the construction of a socialist state.
Historians, however, continue to find value in dependency theory for its ability to describe the history of
economic inequality among nations of the developed and developing worlds and the failures of
developmentalism, modernization theory, and neoliberalism.
18s However, as Cardoso and Faletto acknowledge, each nation on the periphery has a historically specific
and varied experience with the growth of capitalist markets within its borders. This precludes the creation
of a general "dependency theory" and begs for the study of specific "situations" or "categories" of
dependency. In this light, studying the uniqueness of Chile's history with a "capital good" such as the
computer furthers our understanding of the set of relations that characterized the Chilean experience.
19 Cardoso and Faletto, Dependency and Development in Latin America, xx.
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Understanding economic dependency is helpful to understanding the Chilean
experience with computational technologies. Today Chile exports a considerable
number of computer professionals and lines of software code, but the machines
themselves have always been imported from other parts of the world. In the 1920s
tabulating machines arrived from IBM in New York, and in the 1960s machines
arrived from IBM in France and from National Cash Register and Burroughs in the
United States. In the wake of the 1973 military coup and Chile's turn to neoliberal
economic policy, imported computer machinery from DEC, Wang, and Honeywell
(among others) began to enter the Chilean market with increasing ease. However,
from the 1920s to the 1970s the purchase of computer equipment and the
implementation of computer-related state modernization strategies hinged on
securing trade agreements with other nations and financial backing from
international lending agencies. Training a workforce capable of operating these
machines also depended on the availability of foreign experts willing to travel to
Chile or the opportunities offered by other nations for Chileans to study abroad.
It is difficult to overemphasize the role that international political events
such as the Cold War or the Great Depression played in determining the availability
of imported technologies and the nature of their application. These events
fundamentally altered the structure of Chile's economic, political, and social
relationships both domestically and abroad, influencing elections, the availability of
foreign aid, and eventually helping to incite a military coup. The context created by
these events similarly colored public perceptions of Chile's place in the world, the
strategies available to incite or obstruct change, the causes of underdevelopment,
and the solutions proposed to alter the economic and social status quo.
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For all these reasons dependency theory provides a suggestive, if overly
deterministic, framework for analysis. Thus Chile's computer history needs to
include the actions of nations within the developed world, as well as their economic
policies, political agendas, and technical assistance programs. Of the nations in the
developed world, the United States, Britain, France, and Germany exerted the
greatest influence in Chile during the period under study, the first three
contributing significantly to the Chilean experience with computational
technologies. Subsequent chapters will address how these nations contributed to the
evolution of Chile's computer industry, workforce, and technological applications.
Dependency, however, has a flip side. During the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries in particular, Chile provided a metaphorical laboratory for the
experiments of those in other parts of the world. The experimental neoliberal shock
treatment applied to the Chilean economy in the 1970s and 1980s by the University
of Chicago economist Milton Friedman and his "Chicago Boys" constitutes one of the
more famous examples, but it is far from being an isolated one. Chile's small size,
wealth of natural resources, geographical isolation, relatively homogeneous and
concentrated population, commitment to political order, and an elite linked to all
sectors of public life (agriculture, mining, politics, and industry) made Chile, from
the nineteenth century on, the ideal test bed for ideas that ranged from mining
techniques to economic growth strategies. The nation's shifting ideological
allegiances, which swung from the Right to the Left to the Center with each
presidential election, increased Chile's desirability as a site for political and social
analysis during the latter half of the twentieth century. The Chilean historian
Alfredo Jocelyn-Holt has asserted that this history of nation as laboratory has
shaped Chilean national identity. He argues that Chileans have always understood
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themselves as a test case or an experiment for the rest of the world. Even the brief
recapture of national destiny that occurred in 1970 with Allende's election quickly
transformed the struggling socialist nation into a Cold War laboratory for the
conflicting political ideologies of the United States and the Soviet Union.
Today Chile continues to serve as a laboratory for interests that range from
drug companies studying depression to political scientists documenting the return of
democracy. This dissertation argues that changing relations of dependency have
created many different Chilean "laboratories," several of which I will document and
analyze in the pages that follow.
Historians of technology are still grappling with how relations of economic
dependency affect technological development. Chilean history illustrates how
international events, the decisions of lending organizations, and the presence of
ideologically polarized superpowers affect processes of innovation, technology
transfer, and modernization for nations on the geopolitical periphery. It also allows
us to see how technologies became part of Chile's struggle for economic and political
independence. Technological systems were not only something to be imitated,
desired, or envied. If appropriated and altered, they provided a means for nations
such as Chile to escape the hegemonic dominance of Western development.
Reading Technology, Reading Ideology
The increasing ubiquity of computer technology in our daily lives has spurred a
change in the subdiscipline known as the history of computing. Rather than attempt
to document the full history of these machines, their evolution, and their
application, historians concerned with these technologies now must focus on how
these machines entered the histories of a particular field, such as data processing or
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telecommunications, and changed technological processes and operations.20 Aside
from these technique-centered narratives, computer histories permit the study of
institutional change, including changes in the methods, operations, and values that
are embedded within the organization. "The State Machine" defines a crucial part of
Chile's computing history. However, it does not focus on the machines themselves
but rather on how they have helped construct and support differing ideas of
modernity, development, and progress within the Chilean state apparatus. The
history presented here extends beyond that of a particular technology and
documents the interplay between these machines and the evolution of the Chilean
state, as well as the changing approach to modernization and development pursued
by the Chilean government over time.
Discussions of modernity and its pursuit through state modernization
programs invariably become linked with ideology. The word ideology appears
repeatedly throughout this work; given the number of definitions associated with the
term, a short discussion of its use here is necessary. 2' I will not equate ideology with
"false consciousness," as Engels suggested, or regard it as a means of unifying class
interests for the purpose of changing socioeconomic structures, as Gramsci did.22
20 A sample of general computing histories includes Martin Campbell-Kelly and William Aspray,
Computer: A History of the Information Machine (New York: Basic Books, 1996); Paul E. Ceruzzi, A
History of Modern Computing (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998); and Edwards, The Closed World.
General histories of early computing machines can be found in Herman Heine Goldstine, The Computer
from Pascal to von Neumann (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972); William Aspray,
Computing Before Computers (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1990); James W. Cortada, Before the
Computer: IBM, NCR, Burroughs, and Remington Rand and the Industry They Created, 1865-1956
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000); and William Aspray, John von Neumann and the
Origins of Modern Computing (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1990). Overviews of computing and U.S.
defense policy include National Research Council, Funding a Revolution; Norberg, O'Neill, and
Freedman, Transforming Computer Technology; and Abbate, Inventing the Internet.
21 Terry Eagleton, for example, lists sixteen definitions of ideology, ranging from an "action-oriented set of
beliefs" to "semiotic closure." See Eagleton, Ideology: An introduction (New York: Verso, 1991), 1-2.
22 Ibid.; Antonio Gramsci, Quintin Hoare, and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith, Selectionsfrom the Prison
Notebooks ofAntonio Gramsci (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1971); David Forgacs, ed., An Antonio
Gramsci Reader: Selected Writings, 1916-1935, (New York: New York University Press, 2000).
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However, I do build upon Gramsci's articulation of ideologies "as real historical
facts" that are capable of domination and the exertion of political power.2 3 As
historical forces, ideologies leave behind material traces, which can be documented
using the methods and tools of historical analysis. In his treatment of economic
ideology in Latin America, Joseph Love defines ideology as "a set of propositions
which implicitly justifies social values or social configurations."2 4 This framing
allows us to place ideology within the process of history while acknowledging that
ideologies exert very real forms of social power that shape our actions, beliefs, and
relationships with those around us. Although many ideological framings have
coexisted throughout Chilean history (e.g., capitalism, socialism, structuralism,
fascism, etc.), I use as an analytical framework in each chapter only the dominant
political ideology as determined by the political programs and publicly espoused
beliefs of the acting Chilean president and his administration at the time.
Ideology is a notoriously slippery concept. From the perspective of a
historian, accessing and successfully articulating the character of a dominant belief
system is a much greater challenge than, for example, documenting the changing
value of Chilean copper exports.2 5 However, if we treat ideology as a historical
phenomenon, meaning that we try to understand how historical actors understood
23 However, I do not restrict ideology to the context of class struggle or separate ideologies into categories
of historical necessity and arbitrariness, as found in Gramsci's writings.
24 Joseph L. Love, "Economic Ideas and Ideologies in Latin America Since 1930," in Leslie Bethell, ed.,
Ideas and Ideologies in Twentieth Century Latin America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
It is worth noting that Love contrasted ideology with empirically verifiable beliefs or tenets, associating a
degree of falsity with the term that I do not adopt here.
25 Others argue that if ideology is invisible, it is impossible to step outside the bounds of one's own
ideological framework and obtain "God's view" of objective reality. See Slavoj Zizek, Mapping Ideology
(New York: Verso, 1994). Postmodern theory and science studies have both banished claims to objectivity,
and I do not pretend to argue from this place of privilege. While it is impossible to rid a historical work of
the subjective biases of the author, this does not prevent us from making claims about the events of the
past. Here I argue that ideology, if viewed as part of a historical process, is a visible entity whose
mechanisms and ramifications can be documented and interpreted.
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and produced the world around them in accordance with a set of social, economic,
and political beliefs during a particular time period, studies of technologies and
technological systems can contribute greatly to this academic undertaking.
Althusser argued for the material existence of ideology, stating that "an ideology
always exists in an apparatus, and its practice, or practices."2 6 According to
Althusser, individuals act freely according to their own beliefs and ideas, but these
actions stem from a set of practices and rituals that operate as part of an ideological
apparatus. Actions, practices, and rituals constitute the materiality of ideology.
Citing Pascal, Althusser inverts the perception that religious practice stems from
religious belief. Instead, ritual and practice play a vital role in producing and
maintaining the materiality of ideology, such that one could "kneel down, move your
lips in prayer, and you will believe."27 If actions and practices illustrate the material
nature of ideology, it stands to reason that the act of technological creation may also
illuminate the nature of ideology, especially technologies designed to enable or
maintain certain configurations of state power. Machines, moreover, demand and
reinforce certain behaviors, practices, rituals, and social configurations through the
limited flexibility of their operation, thus cementing a particular material character
of modernity that solidifies the influence of technical experts, lending agencies, or
national governments, as well as the relations between workers and managers,
bureaucrats, and the masses.28
If we credit ideology for a set of social values, configurations, and practices,
we also need to recognize that ideology does not behave as a stable monolith but
26 Althusser, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses," 40.
27 Ibid., 42.
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must be continually produced, reproduced, and maintained. In this sense, ideology
functions as a discourse as much as a belief system.2 9 By analyzing the
conversations, displays, and exchanges surrounding the production of Chilean
computer systems, we begin to see shifting and conflicting ideas of modernity and
development mobilized around groups of allies and artifacts that change with the
passage of time. Drawing from the work of Foucault and Escobar, I use the idea of
discourse but only as a complement to ideology rather than a conceptual
replacement;. In this way, we can view ideological production as a mobile and
changing process while maintaining the ability to talk about institutional power and
identify a particular discourse as dominant or more worthy of our attentions.
Hegemony is a useful concept here, as it refers to a way of seeing the world and its
relationships as commonsense political fact that is accepted equally by those who
stand to profit from these relations and by those who are subordinated to them.30
Western concepts of modernization, modernity, development, and progress exerted
hegemonic power within Latin America during the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, shaped U.S. and European relations with Chile, and determined Chile's
approach to economic policy and technological adoption.
Earlier scholarship has engaged the idea of reading computers as ideological
texts. In Latin America, Emmanuel Adler has examined the histories of the
Argentine and Brazilian computer industries and illustrated how nationalist
ideology fueled ideas of antidependency in both countries and created unique
28 Althusser writes that ideology does "not have the same modality as the material existence of a paving-
stone or gun." In contrast, I claim that the paving stone or gun can bear the material marks of ideological
practice. Althusser, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses," 40.
29 Arturo Escobar, Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995). See also Michel Foucault, "Politics and the Study of Discourse," in
Burchell, Gordon, and Miller, The Foucault Effect.
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trajectories of domestic computer development that intentionally broke from those of
U.S. computer companies. Adler's work argues for a historicized conceptualization of
the state that not only examines the evolving raison d'6tre of its various institutions
but also considers how ideologies and human choices have interacted with these
institutional entities to define national goals and the preferred path to progress.3'
Adler also introduces the idea of the pragmatic antidependency guerilla, a term that
he applied to groups of state tcnicos (technical experts) and their acts of linking
domestic scientific and technological development with increased national
autonomy. Although the tcnicos found in the Chilean story do not always marry
national autonomy with technological autonomy, Adler's analysis brings to light how
tecnicos have historically gained power and exerted influence within the Brazilian
and Argentine governments and succeeded in tying their technological projects to
larger state ideological visions.
In The Closed World Paul Edwards illustrates how computers have
historically served as rallying points for the Cold War discourse of control.3 2 Writing
against the histories of computing that delineate narratives of great men,
revolutionary machines, and material progress, Edwards ties technological change
to individual technological and political choices set against a backdrop of politics,
culture, and technological capability. The techniques, practices, and language used
to produce a Cold War "closed-world discourse" created particular fictions, fantasies,
and ideologies that were tied to technological creation and global control and
affected the nature and design of the technological systems produced by the
30 Raymond Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society, rev. ed. (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1985), 145.
31 Emanuel Adler, The Power of Ideology: The Questfor Technological Autonomy in Argentina and Brazil
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 28.
36
military-industrial-academic complex and the metaphors used to describe them.
Computers thus emerged as tools for analysis, command, and control. Their form
reflected the aspirations of national defense operatives, and their applications were
intended to advance the geopolitical strategy of the United States. Edwards opted to
frame his argument in terms of discourse rather than ideology. This allows him to
include "the entire field of signifying or meaningful practices: those social
interactions--material, institutional, and linguistic-through which reality is
interpreted and constructed for us and with which human knowledge is produced
and reproduced."33 Rather than limit his analysis to the exercise of state power,
Edwards is most concerned with how knowledge and subjectivity are produced and
how computers historically served as "supports" for a "heterogeneous ensemble" of
linguistic, technical, and institutional actors. Like Edwards, I link technical
production to knowledge production. The Chilean state's generation of knowledge of
its industries and its citizenry constituted a form of state power, making
undisciplined bodies productive and imposing particular forms of order on Chilean
economic and social practices. However, I am not concerned with all acts of
signification and all forms of subjectivity; my central focus will remain the dominant
discourse articulated and advanced by the Chilean state.
Modernity as Ideology
Computers have contributed to and reinforced state conceptualizations of modernity
and state modernization programs. As concepts, both modernity and modernization
have a long and contested history. The idea of modernity can be found as far back as
32 Edwards, The Closed World.
33 Ibid., 34.
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the writings of Machiavelli, Bacon, and Descartes, but most modernity theorists
identify the Enlightenment in eighteenth-century Europe as the moment when
modernity became linked to ideas of freedom, tolerance, science, progress, and
reason.3 4 The philosopher of technology Philip Brey cites Marx and Weber as the
"fathers of modernity theory" and credits them for developing social theories that
describe the transition from premodern to modern societies.3 5 For Marx the
expansion of productive forces transformed feudal society into a capitalist society
and made a socialist state possible. Weber wrote about rationalization and increased
efficiency found in industrialized capitalist societies, a phenomenon necessary for
the increased accumulation of wealth. Technology, and its uses, figures into both of
these theoretical framings. As an instrument of industrialization and a tool for
bureaucratization and greater efficiency, technology deterministically drives change.
However, more recent scholarship by historians and social scientists of technology
has placed technology and modernity in a symbiotic relationship, whereby modernity
shapes technology and technology helps create modernity. Ideas of what it means to
be modern contributed to the form and function of many technologies and
technological systems, especially when combined with nationalism.3 6 Yet, as the
historian Thomas Misa writes, "culture changing technologies," such as railroads,
electric lighting, atomic power, automotive travel, and computerization, among
others, "have been at the core of modernity because their presence and their
promoters' promises have seemingly offered proof of the modernist storyline that
34 A genealogy of modernity can be found in Jorge Larrain, Identity and Modernity in Latin America
(Oxford: Polity, 2000).
35 Philip Brey, "Modernity Theory and Technology Studies: Reflections on Bridging the Gap," in Thomas J
Misa, Philip Brey, and Andrew Feenberg, eds., Modernity and Technology (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,
2003).
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society is incessantly changing, ever progressing, transcending frontiers without an
end in sight."3 7
In all these instances modernity describes a process of change based on the
experience of Western industrialized nations. To be "modern" requires an implicit
comparison to a more traditional other. Less-industrialized regions, such as Latin
America, are as much a part of what it means to be modern as the nations of the
industrialized world. The Chilean scholar Jorge Larrain dates the birth of modernity
to Europe's discovery of the New World, a moment that reaffirmed the technological
superiority and conquering might of the colonizers.3 8 Europe became modern only in
comparison to the more "primitive" peoples of the Americas, Africa, and Asia. This
observation also appears in the literature on technology and empire. By making
machines "the measure of men," European colonizers and imperialists justified their
dominance over the peoples in the non-Western world through the perceived
superiority of European thought and material culture.39 During the midtwentieth
century, the structural classification of societies as traditional or modern, as found
in the progressive stages of economic growth proposed by W. W. Rostow or the
universal trajectories of traditional to modern espoused by modernization theorists,
further illustrated the interconnectedness of "modern" societies and those of the non-
Western world.40
36 Recent Chilean legislation requiring all primary and secondary schools to have Internet access, regardless
of their other financial and material needs, is one such example.
37 Thomas J. Misa, "The Compelling Tangle of Modernity and Technology," in Misa, Brey, and Feenberg,
Modernity and Technology, 12.
38 Larrain, Identity and Modernity in Latin America.
39 Michael Adas, Machines as the Measure of Men: Science, Technology, and Ideologies of Western
Dominance (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989). An analysis of technology and nineteenth-
century imperial power appears in Daniel R. Headrick, The Tools of Empire: Technology and European
Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981).
40 W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth, A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1960). The sociologist Talcott Parsons also tried to map the structure of modern societies,
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Modernity functions as an ideology. Understandings of modernity guide
national policies, contribute to the construction of national identity, and exert
hegemonic power. Following World War II, the idea of changing the social and
economic structure of less-industrialized nations to reflect those found in the
Western world fell under a new, but equally problematic, heading of development.
Initially, development referred to economic growth exclusively, meaning an increase
in the per-capita production of material goods, but it gradually expanded to include
programs for social, cultural, and economic change. The discourse of development
shaped Chilean economic policies of import substitution (ISI) and attempts to re-
create the industrial path pioneered by the developed nations to the north.4 1
During the 1960s the escalation of the Cold War prompted the United States to
expand its influence in the southern hemisphere in the form of $22.3 billion in aid to
Latin America over a ten-year period. Through this "Alliance for Progress" the
United States tried to help Latin American countries overcome the long-standing ills
of poverty, inequality, and oppression through material progress and the spread of
democracy, in effect linking development to the ideological struggle of the Cold
War.42 President Eduardo Frei encouraged economic policies of import substitution
to push development, supported the entry of multinational corporations into Chile,
and approved the introduction of foreign technology, policies that made him and
Chile an Alliance for Progress favorite. However, U.S.-led development strategies
focused primarily on economic growth and failed to make Chile's social revolution a
tying modernity' to U.S. conceptualizations of capitalism and democracy. Talcott Parsons, Structure and
Process in Modern Societies (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1960).
41 Love notes that many Latin American economists first implemented policies of ISI, then searched for a
theoretical basis for this approach. He writes, "Industrialization in Latin America was fact before it was
policy, and policy before it was theory." Love, "Economic Ideas and Ideologies," 209.
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priority. While Chile strove to either emulate or import the fruits of Western
development; in hopes of constructing a modern nation, "progress" came at the price
of social change.
The crisis of ISI and the failure of the Alliance for Progress bolstered support
for the economic framings offered by dependency theory, which the United Nations
Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) was working on at its
headquarters in Santiago. By the end of the 1960s dependency theory had begun to
exert a considerable degree of influence within Chilean intellectual and political
circles, shaping Marxist economic critiques and the eventual socialist project of the
Popular Unity Party. Dependency theory challenged existing ideas of development
and critiqued the universality of modernization theory. It still posited
"underdeveloped" nations in contrast to those in the "developed" world and
championed modernization, industrialization, and self-sustained growth. However,
it made their attainment more elusive within the existing structures of world
economic power. Under Popular Unity the Chilean government rejected the
developmentalism of the previous administration and linked modernity to
nationalized domestic production, the redistribution of wealth and consumer goods,
and programs for agricultural, industrial, and social reform. In place of the universal
path toward modernization suggested by Rostow and the modernization theorists, or
the developmentalism practiced by the Frei administration, Chile under Allende
struggled to find a path that was uniquely its own, tailored to Chilean needs and
Chilean resources. Following the overthrow of the Allende government, the national
stance on modernization and development assumed a very different tone, grounded
41
42 Tony Smith, "The Alliance for Progress: The 1960s," in Abraham F. Lowenthal, ed., Exporting
Democracy: The United States and Latin America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 72.
in a universal discourse of free-market economics and with little concern for social
costs or political freedoms.
Each of these different approaches to modernization reflected a particular
historical context and dominant political ideology. However, modernity and its
pursuit also functioned as an ideology in its own right. It influenced executive
policies, election platforms, and the criteria for receiving international aid. Beliefs
about modernity and modernization defined international relations and set the
terms for Chile's integration into the world geopolitical system. Moreover, these
beliefs guided economic decisions, defined points of political contention, and attached
values to projects of state growth and the methodologies used to bring them to
fruition. Chilean computer systems adhered to and embodied these perceptions of
modernity. They also symbolized Chilean progress, supported state modernization
programs, and provided a point of comparison that linked Chile to the United States
and nations of Europe. Just as a multidirectional relationship existed between
political ideologies and Chile's use of computer technology, Chile's early computing
machines reflected and advanced Chilean ideas of modernity and the modernization
programs promulgated by the Chilean government.
Outline of Dissertation
This dissertation is comprised of six chapters and an epilogue. Chapter 2 regards the
opening of IBM Chile in the late 1920s as part of the state modernization and
rationalization efforts that began during the presidency of Carlos Ibafiez del Campo
and continued through the 1940s and 1950s. These efforts contributed to the
formation of a bureaucratic welfare state and offered new forms of legitimacy that
differed from the divine right or elite right to rule that had characterized the
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preceding two centuries. In essence, chapter 2 provides the prehistory of Chilean
computing as well as the early history of the Chilean administrative apparatus
during the first part of the twentieth century.
Chapter 3 examines how ideas of directed state planning and rationalized
order played into the state-led modernization programs of Christian Democratic
president Eduardo Frei Montalva and encouraged the application and regulation of
imported computer technologies by the Chilean state, feeding the growing Chilean
bureaucracy with punch cards and reams of paper. These state planning efforts, in
turn, reinforced the values advanced by the Alliance for Progress, U.S. firms that
were doing business with Chile, and the foreign expertise and foreign capital that
were flowing into Chile. The chapter also documents the origins of the Computer
Service Enterprise (EMCO), a state-owned company charged with governing Chilean
use of computing technology, and the emphasis placed on science and technology as
one of the pillars for modernizing the nation.
The next three chapters trace how science and technology, particularly
computer technology, supported the socialist transformation outlined by the Popular
Unity government and President Salvador Allende. I pay particular attention to the
experimental project known as Cybersyn, to which I alluded to at the beginning of
this introduction. Cybersyn sought to facilitate the economic transition from private
to public ownership of production and increase the degree of worker participation in
the nationalized factories. Here we see a distinctively Chilean application of
computer technology that differed from the systems developed in other regions of the
capitalist and socialist world. Chapter 4 provides a brief overview of Chilean science,
engineering, and industrial design during the early 1970s and identifies a shift
toward multidisciplinary, politically oriented research, which later facilitated the
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creation of the Cybersyn Project. Chapter 5 outlines the construction of the
Cybersyn system and the social and technical networks formed in the creation of
this technological system. Chapter 6 considers the Cybersyn system within the
context of the Allende government and illustrates how the ideological program of the
Popular Unity, as well as the ambiguities and contradictions of its practice, can be
read through the design of the system and its construction. Taken as a whole,
chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6 demonstrate how the Frei and Allende administrations used
computers as "state machines" that assisted state projects, furthered political goals,
and created ideas of Chilean nationhood. However, the values associated with
technical expertise and computing machinery changed dramatically from one
administration to the next. The Chilean government used computer technology to
construct different ideas of Chilean modernity during the 1960s and 1970s and to
reposition itself politically and technologically with respect to the developed world.
"The State Machine" concludes with a discussion of the neoliberal reforms of
the Pinochet dictatorship and the shift from state-controlled computing to the rise of
Chile's private computer industry. This shift was most visible in the demise of the
state computer agency, which was renamed ECOM during Allende's presidency. In
its place, we see a new conceptualization of Chilean modernity, now driven by
economic growth and the development of the private sector. Chapter 7 also discusses
how the dictatorship used computers as technologies for intelligence sharing and
social control.
Several actors and themes that play a central role in the history of
computation in the United States will not receive the same degree of attention here.
Although the military does play a part in this story, until 1973 the Chilean military
acted as a largely independent entity, separated from university and state
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administrative bodies. Unlike U.S. history, where the story of computer development
cannot be detached from defense funding and military applications, a distinction
between civilian use and military use can be made in the Chilean example. The
Chilean military lacked the financial resources to fund massive research efforts, and
military engineers received their technical training at the military academies, not
the public universities. As a result, the public universities labeled their engineering
departments with the broad heading "civil engineering," a title that referred to
"civilian engineering" and separated the university's brand of engineering from that
studied at the military academies. Following the coup in 1973, the military
government began to encourage computer science training at the university level as
a way to supply expertise to the growing private sector. The majority of formal
computer science programs took shape during this period. This dissertation does not
address the history of computation within the Chilean military, although such a
study would surely contribute to the themes examined here. The reader will also
note that I have chosen not to address the evolution of computer science pedagogy
and professionalization within the Chilean universities. This decision was made to
preserve the focus on computer technologies and their importance to state
administrative practices.
The research presented here represents a synthesis of sources and questions
drawn from. a wide array of disciplines and repositories. This work may be
categorized as a history of technology, given its focus on computing machines and
their application, but it also pertains to a larger body of literature that strives to
understand historical processes within Latin America. By merging methods and
frameworks from Latin American history and the history of technology, this
dissertation illustrates how an interdisciplinary approach can enrich both
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subdisciplines and augment our knowledge of Latin America as well as our
understanding of technological development.
A Note on Method
The legacy of the seventeen-year military dictatorship under General Pinochet has
created numerous difficulties for scholars wishing to conduct contemporary
historical research in Chile. Most noticeable are the absences--the gaps on library
shelves that bear testimony to the wave of book burnings incited by military
paranoia throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Less noticeable are the effects of poor
archival maintenance that has resulted in the massive loss of documentation to
flooding, mold, and office relocation. Much has been written about collective memory
in Chile and Chileans' ongoing struggle with their past. Although some are still
trying to uncover the details of what happened between 1973 and 1989, many prefer
to live in the present or look toward the Chile of tomorrow.
In efforts to overcome these obstacles, I have relied upon a diverse range of
source materials, including but not limited to, design drawings, newspaper articles,
photographs, computer printouts, folksong lyrics, government publications, and
technical reports amassed from repositories within the United States, Britain, and
Chile. These written sources have been complemented with approximately forty oral
history interviews conducted on three continents between 2001 and 2004. I have
translated to English all the passages excerpted from Spanish-language interviews
and written sources unless otherwise noted.
The merits and pitfalls of oral history continue to fuel debate among
historians. )etractors point to the notorious fallibility of human memory, while
supporters maintain that oral sources offer new levels of richness for historical
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narratives and help in understanding the meaning of historical events. Many
scholars of Chilean history have embraced oral history as one of the only methods of
recovering the lived experiences of the country and of incorporating in the historical
record voices from marginalized sectors of the population, including those of factory
workers, members of indigenous populations, women, and the poor.4 3 Within the
history of computing community, oral histories have significantly enriched historical
narratives of computation when used carefully and in conjunction with more
traditional archival sources.44 Earlier scholarship in the history of technology also
demonstrated the value of oral history in increasing our understanding of work
practices, social relations, reactions to events, and motivating forces.
All source materials, including oral histories, have their ingrained
subjectivity and must be read with a critical eye. The reader should bear in mind
that the memories presented in the following pages have been shaped by the
postcoup experiences of the interviewees, many of whom went into exile after 1973
and some of whom experienced torture, detention, or interrogation at the hands of
their own government. Most found themselves coming to terms with one of the most
contentious periods of the Chilean past during the period that I was conducting my
research. Thus the memories that people related to me cannot be viewed as objective
accounts of what happened but when juxtaposed with one another can represent a
43 See, for example, Gabriel Salazar V., "Ciudadania e historia oral: vida, muerte y resurrecci6n,"
Proposiciones, no. 29 (1999); Peter Winn, "Oral History and the Factory Study: New Approaches to Labor
History," Latin American Research Review 14, no. 2 (1979); and Leopoldo Benavides, "La historia oral en
Chile," paper presented at the Seminario Interdisciplinario Autobiografia, Testimonio, Literatura
Documental, Santiago, Chile, December 1987.
44 William Aspray, "The Problems and Virtues of Oral-History," IEEE Annals of the History of Computing
15, no. 1 (1993). The Charles Babbage Institute, the leading repository for materials related to the history of
computing, has also devoted increasing attention to the collection of oral histories in recent years.
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confluence of many histories, a diffraction of voices, some overlapping, some not.45 I
have tried to remain as faithful to my sources as possible; any errors outside our
excerpted conversations are mine alone.
The research for this dissertation took place during a rather exciting moment
in Chilean history. On September 11, 2003, Chile celebrated the thirtieth
anniversary of the military coup, an event that invited a national process of
remembrance and reexamination. The series of commemorative events tied to the
anniversary spurred a new willingness for Chileans to talk about the events of the
past and deeply affected the scope and depth of my research.
Although politicians and historians alike are still trying to understand why
this particular anniversary opened the Pandora's Box of collective memory, most
agree that the event has permanently changed the scope of Chilean history, allowing
for a greater number of voices to be heard and the documentation of new objects of
study, among them studies of Chilean science and Chilean technology. During this
period I shared my research with a number of journalists from the United States,
Britain, and Chile. Material from chapters 4 and 5 appeared in the international
press, including the Chilean press, for the first time in nearly thirty years.
Moreover, I had the privilege of presenting this work to a number of Chilean
audiences. While many Chilean science and engineering students were well versed
in the U.S. and European trajectory of computer development, from Charles
Babbage to Bill Gates, they did not know their own national history with computing
45 Haraway uses the metaphor of diffraction to describe how we can overcome the inabilities of reflexivity,
which fails to position objects and subjects in the process of knowledge making. Diffraction accounts for a
world where "interference patterns can make a difference in how meanings are made and lived." Although
Haraway believes diffraction patterns result from different combinations of visible subjectivity on the part
of the witness, I hope that presenting a series of subjective, juxtaposed voices will also result in a rich text
that does not claim objectivity but rather acknowledges the multiple voices of the lived past. Donna J.
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machines and the unique path of technological development that their government
had once pursued. The addition of technological themes to studies of the Popular
Unity government represented one of the many changes to Chile's historical
landscape and the evolving historiography of this controversial period.
Computing histories can contribute to our academic understandings of
information technologies, but they can also contribute to larger political discussions
and heighten public awareness of a diverse set of national histories. I hope this work
will not only enrich the history of computing literature by including the experience
of this South American nation but that it will also help Chileans realize the wonder
of their own technological history and their contributions to this pervasive
technology.
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Haraway, Modest- Witness@Second-Millennium. FemaleMan-Meets-OncoMouse: Feminism and
Technoscience (New York: Routledge, 1997).
Chapter 2
The Making of the Masses
N HIS memoir Thomas Watson Jr., former IBM president and son of IBM's first
president, Thomas Watson Sr., recalled that when he first heard of his father's
plan to create a world trade subsidiary of the data-processing giant, he dismissed it
as simplistic: and naive. "We had endless opportunity and little risk in the U.S.," he
wrote, "while it was hard to imagine us getting anywhere abroad. Latin America, for
example seemed like a bottomless pit."' The senior Watson, however, had a different
impression of the potential for profit within the world market, believing that one day
sales abroad would surpass IBM's growing domestic business. The younger Watson
criticized his father's expansion plan in the mid-1940s, several years before IBM
officially established its world trade subsidiary. By that time, however, the company
had already established a substantial presence within Latin America.
IBM had begun investing in Latin America before 1914 under its original
acronym, CTR (Computing Tabulating Recording Company), with operations in
'Thomas J. Watson Jr., Father, Son, & Co.: My Life at IBM and Beyond (New York: Bantam, 1990), 175.
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Buenos Aires, Argentina, and soon after in Brazil and Uruguay.2 The Chilean
market, concentrated in the city of Santiago, constituted IBM's fourth office within
the region. By the end of World War II, IBM had opened at least nineteen offices in
no fewer than twelve Latin American countries, each facility dedicated to selling
punch-card tabulating machinery to Latin American governments and businesses.3
Historians of computer technology generally cite these early punch-card machines as
among the predecessors of today's modern computing machines.4 In this light,
Chile's history with computing machines began long before the neoliberal economic
reforms of the 1970s and 1980s that opened Chilean borders to a flood of foreign
technologies and corporations and predated even the arrival of the first digital
machines in Santiago during the 1960s.
Indeed, IBM began exporting punch-card tabulating machinery to Chile as
early as 1921. In 1925 the Chilean State Railroad Company, seeking to mechanize
its department of statistics and finance, ordered tabulating machines directly from
IBM headquarters in New York, as did the Customs Office, which wanted to
2 IBM Archives, Frequently Asked Questions, June 2004, http://www-
1.ibm.com/ibm/history/documents/pdf/faq.pdf (July 15 2004); "Buenas Ideas, Pilares de IBM," Didlogo
IBM Chile, September-October 1977.
3 IBM Archives, Frequently Asked Questions. Although these are the official dates from the IBM Archives,
it is worth noting that these documents record 1924 as the year IBM opened an office in Santiago, which
does not coincide with the 1929 date found in corporate histories of IBM Chile, such as Fernando
Villanueva's Edici6n Especial de Aniversario, IBM 70 ahos en Chile (Santiago: IBM Chile, 1999). The
FAQ issued by IBM most likely contains other errors in reporting the years that IBM offices opened
elsewhere in the world. The document, however, still provides a useful estimate for measuring the degree
of IBM's penetration in Latin America within a general time frame.
4 Cortada writes, "The important difference between this technology [punch-card machines] and others was
that it dealt with a system that processed information quickly and in high volume." James W. Cortada,
Before the Computer: IBM, NCR, Burroughs, and Remington Rand and the Industry They Created, 1865-
1956, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000), 44. See also William Aspray, Computing Before
Computers (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1990); Martin Campbell-Kelly and William Aspray,
Computer: A History of the Information Machine (New York: Basic Books, 1996); and Paul E. Ceruzzi, A
History of Modern Computing (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998).
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calculate statistics on import and export activity (see figure 2.1).5 When the Chilean
government decided to apply this new technology to processing the results of the
1930 population census, IBM Chile opened its first office in downtown Santiago in
1929 with only two employees, both of whom were charged with supporting the
census effort. Although Chilean customers had imported machines directly from
IBM headquarters in New York before 1929, the opening of the Chilean branch office
signified the beginning of IBM's corporate infrastructure within Chile and the
beginnings of a dedicated effort to increase the size of the Chilean market for punch-
card tabulating machines.
As earlier works in the history of technology have shown, the creation or
introduction of new technologies-their origin stories-rarely is a discrete event but
rather must be situated as part of larger historical trajectory. The question remains,
within which trajectory should we place the opening of IBM Chile? Earlier histories
of computer and other office technologies reveal several dominant approaches.
Yates's work on the adoption of office technologies during the nineteenth and early
twentieth century suggests that the arrival of IBM tabulating machines could be
viewed as another development in the history of office technologies such as
typewriters, accounting equipment, and filing systems and their respective
5 Villanueva, "Edici6n Especial de Aniversario, IBM 70 aflos en Chile." It is interesting to note the
similarity between Chile's early customers for punch-card tabulating machines and those in the United
States. The heavy data-processing needs of government agencies and railroad companies made them among
the first purchasers of Herman Hollerinth's early tabulating machines. Hollerinth's background at the U.S.
Census Bureau and his involvement with the U.S. censuses of 1890 and 1900 have been well documented.
The importance of information technology to the railroad industry may appear less obvious. The economic
historian Alfred Chandler cited the U.S. railroad industry as the prototype for modern business
organization, which depended heavily on new innovations in information technology. Hollerinth, who
founded the company that would one day become IBM, actively sought the railroad companies as his first
clients. He also dedicated a number of years to reforming railway administration methods to incorporate the
benefits of tabulating machines. In Chile the customs office was also an early adopter of foreign
technologies because the agency was able to acquire imported goods.
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applications in business management. 6 Such a study would undoubtedly prove
worthwhile to our understanding of Chilean technological, business, and
administrative history. Unfortunately, the lack of available resources on this topic
prohibits an analysis of this form, although this should not detract from the overall
merit of this approach.
Historians such as Beninger and Edwards have taken a somewhat different
path by placing successive innovations in office and computer technologies within a
framework of control.7 This approach proves particularly useful when discussing the
role of the military-industrial-academic complex in funding research and
formulating the research questions that lead to specific technological developments.
With that in mind, the argument presented in this dissertation does address how
desires for development encouraged the adoption of state planning techniques, the
use of technical experts, and the importation of computing technologies as a means
of controlling of Chile's economic, social, and administrative processes. However, I do
not frame control as a cultural metaphor or examine how ideas of control operated
outside the realm of the state administration.
In The Visible Hand Alfred Chandler makes the case that modern business
organization and its related techniques for information management evolved in
response to the increasingly complex needs of private industry and corporate
growth.8 His thesis, while applicable in the context of U.S. business history, is not
suitable for studies of Chile or perhaps any other country in the developing world.
6 JoAnne Yates, Control Through Communication: The Rise of System in American Management
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989).
7 James R. Beniger, The Control Revolution: Technological and Economic Origins of the Information
Society (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986); Paul N. Edwards, The Closed World:
Computers and the Politics of Discourse in Cold War America (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996).
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For most of the twentieth century, Chilean economic strategizing revolved around
policies of state-led growth, whereas in the United States the growth and cultivation
of the private sector dominated economic policies. Many management techniques
that Chandler cites as arising from private sector need, such as technological
innovations in transportation, communication, and administrative networks, arrived
in South America through state-sanctioned imports and the state's contracting for
expertise from foreign companies. In contrast to Chandler's reading of U.S. history,
the early adoption of information technologies within the Chilean context did not
stem from private sector needs or from domestic innovation.
Finally, many corporate histories of IBM have attributed its early
penetration of foreign markets and international dominance to the aggressive
business approaches used by IBM's first president, T.J. Watson. His philosophy of
swiftly expanding the company's customer base abroad and thus entrenching the use
of IBM products worldwide allowed the company to edge out its competition in the
Chilean market from the outset. The opening of IBM's Chilean branch office,
therefore, could be viewed as another example of Watson's effective business
strategy. The emphasis on IBM sales tactics found in histories written by former
IBM employees, as well as in other histories of the company, has merit. 9 However,
this analytical framework also has the potential of creating a one-sided, U.S.-centric
narrative, which homogenizes IBM's efforts to create new markets in dramatically
different political and cultural settings throughout the world. With regard to the
Chilean context, IBM corporate histories can tell only part of the story. IBM
strategies for international expansion may explain how these machines arrived in
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8 Alfred Chandler, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977).
Chile during the 1920s, but they do not explain why the Chilean government readily
accepted them and applied them to key government tasks.
Rather, this dissertation frames the beginnings of IBM Chile and its
application of punch-card tabulating machines to the Chilean census effort as part of
a larger history of state modernization. When IBM's Chilean branch office began
operations in 1929, the Chilean government was in the midst of restructuring its
administrative practices, bringing them in line with positivist conceptions of
national progress through rationalized order.'° Increasing the efficiency and scope of
the state apparatus reflected this ideological commitment to state organization and
political control that the authoritarian Chilean president Carlos Ibafiez del Campo
(1927-31) promoted. A strong executive, who at times bore a closer resemblance to a
dictator than an elected leader, Ibafiez advanced a program of "state socialism" as a
means of preventing a revolt among the Chilean working classes, who bore the brunt
of economic dislocations from nineteenth-century industrialization. The state, he
argued, could provide for the Chilean masses and create programs of social
protection in order to prevent genuine socialist revolution. The administrative
growth that; ensued gave rise to the Chilean welfare state and entailed the
widespread adoption of scientific techniques and expertise to modernize state
operations and manage poverty, among other social ills.
9 Watson Jr., Father, Son, & Co.; Cortada, Before the Computer.
10 Of the frameworks listed, the argument presented here bears the closest resemblance to that of Jon Agar,
The Government Machine: A Revolutionary History of the Computer (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2003).
Although there are important differences between the British case as described by Agar and the Chilean
case, which stem from historical disparities in political events, economic resources, the degree of
industrialization, and the level of integration in the world marketplace, this work, like Agar's, studies how
the introduction of computer and information technologies changed the scope of government
administration, supported differing ideological visions of governance, and altered the relationship between
citizens and the state.
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This chapter illustrates how the conceptualization of a socially protective
state arose in response to the negative economic and social effects of nineteenth-
century industrialization and the failure of previous governments to address those
effects, known in Chile as "the social question." By directing Chilean citizens from
all social backgrounds to look to the state as a source of protection and well-being,
the Ibafiez administration managed to stall the effects of class antagonisms and
create a new ideological framework that legitimized his administration.
From the perspective of Chilean history, the government contract with IBM
Chile represents one aspect of a multisited push to create an ordered state, which
also included promoting engineers to high-ranking positions, undertaking ambitious
public works projects, and applying scientific methods to the collection of official
statistics and to record keeping. Within the overall scope of state modernization
efforts, tabulating and calculating machines played a small but significant role.
While it is important not to overstate the importance of these technologies, detailing
how these machines permitted the state to visualize complex economic and social
interactions, and expand the scope of state operations by increasing the wealth of
data available to it, complements our knowledge of these other modernization
initiatives. In this chapter I argue that the adoption of scientific methods and
imported technologies during the latter part of the 1920s played a vital role in
Ibafiez's program to create a nation free from political chaos, with the potential to
progress and develop along the same path as nations in the modern industrialized
world. The emphasis, therefore, is not on IBM per se but rather on the state's
coordinated efforts to rationalize, order, classify, and control Chile's economic and
social activities through scientific and technological interventions, including the
early use of tabulating machines. These early efforts to rationalize, classify, and
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produce detailed scientific knowledge of the Chilean economy and population
furthered a conceptualization of development that was grounded in policies of state-
led economic growth, programs for social welfare, and the techniques of directed
planning. Subsequent chapters will address how the naturalization of this
development; discourse transcended political ideology and guided the creation of
Chilean economic policy during the latter half of the twentieth century.
Ordering a Nation
The Chilean elite's desire to bring order to chaos began shortly after Chile declared
its independence from Spain in 1810. Early drafts of the Constitution tried to mimic
the liberal values of the French Revolution and transform Chile into a republic of
equal citizens, each endowed with the same rights, duties, and abilities to elect
government officials." However, conflicts among liberal leaders, as well as between
the liberals and their conservative opponents, threatened to destabilize the Chilean
government and provoke the ire of both the Chilean elites and segments of the
military. In 1830 members of the military, backed by the upper class, succeeded in
overthrowing the government, unseating the president, and establishing a new
system of rule. The earlier commitments to liberalism gave way to the even stronger
appeals for authoritarian order posed by the new government of Diego Portales. As a
Latin American caudillo, or strongman, Portales quickly expanded the authority of
the central government, especially the unchecked power of the executive branch.
These changes appeared in the 1833 Constitution, which governed Chile for the next
fifty-eight years.
" Equality, that is, among propertied and educated men of Spanish descent.
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Political uprisings and the establishment of a provisional authoritarian
"democracy" constituted one of many changes that dramatically altered the Chilean
way of life during the middle part of the nineteenth century. Wars and heated
negotiations with neighboring countries to the north and south, as well as with
Chile's own indigenous Mapuche population, had demarcated national boundaries,
proved the effectiveness of the Chilean military in combat, and, toward the end of
the century, augmented Chile's wealth in natural resources with the nitrate mines
in the Atacama Desert, which previously were held by Peru and Bolivia. With
British investment Chilean copper mines grew to become the leading world
exporters of the metal until the 1870s. The wealth and foreign investment flowing
into the northern mining towns trickled down to the workers through higher, though
still dismal, salaries, higher costs of living, large concentrations of salaried workers,
and the beginnings of class consciousness. It also created a powerful economic tie
between Chile and the global marketplace, making the country vulnerable to the
effects of world economic cycles.
Increased mining activities in the northern regions fueled economic growth in
the south. The northern copper and silver mines generated business for the coal
mines of Lota, Coronel, and Lebu in the southern region of Concepci6n. Agricultural
expansion in central Chile paralleled the growth of the Chilean mining industry and
created a need for seasonal rural wage laborers to help with the increased
production but could not offer permanent employment opportunities. Families from
the countryside traveled in waves toward the cities in search of work. These waves
of migration amplified the size and density of Chilean urban areas and eventually
transformed a population once dominated by rural peasants (campesinos) and large
plantations (haciendas) to one primarily made up of salaried urban dwellers.
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The technical marvels of the nineteenth century, such as the railroad,
steamship, and improved road system, opened new opportunities for employment in
massive public works projects and further encouraged urban migration.' 2 Once
completed, these projects contributed significantly to boosting Chile's economic
activity and advancing the process of national unification. Chile boasted one of the
first railways in Latin America, which was planned in the 1840s. The first line was
completed on Christmas Day 1851, stretched fifty miles, and connected the northern
mining town of Copiap6 to the port of Caldera. On September 14, 1863, work was
finished on the challenging 116-mile line that linked the principal urban centers of
Santiago anti the port of Valparaiso. Government estimates claimed that in 1861
alone the railway between Santiago and Valparaiso transported more than 600,000
people and 130,000 tons of goods.'3
The Pacific Steam Company, headed by the North American William
Wheelwright, was the first and primary investor in the construction of Chilean
railways. The company, with the backing of British investors, had already
introduced a system of steam navigation to the region and had established a
shipping line that crossed the Pacific Ocean and the Magellan Straits.' 4 The Civil
Engineering Corps, founded in 1842, played an important role in expanding and
improving road, canals, and ports from the 1840s to the 1860s, constructing a more
complete network that connected Chile's urban centers, outlying provinces, and the
12 For a condensed history of Chilean railway and telegraph construction, see Sergio Villalobos R., Historia
de la ingenieria en Chile (Santiago: Hachette, 1990); Ernesto Greve, Historia de la ingenieria en Chile,
vols. 1 and 2 (Santiago: Imprenta Universitaria, 1938); Ernesto Greve, Historia de la ingenieria en Chile,
vol. 3 (Santiago: Imprenta Universitaria, 1944); Guillermo Guajardo, "Burocracia Tecnica y cambios socio-
economicos en Chile: El caso de los Ferrocarriles del Estado, 1852-1914," Universidad de Chile, Santiago,
1988; and Rafael Sagredo Baeza, "Politica y Ferrocarril en el Chile del siglo XIX," Patrimonio Cultural,
Autumn 2001.
'3 Villalobos R, Historia de la ingenieria en Chile, 133.
14 Sergio Villalobos R, A Short History of Chile (Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, 1996).
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Pacific Ocean. The Civil Engineering Corps was in such great demand that the
government decided to form the controversial Ministry of Public Works in the 1870s
to keep up with Chile's rapid pace of development. Work on roads south of
Concepci6n advanced as a result of the personal efforts of the local inhabitants, who
built many of the roads themselves.
By the 1880s the transportation networks formed by the interconnecting
systems of railways, roads, and steamships had succeeded in dramatically
transforming Chile from a loosely linked territory of scattered urban and rural
dwellers to an organized, traversable space that could be navigated without great
difficulty. These technologies offered new levels of mobility to the growing working
class, which migrated regularly between the northern and southern regions of the
country, depending on the work opportunities available. Because of their capacity to
mobilize and connect people and goods, these technologies played a significant role
in converting what was an "imagined community" under Spanish rule into a
cohesive nation.'5 Loveman argues that these technologies played a primary role in
constructing Chilean nationhood. He writes, "More important even than the
advancing urbanization of the population, Chilean society and the economy became
truly national with the extension of the rail lines, telegraph networks, and
steamship service and the evolution of a national labor market."' 6 The introduction
of these transportation systems, moreover, played a formative role in the creation of
an integrated workforce, which would later evolve into a self-conscious proletariat,
15 Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism (New York: Verso, 1991).
16 Brian Loveman, Chile: The Legacy of Hispanic Capitalism, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press,
2001), 175.
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or working class, that would push the social question and reshape Chile's political
landscape in the next century.
As the nineteenth century advanced, the strength of the authoritarian state
created by D)iego Portales began to erode, and facets of liberal doctrine reemerged
among the Chilean elite. Conservatives felt that liberal ideals posed a significant
threat to the tight-fisted Portalian state that had dominated the Chilean public
sphere. The! conservatives accused the liberals of removing the state's moral
foundation because they rejected Catholicism and had reintroduced social pluralism
and civil liberties. In 1871 Chile elected its first liberal president since the drafting
of the 1833 Constitution, and liberal candidates continued to win the presidential
office for the next twenty years. Even before 1871, the liberals had managed to build
a significant stronghold within Congress. Upon securing the presidency, they were
able to bring about constitutional reforms that expanded the role of the legislature
and reined in the power of the executive branch. They also implemented a number of
reforms that; weakened the influence exerted by the Catholic Church, which the
liberals viewed as a reactionary institution. For the purposes of this study, one of the
more interesting administrative changes involved the creation of a civil registry
service responsible for recording all births, deaths, and marriages, a responsibility
previously assumed by local parishes.
This political convergence, however, did not guarantee a harmonious
relationship between the president and the parliament. In 1891 most of the Chilean
Congress backed a coup against President Jos6 Manuel Balmeceda, citing his
authoritarian claims to executive power, which they felt did not respect the rights
and wishes of Congress. When it became apparent that the troops backed by
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Congress were besting those of the president, Balmaceda committed suicide, and
liberal ideology returned to a position of dominance.
According to the historian Mario G6ngora, 1891 marked a watershed in
Chilean history, signifying the end of the Portalian era and concluding a century of
waging war. Chile entered an era of "fantasmal" politics, characterized by oligarchic
parliamentary rule that was incapable of confronting the social and economic
realities of nineteenth-century modernization. During the late nineteenth century,
the growing numbers of Chilean workers employed in the nitrate and copper mines
had intensified the struggle between labor and capital. No legislation protected
workers from abuse and economic uncertainty; workers throughout Chile began
pressing for changes that would ameliorate the wretched conditions of poverty that
they and their families were forced to endure. The liberal philosophies voiced by
Chilean political leaders echoed the egalitarian and individualistic principles of
British libertarian thought but failed to address the daily realities endured by the
majority of the Chilean population. Living conditions further declined in the first
two decades of the twentieth century, a situation exacerbated by the First World
War and its aftermath. Disrupted trade routes between Chile and its two major
European markets, Britain and Germany, combined with a drop in demand for
Chilean nitrates with the introduction of a cheaper synthetic at the war's conclusion,
created shortages of consumer goods, inflated prices, lower wages, and massive
unemployment.' 7 Members of Chilean urban working classes lived in squalid
conditions, marked by disease, filth, and crime. The misery of poverty, abusive
17 The entrance of the United States in World War I created a short-lived boom in the export of Chilean raw
materials and fueled growth in selected Chilean industries such as cement, textiles, and sugar refineries.
However, the positive effects of this brief boom paled in comparison to the economic devastation brought
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working conditions, economic instability, and a lack of legislative provisions for
worker protection fueled worker unrest and gave rise to the first organized labor
movements. At the same time, greater access to secondary education and an
expanding state contributed to the creation of a new middle class, consisting of small
shop owners, government workers, and career military. This new class voiced its
opinions and interests concerning the leadership of the nation; especially vocal were
middle-class reformers in the military who felt it was their duty to save the country
from the threat of anarchy they perceived and to encourage progress.' 8
Legislators openly condemned organized labor, collective bargaining between
workers and management, and legislative protections for the industrial classes as
going against liberal conceptualizations of liberty and the right to work, but these
same legislators regularly protected the rights of the aristocracy in practice.
Rhetorical appeals to liberty and equality met the needs of the Chilean elite
ideologically but failed to address the many harmful effects of nineteenth-century
industrialization and the social question. The liberal principles professed by the
Chilean government afforded middle and working classes greater freedom of
expression, but in general the democratic reforms put in place after 1891 created a
democracy for the powerful, a "democracia caudillesca," or democracy controlled by a
strong man.'-9 The military disapproved of the working-class mobilization permitted
by the introduction of synthetic nitrates in the world market, which created a Chilean nitrate crisis with
trickle-down effects. By 1920 the social question had become a central force in Chilean politics.
18 Military unrest increased during the "parliamentary period" and resulted in several failed military efforts
to overthrow the government. Although the military disliked the increasing economic and social chaos of
the parliamentary period, as well as the government's interference in military affairs, the military did not
support the growing labor movement and massacred large numbers of striking workers in Valparaiso,
Santiago, and Iquique.
19 Mario G6ngora, Ensayo hist6rico sobre la noci6n de estado en Chile en los siglos XIXy XX, 2nd ed.
(Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, S.A., 1986).
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under liberal doctrine, fearing it would incite political chaos and deepen the
possibilities for the spread of communism.
The power struggle among the executive branch, legislative branch, and
military, exacerbated by the growing social unrest from below, quickly reached a
breaking point. In 1924 a military junta forced the resignation of President Arturo
Alessandri, a reformer, who temporarily fled to Europe. Following a second coup by
military reformers led by Col. Carlos Ibafiez, Alessandri returned to the Chilean
presidency in 1925. With newfound support among the military and a pacified
Congress, the Alessandri government drafted a new Constitution, which was
approved by plebiscite in 1925. The Constitution shifted power back to the executive
branch, restricted the authority of Congress, separated church and state, and
included provisions for the protection of labor through housing and social security
programs. Ideological problems, however, continued to persist between the president
and the military. In 1927 Alessandri resigned from the presidency for a second time,
under pressure from his minister of the interior, Gen. Carlos Ibafiez de Campo, who
took over the presidential office after a controlled election that gave him
approximately 96% of the popular vote.20 Ibafiez initially appeared committed to the
1925 Constitution but broke quickly from its legal and philosophical provisions and
returned Chile to a personalist dictatorship not seen since the days of Diego
Portales.
Ibafiez became the symbol of a new, strong Chile, a new kind of caudillo who
strengthened the state through bureaucracy rather than by force. He dealt
aggressively with his political opponents and oppressed dissenting voices, but he
also subscribed to Alessandri's philosophy that programs of state "socialism," or
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welfare from above, could prevent genuine socialist revolution from below. Ibafiez
promoted the idea that the state had a moral obligation to protect all social sectors of
the population, a commitment realized by expanding the state administration,
implementing a labor code that both legalized and controlled labor organization, and
applying new techniques and technologies to manage this rate of growth. Although
Chile had experienced the effects of modernization during the nineteenth century, as
judged by the introduction of new transportation, industrial, and agriculture
technologies, most historians of Chile cite Ibafiez's presidency as the moment when
science, technology, and appeals to rationalization intersected with state
administrative practices.2
In this context the application of IBM tabulating machinery to Chile's 1930
census effort is but one manifestation of a larger government effort to create a
modern nation-state grounded in technical expertise rather than parliamentary
politics. The next section will place the introduction of these early tabulating
machines within the context of other initiatives to rationalize state operations,
which included the promotion of engineers to high positions of power, the new
attention paid to generating accurate statistics, and the creation of government
agencies dedicated to state coordination and planning.
Moreover, Ibafiez identified industrial growth as the necessary precursor to
social well-being. This resulted in a new set of criteria for modernization that began
during his presidency and solidified during the next two decades. This definition of
20 Loveman, Chile, 183.
21 Ibid.; G6ngora, Ensayo hist6rico sobre la noci6n de estado; Sofia Correa et al., Historia del siglo XX
chileno (Santiago: Editorial Sudamericana, 2001); Aldolfo Ibafiez Santa Maria, "Los 'ismos' y la
redefinici6n del Estado: tecnicismo, planificaci6n y estatismo en Chile, 1920-1940," Atenea, no. 474
(1996); Aldolfo Ibafiez Santa Maria, Los ingenieros, el estado y la politica en Chile: del Ministerio de
Fomento a la Corporaci6n de Fomento, 1927-1939, vol. 7 (Santiago: Instituto de Historia, Pontificia
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modernity, first articulated within Chile and later combined with the development
discourse that emerged in the wake of World War II, dominated Chilean economic
policies, encouraged the use of advanced imported technologies, and remained
unchallenged until the 1970s.22
Carlos Ibafiez del Campo
The military junta and subsequent "election" that brought Carlos Ibafiez to power
signified a mounting distaste for politics, particularly among members of the armed
forces, and the failure of the elite to confront Chile's political and economic
challenges. bafiez's presidency, moreover, signified an intellectual as well as a
political shift toward nationalism, order, progress, and state protectionism.
Likewise, his articulation of the state stood in deliberate contrast to the British
liberal values and elite rule of the past; instead, Ibafiez drew from the positivist
modernization strategies of the Porfiriato in Mexico and a belief that authoritarian
rule would augment the pace of industrialization, as demonstrated by Otto von
Bismarck in Germany. This approach reflected a mind-set shared by members of the
Chilean army, who felt it was their duty to "save the Republic" and place Chile on
the correct path toward national growth, regeneration, and public well-being, even
Universidad Catolica de Chile, 1985); Aldolfo Ibafiez Santa Maria, Herido en el ala: estado, oligarquias y
subdesarrollo (Santiago: Universidad de Andres Bello, 2003).
22 Here I am referring to Arturo Escobar's definition of development discourse, which he defines as "how
certain representations [of the Third World] become dominant and shape indelibly the ways in which
reality is imagined and acted upon" and create a "space in which only certain things could be said and even
imagined." Arturo Escobar, Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995), 5, 39. This discourse was produced and applied through
international bodies such as the United Nations and its filial organizations, the World Bank, and
government leaders within the United States, Europe, and so-called underdeveloped nations, as well as by
groups of experts representing various disciplines and interests.
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at the expense of Chile's legal framework. 23 The self-perceived importance of the
armed forces in national modernization efforts reflected the Prussian influence in
their education and training and succeeded in expanding their role in public life.
Mandatory military service further increased the popular adoption of military views
on patriotism and historical development and widened Ibafiez's base of popular
support during the early years of his presidency.
While in office, Ibafiez made it a priority to expand Chile's network of roads
and railroads. He used foreign credit to build schools, hospitals, and administrative
offices. Rauil Simon, director of the Budget Office under Ibafiez, eloquently linked
these ambitious undertakings as fundamental to the regime's constructive
philosophy, observing that:
Doctrines change and initiatives are not eternal. Only the railroads,
the universities, the roads, the ports, the schools, and the works for
public health remain. These are the only things that political passion
cannot destroy and the only things that history cannot refrain from
mentioning.2 4
In addition to showing an explicit disdain for "political passion," this passage reveals
an implicit conviction that the state infrastructure could best provide for the long-
term health of the nation. This included the public works projects championed by
both Ibaiiez and Simon, as well as the creation of new administrative bodies capable
of managing and coordinating the myriad of economic and social welfare projects
originating during this period. Through this administrative growth a protectionist
23 In his first message to Congress as Chile's acting executive, Ibafiez wrote, "I will not omit my own
sacrifices or those of others in order to guide the country toward the right path, maintaining order, although
at the end of my time in office, instead of being able to declare that I have closely followed the law, I
would only be able to affirm, repeating the historic phrase: 'I swear that I have saved the Republic."'
Mensaje leido por S. E. el Vicepresidente de la Reptiblica en la apertura del Congreso Nacional el 21 de
mayo de 1927 (Santiago: Imprenta Nacional, 1927), 46.
24 Rafil Simon, Anales del Instituto de Ingenieros, December 1927. Quoted in Ibafiez Santa Maria, Los
ingenieros, el estado y la politica en Chile.
67
state emerged in place of its parliamentary predecessor. Ibafiez argued that
extending state involvement into Chilean economic and social spheres enabled the
government to protect and improve the living conditions of most Chilean citizens.
The government justified this growth as the best means for stimulating the Chilean
economy while protecting the working and middle classes from the abuses of the
elite. These changes, moreover, served the deeper purpose of curtailing a nascent
labor movement and preventing a genuine revolution from below that might
implement radical structural changes. Therefore, the growth of the state apparatus
that occurred during Ibafiez's presidency must be viewed as both the beginning of a
protectionist welfare state and the introduction of new techniques for social control.
In the end, these administrative techniques, rather than the public works
endeavors, would constitute the legacy of Ibafiez's first presidency. As G6ngora
writes, "The great value of Ibaiiez was in his administration." 2 5
The Rise of the Tecnicos
While still minister of war under President Alessandri, Ibafiez gave a speech to the
House of Representatives that set the stage for the next five years of his presidency:
It is necessary to establish clearly and frankly that the country cries
out for expanding the principle of authority; that it wishes to end
anarchy, enemy of all progress, that it desires, once and for all, to
introduce the social justice that our laws establish...; it also asks, in
accordance with our resources, that we reorganize our public
administration, modernizing it and reducing it to the benefit of its
efficiency.2 6
Unbeknown to Ibafiez at the time, modernizing the state administration would
entail its growth rather than its reduction in size. The creationist spirit of the
25 G6ngora, Ensayo hist6rico sobre la noci6n de estado, 178.
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administration's public works programs also applied to the structure and scope of
the Chilean ministries and their subordinate agencies. Ibafiez formed the new
Ministry of :)evelopment (Ministerio de Fomento) in 1927, one of his more important
contributions, given that it served as a precursor for the independent State
Development Agency (CORFO), which spearheaded Chilean policies for state-led
growth from 1939 on. Moreover, the Ministry of Development provided an example
of the perceived necessity for state intervention in order to industrialize the public
and the private sectors. The Ministry of Development and later the State
Development Agency both depended upon the advice of technical experts in drafting
economic policies while trying to outwardly eschew the influence of partisan politics.
The Ministry of Development was one of several key changes to
administrative organization and practice. In 1927 the Ministry of Justice and
Instruction split into two separate ministries, Education and Justice. The
Directorate of Public Works also increased its importance under Ibaniez and secured
many of the same powers as the cabinet-level ministries, much to the pleasure of the
Chilean engineering and technocrat communities. In fact, the number of ministries
was limited only by the scarcity of adequately trained tcnicos (university-trained
technical experts) required to fill their ranks.27 The increasing complexity of the
state led to the creation of the General Comptrollers Office, also in 1927, which
initially housed the Statistics Bureau until it became an independent agency in
1930. Later, Ibafiez created Chile's first National Economic Council, a body charged
with providing expert economic advice to the executive but one that regularly bowed
to the wishes of the president in practice, frustrating industry leaders. Even local
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26 Cited in Ibafiez Santa Maria, Los ingenieros, el estado y la politica en Chile, 5.
governments felt the effects of administrative reform, as local elected
representatives were replaced by appointed juntas de vecinos (neighborhood
governing bodies). In this manner Ibafiez constructed a vast network of supporters
that reached into the very infrastructure of local community governments. The
juntas de vecinos assisted members of various social groups within their
communities and promoted government goals at the local level through the
elimination of political dissidence and the repression of social movements. Political
goals were thus realized through changes in administration, an approach that
contrasted sharply with the political mechanisms of the past. As Chileans began to
look to the state as a new source of economic and social protection, members of the
Ibafiez government further entrenched their claim to legitimate rule and
strengthened their vision of the Chilean nation.
This "tecnificaci6n" of the state demanded a new workforce fueled by young,
middle-class men who could renovate existing administrative practices without a
political commitment to the status quo. Within this new labor force engineers gained
considerable respect and influence and ascended to key posts in the administration.
The treasury, minister, Pablo Ramirez, assembled a group of talented engineers from
the State Railroad Company (Ferrocarriles del Estado) and placed them in a number
of high-ranking positions throughout the government, including director of the
Budget Office, director of the General Accounting Office, superintendent of customs,
director of the Internal Revenue Service, as well as in several crucial positions
within the Ministry of Development. Ibafiez supported the replacement of politicians
with tecnicos throughout his presidency, believing they had a closer connection with
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27 Decreto Supremo 7.912, 12 November 1927, Santiago. Cited in Ibafiez Santa Maria, Herido en el ala,
126.
the challenges of the day and the training to meet those challenges successfully.
Along the same lines he emphasized industrial education over the traditional liberal
education of the past, a preference that carried over into the military schools. Young
Chilean soldiers received lessons in machining, telegraph operation, and public
works in addition to the requisite combat training.
The historian Ibafiez Santa Maria has written at great length on the rise of
the engineering profession in Chile during the 1920s and 1930s. His studies
illustrate how the values of the Ibafiez government created an environment that not
only employed tcnicos but also laid the foundations for training future generations
of engineers and technocrats, who were inspired by the new range of opportunities
available to them. These tcnicos, in turn, spread the positivist doctrine
characteristic of the era and played a crucial role in separating state modernization
strategies from the practice of politics as usual. The visibility and prestige of Chilean
engineers within the government led to an increased sense of self-worth within the
profession. In 1927 Chilean engineers lobbied to restrict the title of "engineer" to
include only those who had graduated with an engineering degree from a university,
a codification of professional identity that would resurface again in the 1960s. Four
years later, in 1931, the Chilean Engineering Institute began its practice of
awarding a gold medal to the individual its members felt had most honored the
profession. In 1938 the organizing committee of the First South American
Engineering Conference commissioned a two-volume history documenting the
contributions of Chilean engineers to the progress of the nation, later supplemented
by a third volume commissioned by the institute in 1944.28
28 Greve, Historia de la Ingenieria en Chile.
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By the end of the 1920s engineers had come to be seen as modernizers and
instruments of economic growth and progress. Their new prestige within the state
administration coincided with the introduction of new technological wonders, such
as electrification networks, the automobile, refrigeration, and the telephone, a
confluence that reinforced the engineers' sense of self-worth and importance in
Chilean modernization efforts. Perhaps the prominent engineer Ram6n Salas
Edwards said it best as he concluded his inauguration speech for one of the new
buildings on the University of Chile's science and engineering campus: "If this is a
century of electricity, antennas, radios, and airplanes," Edwards announced, "then
engineers have the right to stand up from their crouched positions before the
blackboard and look toward the sun."29
International Business Machines
Although Chile celebrated the arrival of its many imported technologies with full-
page newspaper articles and elaborate inauguration ceremonies, IBM Chile opened
its first office in downtown Santiago on April 10, 1929, not with a shout, but a
whisper. The new branch office began operations with only two U.S. employees-
General Director Sydney Wharin and Daniel Toriello-both of whom were North
Americans charged with assisting the newly formed Chilean Statistics Bureau and
the 1930 census effort.30 Because of the small scale of the operation, Wharin and
Toriello took turns watching the office while the other left to attend to clients.31
29 Ram6n Salas Edwards, "La misi6n integral del ingeniero," Annales del Instituto de Ingenieros de Chile,
July 1929, pp. 321-27. Quoted in Ibafiez Santa Maria, "Los 'ismos' y la redefinici6n del Estado," 37.
30 "Mensaje de Nuestro Gerente General," IBM Didlogo, July 1987, 3.
31 "Hablan los precursores," IBM Didlogo, July 1987, 4.
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The nascent Chilean market failed to make much of an impact on the
multinational company, whose international list of clients focused primarily on those
within European countries. However, there are several interesting parallels between
the documented history of IBM's origins and the early operations of the Chilean
branch office, beginning with their shared roots in tabulating national census data.
Hollerinth had worked as a clerk for the U.S. Census Bureau in 1880 and developed
the prototype punch-card tabulating machine with the explicit intention of saving
clerks from the labor-intensive process of hand calculations. The success of his
invention in accelerating the tabulation process of the 1890 U.S. census
subsequently encouraged governments in Europe, Russia, and Canada to apply
Hollerinth's tabulating machinery to their census calculations before World War I.
Hollerinth also spent a number of years applying his machines to the reorganization
of railroad administrative practices. The Chilean State Railroad Company also was
one of the first clients for IBM Chile and would later be used as an administrative
model for state operations.3 2
Hollerinth believed in the potential of the international market and pushed
for sales at home and abroad almost from the outset. In 1889 he traveled to Paris,
hoping to generate enthusiasm for his invention by participating in the Paris
Universal Exhibition. Even before the company adopted the name International
Business Machines, such a trip clearly demonstrated a desire to cultivate
international demand. Early attempts to build a client list outside the United States
created a market overseas for tabulating machines, which in turn fueled domestic
production. When T. J. Watson Sr. took over as general manager of CTR in 1914,
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32 Ibaflez Santa Maria, Herido en el ala.
and later as president of IBM, he continued to push IBM's international activities
and in 1949 spun off IBM World Trade as an independent subsidiary.
Tabulating machinery was not the only office machinery being shipped to
Chile in 1930. Judging from the advertisements of the period, Burroughs calculating
machines, National Cash Register's cash registers, and Remington typewriters all
managed to secure a client base within Chile. Burroughs, for example, claimed that
with forty-two years of experience, it could offer a "Burroughs machine for any
business" (see figure 2.2).33 In 1929 alone Chile imported 282 calculating machines,
786 adding machines, 390 cash registers, and 4,368 typewriters from the United
States, sales totaling approximately $560,000 (see tables 2.1 and 2.2).34
German companies also tried to penetrate the Chilean office machinery
market, building on their previous successes in exporting telegraph machines,
among other technological goods. However, World War I had dramatically changed
the landscape of Chile's international relationships and frustrated these efforts. The
outbreak of the war had interrupted Chile's long-standing ties with Germany and
Britain and enabled the United States to dominate Chilean trade markets. In 1918
U.S. trade comprised more than 50% of all Chilean foreign commerce. By 1930 the
United States accounted for 70% of all Chilean foreign investment and dominated
the largest copper mines, which produced Chile's biggest export.35 Historians of
Latin America have referred to this shift from European to U.S. economic dominance
in the region as a process of "Americanization" that opened the door to U.S. technical
expertise, capital, machinery, and cultural influence. In this context German office
33 "Hay una maquina Burroughs para cualquier negocio," El Mercurio, 12 October 1930.
34 U.S. Department of Commerce, Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1923-46).
35 Loveman, Chile, 178.
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machine companies could not build the same client base as their U.S. counterparts.
By the 1950s Chilean firms had incorporated IBM in their cultures, as evidenced by
the regular creation of "Hollerinth departments." Cortada reports that German
firms eventually abandoned the office machine industry in favor of developing their
expertise in areas such as automobile manufacture.
In the 1920s, however, it was hard to foresee the role that these office
machines would eventually play in changing administrative practices and creating
the modern bureaucratic state that Ibafiez sought to establish. They certainly failed
to capture the public imagination. The oldest Chilean newspaper, El Mercurio,
mentioned the application of tabulating machinery to the 1930 census effort in a tiny
article hidden on page 7, nearly one year after IBM Chile open its doors.3 6
Tabulating machines and other office machinery may not have generated the same
degree of enthusiasm in Chile as the electric light or automobile, but their adoption
by the Chilean government warrants our attention.
The introduction of such office technologies as tabulating and calculating
machines to state administrative practices allowed the Chilean government to adopt
the same techniques of administrative growth as those found in the industrial
nations of North America and western Europe. In the eighteenth century these
developed nations had already confronted the negative effects of industrialization,
such as poverty, economic insecurity, disease, and unconstrained urban growth,
obstacles that now threatened to stall Chile's modernization process and provoke
social unrest;.
When faced with such problems, Chile decided to mirror the approach of the
industrialized nations and begin creating state sponsored social programs. Chile's
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economic integration in the world economy during the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries paralleled its domestic efforts to industrialize and create a mobile, salaried
workforce. These changes brought to Chile the ills that characterized urbanization
and industrialization elsewhere during the nineteenth century. Just as the plight of
the British textile workers captured Marx's attention and spurred a number of state-
sponsored welfare programs in the second half of the nineteenth century, Chile's
expanding cities and impoverished workforce demanded a change in the very nature
of state governance.37 By the end of the 1920s, the Chilean state had begun to
emerge as a protectorate for all social strata of the Chilean population. The creation
of government programs for the scientific understanding and administrative
management of poverty, health, education, and economic growth that Ibaiiez
initiated would continue to grow and expand during the Popular Front governments
of the 1930s.38
The importation and application of office machinery from another
industrialized nation, the United States, can be read as a concurrent attempt to
address the problems of industrialized nations through imported techniques and
technologies. If detailed knowledge of the Chilean population could advance projects
of social ordering, combat social ills, and spur economic growth, as the tcnicos
believed, then tabulating and calculating machines contributed to these goals.
Speaking of office machinery in the U.S. context, Cortada writes that "technology
was clearly a basic driver of business actions."3 9 In Chile we see that office
technology provided a particular articulation of business and government actions, a
36 "Maquinas especiales se emplearan en el escrutinio del censo general," El Mercurio, 6 March 1930.
37 See Agar, The Government Machine.
38 See Karin Alejandra Rosemblatt, Gendered Compromises: Political Cultures and the State in Chile,
1920-1950 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000).
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means for imagining their execution, and a normalization of a new set of techniques
for modern administrative management. In the next section I explore how the
changing role of statistical data also illustrated a particular vision of state
modernity, which achieved new levels of prominence during the Ibafiez period. This
vision both normalized the path toward modernity previously laid down by the
United States and Europe and promoted the administrative techniques and
technologies used in these countries as tools for surmounting Chilean
underdevelopment and advancing the modernization process.
Visualizing a Nation
The Chilean government began collecting statistical information on a national scale
a mere three years after independence, conducting its first census in 1813. Thirty
years later, in March1843, President Manuel Bulnes established the Statistics Office
within the Ministry of the Interior and charged it with collecting "exact knowledge of
the current condition of the country in general and each one of the provinces and
sectors that compose them in particular."4 0 This office became a permanent state
agency in 1847, a formality that allowed its workforce to increase to eight. In 1853
the census law took effect, requiring a regular census of the Chilean population
every ten years.4 '
According to Jaramillo, these early census efforts required the formation of
vast complex social networks capable of disciplining a heterogeneous geography and
population to yield accurate information that adhered to a set of state-determined
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39 Cortada, Before the Computer, 87.
40 Miximo Aguilera Reyes, Estadisticas de Chile en el Siglo XX (Santiago: Empresa Periodista La Naci6n,
1999), 12.
41 Ibid.
classifications.42 As was often the case, Chileans viewed the census effort as a
government tool for determining levels of income tax and counting the number of
young men eligible for military service. The Chilean government and citizenry alike
viewed the collection of census information as inherently political and therefore
suspect. However, the image of the nation proved to be a powerful rhetorical device
for overcoming this resistance. Censuses conducted in the nineteenth century
permitted the fledgling state to sketch the dimensions of the territory and
population it governed and played a key role in shaping the national imagination.
By connecting people from different regions of Chile's diverse territory and imposing
categories of nationality, the census helped create a unified national identity.43
"Nationality" appeared as a fixed category for the first time in the 1843 census,
alongside other categories for local identification such as birthplace. By the 1854
census the space reserved for the "patria chica,"or home town, had completely
disappeared in favor of the broader national category, even though many Chileans
still identified more with their local communities. As Jaramillo writes:
The complex web of social loyalties that [the census] operation needed to
establish demonstrates that a mere administrative practice can have
implications for the social construction process of the [Chilean] nation.
Its simultaneous action, territorial scope, and the need to motivate the
population to overcome their fears served as the primary motors of
machinery that marginalized no individual or institution. 4 4
These census efforts helped consolidate the territorial scope of the Chilean
government and provided the legal base for the organization of congressional and
42 Andrds Estefane Jaramillo, "'Un alto en el camino para saber cuAntos somos.' Los censos de poblaci6n y
la construcci6n ,de lealtades nacionales. Chile, Siglo XIX.," Pontificia Universidad Cat6lica de Chile,
Santiago, 2001.
43 For an analysis of how census efforts deepened the imagined national community in the East Asian and
U.S. contexts, see Anderson, Imagined Communities, and Theodore Porter, Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit
of Objectivity in Science and Public Life (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995).
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local elections. However, in the first decades of the twentieth century the
significance of this statistical collection process changed considerably. The success of
social welfare and economic planning programs placed greater emphasis on these
statistically generated maps of Chilean industries and populations, which in turn
demanded increased attention to accuracy.
Census takers hoped to apply western scientific methods to statistical studies
in the early part of the twentieth century but were unable to do so, blaming their
failures on a lack of resources, an underdeveloped administrative structure, and an
uncultured population. The introduction to the 1907 population census begins with a
rather lengthy apology for the quality of the work accomplished:
The insufficient nature of our statistical services has poorly prepared
our public administration, principally in the provinces, to direct work of this
nature, which not only requires patriotism and enthusiasm, but also a staff
and elements that can only be formed with practice and time.
These reasons have obliged the Commission to undertake all operations in
the least complicated manner possible.... We have always thought that it
is better to stigmatize the Census as incomplete and unscientific in its
methods rather than seeing it fail because we had asked for more from the
country than it was capable of giving.
In operations of this nature, it is not always possible to achieve the level of
admirable perfection that prevails in the more advanced nations of old
Europe; we cannot overlook the state of public administration in Chile, or
the general level of culture of its inhabitants. 4 5
Despite expressed desires to achieve the "perfection" found in other "advanced" parts
of the world, Chilean census takers resigned themselves to their administrative
limits as well as the general lack of sophistication they felt was exhibited by the
majority of the population.
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45 Comisi6n Central del Censo, "Censo de la Repfiblica de Chile levantado el 28 de noviembre de 1907,"
Sociedad Imprenta y Litografia Universo, Santiago, 1908, v.
After the 1907 census the government again decided to increase its statistical
resources and established the Central Statistics Office in 1912 with fifty-six
employees and a director appointed by the president. The degree to which the
Chilean government applied statistical data in its policy making, however, remains
unclear. For example, the 1916 edition of the annual publication "A Statistical
Synopsis of the Chilean Republic," a report compiled by the Central Statistics Office,
contains a very simple amalgamation of statistical data with no advice about how to
interpret or apply its findings. This publication included figures on population
increases since the last census, the number of cities with more than ten thousand
inhabitants, the recorded high and low temperatures, the amount of rainfall
recorded in seven selected cities, the number of urban and rural schools, and the
basic revenues and expenses of the government recorded during the previous five
years.4 6 Written in a purely descriptive tone, the text leaves the reader lacking an
analytical perspective on the significance of the data collected and does not appear
particularly useful for guiding government decisions. The text also appears in both
Spanish and English, suggesting an equally important foreign audience for the
publication, perhaps among British and North American merchants and investors.
This format changed during the latter part of the 1920s. From the early days
of Ibafiez's presidency, the Central Statistics Office occupied a new level of
importance within the Chilean state and used its platform to tout the importance of
scientific methods in the collection and generation of statistical data. On December
23, 1927, the Chilean government again reorganized the Central Statistics Office,
placing it within the federal comptroller's office and granting it exclusive control
46 Oficina Central de Estadistica, "Sinopsis estadistica de la Repfiblica de Chile," Sociedad de Imprenta y
Litografia Universo, Santiago, 1916.
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over all official statistical matters, ensuring the proper application of scientific
methods to the statistical studies conducted in all branches of government. Desires
expressed by Chilean tcnicos to emulate the rigorous statistical methods found in
the industrialized nations created a deeper awareness of Chile's shortcomings in this
area. A 1928 conference paper on Chilean statistical organization lamented that:
Chile still is not ready for complete statistical service. In just one year,
it is not possible to create a definitive office that functions well in all
aspects, especially in a country that has not developed a
comprehension of the importance of effective and well-understood
cooperation in statistical matters.4 7
In illustration of this point, the author (the General Director of Statistics, Dr. Walter
Grdwell) pointed to the current deficiencies in the statistical technique employed by
the government. For example, the country lacked laws to standardize the recording
of foreign commerce activities. Customs agents regularly noted the value of imports
as determined at their point of embarkation instead of recalculating their value
upon arrival in Chile. Grawell also called for the creation of standardized weight
tables for various imported goods to prevent the personal biases of individual
shippers from skewing the numbers reported. Other difficulties included calculating
the cost of living for an abstract Chilean citizen. Questions arose about which social
class should provide the basis for calculations and how to determine food costs
(based on caloric intake or the presence of certain basic food items). In short, the
creation of this statistical category required both knowledge and standardization of
the domestic lives of the Chilean citizenry. Grawell reported that the government,
acting through workers' associations, had given special notebooks to groups of
working-class families and asked that they record their expenses for a period of
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several months. From these samples government tcnicos could peer into working-
class lives, gain a better understanding of their daily activities, and subsequently
determine the criteria for cost-of-living calculations.
Grdiwell's text illustrates the difficulties that tcnicos faced when trying to
measure and record phenomena that did not yet exist. Standardizing the weight of a
can or determining the expenses of an abstract Chilean citizen necessitated the
creation of categories designed to erase difference, ambiguity, and subjectivity.
Through the application of these scientific techniques, the government sought to
replace the messiness of an observed reality with one of clean abstraction that was
easier to document, visualize, understand, and thus manage. Processes of
classification, quantification, and abstraction permitted the government to generate
increasingly sophisticated and comprehensive maps of national activities that it
used to direct state planning efforts. Statistics collection disciplined the
indescribable complexity of Chilean life into distinct, knowable categories.48 From
this knowledge, the government could draft new policies for boosting the
productivity of Chilean industries and the workforce, overcoming the deleterious
effects of industrialization, and furthering the process of development. As Griwell
writes:
In my opinion, statistics are a service that must be responsible for the
systematic observation of the sizeable social masses, in a form that
their results, based on a great number of facts or events, give an idea
of the nation's position and state of development. This opinion
corresponds with the experiences in other countries to develop and
improve official statistics services.49
47 W. Grawell, "Conferencia sobre la organizaci6n de la estadistica," Anales del Instituto de Ingenieros de
Chile (1928): 744.
48 Here I am referring to Foucault's discussion of discipline and economic productivity found in part 3 of
Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, 2nd ed. (New York: Vintage, 1995).
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Here we see that the systematic observation of the masses constituted a necessary
and desirable precursor for gauging the current state of development and the
direction of future policy. These techniques of knowledge production, moreover,
exercised authority among tcnicos, given the successful application of these
techniques in other industrialized nations. The capability of the state to better "see"
the Chilean masses, moreover, complemented the authoritarian practices of the
Ibafiez government, which opposed political dissent and organized labor but still
needed the approval of an increasingly independent voter base.
The application of scientific techniques to the collection of statistical
information amplified the quantity and organization of data recorded from 1927 to
1930. In order to keep up with the myriad economic planning and administrative
initiatives, the General Statistics Office expanded to become the General Statistics
Bureau in August 1930 and welcomed additional labor and technical resources to
complete the population census in a timely fashion.50 The appearance of the formal
magazine, Chilean Statistics, in January 1928 replaced the monthly statistical
overview Statistics Bulletin that had previously been circulated by the Statistics
Office (figure 2.3). This lengthy publication included an impressive array of economic
and population data, as well as figures on specialized topics ranging from meat
consumption. to meteorology to the degree of telegraph penetration. 51 The
appearance of graphs and figures integrated with the printed text constituted one of
the most notable improvements and facilitated the reader's understanding of
observed trends or events of significance. Moreover, the written text did not simply
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49 Grawell, "Conferencia sobre la organizaci6n de la estadistica," 735. Emphasis added.
50 Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas, "Resefia hist6rica del Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas, centdsimo
cuadragdsimo aniversario 1843-1983," INE, Santiago, 1983.
summarize the data but included an analysis of the numbers collected. Readers, for
example, were asked to compare the shape of temperature curves from different
cities, then received an explanation for these phenomena. The publication
sandwiched its reporting between advertisements for such modern luxuries as
imported automobiles and stylish liquors, items that invited the Chilean reader to
enter a world enjoyed by inhabitants of more industrialized nations.
Despite the statistical complexity found in Chilean Statistics, an opposite
trend toward simplification emerged with respect to the agricultural, industrial, and
population censes. Chilean tcnicos reasoned that complicated census forms invited
ambiguity and caused the failure of statistical studies. The application of techniques
that emphasized simplicity and clarity increased the number of industrial
establishments reported from 7,600 in 1926 to 9,100 in 1927. A similar increase was
observed in the number of commercial firms reported, which rose from 34,000 in
1926 to 60,000 in 1927.52 This quantitative increase was attributed to the
imprecision of previous census efforts, which had failed to include these additional
establishments. However, the report failed to mention how these classifications had
been simplified or whether the process of clarification had changed the definition for
industrial establishments or commercial firms.
The 1]930 population census continued this trend toward simplification. The
census questionnaire used in 1920, for example, required the census taker to
manually separate neighborhoods and households by drawing a line between
entries. Given that the majority of census takers were untrained volunteers, many
forgot to mark these divisions on their completed questionnaires, causing problems
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51 Direcci6n General de Estadistica, "Estadistica chilena," Direcci6n General de Estadistica, Santiago,
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for subsequent calculations. The 1930 census questionnaire used one form per
household. It avoided controversial questions such as those pertaining to legitimate
birth, military service, and race.53 The form also provided strict definitions for an
individual's primary occupation, a potentially ambiguous category that in the past
had been left to the judgment of the census taker, and eliminated the space for a
secondary occupation.5 4
As I mentioned earlier, the application of Hollerinth tabulating technology to
census calculations first occurred in 1930. Census clerks recorded the data for every
Chilean citizen on a punch card, not just the data for every household, thereby
permitting the machines to calculate and classify statistics relating to age, civil
status, physical defects, nationality, literacy, and occupation (figure 2.4). The
Hollerinth machines helped census clerks achieve better speed and precision and
significantly augmented the sheer quantity of data published. The results of the
1920 census were published in one volume five years after the census was
conducted. In contrast, the results of the 1930 census occupied three volumes,
published in 1931, 1933, and 1935, respectively.5 5 Hollerinth machines generated
52 Grawell, "Conferencia sobre la organizaci6n de la Estadistica," 742.
53 Chilean statistics takers viewed the country as racially homogeneous, a feature they viewed as beneficial.
It allowed them to avoid the ambiguities found in countries with more diverse populations, such as
theUnited States. The 1930 census report reads, "We do not consider it necessary to note the race or color
of the population because almost everyone is of European descent. The inhabitants of indigenous origin in
the country are few and have already been incorporated in mainstream life. Only the araucanos, who
continue to conserve their primitive customs and live in reduced numbers in regions south of the Bio-Bio,
were counted using colored census questionnaires in order to determine the size of the indigenous
population." Direcci6n General de Estadistica, "Resultados del X Censos de la Repfblica de Chile 1930
efectuado el 27 de noviembre de 1930 y estadisticas comparativas con censos anteriores" Impresa
Universo, Santiago, 1931, 8.
54 Ibid., 9.
55 Ibid.; Direcci6n General de Estadistica, "X Censos de la Repiblica de Chile 1930 efectuado el 27 de
noviembre de 1930 edad, estado civil, nacionalidad, religi6n e instrucci6n," Impresa Universo, Santiago,
1933; Direcci6n General de Estadistica, "X Censos de la Repfiblica de Chile 1930 efectuado el 27 de
noviembre de 1930 ocupaciones," Impresa Universo, Santiago, 1935); Direcci6n General de Estadistica,
"Censo de poblaci6n de la Repblica de Chile levantado el 15 de diciembre de 1920," Soc. Imp. y
Litografia Universo, Santiago, 1925.
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the various configurations of data that comprised the second and third volumes. In
the end, these machines enabled the state to draw an unprecedented connection
between population characteristics-such as education, occupation, standard of
living, social class, and family size-and their respective geographical locations. The
classification, quantification, and geolocation techniques applied by census clerks
and Hollerinth machines resulted in maps of greater precision and sophistication
that increased the visibility of the Chilean population and made it more susceptible
to state policies of economic and social management. Yet, despite efforts to increase
the accuracy of the 1930 census, members of the statistics bureau again faulted the
quantity and ambiguity of the questions found on the census form for the unreliable
data collected on the number of property owners, rates of female fertility, physical
defects, and the number of nationalized citizens. Arguing once more in favor of
increasing categorical simplicity and homogenization, the bureau observed that
"perhaps . . . it would be better to simplify [the census form] a little" before
undertaking the next census in 1940.56
The Rise of the State Machine
Ibafiez's professed commitment to order, progress, and the expansion of state
administration gave rise to new techniques of state control, but not even he could
control the devastating effects of the worst economic crisis in Chilean history.
According to the League of Nations, the Great Depression of 1929 hit Chile harder
than any other country in the world. From 1929 to 1932 imports dropped by 80%,
and copper and nitrate exports dropped from more than 200 million pesos to 18.1
56 Direcci6n General de Estadistica, "X censos de la Repfiblica de Chile 1930 efectuado el 27 de noviembre
de 1930 edad, estado civil, nacionalidad, religi6n e instrucci6n," v.
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million pesos. More than fifty thousand workers lost their jobs in the nitrate fields.57
The government's inability to ameliorate the worsening conditions of poverty and
unemployment fed civilian and military opposition to Ibafiez's presidency. He
resigned on July 26, 1931, and temporarily sought exile in Argentina.
In the aftermath of Ibafiez's resignation Chile slid into political disarray. For
all the dictator's attempts to create an administration that imposed order and
abhorred chaos, six different governments came to power in 1932, including Chile's
first "Socialist Republic," headed by Marmaduque Grove. It lasted for only twelve
days. By the end of 1932 members of the military were calling for civilian elections,
which reinstated Arturo Alessandri in the presidential palace for the second time,
this time as an establishment conservative.
Alessandri's second presidency initiated a period of uninterrupted democratic
rule that lasted until 1973, but Chile had changed dramatically during the six years
since he had left office in 1926. In the aftermath of the depression early attempts to
develop national industries and increase the volume of exports took on new levels of
importance as Chilean leaders realized the dangers of economic integration and the
need for greater independence. The Chilean government turned to policies of import
substitution and channeled their attentions toward spurring local production and
domestic industrial growth. Ironically, these policies of inward development
increased Chile's economic sensitivities to international geopolitics and related trade
disruptions.
In the post-1932 period a cleavage emerged in Chilean politics that separated
the ideological Right, Left, and Center into three distinct groupings, a division that
continues today. After 1952 consecutive administrations often represented parties
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from the opposite ends of the ideological spectrum, a phenomenon some viewed as a
testament to Chilean democracy and others as symptomatic of popular
dissatisfaction with elected representatives. 5 8 Vocal proponents of Marxism,
liberalism, communism, social Catholicism, fascism, and Nazism all found a willing
audience among factions of the Chilean citizenry. Despite this ideological pluralism,
only a single articulation of modernity appeared in Chilean policy making and
remained unchallenged through the victory of the Popular Unity government in
1970. Achieving modernity, a concept predefined by the historical trajectories of
industrialized nations, came to be equated with policies of state-led economic growth
and, to a lesser extent, the creation of state-directed social welfare programs. The
heightened role of this interventionist state in turn grew the national bureaucracy
and expanded the employment opportunities for educated Chileans. No longer a
government composed primarily of a wealthy elite, as was the case in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the public administration of the 1930s and
1940s played a significant role in forming a bureaucratic middle class of white-collar
professionals. Between 1930 and 1949 employment in the public sector more than
doubled, outpacing the growth in the mining, agricultural, and industrial sectors of
the Chilean economy.5 9 In the forty-year span between 1925 and 1965, the number of
employees in the Chilean public administration tripled, whereas the national
population only doubled.6 0
The expansion of the Chilean bureaucracy during the 1930s and 1940s
paralleled the growth of IBM's Chilean operations. From the perspective of IBM the
58 Many historians have noted this phenomenon. See, for example, Paul W. Drake, Socialism and Populism
in Chile, 1932-52 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1978).
59 Loveman, Chile, 199-200.
60 Ibid., 200.
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depression created a new motivation for expanding its market share overseas,
increasing sales coverage, and converting independent dealers of IBM products into
company-owned operations. To encourage international growth and market
penetration, profits from overseas branch offices remained within their host
countries and were reinvested locally. While Chile struggled to recover from the
devastating effects of the Great Depression, Wharin and Toriello, IBM's team in
Chile, decided to hire their first Chilean employee. Mena Verdaguer took over sales.
Despite an initial drop in sales, IBM Chile continued to expand its operations
throughout the economic recovery process. In the early 1930s the company added a
training school. The number of employees had swelled to twenty by 1933. By 1939
seventy employee names appeared on the company payroll.6' Wharin directed the
operations of IBM's Chilean branch until 1938, establishing separate departments
for unit record machines, scales, and clocks, each with their own technical service
department. His coworker, Toriello, took over as general director after Wharin left
and remained in the post from 1938 to 1950, when he was replaced by the Chilean
Hernan Elizade. The early expansion and Chileanization of IBM's Santiago
operations no doubt pleased the elder Watson as a businessman, a believer in Pan
Americanism, and a proponent of "world peace through world trade."6 2
Given the limited data available, it is impossible to determine what
percentage of IBM Chile's sales from 1930 to 1950 were comprised of government
clients. However, given the early integration of these machines in public
administration and the Chilean government's well-documented commitment to
61 "Hablan los precursors."
62 T. J. Watson Sr. wrote editorials about Theodore Roosevelt's Good Neighbor policy (1940) and Watson's
theory of"world peace through world trade" (1953), which were later reprinted in volume Thomas J.
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expanding the state apparatus during the period in question, it seems reasonable to
believe that these machines continued to hold a place of importance within the
larger government machine.
In terms of bureaucratic growth and national planning, the creation of the
State Development Agency (CORFO) in 1939 constituted one of the most important
developments of the decade; its history has been well documented.6 3 Ibafiez Santa
Maria argues that "the creation of CORFO finalized a long trajectory of institutional
searching to show a new concept of the State that ... would require the technical-
administrative channeling of political activities in order to respond to the
requirements of the age."64 Ideas for a state development agency had been
circulating since 1910, yet it was a natural disaster that finally brought the
institution into being. Toward the beginning of 1939, an earthquake whose epicenter
was located in the southern areas of Concepci6n and Chillin caused considerable
destruction in the region and required immediate plans for state assistance and
reconstruction. The Finance Ministry responded by proposing two distinct agencies:
the Relief and Reconstruction Corporation, which would rebuild the areas most
affected by the earthquake, and the State Development Corporation, charged with
directing national economic activities. The latter agency would draft long-term plans
to improve national standards of living through the better use of Chilean natural
resources and through reducing the costs of production; expanding the nation's
mining, agricultural, commercial, and industrial activities; promoting policies of
Watson Sr., "As a Man Thinks": Thomas J. Watson, the Man and His Philosophy of Life as Expressed in
His Editorials (New York: International Business Machines, 1954).
63 Interested readers may consult Luis Ortega Martinez, Corporaci6n de Fomento de la Producci6n: 50
adlos de realizaciones, 1939-1989 (Santiago: Universidad de Santiago Facultad de Humanidades
Departamento de Historia, 1989) for a detailed look at CORFO's origins and subsequent projects.
64 Ibafiez Santa Maria, Los ingenieros, el estado y la politica en Chile, 57.
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import substitution and the national consumption of domestic goods; and
undertaking studies on themes relevant to increasing levels of national production.
Industrial development within ("hacia adentro'), it was argued, could further
Chilean economic independence-a hypothesis that later proved false. The majority
of the financial backing secured for CORFO projects originated from the U.S.
Export-Import Bank. Rather than freeing itself of the relations of dependency that
had caused the nation's economic downfall during the depression years, the Chilean
government gave the United States a new venue for exerting influence and power.
The proposed legislation for the State Development Corporation generated
considerable controversy. Members of the political right feared that the newly
elected president, Aguirre Cerda, would use the agency as a mechanism for
exercising the political whims of the Socialists and Communists within his Popular
Front coalition.65 Moreover, the sums of money cited by Aguirre Cerda as necessary
for implementing Popular Front programs scared many members of Congress,
especially when added to the funds requested for earthquake relief. The agency's
detractors pointed to the mounting national debt as a source of concern, but
CORFO's supporters countered that if the government could not look beyond the size
of the national debt, then earthquake relief efforts must be tied to strategies for
future economic planning and development.
The economic arguments dominating the CORFO debate had merit, but they
were not the only objections to the development agency. The first signs of rural
unionization and what some landowners viewed as "militant activities" among the
65 In fact, Pedro Aguirre Cerda acquired the presidency through an unlikely coalition of Communists,
Socialists, and Radicals and with the votes of Nazi supporters of Carlos Ibaftez-a coalition that was
impossible to maintain and quickly spun off into splintered parliamentary factions whose inability to agree
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Chilean peasantry spread fears of communism and peasant uprisings. Landowners
appealed for government assistance in restoring order to the countryside on the
ground that rural unrest could slow or stall levels of production. Building on this
logic, the vice president of the National Manufacturers' Association (SOFOFA),
Walter Muller, argued that a plan for economic development would be wasted if the
state continued to permit the "unhinging of individual and collective discipline."6 6
Despite these reservations, the legislation for both the development and the
reconstruction agencies passed--barely--in April 1939. With the founding of the State
Development Corporation, Chilean public administrators significantly increased
their ability to intervene and control the development process.67 However, the right's
distrust of Aguirre Cerda and the politics of the Popular Front resulted in a push to
make the agency independent of the executive branch and to limit its duties to
technical analyses of production activities. Claims of scientific neutrality provided
one response to the political and social conflicts of the moment and continued the
trend of placing tecnicos in positions of power within the public administration.
Many engineers who had occupied important posts during the Ibafiez government
had since reassumed positions of power within the administration of Aguirre Cerda.
Appeals to scientific objectivity, and therefore political neutrality, veiled the
inequalities built into the agency's underlying structure. For example, sitting on the
CORFO oversight board were several representatives from the private sector and
stalled most legislative proposals. CORFO's founding constituted one of only two significant pieces of
legislation passed in 1939.
66 Walter H. Muller, "Industria: 6rgano oficial de la Sociedad de Fomento de Fabril" June Direcci6n
General de Estadistica, "Resultados del X censos de la Repiblica de Chile 1930 efectuado el 27 de
noviembre de 1930 y estadisticas comparativas con censos anteriores" Impresa Universo, Santiago, 1931,
8. 1939, 379-80. Cited in Ibafiez Santa Maria, Los ingenieros, el estado y la politica en Chile, 53.
67 That the legislation passed at all provides a clear illustration of Chile's widespread commitment to long-
term economic planning and development.
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government but only one representative from the Chilean Workers Confederation
(CTCH), who alone was charged with presenting the position of labor.
CORFO provides another example of how appeals to technocracy and
scientific objectivity served to advance a particular conceptualization of industrial
progress that blocked legitimate social change. CORFO embodied the widely held
conviction that only mechanisms of state intervention could propel Chile closer to a
state of modernity. The agency's core responsibilities, in fact its very raison d'6tre,
reflected this shared faith. Despite this expressed national commitment to mapping
Chile's financial resources and coordinating them with projects that advanced the
economic health of the country, Chile would not be able to draft a comprehensive
economic plan until 1961. This plan, however, bore fruit almost immediately. As I
show in chapter 3, Chile's first ten-year economic plan served as a vital political tool
for securing U.S. foreign aid and elevating the country's status as the model nation
of the Alliance for Progress.
The Making of "the Masses"
A fundamental shift occurred in the organization of the Chilean state during the
1920s. In place of the oligarchic state of the late nineteenth century, a new
administrative apparatus emerged, one committed to solving the ills of
industrialization by using the tools and expertise imported from industrialized
"modern" nations. Like those nations, Chile chose to respond to the social question
through a welfare state, outwardly committed to identifying and managing the
negative efficts of industrialization by using programs of directed economic
development. It was believed that this approach would improve the standard of
living for all social strata of the Chilean population without slowing the pace of
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industrial growth. The mounting social unrest among Chile's displaced poor,
confirmed by the first signs of organized labor movements and the formation of a
Chilean socialist party in 1933, motivated the government to take up the philosophy
of evolution to prevent revolution. Evolution, however, did not imply solving the
social question or the myriad social ills associated with the industrialization process.
Instead it entailed the creation of new state agencies dedicated to applying
"scientific" techniques for the advancement of industrial and social welfare. As state
operations increased in size and complexity, the application of science, technology,
and expertise emerged as tools vital for defining, understanding, and eventually
overcoming obstacles to progress.
The timing here is important. Scholars of development etiology have often
placed the origins of this discursive framework within the recognition of the Third
World in the aftermath of World War II and the escalating Cold War.68 In Chile,
however, we see a concerted state-initiated effort for development as early as the
mid-1920s, using many techniques and mechanisms later ascribed to the
development; discourse. This included the employment of scientific experts, or
tMcnicos, public intervention in the economy, the importation of foreign technologies,
and the application of statistical methods to generate knowledge of national
economic and social resources. These approaches had strong precedence in both
western Europe and the United States during the nineteenth and early twentieth
century; their appearance in pre-World War II Chilean modernization efforts should
thus come as no surprise. Public economic intervention, moreover, assumed new
levels of importance in the years after the depression, as seen in both the New Deal
68 See, for example, Escobar, Encountering Development; Wolfgang Sachs, The Development Dictionary:
A Guide to Knowledge as Power (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Zed Books, 1992).
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programs in the United States and in the formation of the Chilean State
Development Corporation (CORFO). Technologically speaking, however, the Chilean
modernization process attested to the growing "Americanization" of the region as
European economic and hegemonic influences gave way to those of the United
States. From 1912 to 1932 the United States pursued a strategy of commercial and
ideological dominance, rather than physical domination, in Latin America and
wrapped it in the rhetoric of "Good Neighbor" policies.6 9 This included the growing
presence of U.S. companies in Chile and the broader application of U.S. technologies.
This chapter has situated Chile's early history of computing machinery
within the historical trajectories of administrative growth, state rationalization, and
directed economic planning, core facets of Chilean modernization efforts until the
early 1970s. From the evidence, IBM tabulating machinery appears to have played a
relatively small role in state practices during the 1920s and 1930s. The Chilean
market likewise constituted a small percentage of IBM's international sales.
However, these machines both epitomized and furthered government attempts to
classify, homogenize, standardize, and discipline Chilean commercial and social
spheres, augmenting the influence of foreign experts and tecnicos within the Chilean
public administration.
Finally, the adoption of these technologies further illustrates that Chilean
modernization processes extended beyond simply increasing industrial output and
raising the standard of living. The path to modernity also entailed growing the
powers of state management and the ability to map and manage the population with
greater accuracy, detail, and sophistication. Achieving this goal depended on the
69 Paul W. Drake, "From Good Men to Good Neighbors: 1912-1932," in Abraham F. Lowenthal, ed.,
Exporting Democracy: The United States and Latin America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
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government's ability to collect, quantify, tabulate, combine, and recombine
information on a national scale, reinforcing the unification and naturalization of the
Chilean nation state. Hollerinth machines enabled the government to achieve these
goals through the collection of census data and the managing of customs and railway
accounts. As I noted earlier, the use of these machines increased considerably during
the 1930s and paved the way for the eventual application of electronic mainframe
computers to state planning efforts in the 1960s and 1970s.
The import of the bureaucratic shift that occurred during the 1920s extended
beyond marking the conclusion of nineteenth-century liberalism and the adoption of
western administrative practices. G6ngora writes that the first part of the twentieth
century gave birth not only to the modern administrative state but also to the idea of
"the masses"' as both a political identity and a descriptive category. The construction
of the masses, he asserts, evolved in tandem with the classification, rationalization,
and management techniques characteristic of modern administration. "The
techniques and the masses," he writes, "have reciprocally generated themselves....
The apparatus that serves the masses is grounded in technical inventions." The
abstract conceptualization of the masses legitimized the expansion of the Chilean
state administration by creating an entity that it serves--and controls.70 The
statistical and ordering techniques discussed in the preceding pages did not emerge
as the by-products of a state in transition; they helped solidify a particular
articulation of the state that was supported by new claims to legitimate power.
If we take G6ngora's observation as our starting point, then knowledge of the
Chilean population, gathered through the quantification, categorization, and
1991).
70 G6ngora, Enseayo hist6rico sobre la noci6n de estado, 245.
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homogenization of complex social and economic processes, made this new abstraction
a visible entity. Thus the state played a complicit role in shaping Chilean national
identity. 7 ' G6ngora, moreover, notes that state programs to "civilize the masses"
gave the state an even greater justification for intervening in the lives of its
citizenry, as measured by the creation of welfare institutions and changes to
production processes.
During the 1920s and 1930s the Chilean state defined the characteristics of
its citizenry with greater exactitude and delineated with more precision the
procedures necessary for Chileans to interact with their government. In addition to
creating stricter definitions of normality and deviance, classification imposed order
on Chilean society while erasing old ways of being.7 2 Just as the idea of
"Chileanness" replaced the identification that Chileans felt with their patria chica
during the nineteenth century, the process of "massification" sought to transcend the
complexities of migration, work, community, and fluctuating economic markets.7 3
New categories emerged to determine the cost of living, levels of employment, or
even race, categories that simultaneously homogenized and differentiated. Through
this process certain aspects of Chilean life became visible while others faded from
view.
71 The central thesis of G6ngora's essay rests on the claim that the state formed Chilean national identity.
G6ngora, however, does not elaborate on the techniques used by the state or describe the nature of the
identity created. Chilean historians have traditionally linked the state to processes of national identity
formation with regard to state support for cultural institutions, such as public universities and museums,
which provide sectors of the population with a cultural education. It is clear, however, that this class-centric
argument is not the thesis advanced by G6ngora. Here, I provide an alternative reading.
72 See Foucault's writings on classification, discipline, and governmentality. Foucault, Discipline and
Punish; Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York:
Vintage, 1973); Foucault, The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality: With Two Lectures by and an
Interview with Michel Foucault, ed. Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1991).
73 Jaramillo, "'Un alto en el camino para saber cudntos somos."'
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According to Foucault, disciplinary power operates through distributive
networks rather than extending from a powerful state apparatus. The all-seeing
guard tower located in the center of Bentham's Panoptican functions democratically;
anyone can enter, anyone can exercise disciplinary power. In the Chilean case,
however, we see that the centralized power of the Ibafiez dictatorship played a
crucial role in making the modernization of state operations possible.74 The limited
forms of popular participation in the construction of statistical categories served
more to exploit than to create cooperative relationships among equals. The expense
journals kept by working-class Chileans, to which I alluded earlier, are one example.
The state transformed these chronicles from snapshots of lived experiences to data
sets that later allowed groups of tecnicos to extract and generalize facets of the
working-class experience. The power exerted by Chilean tecnicos to make
populations, territories, economies, and resources visible, and thus knowable, served
to increase the centrality of the tecnicos to the Chilean government and granted
them the freedom to further develop these techniques for seeing. Classification,
rationalization, and directed planning would occupy a central role in the
development; discourse that emerged after World War II, particularly during the
Alliance for Progress and the presidency of Eduardo Frei Montalva. However, it is
evident that by 1930 the state apparatus constructed by the Ibafiez government
enabled new forms of control, permitting greater levels of growth and coordination
among the different branches of the Chilean government. As the government became
more organized and held together by these administrative techniques, so was the
74 The importance of centralized state power in large-scale modernization efforts described by James Scott
more closely resembles the experience described in this chapter. See James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State:
How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University
Press, 1998).
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Chilean population, quantified as it was into data sets of unprecedented completion
that were easily read by the growing state machine.75
Bureaucratic growth rearticulated the claims for a legitimate right to rule.
Ibafiez could not claim legitimacy through divine rule, as in the days of the Spanish
colonizers, or through wealth and elite class status, as with the oligarchs of the
nineteenth century. Rather, he had to convince Chilean citizens that his right to rule
grew out of his ability to serve the people, regardless of social class or status. As I
have shown, this led to the creation of social categories that demarcated new
differences and erased those of the past. Rearticulating the Chilean population in
terms of the masses served to homogenize and reconfigure the relationships among
pobladores (poor), campesinos (peasants), individuals from distinct patrias chicas
(homelands), indigenous populations, and descendants of Spanish blood, all of which
were situated beyond the protective reach of the Chilean state. This claim to
legitimacy holds only when the administration in power remains successful at
bettering the conditions of the population it serves. The Great Depression made this
impossible; even the iron rule of the dictator could not surmount the myriad of
problems that enveloped Chile in 1929. By 1932 the rational, ordered government
created by Ibafiez had disintegrated into chaos.
The era also saw the creation of a different form of political legitimacy tied to
plans for economic growth and industrialization. In the post-Depression period, the
protections afforded by state programs appeared to offer the only possibility for
Chile to recover from economic devastation and assume its place among the
industrialized nations of the world. In contrast to the "antiquated concept of the
75 The administrative machine to which I allude here draws a parallel with the government machine
described by Agar in The Government Machine.
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political-state," which reflected the views of the dominant class or ruling party, the
modern nation-state recognized the danger of partisan interests and prioritized the
needs of the entire country. Jaime Larrain Garcia-Moreno, then the conservative
president of both the Chilean National Agricultural Society and the Confederation of
Production and Trade, wrote in 1937 that the modern nation-state had moved
beyond the partisan ways of the past and tried to recognize the "totality of national
interests" and "integrate within the State all of the useful 'functions' and activities
for the material and social progress of the collective whole."7 6 This new tecnico-
administrative state contrasted sharply with the parliamentary state of the past and
further cemented the relationship between modernity and the powers of objectivity
that came with the application of scientific methods. This early conceptualization of
modernity, articulated through policies of directed economic planning and social
management, withstood the ideological shifts in Chilean politics and emerged as a
widely accepted framework for economic growth and development in the coming
decades. 77
The creation of CORFO in 1939 further illustrates that the Chilean
government equated modernization with economic growth well before the United
States, the United Nations, and international lending bodies began encouraging this
approach to development. Industrial growth promised to increase export capacities,
generate employment and income, raise the standard of living, and decrease
economic dependency, factors that would accelerate the economic recovery process.
Industrialization thus became the primary motivation for state economic activity, as
did assuring the basic conditions for production. CORFO's founding, moreover,
76 Quoted in Ibanez Santa Maria, Los ingenieros, el estado y la politica en Chile, 42.
77 Escobar, Encountering Development.
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continued the trend of employing engineers and other tcnicos in public service
positions.
The 1920s and 1930s witnessed a fundamental shift in administrative
organization, national prioritizing, and state claims to legitimate power. These
changes served to further solidify a definition of modernity cast in terms of state-led
economic growth, industrialization, and new infrastructures for social management
and public well-being. The government did not succeed in solving the social question;
however, it did succeed in rearticulating the underlying causes in terms of
identifiable and manageable phenomena, such as education, nutrition, poverty, and
employment, problems the government could resolve if armed with the correct
political agenda. Implementing the infrastructure necessary to overcome these social
ills and increase economic productivity required collecting information that captured
the key qualities of the Chilean citizenry and the Chilean nation with new levels of
rigor and completeness, as well as the capacity to map and make sense of these
increasingly complex data sets. Early tabulating machines, in combination with
other factors, such the increased hiring of tcnicos and the refinement of statistical
methods, contributed to this process and served to expand the reach of the Chilean
interventionist state. Having accepted the application of scientific techniques and
technological innovations in administrative organization as necessary for achieving
modernity, Chile then struggled to find the political program that would allow the




Figure 2.1: Employees at the Chilean Customs Office in the 1930s use IBM tabulating machines to collect
statistical information on imports and exports. (Image reproduced with permission from the National
Library, Santiago.)
Figure 2.2: A newspaper advertisement from 1930 claims that Burroughs accounting machines offer a
solution for any business. (Image reproduced with permission from the National Library, Santiago.)
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Figure 2.3: The first edition of Estadistica Chilena (Chilean Statistics), 1928. (Image reproduced with
permission from the National Statistics Institute, Santiago.)
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Figure 2.4: A punch card used in the 1930 Chilean population census. (Image reproduced with permission
from the National Statistics Institute, Santiago.)
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Chapter 2: Tables
Table 2.1: Calculating and Adding Machines Exported from the U.S. to Chile
(1923-46)
Year Number of Value Number of Value





1926 165 28,340 181 22,704
1927 167 28,282 219 21,700
1928 187 36,411 612 52,780
1929 282 57,379 786 83,599
1930 338 74,175 1,128 103,649
1931 60 10,168 73 8,9481932** -
1933* - - -
1934 1 50 54 6,972
1935 78 12,707 140 8,950
1936 100 16,064 153 13,590
1937 100 24,540 478 39,183
1938 88 20,444 416 39,453
1939 112 31,056 488 39,495
1940 188 29,966 605 56,878
1941 253 53,112 853 91,971
1942 318 39,656 149 14,112
1943 62 17,033 141 11,946
1944 246 57,968 187 23,165
1945 289 77,469 340 45,571
1946 122 35,379 1,035 142,070
Source: Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, U.S. Department of Commerce, "Foreign Commerce
and Navigation of the United States," compiled by the Division of Foreign Statistics, 1923-1946,
Washington, D.C.
* Listed as "Adding and calculating machines" for these years.
** No data reported for these years.
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Table 2.2: Cash Registers and Typewriters Exported from the U.S. to Chile
(1923-45)
Year Number of new Value Number of Value
cash registers (U.S. Dollars) new standard (U.S. Dollars)
typewriters
1923* 214 54,382 2,444 154,214
1924* 325 73,334 3,354 194,970
1925* 348 66,340 2,548 180,141
1926 277 67,264 2,582 179,665
1927 417 99,781 2,378 170,729
1928 362 86,324 3,047 211,956
1929 390 95,696 4,368 324,481
1930 356 101,223 3,132 226,614
1931 15 4,160 273 20,389
1932** - - 146 9,937
1933** - - 8 637
1934 9 198 127 8,756
1935 13 3,324 753 50,171
1936 28 8,793 954 68,050
1937 48 17,249 1,164 78,642
1938 165 25,075 1,266 92,169
1939 48 33,579 1,858 131,997
1940 165 53,806 2,079 156,756
1941 870 116,310 3,549 259,375
1942 545 73,809 660 55,104
1943*** 7 (used) 1,575 333 24,989
1944*** 21 9,143 974 70,009
1945*** 3 2,700 951 89,589
Source: Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, U.S. Department of Commerce, "Foreign Commerce
and Navigation of the United States, " compiled by the Division of Foreign Statistics, 192345, Washington,
D.C.
* Figures listed are for all typewriters, new and used.
** No data reported for these years.
***A trend toward exporting used machines began during World War II.
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Table 2.3: Card-Punching Machines Exported from the U.S. to Chile (1926-46)
Number of card punching, sorting,
and other tabulating machines
Value
(U.S. Dollars)





















Source: Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, U.S. Department of Commerce, "Foreign Commerce
and Navigation of the United States," compiled by the Division of Foreign Statistics, 1926-46, Washington,
D.C.
* Reported as "Accounting and Tabulating Machines" for this year. Although tabulating machines arrived
in Chile before 1926, the U.S. Department of Commerce had not created a category for tracking their
exportation before this date.





Bringing an Authentic Order
N JANUARY 16, 1969, the newly created State Computer Service Enterprise,
known as EMCO (Empresa de Servicio de Computaci6n Limitada), unveiled
its first computing machine in an elaborate inauguration ceremony. The government
had bought the mainframe computer, an IBM 360-40H, using French credit for the
hefty $2 million purchase price. The Chilean press described the computer as "an
immense machine" consisting of "thirty specialized apparatuses," including fifteen
magnetic disks, nine magnetic tape readers, a punch-card reader, and a printer
capable of writing eleven hundred lines per minute. The general director of EMCO,
Efrain Friedmann, told the newspaper El Mercurio that the new computer would
need only eight hours to process the paychecks for fifty thousand people. With a
separate set; of instructions, Friedmann continued, it could also play music, write
mysteries, compose Christmas cards, or even play chess or roulette.' Chilean
President Eduardo Frei Montalva attended the inauguration ceremony (see figure
3.1), as did the president of EMCO, Alvaro MarfAn; the French ambassador Raoul
Duval; and Frei's ministers of agriculture, mining, finance, labor, public works, and
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health. Also in attendance were the rectors of Chile's top universities, the University
of Chile and the Catholic University of Chile, and officials from the Chilean public
and private sectors. Both Frei and Friedmann delivered eloquent speeches, quoting
Shakespeare and Dickens and heralding the new machine as another step in Chile's
road toward progress and modernity. Leading national newspapers La Naci6n and
El Mercurio reprinted both speeches in their entirety the following day. La Naci6n
declared the computer to be of the "highest productivity" in Latin America.2
Frei began his inauguration speech by saying, "At the beginning of my period
of government, I promised to concern myself with the study and solution of one of
the most acute and least studied problems in the country. I am referring to the
functioning of the public administration and its technological aspects."3 The modern
state, the president declared, was responsible not only for the economy and social
development of the country but also for "orienting, advancing, and coordinating all of
its national activities." The most "critical difference" between a developed nation and
underdeveloped one was in "management."4 Since his 1964 inauguration, Frei's
administration had emphasized state planning in all economic, social, and
administrative activities, but the organization of the state apparatus itself
"practically did not differentiate itself from that of the previous century," Frei said.5
The sophistication of Chile's civil service and the tools it had to work with paled in
"Computadora procesarA desarrollo del pais," El Mercurio, 6 January 1969, 57.
2 "Frei inauguro computador de mas alta productividad en Am6rica Latina," La Naci6n, 17 January 1969;
"Inaugurado computador para el sector pfiblico," El Mercurio, 17 January 1969; "Chile se coloca a la
cabeza del progreso computacional y tecnol6gico de America Latina," La Naci6n, 18 January 1969.
3 Eduardo Frei Montalva, "Discurso del Presidente Frei en inauguraci6n computador electr6nico,"
(Santiago de Chile: Oficina de Difusi6n y Cultura de la Presidencia de la Repfiblica, 1969).
4He used the English word "management," yet another indication of where the criteria for development
originated.
5 Given the tremendous increase in the Chilean state administration from the 1930s to the 1950s and the
rationalization techniques supported by the tcnicos and adopted by the government, Frei's comment is
more rhetoric than historic fact.
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comparison to the "highest powers of the State in all of the developed countries." The
president later noted with pride that several European nations were creating
centralized state computer agencies similar to the one that the Chilean government
had established only a year before, in 1968. "This fact," he announced, "must make
us proud ... Our far-away country is developing this modern centralized system for
public administration at the same time as the most advanced countries in the
world." The president recalled the changes that industrialization had brought to
Chilean life during the nineteenth century and said, "In this way [installing a
computer system] we are returning to the situations that garnered admiration
during the last century for their spirit of scientific and technological progress." The
inauguration of the "great computer" also provided an incentive for the nation's
scientific and technological experts to continue working in Chile, slowing the brain
drain that alarmed Chilean engineering societies, universities, and government
agencies during this period. The president ended his speech dramatically, citing the
famous opening lines from A Tale of Two Cities:
It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it
was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of
incredulity, it was the season of Light, it was the season of Darkness, it was
the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair.
Drawing a parallel between Dickens' s text and the potential offered by science and
technology for tremendous benefit or, if managed poorly, for great harm, Frei
concluded, "I have full confidence that the dramatic alternatives of these times will
resolve themselves positively with the help of science and technology, bringing an
authentic order and the prosperity that our people require."
The inauguration ceremony was designed to emphasize the prominent role
that the Frei administration was giving to science and technology and, in particular,
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the mainframe computers that the administration was purchasing. However, the
views that Frei expressed in his speech also reflected the developmentalist
(desarrollista) strategy he and his party had decided to pursue, which emphasized
sustained economic growth and the marshalling of foreign credit, technical
expertise, and advanced technology to progress the nation and escape the condition
of underdevelopment. Import substitution industrialization (ISI) played a key role in
his developmentalist policies and called for the state to intervene in Chilean
economic activities in order to protect domestic industries through higher tariffs and
import restrictions. This approach also demanded higher levels of state
rationalization to coordinate the allocation of Chile's limited resources and best
direct the Chilean path toward economic growth and industrialization.
External factors also influenced the early computerization of Chile's public
administration and Frei's call for better administrative management. U.S. and
international lending agencies demanded that Latin American governments draft
global economic plans as a prerequisite for receiving foreign aid. These plans
included how the funds would be utilized and the economic benchmarks for gauging
success. Moreover, the Christian Democrats drew from the administrative structure
of foreign governments and used them as a model for reforming the operation of the
Chilean state. For example, Frei and the Christian Democrats decided to emulate
the state planning techniques of French dirigisme, whereby the state encouraged
and directed economic development in the context of a mixed economy. In this vein,
the Christian Democrats pushed to create a series of state-owned enterprises and
state planning agencies, including a central planning agency, ODEPLAN, for the
executive branch, with a function similar to that of the French Commissariat au
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plan (Commisary for the Plan). This same logic also played into the founding of
EMCO in 1968.
Frei's ISI and developmentalist policies largely equated modernization with
the drafting fiscal policies, the owning of machines, and the ability to manufacture
and purchase high-tech consumer goods. His presidency was marked by the domestic
assembly of capital-intensive consumer goods, such as televisions, which were
quickly coveted by members of the Chilean upper and middle classes. This vision of
a technologically mediated road to progress made possible by a coordinated,
interventionist state, made the purchase and application of mainframe computers
even more appealing to the Chilean government. But this only constituted part of
Frei's modernization program, which also included social restructuring through an
agrarian reform and the formation of grassroots organizations to broaden the base of
political participation. However, the government's early pursuit of modern
technology and economic growth later forced to president to put the interests of
foreign investors over those of the Chilean people and stalled the programs proposed
by the Christian Democrats for social change.
This was particularly true in the case of Chile's relations with the United
States. U.S. foreign aid through the Alliance for Progress was often linked to
favorable trade agreements and benefits for U.S. multinational companies operating
in Chile. Therefore, developmentalism continued past relations of economic
inequality between Chile and the United States and placed a substantial portion of
the profits made from Chile's industrialization in foreign hands rather than in the
pockets of Chile's popular classes. As Chile struggled to find its own political and
economic path, technologies such as computers and foreign companies such as IBM
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became contested sites of desire and resentment, feelings that echoed the nation's
conflicted relationship with the developed world, especially the United States.
A "Revolution in Liberty"
Eduardo Frei Montalva had secured the Chilean presidency in 1964 on a platform
that called for a "revolution in liberty." His program reflected a sincere desire to
improve Chile's economic, social, and political conditions without the violence
typically associated with socialism or the abuses of capitalism. 6 With 56% of the vote
Frei and his Christian Democratic Party (PDC) believed that they had a mandate for
their program of social and economic reform, overlooking the fact that their electoral
victory resulted from the support Frei had received from the Right and from the U.S.
government.. Christian Democracy was Chile's largest political party from 1963 to
2001. The rapidity of its growth was impressive--it was established only in 1957 and
had scored Frei's electoral victory only seven years later.
The PDC was an offshoot the National Falange, a party related to the
Spanish Falange of Jose Antonio Primo Rivera but that emphasized the teachings of
6 For an overview of the Christian Democrats and the presidency of Eduardo Frei Montalva, see Paul E.
Sigmund, The Overthrow ofAllende and the Politics of Chile, 1964-1976 (Pittsburgh: University of
Pittsburgh Press, 1977); Michael Fleet, The Rise and Fall of Chilean Christian Democracy (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1985); Albert L. Michaels, "The Alliance for Progress and Chile's 'Revolution
in Liberty,' 1964-1970," Journal oflnteramerican Studies and World Affairs 18, no. 1 (1976); Thomas L.
Edwards, Economic Development and Reform in Chile: Progress Under Frei, 1964-1970 (East Lansing:
Latin American Studies Center, Michigan State University, 1972); James F. Petras, Chilean Christian
Democracy: Politics and Social Forces (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of
California, 1967); Barbara Stallings, Class Conflict and Economic Development in Chile, 1958-1973
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1978); Arturo Valenzuela, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes:
Chile (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978); Leslie Bethell, Chile Since Independence (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Simon Collier and William F. Sater, A History of Chile, 1808-
1994, Cambridge Latin American Studies (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Brian Loveman
Chile: The Legacy of Hispanic Capitalism, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); Brian H.
Smith, The Church and Politics in Chile: Challenges to Modern Catholicism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1982); Eduardo Frei Montalva, "The Aims of the Christian Democracy," Commonwealth,
9 October 1964:; Sergio Molina Silva, Elproceso de cambio en Chile: la experiencia 1965-1970, Textos del
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the Catholic Church and the humanism found in the writings of the French Thomist
philosopher Jacques Maritain. 7 The Falange began as a faction of the Conservative
Party in the 1930s and was led by progressive members of Catholic youth
organizations. In 1938, when the Conservative Party could no longer tolerate the
progressive politics of the young people, the National Falange declared its
independence. The National Falange continued to maintain its elite orientation and
anticommunist position but searched for a means to implement social reform within
a capitalist framework.
As a party, the National Falange had a slow start. Its leader, Eduardo Frei
Montalva, lost congressional races for a seat in the Chamber of Deputies three
times. In 1949 he secured a seat in the Senate representing the smallest region of
the country. However, the Falangists managed to gain attention for their political
integrity. The Nobel laureate and famed Chilean poet Gabriela Mistral described
Frei as a man of "concrete ideas, unsentimental, but noble nature." 8 In 1957 the
Falange decided to merge with another splinter faction of the Conservative Party,
the Social Christian Conservatives, and together they formed the Christian
Instituto Latinoamericano de Planificaci6n Econ6mica y Social (Santiago, Chile: Editorial Universitaria,
1972).
7Jacques Maritain is credited with giving Catholic thought a political framework. His book Integral
Humanism, a volume based on lectures he gave in Spain before 1936, argued that the modem democratic
state best represented human nature and Christian values. He later drafted a Thomist theory of human rights
that influenced the UN Declaration of Human Rights, which Maritain helped write.
After World War II, Maritain's philosophy, which linked democracy, pluralism, and religious freedom,
shaped the ideological positioning of Christian Democratic parties throughout Europe and Latin America.
In 1934 a young Eduardo Frei heard Maritain speak at the Institut Catholique in Paris. The philosopher's
words later inspired the future president to break with the youth movement of the Conservative Party and
establish the National Falange in Chile. Paul E. Sigmund, "The Transformation of Christian Democratic
Ideology: Transcending Left and Right, or Whatever Happened to the Third Way?" in Christian
Democracy in Latin America, ed. Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 2003).
8 Eduardo Frei Montalva, Memorias: (1911-1934) y correspondencias con Gabriela Mistral y Jacques
Maritain (Santiago de Chile: Planeta, 1989), 158. Cited in Collier and Sater, A History of Chile, 1808-1994,
307. A detailed description of Frei's life can be found in the two-volume biography by Cristian Gazmuri,
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Democratic Party. Later that year Frei won election as a senator representing
Santiago. He received more votes than any other candidate that year. The following
year Frei ran for president and came in third, displacing the Radical Party
candidate as the dominant representative of Chile's political center.
The Rightist candidate, Jorge Alessandri, won the presidency in 1958, but as
Huneeus has pointed out, the Right did not have new ideas or a powerful political
figure like Frei. During the next six years the PDC cultivated a platform of
communitarian reform that would benefit a greater number of Chile's citizens
without the class conflict of Marxism. This included gains in education, healthcare,
housing and employment. As the Left continued to gain power, the PDC grew its
base of support to include the Right, which decided that it was better to back the
PDC than allow the Left to win the presidency.
The United States also embraced the third way offered by the PDC as the
best means of addressing the call for social reform without inspiring another
Marxist revolution, such as that of Cuba. Sources vary on the amount of U.S. dollars
that flowed into Chile in support of Frei's election, but in 1975 the U.S. Senate
Committee on Intelligence Activities put the level of CIA support for Frei's campaign
at $2.6 million.9 The committee report also claimed that the United States had
funded more than half of the Christian Democrats' campaign--without Frei's
knowledge--and that the local CIA station had "furnished support to an array of pro-
Christian Democratic student, women's, professional and peasant groups." Most
Patricia Arancibia, and Alvaro G6ngora, Eduardo Frei Montalva y su dpoca (Santiago de Chile: Aguilar,
2000).
9 U.S. Covert Action in Chile, 1964-1973: Staff Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operation with Respect to Intelligence Activities (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1975), 9. In addition, the PDC received monies from the German Christian Democratic Party, among
others.
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notable among the CIA's efforts was the financing of a slick media scare campaign
that equated a Leftist victory with totalitarianism, the loss of Chilean traditions,
and the destruction of the Chilean family. The CIA also paid for reproductions of an
anticommunist pastoral letter written by Pope Pius XI that was distributed by PDC
organizations. These tactics proved remarkably effective with Chile's largely
Catholic population. On election day only 10% of Chileans who regularly attended
mass voted for Allende.l°
This combined base of support gave the PDC a landslide victory. Despite the
Left's accusations that the PDC was nothing more than the new face of the Right,
the party continued to receive strong support through 1965, electing 82 of their 142
candidates to the Chamber of Deputies and all twelve PDC candidates to the Senate.
Confident in its electoral returns, the PDC decided to pursue its "revolution in
liberty" without building alliances or striking compromises with Chile's other
political parties, including those on the Right that had supported Frei. The
Christian Democrats felt they could find a new balance between the often-conflicting
goals of social reform and economic growth without playing the political game of
coalition building and compromise. The idealistic position of the PDC is apparent in
a statement Frei made shortly after his election, in which he summarized the
ideological stance of the Chilean PDC as follows:
The central tenet of the Christian Democracy is the belief that we are witness
to the crisis of a world exhausted, to the death of paternalism, and to the
birth of a civilization of work and solidarity with man as its center, rather
than the pursuit of monetary gain that has pervaded the bourgeois society.
And its inspiration is that this new era in history and the new social
condition will be based on Christian values and concepts of Christianity. The
strength of this movement lies, in consequence, in its positive character, and
not a negative or anti-communist position.""
10 Smith, Church and Politics in Chile, 107.
" Frei Montalva, "The Aims of the Christian Democracy."
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Or, more succinctly, "Christian Democracy is founded on faith and on the ability to
believe that it represents and better interprets the nature of man, and can inspire a
new and more perfect social order."'2
The PDC program led to significant improvements in education and welfare,
aggressive pursuit of a program of agrarian reform, majority ownership of the
nation's copper mines (a process known as "Chileanization"), and major strides in
creating local self-help organizations for women and the poor (promoci6n popular).
During Frei's tenure the state housing corporation, CORVI, built nearly seventeen
thousand new houses. The government established three thousand new schools, and
95% of Chilean children received a primary school education by 1970, Frei's last year
in office.'3 Valenzuela has written that during Frei's presidency public expenditures
on health increased by 136%; on housing by 130%; and education by 167%.'4 In
addition, Frei secured the majority ownership of the El Teniente, Chiquicamata, and
El Salvador copper mines, which were owned by the U.S. companies Anaconda and
Kennecott. In 1966 the Chilean government bought 51% of El Teniente, Chile's
largest copper mine, and 25% of the newer mines Rio Blanco and Ex6tica. After
much negotiation the government convinced Anaconda to permit the
"Chileanizat;ion" of its mines in 1969. As part of the deal the government retained
the option to purchase the remaining stock between 1973 and 1982 and complete the
process of nationalization.' 5
In the countryside the government began a process of agrarian reform and
played a central role in the organization of rural peasants, a demographic group
12 Ibid.
13 Collier and Sater, A History of Chile, 1808-1994, 312.
14 Valenzuela, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, 25.
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previously ignored by the Chilean Left. Drawing on the idea of the social function of
property espoused by St. Thomas Aquinas, the agrarian reform program created
cooperatives of rural peasants and compensated Chilean landholders with
government bonds. The government permitted two hundred rural unions to form
before they were legalized in 1967. By 1970, 136,984 rural workers were organized, a
dramatic increase over the 1965 figure of 2,118.16 In the final two years of Frei's
presidency, rural peasants seized two hundred private estates, actions that put the
government in the difficult position of choosing between upholding the law or the
stated goals of the revolution in liberty.
The PDC succeeded in incorporating marginal sectors of the population into
the political sphere, an accomplishment that worried members of both the Right and
the Left.17 The party increased the number of local grassroots organizations such as
the Mother's Centers (Centros de Madres) and legalized local governing bodies such
as the Juntas de Vecinos. While these organizations succeeded in mobilizing women,
slum dwellers, young people, and rural farmworkers, sectors of the population
previously ignored by the Right, historians are quick to point out that these
organizations excluded more than they were able to benefit. The government's
tolerance for rural and urban unionization resulted in a dramatic increase in strike
activity and unleashed uncontrolled levels of mobilization that would continue to
plague the Chilean government during Allende's presidency. The Popular Unity
program for socialist change through democracy often receives credit for initiating
Chile's "peaceful road" to revolution. However, as we see here, the peaceful
revolution began well before the presidential election of 1970.
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15 Michaels, "The Alliance for Progress and Chile's 'Revolution in Liberty," 92.
16 Valenzuela, he Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, 29.
Apart; from these programs for social reform, Frei's presidency oversaw an
increase in foreign investment, particularly from U.S. multinationals. By 1970
foreign interests controlled forty of the top one hundred Chilean companies. Twenty-
four of the thirty leading U.S. multinationals had branches in Chile.18 As Chilean
private investment declined, foreign firms came to control one-quarter of all Chilean
industrial capital. Government attempts to increase foreign investment deepened
Chile's economic dependence, failed to alleviate unemployment, and gave priority to
the needs of foreign companies and international lending agencies, not domestic
policies. For this reason Loveman opined that the PDC was a "dismal failure" in its
attempts to modernize by increasing the flow of foreign capital into Chile.'9
The Kennedy administration's Alliance for Progress further exacerbated
Chile's dependence on U.S. capital. From 1961 to 1970 the U.S. government gave
$22.3 billion to Latin America, $720 million of which went to Chile. It was the
largest per-capita sum awarded to any Latin American country. Only Vietnam
ranked higher in terms of per-capita U.S. aid during the 1960s.20 The Alliance for
Progress was announced in a speech that Kennedy gave in March 1961, and it
reflected the priorities of the United States during the Cold War: containing
communism and preventing another revolution like the one in Cuba. The Kennedy
administration believed that building democratic institutions and encouraging
17 The Left worried they would loose constituents to the PDC.
18 Collier and Sater, A History of Chile, 318.
'9 Loveman, Chile: The Legacy of Hispanic Capitalism, 239.
20 Miles D. Wolpin, Cuban Foreign Policy and Chilean Politics (Lexington, Mass.: Heath Lexington
Books, 1972), 71. Cited in Michaels, "The Alliance for Progress and Chile's 'Revolution in Liberty,"' 77.
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economic growth would instigate a wave of peaceful, non-Marxist revolution
throughout Latin America.2 1 In his address Kennedy had announced:
I have called on all people of the hemisphere to join in a new Alliance for
Progress - Alianza para Progreso - a vast cooperative effort unparalleled in
magnitude and nobility of purpose to satisfy the basic needs of the American
people for home, work and land, health and schools - techo, trabajo y tierra,
salud y escuela.2 2
The president described an ambitious ten-point program that called for democratic
institution building, economic integration, better nutrition and education for the
poor, technical training programs, collective defense programs, and cultural
exchange between the northern and southern hemispheres. In August 1961
representatives of the Inter-American Economic Council convened in Punta del Este,
Uruguay, to further develop the objectives of the alliance, which included the
redistribution of income, trade diversification, higher agricultural production,
improved education, inexpensive housing, improved tax collection, and raised levels
of foreign investment.
The Alliance for Progress tried to formulate a program that would bolster
Latin American support for the United States. After Kennedy's assassination
President Lyndon Johnson (1963-1969) continued to support the alliance, but its
focus shifted away from the ideological goals of the past, such as social reform and
democratic development, and moved toward programs for fostering economic
growth.23 However, the Christian Democrats had the potential to institute both
while offering an ideological framework for change that the Alliance for Progress
21 Michael E. Latham, Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and "Nation Building" in the
Kennedy Era (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000).
22 John F. Kennedy, "Address at a White House Reception for Members of Congress and the Diplomatic
Corps of the Latin American Republics," March 1961, John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library, Boston.
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lacked. Frei noted the compatibility of the stated goals of the Alliance for Progress
and the reforms that he thought Latin America needed, including the elimination of
the elite, redistribution of the land, equal access to education and wealth, and secure
economic development. "These," he concluded, "are precisely the same objectives of
the Alliance."2 4
Chile provided an ideal test site for the Alliance for Progress. Apart from the
political platform advanced by the Christian Democracy, the country had the longest
history of constitutional democracy in the region, uninterrupted since 1932.
Moreover, Chile had finished drafting a ten-year plan for economic growth that was
known as the National Plan for Economic Development and could be used as a
benchmark for determining the effectiveness of U.S. monies. Although CORFO, the
state development agency, had finished the plan in 1958, the government did not
call for its implementation until 1961. Frei's minister of finance, Sergio Molina,
explained that the four-year delay resulted from a lack of government support for
economic planning during the Alessandri administration. Moreover, the decision to
implement the plan aligned perfectly with Kennedy's announcement of the Alliance
for Progress. According to Molina, the Chilean government "saw the opportunity to
obtain an immediate advantage from the ten-year plan," as it provided a "means of
gaining external credit" from the Kennedy administration.2 5 In 1964 both Frei and
Allende stressed the importance of planning and wanted to increase the number of
technically trained employees within the Chilean government so that they could
further develop the scope and utility of these plans for national benefit. In a 2004
23 Michaels argues that under Johnson the Alliance for Progress adopted a stance of political neutrality
except in the case of stopping communism.
24 Eduardo Frei Montalva, "The Alliance That Lost Its Way," Foreign Affairs 45, no. 3 (1967): 438.
25 Molina Silva, Elproceso de cambio en Chile, 159.
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interview Molina added that planning also "gave [the United States] a vision of an
ordered country, that knew where it was going, what it wanted to do. This was very
important for Chile's relationship with the Alliance for Progress."2 6 Critics of the
Alliance for Progress would point to the clarity with which U.S. officials articulated
the methods, aims, and benchmarks of success for programs of economic growth, the
vagueness of their definitions of democracy, and their failure to explain the
relationship between democracy and social reform.
Organization is Power
In 1965, in his first State of the Union speech, Frei declared, "The road to power is
organization."27 His comment was directed at the need for labor to organize, but the
remark also expressed Frei's stance on administrative order, rationalization, and
control. In that same speech he also stated, "The people voted to reform the
administrative organization of the State so that the country has at its command an
effective instrument for realizing the changes it desires."28 From the beginning of his
presidency, Frei devoted considerable attention to improving the rationalization and
coordination of state activities, which later included computerizing facets of public
administration. In 1965 he created the Special Commission on Rationalization of
State Civil Administration, presided over by the general comptroller, who reported
directly to the president. Frei also submitted to Congress a proposal to create an
executive office of national planning. This agency, which became ODEPLAN, was
located within the executive branch; advised the Ministry of Finance; promoted
26 Sergio Molina Silva, interview by author, 15 January 2004.
27 Primer mensaje del Presidente de la Republica de Chile don Eduardo Frei Montalva al inaugurar el
periodo de sesiones ordinarias del Congreso Nacional, 21 de Mayo de 1965, (Santiago, Chile:
Departamento de Publicaciones de la Presidencia de la Republica - Chile, 1965), 6.
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national, sector, and regional planning across the various government ministries;
and contributed to the creation of short-term and long-term plans for economic
development. Through ODEPLAN the government acknowledged the importance of
economic and social planning and took responsibility for its execution. In addition to
establishing budgets for spending the various sums flowing into the Chilean
treasury and setting priorities for economic activities, ODEPLAN sought to
rationalize the Chilean government workforce by defining the skills required to hold
various administrative positions and directing investment toward the training of
these future employees.29 Congress debated the program for two years before
enacting the law that granted ODEPLAN its charter in 1967. The agency began
operation that August under the direction of Fernando Aguirre Tupper, formerly an
engineer employed by CORFO.30
The Central Office for Organization and Methods (OCOM), an organization
created during the Alessandri administration (1958-1964), also concentrated its
efforts on making government agencies better organized and more efficient. It
established the National Center for Electro-Mechanical Data Processing in 1966 and
helped organize the data-processing centers of other government agencies, such as
the National Statistics Institute (INE). OCOM drafted detailed job descriptions that
were used to define pay scales for all public sector workers.3l In an independent
effort, tthe government also established a system for tallying the total number of
state employees on the payroll of Chile's many state agencies, enterprises, and
28 Ibid., 9.
29 Segundo mensaje del Presidente de la Republica de Chile don Eduardo Frei Montalva al inaugurar el
periodo de sesiones ordinarias del Congreso Nacional, 21 de Mayo de 1966, (Santiago, Chile:
Departamento de Publicaciones de la Presidencia de la Republica - Chile, 1966).
30 "Senado aprob6 creaci6n de la Oficina de Planificaci6n," La Naci6n, 27 April 1967; "Primer director del
"ODEPLAN"," La Naci6n, 12 July 1967.
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organizations. "It seems hard to believe," the president remarked, "but before 1965
there was never a system to know the exact number of administrative functionaries
[in government]. " 32
The Christian Democrats also established smaller offices and committees
charged with reforming state administrative practices. The Office of Rationalization
and Administrative Control opened in 1967. In April 1968 the government created
the National Commission on Computation to advise the government on computing
and to draft reports about how the public sector could make the best use of modern
electronic data-processing technology. At the same time, the government also
proposed creating a national training school for public administration that would
educate state employees on "the most modern techniques of organization and in the
use of computing."33
In addition, the Frei government founded a number of other state agencies
and enterprises dedicated to Chilean technological development. These new state
agencies linked the state to the management of Chilean technical resources and
their role in the Chilean economy. The Empresa Nacional de Telecomunicaciones
(ENTEL), established on December 30, 1964, facilitated communication within Chile
by building new telephone, telegraph, and telex lines. However, the true utility of
these communications lines is debatable. Most Chileans could place a telephone call
only from the limited number of call centers that ENTEL was constructing in Chile's
urban centers. It often took forty-five minutes to call Santiago from Valparaiso, a
31 See, for example, Ministerio de Hacienda, "Nomina finica de cargos administraci6n civil del estado,
indice," Ministerio de Hacienda, OCOM, Santiago de Chile, 1967.
32 Frei Montalva, "Discurso del Presidente Frei en inauguraci6n computador electr6nico."
33 Ibid. See also Ministerio de Hacienda, "Programa de adiestramiento en la administraci6n pfiblica y
creaci6n de la escuela nacional de adiestramiento," Ministerio de Hacienda, Direcci6n de Presupuestos,
OCOM, Santiago de Chile, 1968.
124
distance easily traversed by a two-hour bus ride.3 4 ENTEL also improved radio and
television transmissions, which increased the influence of the media and, as the CIA
and Chilean political parties quickly learned, its potential for manipulating public
opinion. In 1.967 the government established the Comisi6n Nacional de Investigaci6n
Cientifica y Tecnol6gica (CONICYT), similar to the National Science Foundation in
the United States, and charged it with directing and developing Chilean science and
technology to meet national needs. On January 19, 1968, the Frei administration
established Chile's first National Science Prize and made CONICYT an independent
organization. CONICYT significantly increased the government's support for
scientific research. During its first year the science agency funded 154 projects
involving 263 scientists and purchased scientific equipment for common use. Its
formation also reflected the importance of scientific and technological activities to
the Chilean government and its developmentalist policies. At the 1967 Conference of
Science and Technology for Latin America, Frei declared:
No one can ignore that the development of contemporary civilization depends
on science and technology and that those countries that are on the margin of
this process of investigation or that are not capable of perceiving and
adapting this process to their own reality, find themselves unpardonably
condemned. 35
Through CONICYT the government hoped to save Chile from this unpardonable
fate.
The government's determination to promote science and technology was
further reflected in the creation of technology offices within Chile's traditional
government agencies. For example, the state development agency, CORFO, carved
34 For an overview of Chilean telecommunications see "Las telecommunicaciones en Chile," Revista
chilena de ingenieria y anales del Instituto de Ingenieros, May-June 1966.
35 Eduardo Frei Montalva, Amirica Latina tiene un destino (Santiago de Chile: Zig Zag, 1967).
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out a technology subdivision in 1968 that was known as the Comit de
Investigaciones Technol6gicas de Chile (INTEC). This new committee advised
CORFO on ways to "promote technological research in the country" and encourage
"studies for the development of new industrial products." The committee's charter
also contained plans to establish a "Center or Institute for technological research"
that would further assist the application of technology to Chilean industries.3 6
Frei's desire to modernize the Chilean state and the Chilean economy by
using new techniques and advanced technologies depended on the financial
assistance and expertise of international organizations such as the United Nations,
International Development Bank, and European Economic Commission; the United
States; Western European nations such as France, Britain, Italy, Holland, and
Switzerland; and other nations such as Yugoslavia, Romania, Israel, the Soviet
Union, India, Argentina, and Brazil.37 Except for the U.S. funded Alliance for
Progress, many of these reflected Chile's political ties, such as those to the European
Christian Democratic parties. The Chilean program for state growth and Latin
American integration resembled the program advanced by the European Christian
Democrats for the creation of a European welfare state after World War II, postwar
36 CORFO, Resolution No 834, 1968, INTEC Archives, Santiago de Chile.
37 In its report on international technical assistance, ODEPLAN listed various sources of aid. Multilateral
sources included the United Nations and its specialized agencies such as the International Labor
Organization, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and the
World Health Organization. Regional sources included the Organization of American States, the
International Development Bank, the European Economic Commission, and the Organization for
Cooperation and Economic Development. Finally, the report listed the governments of"friend" nations,
including Germany, Belgium, Denmark, the United States, France, Great Britain, Holland, Israel, Italy,
Japan, Switzerland, Austria, Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Spain, India, Norway,
Poland, Romania, Sweden, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia. Departamento de Asistencia Tdcnica
Internacional, "La asistencia tdcnica internacional recibida por Chile, 1965-1968: un intento de
evaluaci6n," 1970, ODEPLAN, Santiago, 10.
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reconstruction, and European integration.3 8 At the beginning of his presidency, Frei
broke off relations with the Soviet Union to increase Chile's standing with the
United States; however, he gradually reinstated relations with the Soviet bloc as his
presidency continued.
Between 1965 and 1968 the Chilean government received $46.4 million in
technical assistance from industrialized nations and earmarked $9 million for
scholarships abroad or at Chilean universities.3 9 France, in particular, provided both
technical assistance and the foreign credit that Chile needed to buy computers,
upgrade the national telecommunications system, and introduce new techniques for
civil administration. An ODEPLAN report on technical assistance acknowledged,
"The help of France in the areas of civil Administration has been of great
importance, especially through OCOM." The report also thanked the United Nations
and Britain for their assistance to the Chilean Budget Office and EMCO.4 0 The $46.4
million in foreign aid also included $1.6 million for 715 scholarships for civil
servants and economists and $4.3 million (1966-68) for state projects and the
bringing foreign experts to Chile. Chile spent more of its foreign aid on
improvements to Chilean government administration than on industry, energy,
transportation, mining, and health, construction, and social development.4 l Most of
this money came from the United States and France.
38 Sigmund, "The Transformation of Christian Democratic Ideology: Transcending Left and Right, or
Whatever Happened to the Third Way?" 68. In the spirit of Sim6n Bolivar, Frei repeatedly called for Latin
American integration. Without integration, Frei believed, "Our markets will be reduced and we will not be
able to reach new forms of economic life and the widespread adoption of modern technology." Segundo
mensaje del Presidente de la Republica de Chile don Eduardo Frei Montalva al inaugurar el periodo de
Sesiones Ordinarias del Congreso Nacional, 21 de Mayo de 1966, 57.
39 Departamento de Asistencia Tdcnica Internacional, "La asistencia tecnica intemacional recibida por





Taken together, these administrative initiatives and the influx of foreign aid
demonstrated the Christian Democrats' commitment to cultivating of Chilean
technological capabilities, as well as the application of new techniques and
technologies to achieve better administrative and economic management. Science
and technology occupied a crucial role in the economic development model promoted
by international organizations and the United States, which emphasized
industrialization, capitalism, and technocracy. Frei employed a similar framing for
his development program and expressed faith in the power of science and technology
to positively change Chilean society. The larger role of the state in Chile's
modernization and development efforts, as well as the emphasis on state planning,
also reflected the influence of the French dirigiste model and its interventionist and
technocratic state.4 2 Chilean industries and administrative bodies both felt the
effects of state growth and heightened intervention. By 1970 the state was
responsible for more than half of all Chilean industrial investment.4 3
Government projects for rationalization and organization extended beyond
the formation of national state agencies and entered the daily life of Chilean
communities. In addition to setting up local and regional offices of ODEPLAN, Frei
42 In the French context dirigisme refers to a capitalist economy with a high level of state intervention and
control. French dirigisme emphasized the formation of state enterprises, such as the national railway,
telecommunications company, and energy company and coincided with the creation of the administrative
training school, the 1tcole Nationale d'Administration, as well as the promotion of engineers to civil service
leadership positions. Dirigisme flourished during the Center-Right presidencies of Charles de Gaulle
(1958-69) and Gieorges Pompidou (1969-74). According to Sergio Molina, Chile "felt a stronger
identification with [dirigisme] than with a liberal or classical system where the private sector [makes]
decisions. Private sector decisions were few and less important, they were to a large extent induced by the
public sector. The State fixed prices ... the State authorized importations, so it was a dominant State."
This made state planning seem logical "because a good part of the influential policy measures [being made]
were State decisions." Molina interview. For an in-depth study of French bureaucracy see Michel Crozier,
The Bureaucratic Phenomenon (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964). For a comparative study of
Chilean bureaucratic structures, see Peter S. Cleaves, Bureaucratic Politics andAdministration in Chile
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), and German Urzua Valenzuela and Anamaria Garcia
Barzelatto, Diagnostico de la burocracia chilena (1818-1969) (Santiago de Chile: Editorial Juridica de
Chile, 1971).
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fought to legalize the Juntas de Vecinos, connect them to other hierarchical
governing bodies, and use them to build democracy and instigate local development
efforts. The formation of grassroots community organizations constituted a vital part
of his National Council for Popular Promotion (Consejeria Nacional de Promoci6n
Popular), charged with identifying local needs, coordinating development efforts
between the state and local levels, and facilitating the flow of information between
the governing center and the Chilean people. According to Molina, promoci6n
popular constituted a key part of the Christian Democratic ideology:
Organization was a form of power ... to better defend your interests and
therefore increase your potential in all levels of society, in the Juntas de
Vecinos, in the Centros de Madres, in the urban centers, because they
pressure the local authorities and the national authorities regarding their
interests. Social organization was an essential question.4 4
He added that the government's attention to increasing participation was "attacked
by other parties because they considered it a political instrument of the Christian
Democrats. The truth is that there was a degree of political proselytizing." He
maintained that this was not the intention but that "people felt a certain
relationship with what the Christian Democracy had done."45
To return to the remark Frei made in his 1965 State of the Union Address,
which was echoed by Molina, organization is power. Through efforts that ranged
from coordinating the activities of a growing public administration to coordinating
the activities of Chile's working and poor classes so that they might improve their
situation, the Frei government increased its scope of influence and tried to fortify its
position. Collier and Sater argued, "The entire PDC program can be seen as an
extension and intensification of the state-interventionist tradition that had built up
43 Collier and Sater, A History of Chile, 318.
44 Molina interview.
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since the Ibafiez regime of the 1920s," an observation that would hold true were it
not for the aforementioned attempts by the Christian Democrats to simultaneously
broaden the base of organized political participation.4 6 In contrast to the Ibafiez
government of the 1920s, where organization and rationalization became
synonymous with tools of dictatorial control, Frei continued to uphold democracy
and succeeded in increasing levels of popular participation.4 7 However, Frei did
appeal to scientific methods and techniques in order to avoid the compromises and
coalition building that had characterized Chile's democratic process in the past. He
strengthened his position by appointing economists or engineers, rather than
politicians, to high government offices, including those in his cabinet. From this
perspective, it would be accurate to say that Frei continued the "tecnificaci-n" that
began under Ibafiez and the Popular Front government. But it was a strategy
members of the opposition had learned to recognize. Members of the Right especially
did not view the president's attention to planning as apolitical but rather as a means
of extending executive power. For example, senators from the Right objected to
ODEPLAN, not because they disagreed with the value of centralized economic
planning but because they believed that the agency's location within the executive
branch would advance the presidential agenda and not the national interest.48 There
was probably some truth in the critique, particularly given the unwillingness of the
PDC to compromise or recognize competing voices. On the surface, PDC calls for the
rational allocation of resources and long-term economic planning appeared to be
45 Ibid.
46 Collier and Sater, A History of Chile, 318.
47 Aldolfo Ibafiez Santa Maria, "Los 'ismos' y la redefinici6n del Estado: tecnicismo, planificaci6n y
estatismo en Chile, 1920-1940," Atenea, no. 474 (1996); Molina Silva, Elproceso de cambio en Chile;
Richard Bourne, Political Leaders of Latin America (Baltimore: Penguin, 1969).
48 "Senado aprob6 creaci6n de la Oficina de Planificaci6n."
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above clientelist politics, offering a scientifically determined path for development.
However, this framing also represented a party strategy to place expertise over
corporatism and justified the PDC's practice of ruling as a single party.
When asked to define the idea of modernity that prevailed during the
presidency of Frei Montalva, Sergio Molina responded, "I believe that modernity was
in the institutional changes [Frei] made, being aware of the need to rationalize
decisions, being aware of the significant waste in state actions due to unjustified
bureaucracy, being aware that decisions must be made with a degree of knowledge
about their effects." Rationalization and order, and the techniques for their
achievement;, therefore constituted central facets of Frei's modernization program.
He added, "I would say that modernity was more in the search for a different way of
doing things." If the administration of Jorge Alessandri had been the "government of
managers," Molina reasoned that the Frei administration was a "government of
advisers," with professional academics assuming a role of greater influence.4 9 Molina
himself was a prime example of this phenomenon, having worked as a professor of
economics at the University of Chile and as the director of the budget office from
1954 to 1964. His successor as minister of finance, Rafil Saez, was one of the most
respected engineers in Chile.50 This predominance and privileging of technocratic
expertise also characterized the ideological program of the PDC. Molina concluded,
"Modernization, the change in the structure of the country, this was the focus, this
was what we were looking for, but in the sense of social change, equality, different
organization." Rationalization, organization, coordination, and, at bottom,
tecnificaci6n not only played a crucial role in Frei's economic policies for
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49 Molina interview.
development, but also the social changes outlined in the "revolution in liberty" and
the president's dream for modernizing the state so that he might create a better
society. As instruments of organization, computers thus played a role in shaping
Chile's economic, political, and social history. 5'
Centers of Computation
The presidency of Frei Montalva marks an important moment in the history of
Chilean computing. The Christian Democrats imported Chile's first mainframe
computers for government use, established a government agency dedicated to
managing the application of these new machines (EMCO), and instituted the first
publicly funded training programs for computer programmers and systems analysts
that predated university computer science curriculums. Granted, the PDC cannot
claim sole credit for these accomplishments as they built upon past efforts to bring
order to the bureaucracy and adopt electromechanical data processing technologies
in state activities. However, the PDC played a vital role in supporting Chile's early
adoption of mainframe computer technology and its initial training of computer
operators.
Electronic computers, as opposed to the mechanical tabulating machines
discussed in chapter 2, had begun to arrive in Latin America during the late 1950s.
Venezuela purchased an IBM 650 in 1957.52 The University of Chile installed a
Standard Electric-Lorenz ER-56 in 1959, a machine later derided as an "elephant
50 For more on Rafil Saez, consult the two-volume collection of his writings, Rafil Saez, Rail Sdez hombre
del siglo XX(Santiago de Chile: Dolmen, 1994).
51 In Spanish computers are even called ordenadores or "orderers."
52 Ram6n C. Barquin, "Some Political Effects of Computation in Latin America," in M. T. Alfred P. Sloan
School of Management Working Paper no. 655-73 (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Alfred P. Sloan School of
Management, 1973).
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without a trunk or feet," given its limited capabilities (see figure 3.2).53 In 1965 the
State Technical University of Chile acquired an electronic computer donated by the
Californian Research Corporation and the Californian Chemical Pan American
Company.54 The University of Concepci6n approved the creation of a computer
center in 1964 and purchased an IBM 1620-II in 1965 with help from the United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and an
education discount from IBM.5 5 The Catholic University also purchased an IBM
1620 for its computer center, and then replaced it in 1969 with a Burroughs B3500
mainframe for academic research and the training of programmers and systems
analysts. 56
On April 4, 1964, IBM had announced that it would be selling a new family of
computers with interchangeable software and peripheral components known as the
System/360. It was, in the words of Fortune magazine, "IBM's $5 billion dollar
gamble." The IBM 360 mainframe quickly became the most sought-after computer in
the Chilean market. According to the United Nations, the first IBM 360 arrived in
Chile in 1966 and was most likely destined for the private sector (see table 3.1). The
University of Chile welcomed the arrival of an IBM 360/40 in 1967 with an elaborate
inauguration ceremony attended by President Frei. For its first official duty the new
machine printed a likeness of the president in less than thirty seconds (see figure
53 Patricio Ldniz, interview by author, 23 December 2003. A firsthand description of the Lorenz ER-56 and
its early operation appears in Julieta Melo, La Escuela de Ingenieria: quidn y que es la Facultad de
Ciencias Fisicas y Matemdticas de la Universidad de Chile (Santiago, Chile: Eds. Mil Hojas, 1997).
54 "Computador electr6nico recibe a las 11.30 Horas la U. Tdcnica," El Mercurio, 13 January 1965;
"Computador electr6nico recibi6 Universidad Tdcnica del Estado," El Mercurio, 14 January 1965. As the
story goes, the Californian Research Corporation was looking for a place to send its outdated hardware. An
employee who had ties to the State Technical University recommended sending the machine to Chile. It
was heralded as the largest computer in Chile and one of the biggest on the continent, with the ability to
perform five hundred operations per second.
5 Carlos Mufioz Labrafla, Historia de la Facultad de Ingenieria Universidad de Concepci6n (Santiago de
Chile: Ediciones Universidad de Concepci6n, 1992).
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3.3).57 The then-director of the Department of Mathematics at the University of
Chile, Efrain Friedmann, stated that the computer would support government
agencies such as CORFO and the National Health Service as well as provide a tool
for scientific research and engineering education within the university. In this way,
the university could help lessen Chilean dependency on foreign computer companies.
Chile's treasury and internal revenue service were among the first
government agencies to use rented computer technology, although the state banks,
the National Statistics Institute (INE), and the Civil Registry (Registro Civil) were
not far behind. Computer technology helped the government to restructure the
national tax system and enforce payment. In 1967 the state treasury began a pilot
program to record daily economic statistics and transactions, an effort purported to
"eliminate a series of routine jobs for treasury personnel."58
Rented computer technology entered the census office in time for the
agriculture and fishing census of 1967; the creation of EMCO and the government's
acquisition of mainframe technology enabled the complete computerization of census
data by the time of the population census in 1970. The new methods of data
processing received a mixed reaction from employees at the National Statistics
Institute. "In Chile we have a particular way of thinking, we are not friends of
change," remarked Jorge Morales, an employee of the National Statistics Institute
for more than forty years. He began his career processing the data for the national
censuses in the 1960s and 1970s. "There was a lot of fear, primarily surrounding
56 "Nuevo computador adquirird la UC.," La Naci6n, 22 July 1969.
57 "Asombroso computador inaugura la universidad," El Mercurio, 17 January 1967; "Centro electr6nico
fue inaugurado por S.E. en la Universidad de Chile," El Mercurio, 18 January 1967; "Cerebro electr6nico
comenz6 a funcionar," La Naci6n, 18 January 1967.
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unemployment, particularly when a machine arrives that works much quicker and
can perform many tasks on its own."59 In the end, however, the process of tabulating
the census data did not change dramatically with the introduction of mainframe
technology. Employees of INE still needed to collect the data and prepare the series
of punch cards as they had in the past. However, they then delivered the stacks of
cards to EMCO instead of performing the calculations themselves on
electromechanical tabulators or taking the cards to an IBM service bureau.
Other government projects made use of the new computing machines. The
Servicio Nacional del Empleo (National Employment Service) drew up plans for a
computerized database that would match unemployed "maestros" (e.g., carpenters,
plumbers, electricians) with potential employers.60 The Ministry of Justice began a
program to assign a national identification number and civil identification card
(C6dula de Identidad) to every citizen, efforts that paralleled activities in the
treasury to prevent tax evasion and tax fraud. This rationalization of the Chilean
population later enabled the Ministry of Justice, Internal Revenue Service, and Civil
Registry to develop a common national identification number (RUT) that facilitated
the collection, organization, and exchange of information on the Chilean
population.6 ' The National Mining Enterprise (ENAMI) established a regional
computing center in September 1968 that was charged with processing the
administrative and production data from the various smelting plants and refineries
58 Tercer mensaje del Presidente de la Repziblica de Chile don Eduardo Frei Montalva al inaugurar el
periodo de Sesiones Ordinarias del Congreso Nacional, 21 de Mayo de 1967, (Santiago, Chile:
Departamento de Publicaciones de la Presidencia de la Republica - Chile, 1967), 188.
59 Jorge Morales, interview by author, 9 August 2002.
60 "Cerebro electr6nico para obtener empleo," La Naci6n, 19 June 1967.
61 Isaquino Benadof, interview by author, 10 April 2002; Sexto mensaje del Presidente de la Repfiblica de
Chile don Eduardo Frei Montalva al inaugurar el periodo de Sesiones Ordinarias del Congreso Nacional,
21 de Mayo de 1970, (Santiago, Chile: Departamento de Publicaciones de la Presidencia de la Republica -
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as well as all ENAMI offices.62 According to La Nacion, the ENAMI computer could
process 30,000 multiplications per second, punch as many as 14,000 cards per hour,
and read as many as 15,000 cards per hour.
OCOM was an important institutional precursor to the government's
computerization of administrative tasks and its formation of a state computer
agency. The Chilean government formed OCOM within the Ministry of Finance
during Jorge Alessandri's presidency, but the office increased its influence
considerably during Frei's administration as part of the multisited effort to promote
economic growth and administration reform.63 The management approach known as
"organization and methods," or O&M, began in the British Treasury during the
1940s as a means of applying scientific methods to administrative management.6 4
The increase in O&M's appeal during the 1940s paralleled the directed economic
policies put in place by the British Labour Party in the aftermath of World War II
and reflected the increases in state spending demanded by reconstruction. Toward
the end of the 1940s other sectors of the government, British nationalized industries,
and the British private sector adopted O&M techniques. O&M always emphasized
the development and application of methods to improve the efficiency of clerical
work. However, it evolved considerably from the 1940s to the 1960s, changing from a
human-centered approach to collecting, organizing, and recording information
Chile, 1970). See also Ministerio de Hacienda, "Registro finico nacional" 1969, Ministerio de Hacienda,
Direcci6n de Registro Civil e Identificaci6n, OCOM, Santiago de Chile.
62 "Inaugurada computadora que realiza treinta mil operaciones por segundo," 1968.
63 Legal decree 106 (Decreto de Fuerza de Ley), passed in 1960, charged the Budget Office of the Ministry
of Finance to "dictate norms and establish general procedures of organization and the operation of
Organization and Methods units that exist or that are created in the different Services." Ministerio de
Hacienda, DFL-106, 25 Feburary 1960.
64 Agar writes that Treasury O&M was "at last, a British administrative science espoused by an expert
movement which can be compared in relative size, influence, and theoretical sophistication to the
management sciences found in early-twentieth century America that have been described by Yates." Jon
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during the 1940s to one that emphasized mechanized data processing, using punch-
card machinery and, later, electronic computation during the 1950s and 1960s. As
Agar writes, these technologies became "the unproblematic tool and symbol of
postwar O&M."65 The computer, in particular, became a machine that embodied the
management goals of O&M technocrats. As O&M spread, Britain became an
administrative model for other nations, such as Chile.
OCOM oversaw the introduction of Organization and Methods techniques in
public administration and trained government workers in these new practices and
the use of tabulating machines. The office also controlled the tariffs on the IBM Unit
Record machines imported by the private sector and assisted the government in
applying these punch-card machines to the administration of the public sector.
Following Frei's election, OCOM was able to expand its presence in the public
administration through Frei's efforts to modernize the state. They also trained
systems analysts and programmers for employment as functionaries in state
accounting and offices such as social security. OCOM served as the organizational
hub for the government's data processing activities prior to 1968. In 1967, the
President formed a National Commission for Data Processing placed under the
direction of OCOM and charged it with laying the groundwork for creating a
national center for data processing. This resulted one year later in the formation of
EMCO.
Agar, The Government Machine: A Revolutionary History of the Computer (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press,
2003), 258.
65 O&M technocrats did not embrace these technologies overnight but gradually became convinced over a
five-year period that computers could feasibly replace clerks. The technocrats also succumbed to external
pressure from computer manufacturers and the British press, as well as internal pressures from the British
government for more complete industrial statistics and increased computing power. Ibid., 256, 305-07.
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EMCO represented the culmination of Chile's gradual acquisition of
computing machinery and expertise throughout the 1960s, its longer history of using
punch-card tabulating machines, and the government's desire to centrally control
the application of data processing technologies. Part of the government's rationale
for EMCO was simple. Computers were extremely expensive machines, and each
branch of government could not afford to purchase a mainframe for its exclusive use.
Former IBM employee Fernando Villanueva recalled that if a Chilean company
wanted to purchase an IBM 1401, a machine known as the "Model T of business
computers" that was hardly top of the line, it needed to pay the $200,000 purchase
price plus a government required $2.5 million deposit in the Central Bank as proof
of funds, money that would be returned to the purchaser when the machine
arrived.66 The company also paid 200% of the purchase price in tariffs, raising the
total cost of the IBM machine to $600,000.67 Chilean law excused government
agencies from paying tariffs, making the government one of the few early adopters of
the technology, but the price of these machines and the limited availability of the
foreign credit required to make their purchase possible presented a strong argument
in favor of centralizing Chilean computer resources. Establishing EMCO permitted
the government to import more advanced, costlier technologies, assured their full
utilization, and helped smaller government offices enjoy the benefits of computers.
The agency was placed under the joint direction of CORFO, ENDESA, and ENTEL
66 The 1401 was the first mass-produced, digital, transistor-based model offered by IBM. It was more
limited but more affordable model than the 360 mainframes that the Chilean government later imported
toward the end of the 1960s.
67 Villanueva interview.
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and given status superior to that of OCOM, which continued as an office within the
Ministry of Finance.68
In addition to purchasing and maintaining the government's computer
machinery, EMCO provided advice, services, and educational training. According to
EMCO's first general director, Friedmann, the agency's initial tasks included
creating an economic system of computation that linked the machines to
telecommunication lines to form a "giant nervous system"; setting up compatible
computer systems in every government agency so that the same data archive could
be used in the future; and establishing an "emergency" training program to produce
the specialists needed to carry out the first two goals. Within six months the
computer agency was servicing twenty-two government institutions.6 9 EMCO
inaugurated its first mainframe in January 1969 and welcomed its second and third
machines exactly one year later.70 In addition, both the national bank (Banco del
Estado) and the state electric company, Chilectra, installed new mainframe
machines in September 1969.71 These new acquisitions represented considerable
gains in Chile's computing power. According to the United Nations, by 1969 Chile
possessed thirty-three computers, eighteen in the public sector and fifteen in the
private sector.72
EMCO played a vital role in training the first generation of computer-literate
professionals employed by the government. Isaquino Benadof began working for
68 Barquin, "Some Political Effects of Computation in Latin America," 25.
69 EMCO, "Seminario sobre sistemas de informaci6n en el gobierno," 1969.
70 "Nuevo computador se instala en el pais," La Naci6n, 7 January 1970.
71 "El mds grande computador de Sud America inaugura mafiana el Banco del Estado," La Naci6n, 31
August 1969; "El Presidente Frei Inauguro Computador Electronico del Banco del Estado de Chile," El
Mercurio, 5 September 1969; "Inaugurado computador electr6nico de Chilectra," La Naci6n, 2 September
1969; "Un computador en el Banco del Estado," La Naci6n, 3 September 1969; "Moderno computador
inaugur6 B. del Estado," La Naci6n, 2 September 1969.
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EMCO in 1969 when he was recruited by Freidmann to start a state computer-
training program with another Chilean, Mario Pardo. After exploring options in
Europe and the United States, Benadof and Pardo decided to model the Chilean
computer-training programs after those offered at the British National Computing
Centre, an organization sponsored by the British government to train computer
professionals and help improve the national use of computer technologies. With
United Nations funding and the help of British advisers, the EMCO training
program began operation in 1969 and, according to Benadof, trained three hundred
programmers and one hundred systems analysts in its first year. "It was massive,"
Benadof recalled. "It was a factory. The country didn't have [a computer literate
workforce]. We needed it urgently."7 3
EMCO provided the Chilean government with a center of calculation, where
populations, salaries, economic activities, and national resources came together as
census data., economic data, and administrative data. Newly trained operators
inscribed these data on punch cards read by a central mainframe computer,
compiled the data into quantified maps of Chile, and used the maps to create future
plans of action. The computer, operating around the clock, generated a new wealth
of data and created new forms of national knowledge that allowed the government to
specify with increasing exactitude its program for development and set benchmarks
for success and failure. Moreover, it allowed government officials to demonstrate
these plans and their projected results to sources of foreign aid and conform to the
top-down, technocratic ideas of development advocated by the United Nations and
the Alliance for Progress.
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72 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, "The Application of Computer Technology
for Development," 1971, New York, 15.
The formation of this centralized computer service agency paralleled the
other policies of state intervention put in place by the Christian Democrats.
Centralized computing embodied and reflected the party's vision of a centralized
Chilean state, which demanded quantification to control and coordinate the greater
wealth of information being generated. Moreover, the state and its computing
machines both projected an outward image of modernity and offered techniques for
national progress. Although Chile's computing resources were few, Chilean public
officials acknowledged their importance. In his analysis of the economic policies
advanced by the Christian Democrats, Finance Minister Molina wrote:
The introduction of the science of informatics with its technological element,
the electronic computer, has come to revolutionize the techniques of
administration through system analysis, programming, and data storage,
with the consequent extension and extraordinary speed to compile data and
provide the necessary statistical information.7 4
Molina also credited computers for being "indispensable in diagnosing, analyzing,
and implementing new methods and functional administrative procedures" that
paralleled the planning techniques the government introduced through ODEPLAN,
among others. Information-processing technologies made programs of centralized
economic planning possible and facilitated the growth and expansion of state
bureaucracy.
The amount of information collected and generated by the Chilean
government between 1964 and 1970, coupled with technological capabilities of rapid
data processing, resulted in an extraordinary leap in the annual production of
government documents and reports. The exponential growth of punch cards
processed annually by the Chilean treasury paralleled the rising number of pages
73 Benadof interview.
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generated annually by the Chilean treasury (see table 3.2) as well as the number
found in the annual presidential address before Congress (105 pages in 1965; 496
pages in 1967; and 1,075 pages in 1970, each year containing a higher volume of
graphs and tables).75
While the Chilean government worked to establish its own computer-
processing center, Freidmann positioned Chile as a new center of computation
within the developing world and encouraged other nations to adopt the EMCO
model. A multitalented engineer, Friedmann held degrees in electrical engineering,
civil engineering, and nuclear science from the University of Chile and the
University of Michigan. During the early 1950s he worked as a researcher for
General Electric Research Laboratories in England. He returned to Chile in 1954
and accepted a position in the state energy company ENDESA, working as the head
of electrical systems and later as the head of nuclear engineering. He also assumed a
professorship at the University of Chile. During the presidency of Jorge Alessandri,
Friedmann served as a scientific adviser to the Ministry of Economy. In 1964
Friedmann became the director of mathematics at the University of Chile and began
publishing on the subject of computation.76 When Frei formed CONICYT in 1967,
the president gave Friedmann a seat on the agency's executive committee, a role
that Friedmann fulfilled while serving as the executive director of the Chilean
Commission on Nuclear Energy. In March 1967 Freidmann, in his role as the
74 Molina Silva, Elproceso de cambio en Chile: la experiencia 1965-1970, 177.
75 Sexto mensaje del Presidente de la Repgzblica de Chile don Eduardo Frei Montalva al inaugurar el
periodo de Sesiones Ordinarias del Congreso Nacional, 21 de Mayo de 1970. Computer use in the Finance
Ministry increased from 700 hours per month in 1964 to 1,260 hours per month in 1970.
76 Efrain Friedmann, "Los computadores y los ingenieros," Revista chilena de ingenieriay anales del
Instituto de Ingenieros, no. 312 (1965). His brother Santiago Friedmann also held considerable expertise in
the area of computation and published one of Chile's first technical articles on computers in the Annals of
the Institute of Engineers, the official magazine of Chile's professional engineering society. See Santiago I.
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director of mathematics at the University of Chile, delivered a series of talks on
computation and management to the Ministry of Housing, that the University of
Chile printed and distributed widely.77 Friedmann strongly supported the formation
of a central state computing agency, and when the government announced the
formation of EMCO, it seemed logical that he would preside over the new agency as
its first general director.
Friedmann played a pivotal role in EMCO's early development and raised
government awareness of computer technology and its applications. However, he
also raised Chile's profile within the international community as a leader in
applying computer technology to state administration and economic development. In
February 1970 Friedmann represented Chile at the U.N.-sponsored meeting of the
Ad Hoc Panel of Experts on Computer Technology and helped write a report that
was widely circulated within the United Nations and professional computer
organizations. He was the only representative from a Latin American nation invited
to participate. Friedmann also served as a special consultant to the U.N.
Department of Economic and Social Affairs and contributed to a 1971 report entitled
"The Application of Computer Technology for Development." In addition, Friedmann
drew upon his international connections to advance Chile's computing capabilities
and establish relations between the Chilean computing community and its
counterparts in other nations. In July 1969 he hosted a conference on government
information systems and invited computing luminaries such as Herb Grosch, the
director of the Center of Computing Science and Technology at the U.S. National
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Friedmann, "La era del computador se inicia en Chile," Revista chilena de ingenierlay anales del Instituto
de Ingenieros, October 1962.
Bureau of Standards, and Dov Chevion, director of the Office Mechanization Center
for the Israeli Ministry of Finance, to give presentations in Santiago.78 The
conference drew a crowd and provided a venue for Friedmann to speak of EMCO's
accomplishments as well as the agency's plans for the future. Among the registered
participants were representatives of Chilean national banks, the armed forces,
members of the various government agencies and ministries, academics from the
Chilean universities, representatives from the United Nations, and President Frei
himself. In 1.971 Friedmann traveled to Israel to speak at the Jerusalem Conference
on Information Technology and delivered a talk in support of the EMCO model
entitled "Management of Computer Resources in Lesser Developed Countries."79 He
promoted EMCO with such enthusiasm that his name became inextricably linked
with the computer agency's, and centralized government control of computation
became known as the "Chilean model."80 Chile possessed fewer computers than
several of its Latin American neighbors, yet, according to Barquin, it was perceived
as a leading user of computers in Latin America. Chile influenced the computer
policies later implemented in Bolivia, Uruguay, Ecuador, and, to some extent,
Colombia.8 ' Barquin writes that by 1973, "studies on the centralization of
77 In 1969 EMCO printed a second edition of Friedmann's presentation, citing the "great diffusion" of the
first edition published by the University of Chile. Efrain Friedmann, La gesti6n y los computadores:
conferencias (Santiago de Chile: Empresa de Servicio de Computaci6n Ltda., 1969).
78 EMCO, "Seminario sobre sistemas de informaci6n en el gobierno." Dov Chevion served on the U.N. Ad
Hoc Panel of Experts on Computer Technology with Friedmann, as did Vicktor Glushkov, the Russian
cybernetician who championed the creation of a national computer system for Soviet economic
management.
79 Efrain Friedmann, "Management of Computer Resources in LDC's," paper presented at the Jerusalem
Conference on Information Technology, Jerusalem, August 1971.
80 Barquin defined the Chilean model as "based on the national computer enterprise concept put forth by
Friedmann and embodied in ECOM." EMCO changed its name to ECOM in 1971. Barquin, "Some
Political Effects of Computation in Latin America," 24-25.
81 Ibid., 29. Brazil also formed a federal service for data processing in 1970 known as SERPRO (Serviqo
Federal de Processamento de Datos).
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computation within government [were] advanced by almost all countries [in Latin
America] ... as a manner of reducing costs."82
The Chilean experience complicates studies of computer history that have
positioned the United States as the center of technological development and
portrayed the country as the model for computer adoption and application
elsewhere. Chile illustrates that there was not one model but many. Developing
nations, such as Chile, created their own policies for computer use that suited their
needs, limited resources, and ideological programs. The Chilean government invited
foreign experts from a range of countries, including France, Britain, the United
States, and Israel, to share their knowledge and technological capabilities. Chilean
officials used facets of each national experience to shape Chile's distinctive computer
policy. Chile, in turn, offered an alternative model for developing nations whose size,
wealth, or technology was closer to Chile's than to that of the nations of the
developed world. Instead of a simplistic concept of center and periphery, we see the
presence of many computational centers and an idea of periphery that changed with
time and perspective. Computers allowed developing nations to mimic the
technology-centered concept of development found in the industrialized nations of
North America and Western Europe. They also provided an instrument for
developing nations to advance their programs for sustained economic growth and
material modernization. At the same time however, computers created new
gradations of development and expertise that developing nations, such as Chile,
could use to reposition themselves with respect to the rest of the world.
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As national governments renegotiated and complicated the idea of center and
periphery, multinationals such as IBM continued to view Chile as a peripheral market,
but one still worth dominating. Although members of the Chilean government frequently
framed EMCO as an attempt to control costs, another rationale surfaced that viewed
EMCO as an institutional effort to limit government dependence on any one
multinational computer company -- particularly IBM. Throughout 1967, critiques of
Frei's economic policies had mounted from the Left and from within the Christian
Democracy. The benefits given to foreign investors and U.S. multinationals in
attempts to industrialize the country drew fire in particular. A new school of
economic thought critical of ISI-led development emerged from the offices of the
United Nations Economic Committee on Latin America, located in Santiago. Known
as dependency theory and advocated by a group of young, highly intelligent South
American economists, this new economic framework gained popularity toward the
latter part of the 1960s and subsequently became an economic pillar for the Leftist
platform. While ISI tried to end underdevelopment through industrial growth,
dependency theory viewed industrialization as insufficient for ending the
inequalities of the world capitalist system. In place of the United States' assertion
that all countries could achieve development if given the right opportunities,
dependency theory cast underdevelopment as the necessary flip side of the wealth
amassed in the developed world nations. Underdevelopment was the very product of
the existing global economic order. Industrialized nations, such as the U.S. and
Europe cont:inued to own the means of production in the ISI model and used their
economic advantage to control the industrialization of Latin American nations and
prevent them from achieving economic equality.
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The failures of ISI and Frei's willingness to sacrifice the social components of
the revolution in liberty for continued foreign investment caused fissures within the
Christian Democratic Party. In 1967 when two of its subgroups, the rebels (rebeldes)
and thirdists (terceristas), gained control of the party and pushed the government-
supporting faction (oficialistas) into a minority position. The rebels were frustrated
with the government and wanted to accelerate the pace of reform outlined in the
revolution in liberty while maintaining the party's commitment to social change.
Their leader, Jacques Chonchol, subsequently drafted a report entitled the "Non-
Capitalist Way of Development," which criticized Chilean economic policies that
favored U.S. corporations and foreign investment. Faced with these challenges, IBM
took measures to secure their position of dominance within the Chilean market.
"La Mama" IBM
As the story goes, Thomas J. Watson Sr. formed IBM World Trade in 1949 to end the
rivalry between his two sons. His elder son, Thomas J. Watson Jr., became CEO of
IBM's massive U.S. operation. His younger son, Dick Watson, presided over the
newly formed World Trade Corporation, which their father established as an
independent subsidiary responsible for all company business outside the United
States. This arrangement permitted Watson Sr. to provide ample opportunity for his
younger son. and prevented the ambitious elder son from trying to sabotage the
career of his younger brother.8 3 Dick Watson was fluent in Spanish, French, and
German. He traveled extensively but spent most of his time overseeing IBM's
European operations and rubbing elbows with the European elite. While his brother
83 David Mercer, IBM: How the World's Most Successful Corporation Is Managed (London: Kogan Page,
1987); Thomas J. Watson Jr., Father, Son, & Co.: My Life at IBM and Beyond (New York: Bantam, 1990).
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increased IBM's dominance in the U.S. market, Dick Watson made World Trade a
lucrative and successful operation, transforming the company into a true
multinational. In 1965 World Trade had a gross income of more than $1 billion, a
figure that had doubled by 1968 and approached the $3 billion mark by 1970.84 IBM
President Al. Williams quipped in the early 1960s that Big Blue's competitors were
"fighting us so hard here [in the United States] that they're not even thinking about
overseas. Wait until they find out how thoroughly World Trade has gotten itself
entrenched."8 5
Dick Watson and World Trade recognized the importance of tailoring IBM
sales tactics to the conventions of local cultures. In Europe IBM hired members of
the aristocracy and used their connections among the European elite to build the
company's customer base. In Chile IBM hired largely from the Chilean navy, a
recruiting ground that provided IBM with not only a technically literate workforce
but also connections within government and military organizations. As in IBM's
other international offices, IBM Chile hired local branch managers and staff and
channeled profits back into its Chilean operations, rather than to the company's
central headquarters in New York.
Alfredo Acle began working for IBM in 1964, the year the Christian
Democrats came to power. He was employed first in the education division and later
as the director of systems engineering for IBM Chile. Acle also directed IBM Chile's
government operations branch and participated in many of the government projects
that applied computer technology to administrative operations. He retired after
84 IBM Archives, IBM Highlights, 1885-1969, IBM Archives Documents, 2004, http://www-
03.ibm.com/ibm/history/documents/pdf/ 1885-1969.pdf (18 February 2004); IBM Archives, IBM
Highlights, 1970-1984 IBM Archives Documents, 2004, http://www-
03.ibm.com/ibm/history/documents/pdf/1969-1984.pdf (18 February 2004).
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twenty-seven years with the company and continues to live off of his pension check.
He gushes when speaking of his former employer, to which he refers affectionately
as "la mama IBM," and praises the company for the many benefits that he and his
family received over the years, including health care, educational opportunities, job
security, and a generous retirement plan. He once considered leaving the company,
but his wife would not let him. Laughing, he recounted his many job offers and his
wife's protestations of "Don't go! We are so protected here!"86 Forty years after he
began working for Big Blue, Acle could still recite IBM's company principles
verbatim. When asked how the culture at IBM Chile differed from the IBM culture
in other countries, Acle replied, "There was no difference--the culture of the country
was different, but the culture of IBM was the same. IBM was like a family or a
separate country. We were a country within other countries. .... I believe that
almost all of IBM's old employees think that way."
Fernando Villanueva, a former navy engineer who began working for the
company in 1962 and managed IBM's education center from 1964 to 1968, recalled
several cultural differences that the company needed to accommodate. "The first
cultural change that took place in Chile is when we explained to the United States
that in Chilean and Latin American culture, we drink wine with our food. There
were official IBM meals where there was no alcohol. If you do not offer wine at
lunchtime, you are offending someone."87 The company also had to confront and
overcome differences between what Villanueva described as the "American spirit"
and the "Latin spirit." "When making a promise," Villanueva said, "Latinos tend to
be a little more lax with respect to the promise. Do something, yes, now [ahora].
85 Watson, Father, Son, & Co., 344.
86 Acle interview.
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When is 'now'? 'Now' can be tomorrow or never." Chilean employees of IBM also had
to adapt to the company's strict dress code. "I entered in the age of the white shirt.
They never told you [how to dress, but] you saw everyone dressed that way and you
copied it," Villanueva said. Repeating the instructions that he received in a training
course, Villanueva added that employees had to "always be ready to meet with the
president of a company." He acknowledged that IBM's formal style of dress was not
normal in Chile and that "not all companies had a policy of being correctly well
dressed." For this reason "people looked at us . .. strangely." Villanueva recalled
leaving a meeting with several coworkers and bumping into his aunt on the Santiago
streets. "She asked me," he said laughing, "'What are you doing with all of these
Mormons?"'
Both Acle and Villanueva recalled IBM's close relationship with the Chilean
government, regardless of the ideological bent of the administration. "IBM never had
politics," Villanueva said. "It maintained good relations with the governments [of
Alessandri, Frei, Allende, and Pinochet]." He also noted that the Chilean
government "always had a place for IBM at some table of government," a comment
that clearly illustrates the economic motives behind the company's unwillingness to
align itself outwardly with any political ideology. "That's why President Frei went to
inaugurate the computer and push the button," Villanueva concluded. "There was a
very good relationship." IBM enforced its "apolitical" position within the company as
well as without and was known as one of the few companies that never dealt with a
unionized workforce, a considerable feat given the rise of organized labor in Chile
during the 1960s. Management prohibited employees from expressing political views
in newspapers or other public forums and viewed any infraction as a serious matter.
87 Villanueva interview.
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The company also sponsored workshops on how to deal with labor conflicts that
included role-playing exercises in which employees simulated negotiations between
managers and disgruntled workers. The company instituted an open door policy,
whereby anyone with a grievance was entitled to an audience with his manager,
decreeing that employees therefore did not need to unionize to be heard. Like the
U.S. government, multinational companies also played a role in stifling Chile's
revolutionary process.
IBM tended to its culture. "The culture of IBM was not that simple," Acle
acknowledged. "It had to be manufactured, it had to be maintained, and it had to be
studied." The company began using the phrase "la mama IBM" in the 1960s in
parallel with the rise of the labor movement. During the socialist government of the
early 1970s, Acle said company officials "always referred to themselves as 'la
mamA."' He added, "Behind all of the politics going on," such as strike activity, land
seizures, and public demonstrations, "there was a great IBM family. This was the
slogan. And how do you maintain the great IBM family? You maintain it with a few
meals during the year, where they invited your wife, a celebration at the end of the
year that your whole family attended. They gave you food, gifts for the children,
Santa Claus came . . . [The feeling of the great family] was not born inside, [IBM]
had to inject; elements to keep it alive."
IBM navigated the Chilean political landscape and dominated government
computer sales with the same dexterity that it displayed in keeping politics out of its
offices. Rental contracts for IBM machines included maintenance and training
classes, services that many IBM clients perceived as free but that IBM saw as
increasing its market penetration. At one point a government law required that all
individuals holding the job description of card puncher and data entry operator
151
receive a "degree" from IBM. "They [the government] gave us tremendous
responsibility," Villanueva said. "We were practically dictating who the
programmers and card punchers were." The only problem was that IBM did not give
degrees or certificates for completion of its courses. "They [the students in the
training classes] came to us and asked, 'I want my degree,"' which of course
Villanueva's education center could not provide.
Acle, who was in charge of IBM's government branch, said, "I worked for the
government as a systems engineer, always in the technical aspects of engineering,
advising the client. I introduced myself to the client without the goal of selling,
which gave a different image. I helped the client solve his problems." Acle's presence
kept the IBM name circulating among Chilean government administrators so that
they would call IBM, rather than one of its competitors, for their computer needs.
These strategies proved so effective that the name IBM became synonymous with
the technology itself. Villanueva explained that if "someone [was] talking about
computation or data processing [he] would say 'IBM.' Within the fiscal enterprises
you would find 'IBM departments' and years earlier 'Hollerinth departments.'
[Saying] 'IBM' in Chile was like talking about a Frigidaire or a Gillette razor--you
could have any razor, but the people say 'Gillette."'
Unlike Gillette, however, IBM sold an extremely expensive product with a
prohibitively high price tag. Given the newness of the technology, and the many
other demands for foreign credit, many potential clients viewed the purchase or
rental of an IBM machine as lunacy. But the government was in a unique position: it
could avoid paying the hefty customs fees that barred the entry of computers in the
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private sector.88 This difference made the government IBM's single biggest customer.
Acle said, "The government was a very important client of IBM's, very important.
They ... [government agencies accounted for] forty percent of our income--that was
an enormous amount, forty percent came from only one type of organization [the
Chilean government]." By serving as a central purchasing office, EMCO reduced the
government's potential spending on computation, provided a means for smaller
government agencies to reap the benefits of this technology, and, as Acle put it,
allowed the government "to control the expenditures being given to a private firm,
IBM." Critics pointed to the hazards of the government's growing dependency on the
U.S. company, sentiments reflected in the work of ECLA's dependency theorists as
well as in the dominant current of thought in Frei's own Christian Democratic
Party. Other events, such as the U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic in
1965 and the discovery of the U.S. defense-funded "Project Camelot," a program
accused of sponsoring social science research as a cover for spying on the Left,
further provoked Chilean outrage against the United States.
Frei also began to criticize the United States and the Alliance for Progress. In
1967 Chile refused all loans proffered by the Agency for International Development,
and Frei, despite no support from other Latin American nations, spoke out against
U.S. involvement in the Dominican Republic at a meeting of the Organization of
American States. That year Frei published an article entitled "The Alliance That
Lost Its Wasy." Written in English, the article appeared in the U.S. journal Foreign
88 According to Law 17271 of the Ministry of Finance, computing machines purchased for the exclusive of
the Chilean state administration, including all EMCO machines, were exempt from tariffs. The law applied
retroactively but stated that all such machines bought under these conditions needed to remain in
government service for ten years. Otherwise, for the machine to stay in Chile, the new owners needed to
pay prorated tariffs for the remaining ten-year period. Ministerio de Hacienda, Ley-1 7271, (31 December
1969).
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Affairs, self-described as "America's most influential publication on international
affairs and foreign policy."89 The mounting tensions with the United States,
recognition of the negative effects of capitalism on Chilean development, and the
rising popularity of dependency theory provided an added impetus for EMCO. "A
series of elements came together in the [formation of EMCO]," Acle explained,
"political, strategic, that we can't continue to depend on the same institution or only
one business, that, moreover, was American. All of the businesses that were here in
Chile were yankee [yanqui]--[EMCO] went against the American private sector that
was exploiting the country. There already was a sentiment of 'anti-yanquismo.' IBM
was Yankee."
The formation of EMCO, however, did not curb the level of influence that
IBM exerted in within the Chilean government or within Chilean computing circles.
The government may have been criticized for depending on the flow of expertise and
machinery that IBM offered, but the multinational also depended on the government
as its most; important customer. IBM trained many of EMCO's programmers,
systems engineers, and upper management, and the first machine EMCO purchased
was an IBM 360. The company also provided funds to the University of Chile to
establish one of the leading computer science programs in Latin America and
provided scholarships for Chileans to travel to the University of Waterloo in Canada
to study computing using IBM machines. Although the Chilean market was small,
IBM invested in it, creating a group that would be inclined to buy IBM's products for
the government.9 0 By expanding its web of contacts within the universities and
89 Council on Foreign Relations, About Foreign Affairs http://fullaccess.foreignaffairs.org/about/. Last
accessed 18 February 2004.
90 "Valioso aporte de IBM a la 'U."' La Naci6n, 23 March 1969. Rend Peralta, interview by author, 12
January 2004.
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government agencies, maintaining an outwardly apolitical stance, and promoting
the idea of the IBM family, the company's Chilean branch hoped to withstand the
effects of rising political polarization and social mobilization.
As the 1960s progressed, computers became symbols of modernization and
dependency, objects of desire and resentment, and instruments of greater efficiency
and an expanding bureaucracy. Given IBM's near monopoly in the Chilean market,
the government and IBM Chile found themselves tied to one another in an
increasingly conflicted relationship. The government wanted to apply modern
computer technologies to its state rationalization and planning efforts, but these
applications increased the nation's economic dependence on a foreign multinational
firm. IBM Chile in turn sought to establish, dominate, and reap a profit from the
Chilean market while resisting the politicization of Chilean society, the rejection of
capitalism, and the social upheavals unleashed by the PDC's call for labor to
organize. These very same tensions, and the government's allegiance to foreign
investment, ultimately plagued the Alliance for Progress and diminished popular
support for Frei's presidency. Foreign lending agencies such as the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank demanded that the government cut spending as
a condition fbr receiving aid, including the funding for the social programs described
in the revolution in liberty. The Alliance for Progress also linked economic incentives
for foreign investment and U.S. multinationals with the granting of U.S. monetary
aid. By 1969 the Chilean government increasingly had to subsidize its programs for
economic growth with foreign investments, in essence proving the developmentalist
economic program to be unsustainable. In the end, Frei found himself trapped by the
need to keep foreign capital flowing into Chile. As Michaels writes, "Frei opted for
economic growth and social stability at the expense of social justice. The United
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States had opted for protecting its economic interest at the cost of slowing down the
political momentum of its most successful Latin American ally."9' Both IBM and the
Alliance for Progress valued economics over ideology and stability over change.
After we had discussed IBM's significance to the Chilean government for
several hours, I asked Acle to consider the importance of IBM's Chilean operation to
the multinational firm. After some thought he replied, "We were a pilot country for
several of IBM's world projects ... We were a country that contributed quite a lot in
these sorts of things." He went on to describe a new system for machine assembly in
Chile that the company put in place during the military government of Augusto
Pinochet. "When you asked for a computer, you had to ask for the disks from a plant
in Canada, the central processing unit from an American plant, the tape from a
French plant.... When you had an order in those days you sent it to a distribution
center, and the center distributed the order across the world--it was a great process
of people." The new system eliminated the distribution center and demanded that
IBM Chile contact each factory separately and have the parts sent for assembly in
the country, cutting the intermediary costs. The company chose Chile for the pilot
program because it had the ability to use the technology, the necessary machinery,
and the management infrastructure to implement the program. And, Acle added,
"What is the risk if Chile makes a mistake? It's negligible from the point of view of
IBM worldwide."92 The pilot program was a disaster and wrought havoc with the
Chilean operations. "For us it was a tremendous chaos," Acle said. Then, reflecting
beyond the years of company dinners, pension plans, and dedication ceremonies, he
added, "For IBM, what did Chile matter?"
9' Michaels, "The Alliance for Progress and Chile's 'Revolution in Liberty,"' 83.
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Conclusion.
Using the mantra "order is power," the Christian Democrats pursued a technocratic
vision of state organization that introduced new administrative techniques and
technologies to better direct economic growth and map Chile's fiscal, human, and
natural resources. Moreover, the creation of global plans at the national, regional,
and local levels offered quantifiable plans for national progress and charted a path
to future development that strengthened the position of state technocrats. The
emphasis the Chilean government placed on planning, organization, and
rationalization also helped Chile obtain the foreign aid necessary for their
developmentalist policies of ISI. The United States and France in particular played
an important role in these changes to Chilean state management. In the case of the
United States, global planning provided a necessary prerequisite for obtaining
Alliance for Progress dollars. The style of administrative dirigisme that flourished in
France after World War II provided Chile with a model for state growth and directed
industrialization within a mixed economy and French credit and technical
assistance helped Chile implement changes based on the French experience. The
confluence of economic planning, dirigisme, and technocracy that occurred during
Frei's presidency, as well as the government's fetishism for advanced technology,
gave new importance to data processing technologies and helped explain the rapid
adoption of computers by the Chilean state despite their high price.
In this context, the government's swift formation of a state enterprise
dedicated to providing the public administration with computer services is
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92 According to Villanueva, Burroughs also used the Chilean market as a test site for new machines.
Villanueva interview.
understandable -- and impressive given that the first mainframes entered the
country only a few years prior. It is also important to recognize the significance of
the period marked by Frei's presidency (1964 - 1970) from the perspective of
computer history. Digital mainframe technology, in particular the IBM 360 series,
reached the market while the Christian Democrats were in office; prior
administrations could not have made comparable changes to data processing
practices even if they had wanted to. Moreover, the very nature of these machines,
from their large size to their expense, provided a strong motivation for the
centralization of government computer power. EMCO therefore represented the
limitations of computer technology during the 1960s as well as the rational and
interventionist state envisioned Christian Democracy. The elaborate inauguration
ceremonies held for Chile's early mainframes further demonstrate the functional
and symbolic importance of these machines to the Chilean government.
The top-down, technocratic state created by the Christian Democrats
supported the adoption of expensive computing machines. Computer technology, in
turn, advanced PDC programs for state modernization, economic development, and
material progress. This arrangement strengthened the position of machines and
politicians alike. At times, the PDC framed the application of scientific methods and
the use of technical expertise as both apolitical and vital for national progress. Ideas
of economic productivity, modernization, and progress appealed to members of
various Chilean parties, including those of the Right and the Left.93 By linking
development; to technocracy rather than to politics, the PDC defended its right to
rule as a single party while empowering the significant number of university-
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educated professionals and academics within its ranks. However, this strategy had
limited success. The reticence of Chilean senators to support the formation of an
executive planning office (ODEPLAN), which they argued would represent the
president's interests and not those of the nation, shows that they understood that
technocracy at bottom served real political interests. Sometimes the PDC's
privileging of technical expertise proved to be more alienating than persuasive and
hindered the party's ability to broaden their base of support. In his analysis of
Chilean economic policy during the Frei government, Molina observed that the use
of highly technical language by economists, particularly economic planners, put off
Chilean politicians from other parties and broke down lines of communication.
The president's unwillingness to compromise with the wishes of Chile's other
political parties and the failure of his economic policies to change the quality of life
for most Chileans diminished Frei's popularity and distanced him from his own
party. As Frei's presidency progressed, political divisions deepened. The Right and
the Left continued to gain strength at the expense of the Center. In January 1967
Chile's Congress denied the president permission to visit the United States, an
embarrassing turn of events for the leader of the nation heralded as the shining star
of the Alliance for Progress. The Chilean Right, spurned by the unwillingness of the
PDC to recognize its demands, took up the role of opposition party and refused to
form a coalition with the Center against the Left for the 1970 presidential elections.
Members of the Left criticized Chile's increased dependence on foreign capital and
the failure of the revolution in liberty to bring the social changes that it had
promised. Together the Left and the "rebel" factions of the PDC pushed for even
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93 As the historian Anson Rabinbach remarked, "Productivism, in short, was politically promiscuous."
Anson Rabinbach, The Human Motor: Energy, Fatigue, and the Origins of Modernity (New York: Basic
greater mobilization in the Chilean countryside and urban centers. Collectively, the
PDC asked their president for greater change and questioned the benefits of foreign
investment and Chile's close relationship to the United States. Toward the end of
Frei's presidency, the PDC stepped up its support for Andean economic integration
and open relations with Cuba. The party also supported reformist Radomiro Tomic
as its candidate for the 1970 presidential election.9 4
As members of the Left and Center moved to accelerate the pace of social
change, Frei's technocratic approach to modernization seemed increasingly at odds
with the mounting demands to rectify class inequalities. Reports of fiscal gains fell
flat as unemployment climbed. Most Chileans failed to appreciate the fruits of
material progress heralded by their president, such as the domestic production of
television sets or automobiles, when few could afford to purchase such luxury items.
While government computer purchases fueled the public imagination with talk of
electronic brains and celebrations of technological modernity, the technological
fetishism displayed by the PDC deepened Chilean dependence on foreign
multinationals and U.S. capital. The same could be said of the other technological
wonders, such as televisions, radios, automobiles, and washing machines that were
entering the Chilean markets and being praised a signs of material progress. The
disconnect between the developmentalist discourse articulated by Frei and the lived
experiences of Chile's popular classes fueled frustration on both sides. In his 1969
State of the Union speech, Frei again responded to the criticism of his economic




Have you known before higher importations of machines than what the
country receives today? Do you remember a period when the balance of
payments has been better? Have you seen more spectacular growth in bank
savings and bonds? Why don't you realize the fact that the automobile
industry produces twice as many automobiles as they did five years ago, and
that automobiles, buses, taxis, and trucks fill the streets and roads? Why do
you ignore that we sell seven times more televisions than five years ago?...
It is absurd that all of the speculations of crisis appear ... when it is evident
that there had been a great activation of production .... I invite everyone to
look at their own homes and see for yourselves how in these years you have
acquired a house, a car, a television, radio, refrigerator, washing machine,
sewing machine, stove, or new clothes for your family .... I know that no one
is satisfied. This always happens. If you acquire a radio, you want a
television. If you buy a house, you want to get around better. If you have a
bicycle, you desire an automobile.
Despite these "attacks without justification," the president promised, "Chile and
Chileans continue forward, so that progress reaches everyone in the community."95
Yet the measures of political, social, and economic reform outlined in Frei's
revolution in liberty and demanded by growing sectors of the Chilean population
continued to take a backseat to the interests of foreign investors and foreign
governments. By the end of Frei's presidency, greater numbers of foreign businesses,
educators, economists, scientists, engineers, and government advisers exerted
influence in Chile than ever before. While Chile strove to either emulate or import
the fruits of Western development in the hope of constructing a modern nation,
"progress" came at the price of social change. Seventeen months after Frei chastised
the Chilean people for wanting more than his government could provide, Chileans
chose to accelerate the pace of revolution and elected the socialist candidate
Salvador Allende.
94 According to the Chilean Constitution, a president cannot serve consecutive six-year terms. Frei could
not run in the 1970 election.
95 Quinto mensa/e del Presidente de la Repfzblica de Chile don Eduardo Frei Montalva al inaugurar el
periodo de sesiones ordinarias del Congreso Nacional, 21 de Mayo de 1969, Departamento de
Publicaciones de la Presidencia de la Republica, Santiago, 73-74.
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Chapter 3: Images
Figure 3.1: President Eduardo Frei types his name as part of the inauguration ceremony for the first
computer acquired by the state computing service enterprise, EMCO. (Image reproduced with permission
from the National Library, Santiago.)
Figure 3.2: The first computer purchased by the University of Chile, a German-made Standard Electric
Lorenz ER-56 (Image reproduced with permission from the National Library, Santiago.)
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Figure 3.3: President Eduardo Frei holds a computer-generated reproduction of his likeness at the
inauguration ceremony for the IBM 360 at the University of Chile, while Efrain Friedmann looks on.
(Image reproduced with permission from the Instituto de Ingenieros de Chile, Santiago.)
Figure 3.4: Inauguration of IBM's headquarters in 1960, located at Agustinas 1235 in downtown Santiago.
(Image reproduced with permission from IBM Chile, Santiago.)
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Chapter 3:: Tables
Table 3.1: Accumulated Number of Computers Installed in Chile
By Year and Model
Year of IBM IBM IBM IBM NCR NCR Burroughs PDP Other Total
installation 1401 1620 1130 360 315 200 B-3500 PDP- Models
8
1962 3 1 4
1963 8 1 9
1964 10 2 2 14
1965 10 2 2 14
1966 13 3 1 2 19
1967 13 3 1 6 1 2 26
1968 14 3 3 8 1 3 32
1969 14 3 4 10 1 4 36
1970 14 3 8 12 1 3 1 4 46
1971 14 3 9 14 1 3 2 4 7 57
Source: United Nations, "The Application of Computer Technology for Development, Second Report of
the Secretary General," New York, 1973.
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Table 3.2: Data Processing and Documentation Output for the Chilean Treasury
(1962-1969)














Source: Sexto mensaje del Presidente de la Repziblica de Chile don Eduardo Frei Montalva al
inaugurar elperiodo de sesiones ordinarias del Congreso Nacional, 21 May 1970.
Table 3.3: Dollar Value of Electronic Digital Computers Imported to Chile from the
United States, Including Process Control Equipment (1965-1973)










Source: Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, U.S. Department of Commerce, "Foreign Commerce
and Navigation of the United States," compiled by the Division of Foreign Statistics, 1965-1973,
Washington, D.C.
* Figures do not include the movement of U.S.-owned or -financed merchandise from one foreign country
to another, only the movement of goods from the United States to a foreign country. They do include
shipments from a U.S. company to a branch office overseas. Values shown as reported by the shipper for









Political Science, Revolutionary Technology
HE ELECTION of Salvador Allende Gossens as president radically changed
the path of Chilean history. His victory in 1970 signaled the success of the
center-left Popular Unity coalition (UP), a mixed group of socialists, communists,
and small factions of the Radical and Christian Democratic parties, as well as the
failure of the Christian Democrats to garner sufficient support for their stalled
"revolution in liberty." The refusal of the Christian Democrats to build political
alliances with the right or to reach out to members of the left during their previous
six-year administration alienated both ends of the political spectrum and caused
fractures within their own ranks, deepening the polarization and fragmentation of
Chilean politics. In the absence of an effective center-right coalition, Allende's
winning margin was slim--1.3 percent--over his closest competitor, the rightist
candidate Jorge Alessandri. Although the UP won the electoral support that it
needed to begin implementing its forty-point program of economic and social
reforms, the country remained sharply divided about the correct path for the
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nation.' Allende, however, had a reason to feel optimistic. All three candidates had
run on a platform of change. Both Allende and the Christian Democratic candidate
Radomiro Tomic had stressed accelerating the social and economic reforms begun by
the Frei administration. In this context, Allende felt confident that he could increase
his base of popular support and leverage it to implement change democratically,
rather than by force, using Chilean legal and political institutions. 2 It would be a
revolution with "the taste of empanadas and red wine." Change would occur without
bloodshed and possess a distinctively Chilean flavor.
Allende ranks among the more controversial figures in Latin American
history.3 He was a medical doctor by training, a career path that introduced him to
I "Popular Unity Program" in James D. Cockcroft, ed., Salvador Allende Reader (Hoboken, N.J.: Ocean
Press, 2000), 257-85.
2 The Popular Unity period has generated a wealth of literature; I will cite here only a representative
excerpt. Historical overviews of the UP era can be found in Leslie Bethell, Chile Since Independence (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Simon Collier and William F. Sater, A History of Chile, 1808-
1994, Cambridge Latin American Studies (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Brian Loveman,
Chile: The Legacy of Hispanic Capitalism, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); Paul E.
Sigmund, The Overthrow ofAllende and the Politics of Chile, 1964-1976 (Pittsburgh: University of
Pittsburgh Press, 1977). Analyses of the period from the perspective of political economy appear in Stefan
De Vylder, Allende's Chile: The Political Economy of the Rise and Fall of the Unidad Popular, Cambridge
Latin American Studies (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976); Barbara Stallings, Class Conflict
and Economic Development in Chile, 1958-1973 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1978). Peter Winn,
Weavers of Revolution: The Yarur Workers and Chile's Road to Socialism (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1986) and Margaret Power, Right Wing Women in Chile: Feminine Power and the Struggle Against
Allende (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002) document the revolution and
counterrevolution as seen from below. Sergio Bitar, Chile: Experiment in Democracy, trans. Sam Sherman,
vol. 6, Inter-American Politics Series (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1986) offers a
rather balanced first-hand account. Nathaniel Davis, The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1985) provides an interesting, if less balanced view from the perspective of the
U.S. Embassy in Santiago. U.S. intervention in the Allende government has similarly been documented in
Peter Kornbluh, The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability (New York:
New Press, 2003). Fernando Garcia and Oscar Sola, Salvador Allende: una ipoca en blanco y negro
(Buenos Aires: El Pais Aguilar, 1998) depicts Salvador Allende's life through interlaced text and black and
white photographs.
3 The University of Arcis hosted a panel on September 4, 2003, dedicated to historical interpretations of
Allende thirty years after his death. The Chilean historian Diana Veneros observed that "the exercise of
studying and really trying to understand Allende presents a difficult task in subjectivity." Members of the
center have tended to portray Allende as a conflicted and contradictory figure whose love of women and
bourgeois luxuries paralleled his political dreams for socialist transformation. Members of the left have
transformed Allende into a martyr who refused to compromise his ideals and died gripping a gun given to
him by Fidel Castro. The right blamed Allende for destroying the economy and creating an era of political
chaos. More recently, members of the right have adopted a new line of argument that urges Chileans to
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the afflictions of the poor while he was still enrolled at the university. He became a
socialist when he was twenty-four and entered politics fighting on behalf of his
cousin Marmaduke Grove Vallejo, the Air Force commander who became Chile's first
socialist president for twelve days in 1932. After establishing a branch of the
socialist party in his hometown of Valparaiso, Allende quickly rose through the
ranks of the party and was elected to Congress in 1937. He was elected to the Senate
in 1945 and subsequently ran for president in the 1958 and 1964 elections. Unlike
many of his more radical contemporaries, Allende always favored pursuing socialist
reform through existing democratic practices and consistently pushed for a Leftist
agenda from the Senate floor and later from the presidential palace.
The success of the UP in the 1970 election vaulted Chile onto the world
political map and drew international attention, particularly that of the United
States, to events in this slender South American nation. Many progressives believed
that Chile would pioneer a political third way between the ideological poles of the
superpowers, a possibility that was both frightening and inspiring in those Cold War
years. U.S. government documents reveal that on the day of Allende's election, U.S.
Ambassador Edward Korry sent eighteen cables from Santiago to Washington, D.C.,
apprising the Nixon administration on the latest poll results. According to Secretary
of State Henry Kissenger, "Nixon was beside himself' with the election returns and
promised to "circumvent the bureaucracy" in the future.4 On the morning of
September 15, 1970, eleven days after the election, Nixon held a private breakfast
meeting with Kissinger, Pepsi Cola chairman Donald Kendall, Attorney General
move beyond the past and focus on the future. This strategic move undermines the importance the UP,
Allende, and current efforts to document the acts of violence and repression that occurred during the
Pinochet dictatorship.
4 Henry Kissinger, White House Years, 1st ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), 671. Cited in Davis, The Last
Two Years of Salvador Allende, 6.
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John Mitchell, Augustin Edwards, owner of the conservative Chilean newspaper El
Mercurio and a Pepsi Cola bottling plant. Edwards pleaded for Nixon's assistance in
preventing Allende's presidency and predicted disaster for the region if the United
States permitted the socialist government to assume power. The report from Senator
Frank Church's Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, which documented the
Covert Action in Chile from 1964-1973, reveals that after this meeting Nixon met
with CIA Director Richard Helms and instructed the CIA to prevent Allende from
taking power by arranging a military coup d'etat without the knowledge of the State
Department, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. ambassador in Santiago. In
addition, the Church Committee report "Alleged Assassination Plots Involving
Foreign Leaders" asserts that Helms left the meeting with a page of handwritten
notes authorizing a budget of ten million dollars-"more if necessary"-to prevent
Allende's confirmation and instructions to "make the economy scream."5 These
instructions evolved into Track II of Project FUBELT, an operation that resulted in
the death of Chilean Army General Rene Schneider, but failed to provoke a military
coup or block Allende's confirmation on November 3, 1970. They also set the tone for
the hostility of U.S. foreign policy toward Chile from 1970-1973 that resulted in an
overt economic blockade and a multitude of covert CIA initiatives. Over the next
three years, the CIA channeled more than eight million dollars to covert operations
in Chile, which were designed to destabilize and overthrow the Allende government.
These operations ranged from the manipulation of the Chilean media to "direct
5 United States Senate, "Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders: An Interim Report of the
Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities," (U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1975), 227; United States Senate, "Covert Action in Chile, 1964-1973: Staff
Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operation with Respect to Intelligence Activities,"
(U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), 170.
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attempts to foment a military coup."6 We are still continuing to uncover the full
extent of these actions.7
Given the magnitude of the U.S. response, and the White House's
commitment to overthrowing Allende, the number of changes completed by the
government during Allende's first year in office is quite remarkable. From the
outset, the government pursued an aggressive nationalization program that
expropriated the U.S.-owned copper mines, purchased almost all of the banks, and
nationalized major industries. By the end of 1971, Allende had succeeded in
nationalizing sixty-eight of Chile's most important industries, particularly in the
areas of metalworking, textiles, and construction materials. 8 By September 1973,
the government had requisitioned more than four hundred foreign and Chilean elite-
owned industries, a pace that exhilarated workers and frightened the owners of
small and medium-sized businesses who feared their property might be next. In
response, many owners reduced the size of their business operations or refused to
invest in factory improvements. Others, such as Pepsi Cola and International
Telephone and Telegraph (ITT) requested direct assistance from the U.S.
government to help protect their investment by undermining support for the UP. In
the countryside, the UP accelerated the agrarian reform begun by the Christian
Democrats. By the end of 1972, the government had expropriated all estates larger
than eighty hectares and had converted more than forty-four hundred estates into
peasant cooperatives.9 This redistribution of land dramatically changed the long-
6 United States Senate, "Covert Action in Chile, 1964-1973: Staff Report of the Select Committee to Study
Governmental Operation with Respect to Intelligence Activities," 148.
7 See Kornbluh, The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability
8 Bitar, Chile: ;Experiment in Democracy, 45.
9 Collier and Sater, A History of Chile, 1808-1994; Peter Winn, Victims of the Chilean Miracle: Workers
and Neoliberalism in the Pinochet Era, 1973-2002 (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2004).
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standing power structure of the Chilean countryside and ended the hacienda system
that had dominated rural life since colonial times.
This revolution from above paralleled a revolution from below. Workers
pushed the government to requisition their factories, and peasants seized land from
wealthy landowners, both acting without the expressed permission of or
encouragement from the presidential palace.' 0 As a result of the income
redistribution policies, members of the working and lower classes could afford goods
and services that they formerly regarded as unobtainable luxuries and that allowed
them to make improvements to their homes and communities. Groups traditionally
marginalizedc within Chilean society-women, peasants, the poor--dramatically
increased their public activity. Marxist readings of history, expressed in political
speeches, made it dignified to be poor and emphasized the historic importance of the
proletariat to national progress." The promise of revolution sparked a
counterrevolution; both encouraged popular mobilization. Women, particularly those
from the middle and upper classes, occupied an important role in the
counterrevolution against Allende, banging empty pots in protest of consumer
shortages and positioning themselves as the moral defenders of family life against
the evils of socialism.' 2 The levels of political participation observed during the UP
era and the government's continued commitment to respecting opposing voices, have
10 Winn, Weavers of Revolution.
" In a conference paper presented at the 2003 Meeting of the Latin American Studies Association (LASA),
Winn argued the Chilean revolution added "dignity" to the tripartite of"liberty, equality, and fraternity"
that characterized the French revolution, an addition he believes marks another unique facet of the Chilean
revolution.
12 Power, Right Wing Women in Chile: Feminine Power and the Struggle Against Allende . Historians have
also documented the significant presence of working class and poor women in the protests against Allende,
a phenomenon that equally reflected the inattentiveness of the UP program to women's needs and the
outward respect shown to Chilean women by the opposition for their role as wives and mothers. See
Camilla Townsend, "Refusing to Travel La Via Chilena: Working-Class Women in Allende's Chile,"
Journal of Women's History 4, no. 3 (1993) and Thomas Miller Klubock, "Writing the History of Women
and Gender in Twentieth Century Chile," Hispanic American Historical Review 81, no. 3-4 (2001).
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caused some historians to label the period between 1970-1973 the most democratic
moment in Chilean history, an observation that challenges the assumptions made by
the White House and the appropriateness of U.S. foreign policy toward Chile during
the early 1970s.
The reforms of the UP program also fueled artistic and scientific creativity
and encouraged freethinking and interdisciplinary collaboration. s3 Notions of
Chilean individuality and national destiny influenced Chilean scientific and
technological undertakings and contributed to a new articulation of modernity that
reflected the principles of the socialist revolution and the distinctive needs of the
Chilean nation. University administrators and public officials developed science
policies that; stressed a fundamental commitment to achieving national autonomy,
raising levels of production, and pursuing a path to development that broke from the
model offered by the industrialized world. Rather than concentrate on capital-
intensive goods for elite consumption, Chilean engineers and industrial designers
set about creating products suitable for popular markets. Behind these activities
was a conviction that politics should guide the direction of science and engineering
pursuits, given their potential to realize the ideological aims of the UP coalition.
Orienting Science
In Chile, as in many Latin American countries, science and technology occupied an
important place in the national strategy for development and material progress.
13 The UP forty point plan called for the creation of a National Institute for Art and Culture. A history of
Chilean music during the UP era, especially of la nueva canci6n, appears in Cdsar Albornoz, "Los sonidos
del golpe," in 1973 La vida cotidiana de un alo crucial, ed. Claudio Rolle (Santiago de Chile: Planeta,
2003).
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After World War II, the U.S. government emphasized technological assistance to
developing nations instead of monetary aid and argued that the universal benefits of
technological progress transcended cultural differences.'4 The desarrollista policies
of the Christian Democrats echoed these sentiments and elevated science and
technology as vital to national progress and economic growth. Chilean policies for
modernizing industries, training a technically literate workforce, and increasing the
scope of state planning practices reflected a particular set of beliefs about economic
development and the political goals of the Kennedy administration's Alliance for
Progress. These programs strove to change Chile's social and economic conditions by
"modernizing" the existing economic structure instead of questioning the assumed
benefits of foreign investment and the production of capital-intensive goods. Within
the limits of this framework, political promises of increased equality and
redistributed national wealth failed to change the concentration of property and
capital that characterized industrial and agricultural sectors and placed the interest
of foreign multinational firms ahead of the social and economic reforms outlined in
the "revolution in liberty." Foreign technological assistance and the arrival of
multinational firms throughout the 1960s, particularly from 1964 to 1970,
introduced Chile to the manufacture of high-end luxury items, but only a limited
percentage of the population could enjoy these fruits of economic growth. Foreign
firms exacerbated these unequal consumption patterns, even encouraged them. Far
from being neutral, the technology policies of the Christian Democrats directed
Chilean resources toward expanding elite markets and paid less attention to the
wider needs of the Chilean nation. As these consumption patterns intensified the
14 Arturo Escobar, Encountering Development: the Making and Unmaking of the Third World, ed. Sherry
Ortner, Nicholas Dirks, and GeoffEley, Princeton Studies in Culture/Power/History (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1995).
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gap between rich and poor, movements of workers and peasants continued to gain
momentum throughout the country.' 5
Once the UP came to power, the discourse of development changed. Under
the policies of desarrollismo advocated by the Christian Democracy, foreign
investment spurred national development. In contrast, economists within the UP
coalition mixed the ideological goals of socialism, namely social equality and state-
owned production, with the economic framework of relations described by
dependency theorists. 6 Responding to the modernization theories advocated by the
United States and international lending organizations, which delineated a universal
framework for development, the UP emphasized the uniqueness of Chilean history
within the Latin American region. Chilean economists noted that the nation's
mature industries and political institutions were not so different from those of the
developed world. Given the ineffectiveness of past development models, progressives
and dependency theorists alike called for a new economic model. Marxists and other
members of the UP coalition criticized the social and economic inequalities of
capitalism. Dependency theorists rejected modernization models that assumed a
universal transition from "traditional" to "modern" societies. Cardoso and Faletto
observed that "there exists among the developed and underdeveloped economies a
difference, not only of the stage or the state of the production system, but also of
function or position within the international economic structure of production and
15 For this reason Bitar writes, "the Frei government intensified the contradictions in the system by moving
in opposite directions: on the one hand it fed popular mobilization and organization; on the other it
attempted a course of economic development which left the economic structure practically intact." Bitar,
Chile: Experiment in Democracy, 12.
16 Several dependency theorists, most notably Fernando Henrique Cardoso, have argued that dependency
theory grew out of Marxist theory. In his reading of dependency school texts from the 1960s, Love
challenges the ubiquity of Marxist influence, but writes that by the 1970s "many writers on dependency
adopted an exclusively Marxist perspective, and dependency analysis for this group matured as a "region"
of Marxism. Joseph L. Love, "The Origins of Dependency Analysis," Journal of Latin American Studies
22, no. 1 (1990): 167.
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distribution."17 Understanding underdevelopment, therefore, required more than
positioning a nation on a universal trajectory of progress. Underdeveloped nations
needed to understand the history of their integration to the world market and their
positioning as central or peripheral economies. According to both Marxism and
dependency theory, every economic link behaves as a social link capable of
establishing relations of domination and subordination. National progress, therefore,
hinged on increasing national autonomy, decreasing the reliance on foreign capital,
changing Chilean economic structures, and establishing Chile's economic centrality
to the world market. As a result, Chilean leaders redefined their approaches to
modernization and redirected national science and engineering efforts toward the
distinctive needs of the Chilean nation and the political goals of the UP.
The acceptance of dependency theory within the socialist program of the UP
changed national perceptions of science and technology and their role within Chilean
development policies. The government expanded the role of science and technology
to one of directing the knowledge produced in Chilean laboratories. Technologies
became instruments of political domination or liberation. Moreover, "development"
ceased to be a universal process and instead reflected the unique facets and political
aims of the Chilean revolution. Science and technology should "not repeat the
development of other countries or close the technological gap with them, but break
the different forms of technological and cultural domination, and freely choose and
bring into being ways of life that are in accordance with [Chilean] society."l8
17 Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, Dependency and Development in Latin America, trans.
Mariory Mattingly Urquidi (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), 17.
'g Jose Valenzuela, "Apuntes sobre la politica de acci6n del INTEC," INTEC 1 (1971): 11. In his report
analyzing the distribution of resources for research in Chilean universities, Engineering Professor Eugenio
Yunis Ahuds argued that Chile "must have the capacity to observe and study their own problems, and find
for themselves the most appropriate solution for their cultural, geographic, social, and economic
175
Government and university bodies highlighted the potential of science and
technology to resolve problems of direct national interest in areas such as health
care, industrial production, goods for export, and living conditions. Increased
government involvement in research and development changed the objects of
scientific study, the practice of science and engineering, and the motivation for
scientific research.
Historians have often criticized the UP for pursuing long-term objectives
without a short-term plan of action. However, this does not appear to be the case
regarding the UP's stance toward science and technology. The range of state-
sponsored science and engineering endeavors pursued by university and government
organizations from 1971 to 1973 illustrates a real commitment to "the absolute
necessity of organized, systematic, and coherent government support for science and
technology research activities." '9 Government monies supported inventories of
Chilean science and engineering resources, such as the numbers of trained
personnel, availability of scientific equipment, and the areas of research being
pursued in Chilean universities, government agencies, and industries. The
government also sponsored studies cataloging the technological needs of the
nationalized industries within the "social property area" (APS) and those within the
"mixed property area" (APM) a term used to describe industries requisitioned by the
government that retained a minority percentage of private ownership. In addition,
the Chilean government commissioned and published works that documented these
resources, including a volume consisting solely of the curriculum vitas of Chileans in
characteristics." Eugenio Yunis Ahuds, Asignaci6n de recursos y politica de investigaci6n para la ciencia y
la tecnologia: El caso de la Universidad de Chile (Santiago, Chile: Ediciones C. P. U., 1972), ix.
9 Mensaje Presidente Allende ante congreso pleno, 21/Mayo '73, (Santiago, Chile: Departamento de
Publicaciones de la Presidencia de la Republica - Chile, 1973), 266. See also Augusto Salinas Araya,
Ciencia, estado, y revoluci6n (Santiago de Chile: Ediciones Universidad Finis Terrae, 1994).
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possession of a four-year university degree in science or engineering disciplines. The
national science and technology agency, CONICYT, expanded the size of its library
collections and catalogued a greater number of holdings. However, CONICYT's
greatest accomplishment was coordinating the First National Congress of Scientists,
which brought together more than 3,000 Chilean scientists at regional meetings in
Arica, Antofagasta, Valparaiso, Santiago, Concepci6n, Valdivia, and Punta Arenas
and culminated in a series of plenary talks in August 1972. From these meetings,
CONICYT not only generated a map of the research topics being pursued
throughout the nation, but also of the areas and resources that needed improving.
This information subsequently guided a structural reorganization of CONICYT in
1973. The benefits of cultivating national scientific and technological capabilities
extended beyond economic development and took on a symbolic value. Innovation
offered a new form of propaganda that illustrated the success of the Chilean political
experiment. This new role for scientific accomplishment is perhaps best seen in the
government"s plan to distribute the publication Science and Technology Week to all
Chilean embassies beginning in August 1973. The magazine served as a vehicle for
the international dissemination of Chile's science and engineering
accomplishments.2 0
Government attention to national science and engineering activities echoed
within the universities. The University of Chile, where the majority of science and
technology research occurred, published studies in 1971 and 1972 outlining
university practices and policies in regard to research and the allocation of
20 Mensaje Presidente Allende ante congreso pleno, 21/Mayo '73, 263.
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resources.2 ' "It is not enough to document or create scientific knowledge," one report
noted as justification for its self-described "vast and complete plan, in which the
university supports the scientific, technological and creative infrastructure [of the
country]. "22 Given the importance of science and technology to national development
policies, the report encouraged the government to expand the scope of state
involvement in research and development. Both the 1971 and the 1972 report
targeted new areas of study, made suggestions to encourage interdisciplinary
collaboration and communication across departments, suggested priorities for
university-level research, and called for research directed toward problems of
national need. Individually, these reports set goals for national science education at
all levels, proposed specific criteria for reviewing research proposals, made specific
suggestions for the allocation of resources, and proposed expanding the scope of
"science" to include work within the fine arts and humanities.2 3 The confluence of
national goals and scientific activities within Chilean universities similarly
dominated the First National Congress of Scientists and provided the impetus for its
organization. 24
Policies favoring "oriented research" over "basic research" raised objections
within Chilean scientific communities and opened debates about the fundamental
21 Hacia unapolitica de desarrollo cientificoy tecnol6gicopara Chile, (Santiago, Chile: Universidad de
Chile Rectoria, 1972); Yunis Ahuds, Asignaci6n de recursosAsignaci6n de recursos y politica de
investigaci6n para la ciencia y la tecnologia . According to Yunis Ahuds, 55% of individuals engaged in
scientific research were connected with the University of Chile. Of those, 40% were within the exact and
natural sciences, 35% were affiliated with technology, and 25% had positions within the social sciences and
humanities.
22 Hacia una politica de desarrollo cientifico y tecnol6gico para Chile, 10.
23 Ibid. The report argued for the inclusion of human sciences and works of artistic creation within the
category of "basic science" given their contributions to the creation of knowledge and cultural
independence. At the Catholic University, the heading of "science" also served as shorthand for Marxist
science.
24 Margaret Power, "The Popular Unity Government, Science, and Development: The First National
Congress of Scientists in Chile," in Congress of the Latin American Studies Association (Las Vegas:
Unpublished Manuscript, 2004) Mensaje Presidente Allende ante congreso pleno, 21/Mayo '73, 254.
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nature of scientific knowledge and the practice of technological development.
Factions of university scientists highlighted the importance of pursuing pure
knowledge, independent of any ideological project. They worried that marrying
scientific practice with political considerations threatened to compromise rigor and
the ability to think freely without bias.25 In his study of the University of Chile,
Yunis Ahu6s pleaded: "Don't deny the necessary academic liberty" or the "autonomy
and independence" needed by university researchers when selecting projects and
methodological approaches. Universities, he felt, must preserve some fundamental
or basic science, not tailored to the fulfillment of short-term objectives.2 6 As a
compromise, Yunis Ahues proposed that only a portion of university-supported work
fall under the heading of oriented research. The university would not attempt to
control the central questions or methodologies pursued by researchers undertaking
projects of national interest. Of the proposals submitted to the Scientific Research
Commission of the University of Chile, a body created in 1970 to coordinate science
and technology research across the various faculties of the university, only 54% were
evaluated according to national importance in 1972, whereas 95% were judged on
their originality and proposed methodology.27
Members of science and engineering communities also questioned the idea of
technological neutrality. "The myth of aseptic technological neutrality has been
destroyed," announced an article in the magazine INTEC. "Extra-technologic
decisions infiltrate techno-scientific work, although the subjective conscience does
25 Members of the scientific community voiced similar concerns regarding the overt political motivations of
the National Congress of Scientists. Power, "The Popular Unity Government, Science, and Development."
26 Yunis Ahuds, Asignaci6n de recursosAsignaci6n de recursos y politica de investigaci6n para la ciencia y
la tecnologia, 13.
27 Ibid., 82. A date did not appear on this study, although given that the Commission began in 1970 and the
report was published in 1972, we can assume that the study referred to proposals made during the UP
government.
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not always realize this and at times represses it." Contrary to the positivist thought
that had dominated the previous part of twentieth century, the article observed that
science and technology did not exist as "an untouchable king, undisturbed by
conflicts and interests."2 8 Directed national research and development efforts
produced technologies tailored for Chilean industries and could boost the
productivity of Chilean resources. Technologies developed in this vein were better
suited for advancing UP social programs. Moreover, government scientists and
engineers developed technological systems to assist with nationalizing the economy,
as is illustrated by the Cybersyn system, the subject of chapters 5 and 6. By
questioning the assumed superiority of imported technologies, Chilean scientists,
engineers, and designers expanded the criteria for measuring technical superiority
and introduced design considerations they had ignored in the past. Like the work in
university laboratories, the design and development of technology could no longer be
separated from national problems and national needs.
The structural changes to the Chilean economy, such as the income
redistribution and the nationalization policies put in motion by the UP, heightened
the importance of Chilean science and engineering and their application to
improving the quality of life for impoverished sectors of the Chilean population and
augmenting the economic productivity of the nation. As a result, research and
development practices changed. Instead of keeping science, technology, and politics
separate, members of Chilean government agencies, industries, and academic
institutions argued for their collective synthesis and rejected such concepts as
technological neutrality and scientific purity. Through their program of democratic
socialism, the Chilean government tried to pioneer a political "third way" that broke
28 INTEC, "Introducci6n a una nueva revista," INTEC, December 1971.
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from past models of governance and struggled to create something new. In the same
vein, Chilean scientists and engineers worked to generate a corpus of knowledge
that reflected Chile's unique path of historical development and its hopes for the
future. This should not imply that all Chilean scientists and engineers agreed with
the UP program or even viewed their work as political.2 9 However, if we view these
directed research and development efforts as a component of the multi-sited UP
project for socialist transformation, we see that Chilean laboratories also became
spaces for revolution.
Popular Consumption
Advancing national scientific and technological capabilities meshed with state plans
to stimulate industry and diminish economic dependency. Government agencies and
universities believed oriented research and development supported economic
growth, improved manufacturing practices, diversified national industries, raised
output levels, extracted natural resources, and identified new export opportunities.
Applied correctly, science and technology promised to lower production costs and
create domestic goods tailored for Chilean consumers, including the expanded
manufacture of low-cost products designed for massive consumption. This section
provides a brief overview of some of the products and technologies developed from
1971 to 1973 that reflected, or furthered, the ideas of the UP program. Through
these technologies, Chilean scientists and engineers articulated a new form of
material progress that was defined by the widespread use of everyday objects.
The industrial production of goods for mass consumption constituted one of
the central goals pursued by CORFO, the state development agency, while the UP
29 This will be discussed at greater length in the following two chapters.
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was in power. Beginning in 1971, CORFO pursued a number of programs to
"augment the production capacity of goods for popular consumption," including plans
for the design and manufacture of low-cost automobiles, bicycles, motorcycles,
sewing machines, household electronics, and furniture, among other items.3 0 These
projects paralleled UP policies for income redistribution and represented a
"diversification and decentralization" of property, distribution patterns, and
commercialization practices within Chilean industrial firms.3' As a result of these
efforts, poor Chileans and members of the working classes gained access to products
and services previously reserved for the elite, a maneuver that raised levels of
popular support for the UP, particularly during 1971 and the initial parts of 1972.
UP policies of income redistribution expanded Chileans' access to consumer
goods while increasing the range of products produced for domestic, popular
consumption.32 These actions are perhaps best illustrated by the work of INTEC, a
filial organization of CORFO. As mentioned in the previous chapter, CORFO created
INTEC in September 1968 to "promot[e] technology research in the country" and
create "studies for the development of new industrial products and/or the perfection
of those that already exist."3 3 In March 1971, presidential appointments changed
INTEC's upper management; Fernando Flores was named institute president and
Jose Valenzuela became vice director. Both men later played central roles in
30 Luis Ortega Martinez, Corporaci6n de Fomento de la Producci6n: 50 aios de realizaciones, 1939-1989
(Santiago de Chile: Universidad de Santiago Facultad de Humanidades Departamento de Historia, 1989),
233-34; Hugo Palmarola Sagredo, "Productos y socialismo: disefto industrial estatal en Chile," in 1973 La
vida cotidiana de un aio crucial, ed. Claudio Rolle (Santiago de Chile: Editorial Planeta, 2003), 225-96.
The University of Chile similarly supported the application of technological resources to the creation of
goods for mass consumption. Hacia unapolitica de desarrollo cientifico y tecnoldgico para Chile, 15.
31 CORFO Relaciones Publicas, "Rol de CORFO en los prop6sitos de cambios," CORFO en el gobierno de
la Unidad Popular, 4 November 1971.
32 Real wages increased by an average of 30% during Allende's first year in office. Winn, Weavers of
Revolution, 142.
33 Uldaricio Acosta, "Datos sobre el Instituto Tecnol6gico/CORFO," INTEC 1 (1971): 7.
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developing the Cybersyn project. By October 1971, INTEC employed 5 electrical
engineers, 7 mechanical engineers, 21 specialists in chemistry and metallurgy, and 8
economists to pursue state funded projects related to technological innovation. The
figure doubles when including individuals without full-time appointments.3 4 INTEC
also supported the first state-sponsored industrial design group in the country.3 5
Collectively, the organization commanded a diverse group of technically educated
professionals whose projects ranged from ecological studies of pesticides promoted by
U.S. chemical companies and the Rockefeller Foundation's Green Revolution to
improving the efficiency of Chilean refrigeration units.
INTEC demonstrated a strong commitment to developing products and
technologies intended for popular use. In the first issue of the bi-annual magazine
INTEC, Valenzuela observed, "Technology is not an end in itself, but a means to
achieve social objectives."3 6 Manufacturing low-cost, durable goods for widespread
consumption fell in line easily with UP programs for industrial expropriation,
agrarian refbrm, and the national redistribution of wealth. The production of these
goods simultaneously increased the scope of Chilean import substitution
capabilities, decreased expenditures on foreign patent licenses, and lowered overall
production costs.3 7 These products, moreover, help create a distinctively Chilean
material culture, domestically manufactured and designed to meet national needs.
Use value combined with profit as the central motives for the social and mixed
property areas and replaced the exclusive profit-driven mentality of the private
34 Ibid.
35 For a concise history of the Grupo de Disefio Industrial, refer to Palmarola Sagredo, "Productos y
socialismo: diseflo industrial estatal en Chile," 225-96.
36 Valenzuela, "Apuntes sobre la politica de acci6n del INTEC," 11.
37 By 1967, 94.5% of all patents registered in the Oficina de Patentes y Marcas de Chile were held by
foreigners, up from 89% in 1958 and 65.5% in 1937. CORFO, "La propiedad industrial en Chile y su
impacto en el desarrollo industrial," 1970, cited in Yunis Ahuds, Asignaci6n de recursosAsignaci6n de
recursos y politica de investigaci6n para la ciencia y la tecnologia, 4.
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sector. The increased attention given to a customer's purchasing constraints and his
or her use of a consumer good raised awareness for the importance of good industrial
design. Within INTEC, young Chilean industrial designers working under the
direction of Gui Bonsiepe (a former instructor at the renowned German design
school Hochschule fr Gestaltung (HfG) in Ulm) adopted a scientific approach to
design. Their methods upheld function over form and used systems theory to study
how objects interact with their environment. From 1971 to 1973, the Industrial
Design Group developed nearly twenty products, including inexpensive cases for
electronic calculators; agricultural machinery for sowing and reaping that furthered
the agrarian reform by raising the productivity of the land; spoons for measuring
rations of powdered milk given to children through the National Milk Plan; a system
of inexpensive, durable furniture for use in public housing projects and playgrounds;
and a record player inexpensive enough for popular use. These goods were simple in
design, easy to construct, inexpensive, and of good quality, important considerations
for the majority of Chilean consumers. INTEC's interdisciplinary approach to
product development, and the incorporation of design considerations within the
development process, eventually produced a merger between the Mechanical
Engineering Division and the Industrial Design Group, known thereafter as the
division of "Product Development."38
Outside INTEC, other industries within the social and mixed property areas
began developing products for popular markets, particularly within the
microelectronics and transportation sectors. The production of the Anti television
offers one illustrative example. In 1971, CORFO assumed partial control of the
Chilean branch of RCA International, Ltd. CORFO administrators renamed the
38 Palmarola Sagredo, "Productos y socialismo: diseflo industrial estatal en Chile."
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mixed-area enterprise Industria de Radio y Television S.A., or IRT, for short. When
the CORFO Sector Committee for Electric and Electronic Industries announced
plans to manufacture 130,000 low-cost televisions for popular consumption between
1971 and 1972, IRT assumed responsibility for the project.39 It created the IRT Anti,
a small black-and-white unit with an 11-inch screen, housed in a plastic case that
read: "IRT. Built by order of the Electric and Electronic Committee, CORFO.
Chilean Made." According to Palmarola, the Anti made television accessible to the
masses. Instead of being an elite luxury item, it soon became a basic staple of
Chilean homes and "one of the most remembered products of the UP."40 However,
sustaining the Anti's inexpensive price tag depended on developing a domestic
industry for the manufacture of reliable microelectronic component parts. A study
published by the University of Chile in 1971 estimated that the consumer electronics
industry paid nearly $2.5 million annually in foreign patent royalties, money that
could be saved if Chileans developed their own designs and manufacturing processes
for microelectronic goods and their components--radios, televisions, tape players,
telephones, and even small computers.4 ' Many parts found within the Anti's plastic
casing were manufactured in the Chilean city Arica, a free-trade zone and one of the
manufacturing centers of the country.42
39 CORFO controlled 51% of the company, while RCA maintained the minority 49% share. CORFO,
"Comite de las Industrias Electricas y Electronicas," CORFO en el gobierno de la Unidad Popular, 4
November 1971.
40 Palmarola Sagredo, "Productos y socialismo: disefio industrial estatal en Chile," 275.
41 Hacia una politica de desarrollo cientifico y tecnol6gico para Chile, 99-100.
42 The domestic manufacture of microelectronic components and the government's insistence on their use
presented numerous difficulties for Chilean factories. According to Barrie Lawson, manager of the Chilean
Phillips plant during the UP era, the new Chilean-made components did not share the same specifications
or tolerances as the components the company had used previously in their assembly lines. As a result,
Phillips engineers were forced to redesign their televisions repeatedly in order to accommodate the
introduction of these new components. Barrie Lawson, interview by author, 20 January 2001.
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While IRT worked to make the television accessible to a broader consumer
base, Citroen of Arica began constructing a new "automobile for the people." In
1971, Minister of the Economy Pedro Vuskovic ordered the manufacture of a utility
vehicle akin to the jeep that would cost less than $250 to produce-a Chilean version
of the German Volkswagen.4 3 Using funding and technology from its parent
company, Citroen, the Chilean plant drew up plans for a utility vehicle modeled
after the Citroen Baby Brousse, which the French manufacturer had designed for
public transport in Vietnam. Citroen christened the new design "YagAn," after a
Chilean Indian tribe indigenous to Tierra del Fuego. Cristian Lyon, then director of
Citroen, Arica, remembered that the designers "wanted to see [a vehicle] that was
native like the YagAns."44
The size and scope of Chilean automobile production had grown significantly
during the 1960s, thanks in part to the protections given to the automobile industry
by the previous two government administrations. The Yagan, however, is widely
regarded as the first automobile completely designed and assembled in Chile,
although the veracity of this claim is subject to debate.45 Ly6n described building the
43 Automobiles were among the most highly politicized technologies of the UP era. Although the Popular
Unity Program banned government workers from using automobiles for private use, government workers
received priority in the distribution of new cars produced by Chilean factories and sparked charges of
favoritism. In 1971, CORFO created the Automotive Commission in efforts to coordinate the distribution
of Chile's limited automobile supply in the face of rising demand and bring Chilean automobile production
in line with the goals of the UP. Among their core objectives was the production of utility vehicles and
automobiles for mass consumption. Primer mensaje del Presidente Allende ante el congreso pleno, 21 de
Mayo de 1971, (Santiago, Chile: Departamento de Publicaciones de la Presidencia de la Republica - Chile,
1971), 119.
44 CristiAn Lyon, Creando El Yagdn [webpage] (Corporaci6n de Televisi6n de la Pontificia Universidad
Cat6lica de Chile, 2003 [cited 11 November 2004]); available from
http://www.reportajesdelsiglo.cl/reportajes/reportajes/auto/entrevista/lyon.htm.
45 In actuality, Citroen employees only designed and assembled the Yagan body. They used the suspension
system, motor, and other key components from other Citroen vehicles. According to the Chief Methods
Officer for Citroen Arica, Pedro Medina, Citroen Arica previously designed and assembled a new
automotive body in 1960, eleven years before Vuskovic commissioned the Yagan. Therefore, the YagAn
was not fully designed and manufactured in Chile, nor was it the first automobile to sport a body that was
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YagAn as an artesanal undertaking rather than a science: cutting here,
straightening there, and creatively combining parts from Citroen vehicles past to
produce a distinctively Chilean automobile. "I insist it was almost a metaphor for
the history of Chile," Ly6n remarked, perhaps referring to the ad hoc willingness of
Citroen workers to construct something from the ground up or the excitement of
creating something new with only limited resources. "It's incredible what objects can
say about the characteristics of a people, a nation, and a time."46 The UP believed
income redistribution programs would increase demand for automobiles-a
prediction that came to pass. In the end, however, Citroen sold only four hundred
Yagains. Despite its low cost to manufacture, it failed to substantially undercut the
prices of competing models destined for the popular market. Its creators lamented
that it never had the chance to secure a solid market share before the end of the UP
government :in 1973. 47
Taken together, these projects illustrate a shift in the definition of industrial
success and the considerations driving technological innovation. Instead of giving
priority to the production of capital-intensive goods and the maximization of profit,
as private firms had in the past, the government emphasized accessibility, use
value, and the geographic origin of component parts. These new considerations
reflected the economic policies of the UP and the social goals of the Chilean
revolution. Far from being neutral, the technologies described here intentionally
reflect the philosophy of the UP. In this setting, televisions, automobiles, measuring
100% Chilean made. This raises the question of why the Yagdn has assumed this place of honor in Chilean
history. Pedro Medina, interview by Cristian Medina and the author, 20 December 2004.
46 Ibid.
47 In recent years, the Yagan has emerged as an object of nostalgia. A recent documentary entitled, "La
huella del Yagan" (The Tread of the YagAn) illustrates this sentimentality by recording the road trip of two
young Chileans as they drive a Yagan from Santiago to Arica, in a sense bringing the historic vehicle back
to its birthplace.
187
spoons, and electronic calculators all became tools for revolution and signaled the
beginnings of a material culture that Chileans could call their own.
State Computing
On December 24, 1970 EMCO, the computer service enterprise (Empresa de Servicio
de Computaci6n) changed its name to ECOM, the national computer and informatics
enterprise (Empresa Nacional de Computaci6n e Informdtica). According to La
Naci6n, the! government newspaper, the change acknowledged that EMCO's
important activities "go beyond the traditional limits of a computer service" and
therefore warranted dropping the word "service" and raising the agency to the level
of a national enterprise, akin to ENTEL or ENDESA.48 "This is an enterprise," the
newspaper read, "whose objectives are clearly national, without the goal of profit,
and that will operate throughout the country." The announcement signified more
than a name change. From 1970-1973, ECOM expanded to near monopolistic
proportions and controlled almost all of Chile's computer related activities, including
those in the private sector, and dictated national computer policies. Although other
Latin American nations, such as Brazil, established their own centralized computer
agencies, ECOM's strict controls were reportedly the strongest in the region.4 9
Raimundo Beca, the general director of ECOM during the Allende period,
succinctly stated that although the agency was small, "ECOM had a lot of power,
power is order." When pushed to explain, Beca said, "because all of the computers
entering the country required the signed authorization of ECOM." However,
48 "ECOM: nuevo nombre para una empresa que surge," La Naci6n, 7 January 1971.
49 Ram6n C. Barquin, "Some Political Effects of Computation in Latin America," in MI. T. Alfred P. Sloan
School of Management Working Paper no. 655-73 (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Alfred P. Sloan School of
Management, 1973).
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"ECOM did not authorize anyone to purchase a computer, ECOM bought them and
people had to use ECOM's machines. There were some large private companies and
other large public agencies that wanted to buy [their own computing machines] but
ECOM did not let them." ECOM was "a monopoly of calculation, because it provided
services," Beca said. Although it was also the only entity with the power to purchase
and import computing machines. ECOM's growth mirrored the overall expansion of
the Chilean state under Allende, which extended the programs of state-led economic
growth begun by the Christian Democrats. ECOM's tight regulations reflected
government attempts to direct the national economy and control the distribution of
national resources. Moreover, computer technology allowed the government to
manage the payroll records for the growing numbers of state employees who entered
the workforce as a result of government employment and income redistribution
programs. Once aligned with the economic goals of socialism, computers also
presented new technological possibilities for directed economic management and
control, an area of application that will be addressed at great length in the following
two chapters.
The reaction of the U.S. computer companies IBM and Burroughs to the
Popular Unity government further complicated Chile's ability to purchase computing
hardware. When the Popular Unity came to power, Burroughs decided to suspend all
Chilean operations rather than risk expropriation. IBM, however, took a different
tack. Alfredo Acle, then director of systems engineering at IBM, reported that the
company viewed the potential expropriation of IBM Chile as a legitimate threat;
IBM was a large, foreign-owned enterprise of near-monopolistic proportions that
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sold high-end technology to the Chilean market. 50 However, instead of ending its
Chilean operations, the company decided to use its international presence to relocate
more than eighty Chilean employees to other IBM offices throughout Latin America
and Europe. This reduced the size of the Chilean operation to the bare minimum
required to maintain existing service contracts. IBM's culture of company loyalty
assisted these efforts, presenting relocation as a worthy sacrifice for saving "La
Mama IBM."' Decreasing the size of the Chilean office, the company argued, made
the enterprise less desirable to the state and could allow the company to continue
operating under private ownership and maintain its management structure.51 The
relocation program, moreover, served the interests of the company. Trained Chilean
employees filled vacancies in other IBM World Trade operations, many at the
executive level. According to Acle, the majority of employees who decided to relocate
had engineering degrees and years of experience working for the company. Acle,
however, decided to remain in Santiago "to turn out the lights."52
The Chilean government never nationalized IBM Chile. The strategy of
reducing the number of employees succeeded in lowering the company's profile. And
because the company consisted of white-collar employees, rather than blue-collar
workers, IBM never attracted the levels of worker or government attention found in
other foreign-owned firms. ECOM supported the continued presence of IBM Chile,
and Acle considered ECOM director Raimundo Beca "a friend" of the company,
although ECOM insisted that IBM lessen its influence in national operations.5 3 The
previous IBM practice of recruiting engineers from the Chilean Navy further
50 Alfredo Acle,. Interview with the author, 18 December 2003.
51 Moreover, it would allow the company to maintain the promise of "full-employment," upholding IBM's




benefited Big Blue. Many of the employees who decided to stay behind, particularly
those in upper management, maintained ties with members of the armed forces.
Acle reported receiving word of the military coup the night before it happened, as
did all of his coworkers but one. On the morning of the military coup, that lone IBM
employee showed up for work as usual.54
IBM's reduction in force and the closure of Burroughs, combined with the
outward economic and political hostility expressed by the United States toward the
Allende government, forced ECOM to look beyond these corporate mainstays for
Chile's computing needs. In 1973, Chile finalized plans to purchase machines from
the French company CII (Machines Bull). Beca cited economic and technological
considerations as the primary motives for purchasing CII mainframes, independent
of politics. However, CII's past willingness to sell computing machinery to Cuba
under Castro, as well as the French willingness to assist the financially strapped
Chilean government, likely also played a role.55 ECOM finalized the contract with
CII in June 1973 and agreed to purchase an Iris-80 and an Iris-60 for approximately
US$8 million. Due to the differences in the CII, IBM, and Burroughs hardware, the
government developed a training program to teach government employees to use of
the new French machines.5 6
54 Acle recounted the misfortune of this particular employee, who spent three days holed up in the
downtown IBM office eating crackers and other food items he found in the desk drawers of his co-workers.
Acle, interview.
55 Barquin, "State of Computation in Cuba," Beca, interview.
56 ECOM, "Caracteristicas principales de los sistemas Iris-80 e Iris-60," in Conferencia deprocessamiento
electronico de datos para empresas y organismos gubernatales (Santiago de Chile: Empresa Nacional de
Computaci6n e InformAtica Ltda., 1973).; ECOM, "Programa capacitacion Iris-80," in Conferencia de
processamiento electronico de datos para empresas y organismos gubernatales (Santiago de Chile:
Empresa Nacional de Computaci6n e InformAtica Ltda., 1973). Following the military coup, the new
director of ECOM, Patricio Lniz canceled the contract for the two Iris machines, discretely paying the
French company $500,000 indemnification. According to Ldniz, the machines were an unreasonable
purchase given that they were not compatible with existing Chilean hardware and software systems.
Patricio Lniz, Interview with the author, 23 December 2003.
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The UP government not only changed the character of Chilean politics, the
role of the state, and the structure of Chilean society. It also drastically affected
Chile's ability to purchase foreign technologies and altered the manner in which
these technologies could be applied. The UP, like the Christian Democrats before
them, recognized the importance of science and technology. However, Chile's
trajectory of technological development, which from the time of Ibafiez to Frei had
emphasized advanced technology, expertise, and a technocratic elite, could not
continue under Allende's ideological program for peaceful revolution. Political
revolution led to technological rupture. The technological history of the U.S. during
the twentieth century has been characterized incremental developments afforded by
political continuity and economic stability. In the Chilean case, incremental change
was made impossible by the radical changes in the prevailing political ideology and
the subsequent reaction to these changes at home and abroad.
Interdisciplinary Problem Solving
Science, technology, and politics merged to an unprecedented degree during the UP
years, often with government and/or university support. Linking science and
technology to societal concerns, moreover, resulted in changes in the practice of
research. Members of academic and government communities argued for deeper and
more "global" understandings of Chilean society and studies examining how socialist
transformation affected all aspects of Chilean life. This new wave of research
demanded holistic scholarship, which transcended disciplinary and institutional
boundaries and broke from the traditional university structure of department- and
discipline-oriented research. The presence of interdisciplinary thought,
collaboration, and communication in scientific undertakings became a feature of
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work conducted during UP and influenced research and development activities in
university, industrial, and government settings.5 7 Only a brief discussion of the
university experience will be presented here; the interdisciplinary collaborations
formed among government agencies will provide one focus of chapter 5.
The University of Chile recognized that interdisciplinary scholarship
constituted an important component of research that was oriented toward areas of
social and economic concern. In a report published in 1972, the executive secretary
for the Commission on Scientific Research at the university urged the university to
form temporary interdisciplinary working groups dedicated to solving "human
problems." The proposed groups cut across university departments and applied the
expertise of each discipline to the collective knowledge of a particular theme or social
issue. In the process, these groups encouraged creative synthesis and cross-
fertilization among diverse bodies of academic thought.58 The report received the
support of the university rector, Edgardo Boeninger.59
The Center for Studies on National Reality (CEREN) at the Catholic
University provides one of the more illustrative examples of the push for
interdisciplinary research and collaboration within Chilean universities during this
period and links these activities to the political changes instigated by the UP. The
center grew out of the university reform movement of the late 1960s and represented
57 The Chilean government also proposed bridging the gap between national needs and national research
activities by encouraging direct contact between university researchers, government researchers, and
members of industry. Mensaje Presidente Allende ante congreso pleno, 21/Mayo '73, 254.
58 Yunis Ahuds,, Asignaci6n de recursosAsignaci6n de recursos y politica de investigaci6n para la ciencia y
la tecnologia.
59 Boeniger also wrote the forward to Hacia una politica de desarrollo cientifico y tecnol6gico para Chile,
a text that argued for the importance of science and technology in national policy.
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a response to student demands that the university "adopt a critical stance."60
CEREN promoted itself as a space for interdisciplinary scholarship that addressed
issues relevant to the long-term future of Chilean society. Jacques Chonchol, then a
member of the Christian Democrats, served as the founding director of the center
and held that position until Allende appointed him to be Minister of Agriculture, a
cabinet position.
While the center's formation predated Allende's presidency, Chonchol's
initial description of CEREN communicates how the center rapidly evolved into a
space for creative, interdisciplinary thinking during the UP.61 According to
Chonchol, intellectuals from different disciplines, or even from different universities
or institutions outside academia, came together at the center to theorize the future
of Chilean society. He equated CEREN's activities with those of U.S. think tanks,
such as RAND, or state planning agencies in France or Poland-organizations
concerned with the significance of change, including the social and economic changes
spurred by :innovations in science and technology.62 Understanding these changes
required studies of Chilean society in its totality and brought together economic,
scientific, cultural, and institutional perspectives, among others. Chonchol credited
science and technology with the level of economic progress found in the developed
world and the idealization of modern society copied by underdeveloped nations such
as Chile. The emphasis placed on emulation, rather than innovation, prevented
underdeveloped nations from finding their own unique path to economic and social
advancement. CEREN, therefore, tried to understand science and technology from
60 "CEREN: ciencia en la tradici6n del Marxismo," Que' Pasa, 14 June 1973; Jacques Chonchol, "Qud es el
CEREN," Cuadernos de la realidad nacional 1 (1969). On the university reform movement of 1967 see
Carlos Huneeus, La reforma universitaria: veinte aos despurs, 1 st ed. (Santiago, Chile: CPU, 1988).
61 Chonchol, "Qu es el CEREN."
62 Ibid.: 6.
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the perspective of the developing world and proposed ways that Chile could adopt
and adapt technology to better suit its particular situation.63
After Allende was elected in 1970, CEREN became an official academic unit
within the Catholic University. It grew to employ twenty-five full-time professors
and an even larger number of part-time affiliates, who published a number of books,
working papers, and journal editions while educating a student body of
approximately one thousand. 64 When Chonchol left to join the cabinet, the CEREN
directorship passed to Manuel Antonio Garret6n, a former student leader and one of
the original founders of the MAPU Party, a relatively new political organization of
young intellectuals that had split from the Christian Democracy to join the Popular
Unity coalition in support of Allende. Under Garret6n, CEREN assumed a strong
Marxist bent and promoted interdisciplinary collaborations in the service of Chile's
socialist project. Work at the center focused on four key areas: the economic
transition to socialism, ideologies and cultures of change, the state and socio-
political organization, and studies of technology.65 Within CEREN "science" often
became shorthand for Marxist science, even though the center outwardly
maintained a commitment to representing heterogeneous perspectives. 66 By 1973,
CEREN and its triennial publication Cuadernos de la Realidad Nacional (Notebooks
of the National Reality) emerged as one of the strongest critics of the Chilean
"bourgeois media," particularly of the unabashedly rightist newspaper El Mercurio.
63 Ibid.: 12-13.
64 "CEREN: ciencia en la tradici6n del Marxismo." This figure does not include the number of professors
with split or part-time appointments in CEREN.
65 "CEREN: doble desafio en el plano universitario y social," La Naci6n, 3 January 1971.
66 In an interview, journalists from Qu Pasa asked Garreton if CEREN's commitment to plurality would
include a hypothetical "scientific line" developed by the extreme rightist party Patria y Libertad (Fatherland
and Liberty). Garrret6n responded, "All scientific positions have a right to CEREN... [but] obviously this
depends on other factors.. .Patria y Libertad is a fascist political movement and it inspires nothing of
intellectual value." "CEREN: ciencia en la tradici6n del Marxismo."
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Moreover, CEREN became a treasured source of information for leftist journalists
while evoking scorn and skepticism from those who claimed that the center had
replaced academic rigor with assumptions grounded in political ideology.67
This political controversy, however, veils one of the most impressive facets of
the CEREN, namely, its commitment to interdisciplinary research and its unique
perspectives on topics such as science, technology, urbanism, industry, and even
feminism. The diverse range of articles found in the Cuadernos provides lasting
proof of the creative research and interdisciplinary thinking that flourished within
CEREN. Its contributors included the demographer Armand Mattelart, sociologist
Jorge Larrain, economist Sergio Bitar, industrial designer and professor of
engineering Gui Bonsiepe, writer and novelist Ariel Dorfman, and economist
Stephan de Vylder.68 An article written for the Cuadernos not only discussed
methods for directed economic planning, as did the majority of texts from the Frei
period, but also considered who would benefit from their application and raised
questions about power and justice.6 9 The Cuadernos similarly introduced gender
issues to work in labor studies, as evidenced by Lucia Ribeiro's work on the plight of
female Chilean workers.7 0 Reviews of books by the feminist writers Betty Friedan,
67 Ibid; "Cuadernos del CEREN: ,Donde queda el rigor universitario?" Qui Pasa, 1 February 1973.
68 Sergio Bitar and Eduardo Moyano, "Redistribuci6n del consumo y transici6n al socialismo," Cuadernos
de la realidad nacional 11 (1972); Gui Bonsiepe, "Subdesarollo, tecnologia y universidad. Reflexiones
metatecnol6gicas," Cuadernos de la realidad nacional, no. 11 (1972); Stefan De Vylder, "La UNCTAD III.
,Hacia un tercer fracaso?" Cuadernos de la realidad nacional 12 (1972); Jorge Larrain, "Orientaciones y
actividades de la Confederaci6n Democratica de Partidos durante la crisis de octubre de 1972," Cuadernos
de la realidad nacional 16 (1973); Armand Mattelart and Michele Mattelart, "Ruptura y continuidad en la
comunicaci6n: puntos para una polemica," Cuadernos de la realidad nacional 12 (1972); Michele
Mattelart, "La prensa burgesa No sera mas que un tigre de papel?" Cuadernos de la realidad nacional 16
(1973); Urs Muller Plantemberg and Franz Hinkelammert, "Condiciones y consecuencias de una politica de
redistribuci6n ingresos," Cuadernos de la realidad nacional 16 (1973).
69 See for example Guillermo Geisse and Enrique Browne, "Planificaci6n para los planificadores o para el
cambio social?" Cuadernos de la realidad nacional 11 (1972).
70 Lucia Ribeiro, "La mujer obrera chilena. Una aproximaci6n a su estudio," Cuadernos de la realidad
nacional, no. 16 (1973).
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Germain Greer, and Kate Millet also graced the pages of the Cuadernos,
disseminating the ideas of the U.S. women's movement to a Chilean academic
audience.7 ' Science and technology often appeared in articles relating to
underdevelopment, discussions of technological transfer, or critiques of capitalism
and dependency. Moreover, these essays enjoyed a significant presence within the
CEREN curriculum. In 1972, the center offered such courses as "Technology and
Social Change in Chile," "Ideology and Means of Communication in Chile," and
"Copper Mining and Industry: Technological Conditioning and Socio-Political
Effects," as well as related seminars on social aspects of biology, mathematics,
chemistry, and psychiatry.7 2 The following year, CEREN's course offerings included
"Technology and Ideology" and "Ideology and Science."7 3
The interdisciplinary approach pursued by CEREN permitted the creative
merging of science and technology with themes found in the humanities, social
sciences, and politics, generating new research questions and original topics of
study. However, CEREN's clear political position often fueled critiques that the
center produced ideological rather than scientific research. In response, Garret6n
asserted that science and technology had upheld and even promoted state ideological
projects in the past and could thus be directed responsibly in the service of the
Chilean revolution. These sentiments similarly appeared in the articles published by
CEREN, as well as in the center's course offerings. However, Garret6n also argued
that science possessed the ability to understand "ideological elements." CEREN
71 Isabel Gannon and Lucia Ribeiro, "El problema que no tiene nombre: la situaci6n de la mujer,"
Cuadernos de la realidad nacional 13 (1972).
72 "Programa docente del CEREN primer semestre de 1972," Cuadernos de la realidad nacional 12 (1972).
73 "Programa docente del CEREN," Cuadernos de la realidad nacional 16 (1973). Additional CEREN
activities and class listings appear in "Investigaciones y otras actividades del CEREN," (Santiago de Chile:
CEREN Apartado de Cuademos de la Realidad Nacional, 1971).
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researchers therefore used scientific methodologies to purify themselves and their
work of ideological bias and maintain the required level of academic rigor.74 This
observation echoed the stance adopted by the University of Chile-science could be
directed in the service of particular research questions, including the study of
ideology, but its practice needed to remain free from political thought. Unlike
CEREN, however, the University of Chile did not conflate facets of Marxism, such as
class struggle, with claims to objectivity.
The work produced by CEREN, from its inception through 1973,
demonstrated a sophisticated and well-developed stance toward science, technology,
ideology, and politics within the Chilean context, often framed in relationship to
Marxist ideas of class struggle and the ownership of production. Given Garret6n's
prior claims to scientific purity, this practice may continue to raise eyebrows now,
just as it did then. The more interesting observation, however, is that the
interdisciplinary research supported by CEREN (as well as the research supported
by other interdisciplinary gatherings of scientists, researchers, and engineers within
Chilean government agencies and universities) enabled the formulation of new
research questions and encouraged the generation of original scholarship and
collaborative projects that crossed boundaries in innovative and unprecedented
ways.
Conclusion
The structural changes set in motion by the UP extended beyond political, economic,
and social spheres and entered Chilean laboratories, classrooms, and businesses.
They shaped. technological design processes, the use and availability of technological
74 "CEREN: ciencia en la tradici6n del Marxismo."
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resources, and the practice of scientific research. The UP program expanded role of
the state and the desire for greater coordination within this growing apparatus
provided both a mechanism and a desire for mapping science and engineering
resources with greater precision. On one hand, the generation of these maps
illustrates the continued influence of past development models, which valued
identifying and quantifying national activities and incorporating this knowledge to
improve state planning efforts. On the other hand, state planning now had a
different ideological framework. Information from these studies now assisted in
coordinating the activities of an increasingly nationalized economy and helped
government and university officials channel Chile's limited science and engineering
resources in support of the peaceful socialist revolution.
While dependency theorists and members of the Left uncovered the relations
of domination and exploitation embedded in economic practices, similar challenges
arose that questioned modernist faith in empiricism and scientific purity. Scientific
knowledge and technological transfer no longer provided universal benefits for
national progress. Government, industrial, and academic communities oriented
research and development toward the central problems facing the Chilean nation, as
determined by the UP political project. Struggles for national autonomy conflated
with desires to pursue certain aspects of scientific knowledge, particularly those
geared toward solving industrial and social problems. Past fetishism for imported
high-end durable goods and foreign technologies gave way to critiques of their
appropriateness for Chilean markets. In this context, Chilean designers equated
technological superiority with an object's ability to meet Chilean needs and reflect
the national vision for the future.
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In spite of these efforts, the Chilean government could not surmount its
dependence on imported spare parts, foreign expertise, or foreign patents. Shortages
of components parts and the government's inability to obtain replacements from
U.S.-owned companies-a result of the White House's open hostility toward
Allende-continued to plague Chilean industries. Moreover, several oriented science
and engineering projects occurred under the leadership of European experts. Given
the short lifespan of the UP and the levels of economic and political instability that
intensified throughout Allende's presidency, directed research and development
proved inadequate for surmounting the economic dislocations that intensified from
1970 to 1973. These included, among others, widespread consumer shortages, labor
strikes, black market hoarding, and the aforementioned U.S.-led economic blockade.
Given the gravity of these problems, the level of creativity and energy displayed
within scientific, engineering, and industrial design communities seems rather
remarkable, as does the level of government attention to their cultivation. This
moment in Chilean history gave rise to interdisciplinary combinations and
confluences of knowledge and resulted in new questions, new combinations of source
materials, and new frameworks for analysis. The richness and diversity of science
and engineering activities pursued during the UP era suggests that Chile's unique
interpretation of socialism fostered innovation and proposed new articulations of
modernity, material progress, and development. This chapter has illustrated how
science, engineering, and design practices reflected the institutional and political
changes of the Chilean revolution and the shared sense of possibility. From the
drawing board to the shop floor, Chileans were taking control of their destiny.
The changes that occurred in Chilean scientific and technological circles
during the Allende period provides a backdrop for the material presented in
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chapters 5 and 6, both of which document the construction of the Cybersyn computer
system. The history of this computer project brings together many of the ideas
introduced here, including the recognized importance of interdisciplinary
collaboration; the interplay of science, technology, and politics; and the expressed
desire to construct technologies tailored for Chilean needs and ideological framings.
By redefining what it meant to be modern while encouraging creative collaboration
and technological innovation, the Allende government provided the conditions
suitable for constructing this unprecedented computer system that resulted in a new
technology for state management.
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Chapter 4: Images
Figure 4.1: Pedro Medina sits in the driver's seat of the Citroen Yagdn, a vehicle widely viewed as the first
automobile produced completely in Chile. Medina was the Chief Methods Officer for Citroen and played a
key role in designing the Yagan's production process. (Claudio Rolle ed., 1973 La vida cotidiana de un aho
crucial, Santiago de Chile, Editorial Planeta, 2003. Image used with permission.)
Figure 4.3: Image of the Ant6 television set designed by IRT for popular consumption. The image to the
right shows the Chilean shield ("escudo") imprinted on the front panel of the television set, a symbol of
national manufacture. After the coup, Anti televisions were made without the shield. (Images used with
permission from Hugo Palmarola Sagredo.)
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Figure 4.4: Design of a modular computer case created by INTEC industrial designers in 1973. This
project never made it past the initial planning stages. (Image used with permission from Rodrigo Walker.)
Figure 4.5: A portable record player designed by the INTEC industrial design group and manufactured by




N NOVEMBER 12, 1971 British cybernetician Stafford Beer met with
Chilean President Salvador Allende to discuss constructing an
unprecedented tool for economic management. For Beer, the meeting was of the
utmost importance; the project required the President's support. During the past ten
days, Beer and a small Chilean team had worked frantically developing a plan for a
new technological system capable of regulating Chile's economic transition in a
manner consistent with the socialist principles of Allende's presidency. The project,
later referred to as "Cybersyn" in English and "Synco" in Spanish, would network
every firm in the expanding nationalized sector of the economy to a central computer
in Santiago, enabling the government to grasp the status of production quickly and
respond to economic crises in real-time.' Although Allende had been briefed on the
project ahead of time, Beer was charged with the task of explaining the system to
the President and convincing him that the project warranted government support.
1 "Cybersyn" comes from a synthesis of the two concepts driving the project, "cybernetics" and "synergy."
The abbreviation "Synco" conveyed the objective of the project, namely "Sistema de Informaci6n y
Control." The project name has also appeared erroneously as "Sinco" or "Cinco."
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Accompanied only by his translator, a former Chilean Navy officer named
Roberto Cafiete, Beer walked to the presidential palace in La Moneda while the rest
of his team waited anxiously at a hotel bar across the street. "A cynic could declare
that I was left to sink or swim," Beer later remarked. "I received this arrangement
as one of the greatest gestures of confidence that I ever received; because it was open
to me to say anything at all."2 The meeting went quite well. Once they were sitting
face to face (with Cafiete in the middle, discretely whispering translations in each
man's ear), Beer began to explain his work in "management cybernetics," a field he
founded in the early 1950s and cultivated in his subsequent publications.3 At the
heart of Beer's work stood the "viable system model," a five-tier structure based on
the human nervous system, which Beer believed existed in all stable organizations-
biological, mechanical, and social. Allende, who had trained as a pathologist,
immediately, grasped the biological inspiration for Beer's cybernetic model and
nodded knowingly throughout the explanation. This reaction left quite an
impression on the cybernetician. "I explained the whole damned plan and the whole
viable system model in one single sitting ... and I've never worked with anybody at
the high level who understood a thing I was saying."4
Beer acknowledged the difficulties of achieving real-time economic control
but emphasized that a system based on a firm understanding of cybernetic
principles could accomplish technical feats deemed impossible in the developed
world, even with Chile's limited technological resources. Once Allende gained a
familiarity with the mechanics of Beer's model, he began to reinforce the political
2 Stafford Beer, Brain of the Firm: The Managerial Cybernetics of Organization, 2nd ed. (New York: J.
Wiley, 1981), 257.
3 Wiener himself christened Beer the "father of management cybernetics."
4 Stafford Beer, Interview by the author, 15-16 March 2001.
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aspects of the project and insisted that the system behave in a "decentralizing,
worker-participative, and anti-bureaucratic manner."5 When Beer finally reached
the top level of his systematic hierarchy, the place in the model that Beer had
reserved for Allende himself, the president leaned back in his chair and said, "At
last, el pueblo."6 With this succinct utterance, Allende reframed the project to reflect
his ideological convictions and view of the presidential office, which often equated
his political leadership with the rule of the people. By the end of the conversation,
Beer had secured Allende's blessing to continue the project.
At face value, a meeting between a British cybernetician and a Chilean
president, particularly one as controversial as Allende, seems most unusual. The
brief presidency of the Unidad Popular (UP) has arguably inspired more historical
scholarship than any other moment in Chilean history, even more so following the
recent 30-year anniversary of the military coup. But despite all that has been
written about that period, little is known about the Chilean government's
experiment with cybernetics and even less is known about its contribution to the
UP's experiment in democratic socialism.7 The nature of the meeting between Beer
5 Beer, Brain of the Firm: The Managerial Cybernetics of Organization, 257.
6 Ibid., 258. The meeting between Allende and Beer constitutes one of the most popularly printed anecdotes
of the Cybersyn project, always constructed from Beer's account. Here I have retold the story drawing from
Beer's account in Brain of the Firm, an interview with Beer, and an interview with Roberto Cafiete, Vifia
del Mar, Chile, 16 Jan. 2003.
7 This should not imply that the project has not been documented. Beer published his account of the project
in the last five chapters of Brain of the Firm, as well as in the last chapter of Stafford Beer, Platform for
Change: A Messagefrom Stafford Beer (New York: Wiley, 1975). Other references include Armand
Mattelart and Hector Schmucler, Communication and Information Technologies (Norwood: Ablex Pub.
Corp., 1985), which has devoted several pages of text to the Cybersyn project. Project participants, such as
Rail Espejo, Herman Schwember, and Roberto Cafiete have also published their account of Cybersyn in
international cybernetics journals. See Roberto Cafiete, "The Brain of the Government: An Application of
Cybernetic Principles to the Management of a National Industrial Economy" (paper presented at the 22nd
Annual North American Meeting Avoiding Social Catastrophes and Maximizing Social Opportunities: The
General Systems Challenge, Washington, D.C., 13-15 February 1978); Raul Espejo, "Cybernetic Praxis in
Government: The Management of Industry in Chile 1970-1973," Cybernetics and Systems: An
International Journal 11 (1980); Herman Schwember, "Cybernetics in Government: Experience with New
Tools for Management in Chile 1971-1973," in Concepts and Tools of Computer-Assisted Policy Analysis,
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and Allende suggests that writing technology into one of the most widely studied
periods of Latin American history will bring to light an unstudied facet of the
Chilean revolution and, in the process, demonstrate the value of this approach. On
one hand, documenting the construction of this system provides information about
the extent of Chile's technological capabilities during the early 1970s, particularly
with respect to computation. More important, however, is that the project provides a
window for viewing new tensions within the UP coalition, Chile, and the
international community at large. Furthermore, the impressions and aspirations
expressed by various project participants reveal an alternative history of the UP era
that is grounded in technological optimism and the merging of science and politics in
order to bring about social and economic change.
Similarly, the meeting between Beer and Allende suggests that cybernetics,
an interdisciplinary science encompassing "the entire field of communication theory,
whether in the machine or in the animal," achieved a level of importance in Chile
during this period and that Allende's Chilean revolution was open to these
cybernetic ideas and their application. s However, most discussions of cybernetics to
date focus on the evolution of these ideas and their application in the United States
and Europe and do not address how they migrated to other parts of the world such
as Latin America. The same could be said of the literature dedicated to the history of
computing, which has an almost exclusive focus on the United States and Western
ed. Hartmut Bossel, Interdisciplinary Systems Research (Basel, Germany: Birkhtiuser, 1977). Discussions
of the project have similarly appeared in publications such as New Scientist, Datamation and Data Systems.
R. C. Barquin, "State of Computation in Cuba," Datamation 19, no. 12 (1973); Herb Grosch, "Chilean
Economic Controls," New Scientist, 15 March 1973; Rex Malik, "Chile Steals a March," Data Systems,
April 1973; Rex Malik, "Inside Allende's Economic Powerhouse," Data Systems, May 1973. These,
however, are all publications dedicated to science and technology and not to the documentation Chilean
history during the Allende period.
8 Norbert Wiener, Cybernetics: Or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine, 2nd ed.
(Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1965), 11.
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Europe. Chilean history provides a clear of example of how alternative geographical
and political settings gave rise to new articulations of cybernetic ideas and
innovative uses of computer technology, ultimately illustrating the importance of
including Latin American experiences in these bodies of scholarship. 9
From yet another angle, the meeting between Beer and Allende illustrates
the importance of both technological soundness and political ideology in Cybersyn's
construction. Although the project was technically ambitious, from the outset it
could not be characterized as simply a technical endeavor to regulate the economy.
Project team members in fact thought that it could help make Allende's socialist
revolution a reality-that Cybersyn would constitute "revolutionary computing" in
the truest sense-and that it could do so in a way that was ideologically congruent
with Allende's politics. Indeed, the tensions surrounding Cybersyn's design and
construction mirrored the struggle between centralization and decentralization that
plagued Allende's dream of democratic socialism. Throughout Allende's presidency,
Chile's political polarization strongly influenced the perception of the project and its
role in Chilean society. The interplay of cybernetic ideas, Marxist ideology, and
computer technology found in the project illustrates how science and technology
contributed to Chilean ideas of governance during the early 1970s and altered the
possibilities for socialist transformation.
9 Although little attention has been paid to cybernetics in Latin America, scholars have addressed the
development of cybernetic ideas in the Soviet Union, most notably Slava Gerovitch, From Newspeak to
Cyberspeak: A History of Soviet Cybernetics (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2002).
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Chilean Cybernetics
The origin of cybernetics has been well documented elsewhere.' ° Previous
scholarship has shown that cybernetics grew out of a World War II project to create
anti-aircraft servomechanisms capable of accurately aiming weapons at the future
position of an enemy aircraft. This problem led Norbert Wiener, Julian Bigelow, and
Arturo Rosenblueth to develop a theory of predictive feedback control capable of
making predictive calculations from an incomplete set of information. Their work
later evolved into a theory for self-corrective control that many believed could be
applied to both machines and organisms. Attempts to bridge the mechanical and the
biological appeared as early as 1943 when Rosenblueth and colleagues wrote that "a
uniform behavioristic analysis is applicable to both machines and living organisms,
regardless of the complexity of the behavior.""' This conviction laid the foundation
for cybernetics, a new interdisciplinary science that strove to apply concepts from
mathematics and engineering-such as statistical modeling, information theory, and
the feedback loop-to a myriad of systems, including those outside the mechanical
and biological domains.
Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela provided one of the initial links
between Chile and the cybernetics community, although Maturana never identified
himself as a cybernetician.l2 Born in Chile in 1928, Maturana studied medicine at
10 For a more in depth treatment of the origin of cybernetics, refer to Paul N. Edwards, The Closed World:
Computers and the Politics of Discourse in Cold War America (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996); Steve J.
Heims, The Cybernetics Group (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991). An alternative reading of the field's
evolution is presented in David A. Mindell, Between Human and Machine: Feedback, Control, and
Computing Before Cybernetics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002). It is also worth noting
that the British cybernetics community, of which Beer was a part, placed a greater emphasis on applying
their cybernetic ideas outside of the laboratory than did their American counterparts. Andrew Pickering,
"Cybernetics and the Mangle: Ashby, Beer, and Pask," Social Studies of Science 32, no. 3 (2002).
" Arturo Rosenbluth, Norbert Wiener, and Julian Bigelow, "Behavior, Purpose, and Teleology,"
Philosophy of Science 10 (1943).
12Humberto Maturana, Interview by the author, 8 September 2003.
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the University of Chile and later pursued his graduate studies in the Biology
Department of Harvard University. In 1959, he co-authored the important paper
"What the Frog's Eye Tells the Frog's Brain" with Warren McCulloch, Jerome
Lettvin, and Walter Pitts, all of whom were important figures in the growing field of
cybernetics.' 3 After Maturana completed his doctoral degree, he returned to Chile
and assumed a position in the biology department of the University of Chile, the
most respected public university in the country. Here, he continued his work on the
optic nerve, but more broadly he was trying to uncover the organizational structure
of living organisms. Varela began his studies under Maturana's tutelage at the
University of Chile and followed his mentor's footsteps to the doctoral program in
biology at Harvard University. Like Maturana, Varela accepted a faculty position at
the University of Chile upon his return to Santiago. The title of their first co-
authored book, De Maquinas y Seres Vivos (On Machines and Living Beings),
illustrates the continued presence of cybernetic ideas in their biological studies.' 4
Here, the authors presented their groundbreaking theory of self-organizing systems,
known as autopoeisis.
However, neither Maturana's nor Varela's contribution to Chilean
cybernetics during the 1960s and early 1970s extended beyond the laboratory. On
occasion, Maturana would later advise Beer on the theoretical aspects of the
system-the men had traveled in the same circles and Beer knew of Maturana
before Allende came to power. Maturana and Varela later delivered several lectures
13 J. Y. Lettvin, H. R. Maturana, and W. S. McCulloch, "What the Frog's Eye Tells the Frog's Brain,"
Proceedings of the Institute of Radio Engineers 47, no. 11 (1959).
'
4Humberto R. Maturana and Francisco J. Varela, De mdquinas y seres vivos: una caracterizaci6n de la
organizaci6n biol6gica (Santiago de Chile: Editorial Universitaria, 1973). This book was later translated
into English as Humberto R. Maturana and Francisco J. Varela, Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization
of the Living (Boston: D. Reidel Pub. Co., 1980) with an introduction written by Stafford Beer.
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to the core members of the Cybersyn team, but they always did so in an unofficial
capacity.'5 Although these biologists provided one of the first bridges between Chile
and the international cybernetics community, they did not contribute to the Chilean
government's familiarity and acceptance of cybernetics during Allende's presidency.
Beer himself would unwittingly provide this connection.
The scope of this chapter does not permit a full biography of Beer, but a brief
sketch will enable the reader to appreciate the unorthodox nature of his character in
both business and cybernetic circles. Unlike many of his contemporaries in the
cybernetics community, Beer never received a formal degree; his undergraduate
studies in philosophy were cut short by military service in the British army during
World War II. Following the war, Beer entered the steel industry and ascended
rapidly to the management level. In 1950, a friend serendipitously handed Beer a
copy of Norbert Wiener's groundbreaking publication, Cybernetics. Reading the book
changed Beer's life and spurred him to write an enthusiastic letter to the famous
MIT mathematician detailing his application of cybernetic principles to the steel
industry. Wiener, who was unfamiliar with the business world and intrigued by this
new application of his work, invited Beer to visit him at MIT. Beer eventually
became an informal student of MIT biologist Warren McCulloch's and a friend to
Wiener and Heinz Von Foerster, an electrical engineer at the University of Illinois.
An independent thinker, Beer once gave a paper entitled "The Irrelevance of
Automation" at an international automation conference, an occasion that reportedly
convinced Von Foerster that the British did indeed possess a sense of humor.'6 In




of cybernetic principles to bring about social change, as evidenced by a series of
lectures he gave between 1969 and 1973 that he later published as Platform for
Change.17 Known for his long beard, the ever-present drink in his hand, and his
habit of smoking 30 cigars a day, Beer cultivated an image that, in one journalist's
words, resembled a "cross between Orson Welles and Socrates."' 8
After serving for a number of years as the director of cybernetics and
operations research at United Steel, the largest steel company in the United
Kingdom, Beer left to run Science in General Management (SIGMA), a French-
owned consulting company that applied operations research techniques to business
problems. Beer recalled that he was trying to use operations research "to change
industry and government in the same way that the army, navy, and air force had
been changed [during World War II] by making mathematical models."19 This was
quite an ambitious goal, considering the numerous contributions that operations
research techniques had made to the Allied antiaircraft and German U-boat efforts
during the war.20
SIGMA's reputation grew, and gradually the company began attracting an
international clientele. In 1962, the director of Chile's steel industry requested
SIGMA's services. Beer refused to go himself-he had never been to South America,
and his hectic schedule made the lengthy transit time seem unreasonable-but he
put together a team of English and Spanish employees to travel to Chile in his place.
SIGMA's work in the steel industry gradually expanded to include the railways. Due
17 Beer, Platform for Change: A Message from Stafford Beer and Beer, interview.
s Michael Becket, "Beer: The Hope of Chile," The Daily Telegraph, 10 August 1973.
19 Beer, interview.
20 See for example Agatha C. Hughes and Thomas Parke Hughes, Systems, Experts, and Computers: The
Systems Approach in Management and Engineering, World War II and After, ed. Agatha C. Hughes and
Thomas P. Hughes (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000).
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to the large amount of work, the Chilean SIGMA team often hired students to pick
up the slack. Among them was Fernando Flores, a young Chilean who studied
industrial engineering at the Catholic University in Santiago.
A workaholic by nature, Flores devoted himself to mastering the principles of
cybernetics and operations research practiced at SIGMA and became intimately
familiar with Beer's work after reading his books, Decision and Control and, later,
Cybernetics and Management. 2 1 Flores's knowledge of operations research led to a
teaching position at the Catholic University in Santiago and by his twenty-seventh
birthday he had become the acting dean of the Department of Engineering Science.
Like many of his contemporaries, Flores was active in both academic and political
circles. In 1969, a group of young intellectuals at the Catholic University, which
included Flores, broke from the Christian Democratic Party and established the
Movement of Popular Unitary Action (MAPU), a political party of young
intellectuals who were critical of the Christian Democrats and aligned with the
Communists and Socialists of the UP coalition. MAPU's joining with the UP,
combined with the inability of the right and the Christian Democrats to form a
winning coalition, resulted in Allende's narrow victory in the 1970 presidential
election. As an acknowledgement of Flores's political loyalty and technical
competency, the Allende government appointed the then twenty-eight-year-old
professor to serve as general technical manager of the Corporaci6n de Fomento de la
Producci6n (CORFO), the state development agency that Allende had charged with
21 Stafford Beer, Cybernetics and Management, 2nd ed. (London: English Universities P., 1967); Stafford
Beer, Decision and Control: The Meaning of Operational Research and Management Cybernetics (New
York: Wiley, 1966). While at the Catholic University, Flores studied Operations Research with Amoldo
Hax, a professor who left the university shortly thereafter to teach management at the MIT Sloan School.
Flores maintained his connection with Hax and through this channel learned of other research within the
United States and Great Britain pertaining to management science and operations research. Flores,
interview.
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nationalizing Chilean industry. It was the third highest position within CORFO, the
highest position within the state development agency held by a member of the
MAPU, and the management position most directly linked to the daily regulation of
the nationalized factories.22
Nationalizing the Economy
Allende believed that the nationalization of major industries deserved the utmost
priority and later referred to the task as "the first step toward the making of
structural changes."2 3 The nationalization effort would not only restore foreign-
owned and privately owned industries to the Chilean people, it would, he said,
"abolish the pillars propping up that minority that has always condemned our
country to uLnderdevelopment"-a reference to the industrial monopolies controlled
by a handful of Chilean families.2 4 The majority of the UP coalition believed that by
changing Chile's economic base, they would subsequently be able to bring about
institutional and ideological change within the boundaries of Chile's preexisting
legal framework, a facet that set Chile's path to socialism apart from that of other
socialist nations.2 5
After Allende's inauguration in November 1970, the government used the
first few months to implement policies grounded in structuralist economics and
Keynesian "pump priming," whereby economic growth would be achieved through
22 Fernando Flores, Interview by author, 30 July 2003; Oscar Guillermo Garret6n, Interview by the author,
4 August 2003.
23 Regis Debray and Salvador Allende Gossens, The Chilean Revolution: Conversations with Allende, I st
American ed. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972).
24 Salvador Allende, 'The Purpose of Our Victory: Inaugural address in the National Stadium, 5 November
1970', in Salvador Allende Gossens, Chile's Road to Socialism, ed. Joan E. Garces, trans. J. Darling
(Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1973), 59.
25 Sergio Bitar, Chile: Experiment in Democracy, trans. Sam Sherman, vol. 6, Inter-American Politics
Series (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1986)
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increased purchasing power and higher employment rates in order to pull the
Chilean economy out of the recession that the Allende administration had inherited.
Land reform programs and the inception of government-sponsored assistance to
rural workers augmented the purchasing power of individuals in the impoverished
agrarian sector, while workers in Chilean factories enjoyed a 30% average increase
in real wages during Allende's first year in office.26 Initially, these initiatives to
redistribute income succeeded in creating a growing segment of the population with
money to spend, stimulating the economy, increasing demand, raising production,
and expanding the popular base of support for the UP coalition. In the government's
first year, the GDP grew by 7.7%, production increased by 13.7%, and consumption
levels rose by 11.6%.27 These economic policies, however, would soon come to haunt
the UP government in the form of inflation and massive consumer shortages.
On the production front, the government wasted no time expanding the
existing nationalized sector and pushed it to a new level. By the end of 1971, the
government had transferred all major mining firms and sixty-eight other private
companies from the private to the public sector.2 8 The rapid pace of the
government's nationalization program, coupled with its lack of a clear, consistent
structure and delimitation, exacerbated the fears and insecurities expressed by
owners of small- and medium-size Chilean businesses. Promises of social change,
moreover, helped provoke a revolution from below: workers sometimes seized control
of their factories against the explicit wishes of their companero presidente. Less than
26 Peter Winn, Weavers of Revolution: The Yarur Workers and Chile's Road to Socialism (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1986), 142.
27 Bitar, Chile: Experiment in Democracy, 52.
28 Ibid., 45.
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one quarter of the firms expropriated during Allende's first year had been on the
government's list for incorporation into the public sector.29
Foreign investors in Chilean copper mines and telecommunications
companies (for example, ITT) further complicated the situation by insisting that
they be fully compensated for the businesses that the government proposed to
nationalize. ° In July 1971, the alienated Christian Democrats accused the
government of abusing legal loopholes to acquire desirable industries and proposed
an amendment that would require congressional approval for all acts of
appropriation. The Christian Democrats claimed that the government had invoked a
law written during the Great Depression to prevent layoffs and plant closings as a
means of nationalizing factories once workers aligned with the Left had gone on
strike and interrupted production. They proposed an amendment that would curb
the pace of nationalization by requiring Congress to pass a law authorizing every
new factory acquisition, a legislative maneuver that considerably weakened
Allende's executive power.
Moreover, the rapid growth of the nationalized sector quickly created an
unwieldy monster. The increasing number of industries under state control and the
number of employees within each industry presented the government with the
difficult task of managing a sector of the economy that became harder to monitor
with each passing day. In accordance with a decree passed in 1932, the government
sent "interventors" to replace previous management and govern activities within
29 Winn, Weavers of Revolution: The Yarur Workers and Chile's Road to Socialism, 228.
30 Nathaniel Davis, The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), 23-6,
67-71.
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these newly nationalized industries. 3 ' These representatives, however, often created
new problems. Although many were competent and dedicated to their jobs, others
were severely unqualified for the positions, and some were corrupt. The problem of
effectively managing the new "social property area" (APS) was exacerbated by the
decision to distribute appointments equally among the political parties, regardless of
the level of competency found in their respective talent pools. Even parties within
the UP coalition criticized Allende's choice of the interventors. For example,
members of the Communist Party argued that some interventors merely served as
replacements for the managers who had preceded them, occupying similar houses
and driving similar cars.3 2 From the Communists' perspective, not only did these
representatives fail to provide an adequate means of bringing production under the
control of the people, but they also helped veil the social reality of a continuing
status quo. Daily operations within the factories suffered further from the political
strife caused by interventors who saw themselves as representatives of their party.
At times, workers in some enterprises refused to listen to managers hailing from
political parties different than their own; this in turn necessitated a frustrating
process of party meetings and negotiations.3 3
As the bliss of the honeymoon period began to fade, the long-term instability
of Allende's approach became apparent. Politically motivated reforms, such as the
income redistribution championed by the UP, emphasized long-term structural
transformation over short-term economic management. Consumption started to
31 Allende's administration used the word "interventor" to refer to the politically appointed officials who
replaced the previous factory managers and literally intervened in factory production practices by bringing
each newly nationalized factory under the control of state.




outstrip production, inflation began to skyrocket, and the government's deficit
spending continued to grow, all of which were exacerbated by shrinking foreign
reserves and the denial of foreign credits. By July 1971, inflation had climbed by
45.9% and would continue to rise to unprecedented levels throughout Allende's
presidency.3 t From a production standpoint, the UP program of industrial
expansion through massive hiring initially helped factories increase their output
and attain fiull productive capacity, but once they reached that capacity, the number
of employees began to exceed the amount of work available, and productivity began
to fall. Although the symptoms of Chile's economic crisis assumed many forms,
many of which were already apparent during Allende's first year in office,
Valenzuela's retrospective observation that the "economic crisis during the Allende
period clearly became the government's chief unsolvable problem" succinctly
characterizes the magnitude of Chile's economic decline.3 5
However, at the time the government viewed the economic situation as far
from unsolvable. On July 13, 1971, Beer received a letter from Flores stating that he
was familiar with Beer's work and was "now in a position from which it is possible to
implement on a national scale-at which cybernetic thinking becomes a necessity-
scientific views on management and organization."3 6 He asked for Beer's advice
about applying cybernetic principles to the management of the nationalized sector.
Beer's response was enthusiastic:
I simply must ask you whether I could play some part, although I do not
know what to suggest... . Believe me, I would surrender any of my retainer
34 Ibid., 55.
35 Ibid., 61.
36 Letter from Fernando Flores to Stafford Beer, 13 July 1971, box 55, The Stafford Beer Collection,
Liverpool John Moores University, Liverpool, England.
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contracts I now have for the chance of working on this. That is because I
believe your country is really going to do it.37
One month later, Flores flew to England to meet with the man whose work he had
studied during his years working for SIGMA. The two met at Beer's club in London,
the Athenaeum, a gentlemen's club for the British intelligentsia. Flores did not
speak much English, and Beer did not speak any Spanish, but the two men managed
to communicate in a mixture of French, English, and Latin. Flores informed Beer
that he had assembled a small government team and asked the cybernetician to
travel to Chile and direct their efforts to apply cybernetic principles to the
nationalization effort. In November 1971, Beer arrived in Santiago.
Constructing Cybersyn
Beer landed in Chile on the same day that Allende celebrated the one-year
anniversary of his election. Before a packed audience at the National Stadium, the
president informed the crowd that now "more than ever one has to be aware of what
Chilean life is and of the path that is authentically ours, which is the path of
pluralism, democracy, and freedom, the path that opens the doors of socialism."38 It
was a speech of celebration, promise, and national pride that electrified the nation.
Shortly thereafter, the minister of finance announced that Chilean expenses had
topped $100 million, far exceeding the predicted $67 million inflow for the year.3 9
"When Stafford [Beer] came, it was around the time that Fidel Castro came," Flores
recalled, referring to Castro's extended visit to Chile that began on November 10,
37 Letter from Stafford Beer to Fernando Flores, 29 July 1971, box 55, The Stafford Beer Collection,
Liverpool John Moores University, Liverpool, England.
38 Salvador Allende, "First Anniversary of the Popular Government, National Stadium, Santiago,
November 4, 1971," James D. Cockcroft, ed., Salvador Allende Reader (Hoboken, N.J.: Ocean Press,
2000), 123-4.
39 Bitar, Chile: Experiment in Democracy, 65.
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1971, and lasted for twenty-five days. "Most of the Chilean guys were [going] to see
Fidel Castro," Flores laughed, "I [went] to see Stafford Beer. It was kind of a joke.
But that was good because it gave me a lot of time."40
Flores's handpicked Chilean team included representatives from various
academic disciplines, which set the tone for the interdisciplinary work that the effort
would require and reflected the trend toward cross-disciplinary collaboration that
characterized the research being conducted in other areas.41 During his ten-day
visit, Beer met various influential people in the Chilean government, including
Pedro Vuskovic, the minister of economics, and Allende himself. Meanwhile, each
member of Flores's team read the manuscript version of Beer's book Brain of the
Firm and made the language of Beer's management cybernetics their lingua
franca.4 2 The book outlined the "viable system model," a system that Beer believed
could describe the stability found in biological, mechanical, social, and political
organizations. Cybersyn's design cannot be understood without a basic grasp of this
model, which played a pivotal role in merging the politics of the Allende government
with the design of this technological system.
Although the viable system model first appeared in Brain of the Firm (1972),
it still stands as one of the guiding concepts behind Beer's work.43 It is defined as "a
system that survives. It coheres; it is integral ...but it has none the less mechanisms
and opportunities to grow and learn, to evolve and to adapt."44 The value of the
40 Flores, interview.
41 Caflete, "The Brain of the Government: An Application of Cybernetic Principles to the Management of a
National Industrial Economy"
42 Beer, Brain of the Firm: The Managerial Cybernetics of Organization, 249.
43 "Ten pints of Beer: The rationale of Stafford Beer's cybernetic books (1959-94)," Kybernetes 29, no. 5/6
(2000): 558-69.
4Beer, Brain of the Firm: The Managerial Cybernetics of Organization, 239. This statement illustrates a
reoccurring characteristic of Beer's work, namely the synthesis of metaphors drawn from biology and
engineering characteristic of work in the field of cybernetics.
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system "variables" (inputs) determined the system's resultant "state"; Beer referred
to the number of possible states as the system's "variety," a direct reference to Ross
Ashby's important "Law of Requisite Variety."4 5 A system able to maintain all
critical variables within the limits of systemic equilibrium achieves "homeostasis," a
quality desired by all viable systems. From these principles, Beer constructed a five-
tier model for viable systems that he based on the human neurosystem. Despite the
model's biological origins, Beer maintained that the abstraction of the structure
could be applied in numerous contexts, including the firm, the body, and the state.
In its most basic form, the viable system model resembles a simple flowchart
connecting the five levels of the system's hierarchy. In his writings, however, Beer
switches freely among metaphors drawn from machines, organizations, and
organisms when describing the purpose and functionality of each level. I will explain
the viable system model here only as it applies to the Chilean industrial sector,
focusing specifically on the five-tier cybernetic mapping of a general Chilean
enterprise within the newly formed social property area, shown in figure 5.1. It is
perhaps easiest to understand the model at this level, though bear in mind that the
Cybersyn prototype operated initially within CORFO's management structure, a
higher level of recursion than the model of the individual enterprise presented here.
Although Beer hoped one day to restructure enterprise management to reflect this
model, the hypothetical chain of command presented here does not reflect the
documented management practices of the nationalized enterprises.
The model drew a distinction between the bottom three levels of the
hierarchy, which governed daily operations (systems 1, 2, and 3) and the upper two
45 This law holds that the variety in the control system must match the variety in the system to be
controlled. See W. Ross Ashby, Introduction to Cybernetics (London: Chapman and Hall, 1956).
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levels of management (systems 4 and 5), which determined future development and
the overall direction of the enterprise. At the bottom of the hierarchy, individual
plants within each enterprise interacted with the outside environment (represented
by the cloud-like figures on the left hand side of the drawing) and through these
flows of material inputs and outputs generated low-level, system 1 production
indices. Factors such as energy needed, raw materials used, or even employee
attendance could constitute such an index. Each plant behaved in an "essentially
autonomous" manner, restricted only by the operational bounds needed to ensure
the stability of the entire enterprise. System 2, which Beer equated with a
cybernetic spinal cord, transmitted these production indices to the various plants
and upward toward the director of operations (system 3). By assuming responsibility
for the normal functioning of the plants within the enterprise, these lower three
levels prevented upper management from being overwhelmed with the details of
daily production activity. However, in the case of a serious production anomaly, one
that could threaten the stability of the enterprise and that after a given period of
time could not be resolved by the director of operations, or system 3, the next level of
management was alerted and asked to provide assistance.
Systems 4 and 5 intervened in production only under these circumstances.
Unlike the other levels of management outlined in Beer's hierarchy, system 4
required the creation of a new level of management dedicated to development and
planning that would provide a space for discussion and decision making. This level
did not exist; within the vast majority of Chilean state enterprises or, as Beer noted,
in the management configuration of most firms in operation during the 1970s. In the
drawing it appears as the Subdirectorate for Development. System 4 also provided
the vital link between volitional and automatic control or, in the case of industrial
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management, between centralized or decentralized regulation. Under normal
circumstances, it allowed the lower levels to behave autonomously but could trigger
intervention from upper management if necessary. Securing this balance between
individual freedom and centralized control proved vital when attempting to align the
Cybersyn project with the political ideals promoted by the UP coalition, a theme
discussed at; greater length in chapter 6. The final level of the model, system 5,
occupied the "chief executive" position held by the appointed interventor, who
determined the overall direction of the enterprise and the requisite levels of
production.
In Beer's mind, this five-tier system not only provided the characteristic
skeleton for all viable systems; it also existed recursively in each of the five levels.
Beer writes: "The whole is always encapsulated in each part ... this is a lesson
learned from biology where we find the genetic blue-print of the whole organism in
every cell."4 63 The state, the firm, the worker, and the cell all exhibited the same
series of structural relationships. Applying his organizational vision to Chile, Beer
wrote, "Recursively speaking, the Chilean nation is embedded in the world of
nations, and the government is embedded in the nation ...all these are supposedly
viable systems."4 7 This characteristic allowed the team to design a system of
management that theoretically could function anywhere, from the factory floor to
the presidential palace.
Once armed with Beer's model for cybernetic control and convinced of its
utility to Chile's economic transition, the project team examined its available
resources. By 1968, three U.S. companies-NCR, Burroughs, and IBM-had
46 Beer, Brain of the Firm: The Managerial Cybernetics of Organization, 156.
47 Ibid., 249.
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installed fewer than fifty computers in all of Chile; the largest was an IBM 360
mainframe.4 According to the trade publication Datamation, Chile owned fewer
computers than Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, and Venezuela.4 9 The previous
Christian Democratic government had encouraged U.S. investment and business
with U.S. companies, but high import duties, combined with the already high price
tag, made computer technology a less attractive option to Chilean industries than it
was to those within the United States. Moreover, the National Enterprise for
Computers and Informatics (ECOM), a centralized government agency established
in the 1960s to oversee the purchase of Chilean computing technology and offer
data-processing services on state-owned mainframes, tried to maintain its monopoly
on computing machines by frequently denying requests from universities and
private firms wished to acquire additional computing resources.50 The government
owned few mainframe computers and could allocate time on only one machine to the
Cybersyn project.5 1 The project leaders originally secured time on the top-
performing IBM 360/50 but later transferred the project to the less heavily used
Burroughs B-3500 mainframe when processing delays on the 360/50 exceeded forty-
eight hours.52 Because of the shortage of qualified personnel, ECOM agreed to
assign several of its employees to assist with the project, including Isaquino
Benadof, Juan Bulnes, Ricardo Majluf, Juan Francisco Letelier, and Hernan Avil6s.
48 Aaron Finerman, "Computing Capabilities in Argentine and Chilean Universities," Communications of
the ACM 12, no. 8 (1969): 427.
49 Barry W. Boehm, "Computing in South America," Datamation 16, no. 5 (1970): 98.
5 0 Raimundo Beca, Interview with the author, 9 September 2003.
5' ECOM owned three IBM mainframes (two 360/40 models and one 360/50) and one Burroughs 3500
mainframe. Notes on available ECOM computing resources, 11 Nov. 1971, box 55, The Stafford Beer
Collection, Liverpool John Moores University, Liverpool, England.
5 2 A forty-eight hour processing delay on the IBM machine prohibited real-time analysis and caused much
frustration among the Cybersyn team members.
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In addition to securing computing hardware and computer-literate personnel,
the team needed a means to enable communication across factories, state
enterprises, sector committees, CORFO management, and the central mainframe
housed in CORFO headquarters. Eventually, team members settled on an existing
telex network that once had been used to track satellites. Unlike the heterogeneous
networked computer systems in use today, telex networks mandate the use of
special terminals and can transmit only ASCII characters. However, like the
Internet of today, this early network of telex machines was driven by the idea of
creating a high-speed web of information exchange. The telex network would later
prove more valuable to the government than the processing might of the mainframe,
reaffirming a belief shared by both Flores and Beer that "data is wasted without
action."5 3
Forming a Tam
In the initial stages of the project, Flores assembled a small interdisciplinary project
team that included members from several different government agencies, mostly
friends of h:is. "It was very informal at the beginning," Flores noted, "like most
things are. You look for support in your friends."5 4 The team met at INTEC
headquarters, where Flores, as institute president, had the power to allocate the
resources needed for the project and to recruit expertise, such as that of industrial
designer Gui Bonsiepe. Given his position as the general technical manager of
CORFO, one of the biggest government agencies at the time, Flores also controlled a
wealth of resources outside of INTEC. Operating through CORFO, Flores was able




as secure the other material and personnel expenses that the project demanded.
Moreover, the CORFO connection gave Flores the power to recruit individuals who
possessed expertise not found in his network of friendships. Crediting his leadership
abilities, Flores boasted, "I didn't need to convince people. I had a lot of power or so
to do it ... given the amount of resources I managed in all aspects of the economy. We
[CORFO] were so immense compared with [the Cybersyn Project] ... it was a very
small amount of resources compared with who we were and what were the stakes."5 5
Several of his coworkers offered complementary explanations, describing Flores a
"smooth operator" and a "wheeler dealer."
When Beer returned for his second visit in March 1972, the team had grown
to include representatives from CORFO, INTEC, and ECOM, as well as
representatives from other agencies such a CODELCO, the national copper
corporation, and ENAP, the national petroleum enterprise. The different affiliations
of the project team members broadened the group's range of expertise and gave it
access to the informal networks within each agency. This strategic move proved
invaluable for Flores and provided a non-technological approach to real-time
communication. Flores explained, "[if] we have a crisis, I have people from the
different places right there and they go to their own networks."5 6 Principal members
of the Cybersyn team included, among others, Rafil Espejo and Sonia Mordojovich
from CORFO, Jose Valenzuela, Jorge Barrientos, TomAs Kohn, Humberto Gabella,
Eugenio Balmeceda, Ernesto Valdivia, Gui Bonsiepe, and Rodrigo Walker from




translator, and the aforementioned members from ECOM.5 7 In addition to bringing
to the team a particular area of technological expertise, each could communicate in
English with a reasonable degree of proficiency. Several participants credited Flores
and Beer for creating a productive, interdisciplinary climate. Sonia Mordojovich, the
only woman assigned to the project, described the working culture as "a space of
creativity ... everyone had a wide range of freedom."5 8 Benadof also pointed to the
unique working environment, where "the glue [was] relationships, not technical
skill." 5 9
For many of the early members of the team, the Cybersyn project represented
much more than making a technological system. It was an intellectual experience.
Beer distributed copies of the inspirational books Jonathan Livington Seagull by
Richard Bach and Journey to Ixtlan by Carlos Castaneda to all the Chileans working
with him. "I was appalled by all these technies not knowing any larger things," Beer
said. "I tried to advise them. They were amazed."60 At one point Beer selected
quotes from both books that were appropriate for every team member, copied them
onto seagull cutouts, and distributed them. "It was the idea that everybody tried to
share a vision of what we were doing," Benadof remarked. "We [are] like a team
because we fly together."61 During 1971 and 1972, the team also met for a series of
seminars conducted by such scientific luminaries as Maturana, Varela, and Von
Foerester. The topics discussed had no immediate application to the project, but they
allowed the team members to deepen their understandings of cybernetics and
57 Herman Schwember did not formally join the team until October 1972, but has participated informally
from the outset.
58 Sonia Mordojovich, Interview by the author, 16 July 2002.




biology and provided a source for additional intellectual stimulation. The team was
small and at this point relatively unknown to the Chilean government, but its
members felt as if they were part of something special.
During the course of the project, Beer and Flores cultivated a "unique
friendship" grounded in mutual respect, a shared intellectual curiosity, and a
common goal. "A level of sympathy was developed," Flores recalled. "I was a national
leader, he was an international leader, and also we were of a different age."62 While
Beer imparted knowledge of cybernetics, Flores sought to educate Beer on Chilean
politics, language, and South American culture. At Flores's insistence, Beer read
Gabriel Garcia Marquez's masterpiece, One Hundred Years of Solitude, and used it
as a text for understanding the magic realism of South American life. Beer
thereafter referred to Flores as "Aureliano," the name of Marquez's frustrated
revolutionary who survived fourteen attempts on his life, seventy-three ambushes,
and a firing squad. Flores responded in kind by calling Beer "Melaquiades," the
name of Marquez's gypsy who brought news of scientific and technological
innovations from the outside world to the tiny town Colombian town of Macondo.
Working together against the clock, the team designed a feasible schematic
for the entire system with a finish date optimistically set for October 1972.63 The
design consisted of four subprojects: Cybernet, Cyberstride, Checo, and Opsroom.
Work on each of would span 1971-73, a period in which Beer would make eleven
trips to Chile, for approximately two weeks each time.64 When Beer returned to
Chile for the second time in March 1972, the team first applied the name "Cybersyn"
to describe the entire scope of the system. A synthesis of "cybernetics" and "synergy,"
62 Flores, interview.
63 Beer titled one of the earlier project schedules, "Project Cybersyn, Programme Beat-the Clock."
64Beer, interview.
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the project name firmly illustrated the team's belief that the whole system exceeded
the sum of its parts, an observation that applied equally to the technological system
being built and to the group of individuals charged with its construction.
Cybernet
The first component of the system, Cybernet, expanded the existing telex network to
include every firm in the nationalized sector and allowed them to communicate with
the mainframe computer, thereby helping to create a national network of
communication throughout Chile's three-thousand- mile-long territory. Preexisting
microwave links connected the northern city of Arica to the southern city of Puerto
Montt, and. with additional radio links, the network extended to Chile's
southernmost city, Punto Arenas. Production information traveled from the factories
to a telex control room at CORFO headquarters, where Benadof and other ECOM
employees transferred the data onto punch cards and fed them into the mainframe
computer for processing. Stafford Beer's early reports describe the system as a tool
for real-time economic control, but in actuality each firm could transmit data only
once a day.65 This centralized design may appear to run counter to the UP
commitment; to individual freedom, but it coincides with Allende's statement that
"we are and always shall be in favor of a centralized economy, and companies will
have to conform to the Government's planning."66
Work: on the network began in November 1971 under the leadership of
Roberto Cafiete, and, because a good number of Chilean factories already possessed
telex capabilities, Cybernet became operational in March 1972 and continued to
65 Processing time lags of 2-3 days eventually forced the team to switch the project from the more powerful
IBM 340/50 mainframe to a Burroughs mainframe. However, reminding factory managers to send data on a
daily basis to the mainframe proved to be an even greater source of frustration. Benadof, interview.
66 Debray and Allende Gossens, The Chilean Revolution: Conversations with Allende, 111.
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grow. Cafiete occasionally used the promise of free telex installation to convince
factory managers to lend their support to the project, a ploy that made the project
attractive even to managers of private sector firms.67 Of the four subprojects
comprising the Cybersyn Project, Cybernet was by far the most valuable to the
government. In October 1972, the government constructed a telex control room
within the presidential palace La Moneda and used the network to coordinate efforts
to counter the forty thousand striking truck drivers who tried to bring an early end
to Allende's presidency during the Paro de Octubre (October strike).
Cyberstride
Cyberstride, the second component of the Cybersyn system, encompassed the suite
of computer programs written to collect, process, and distribute data to and from
each state enterprise. Members of the Cyberstride team created "quantitative flow
charts of activities within each enterprise that would highlight all important
activities," including a parameter for "social unease" that was measured by the
proportion of employees present on a given day of work in comparison to the number
of employees on the factory payroll.6 8 Cyberstride performed statistical filtration on
the "pure numbers" output from the factory models, discarding the data that fell
within the acceptable system parameters and directing the information deemed
important upward to the next level of management. Equally important, the software
used statistical methods to detect production trends based on historical data,
theoretically allowing CORFO to prevent problems before they began. If a particular
variable fell outside the range specified by Cyberstride, the system emitted a
67 Roberto Cafiete, Interview by the author, 16 January 2003. Caflete also noted that he received several
inquiries from private factory owners of who wished to join the Cybersyn project in return for free access
to telex technology.
68 Beer, Brain of the Firm: The Managerial Cybernetics of Organization, 253.
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warning, known as an "algedonic signal" in Beer's cybernetic vocabulary. Initially,
only the interventor from the affected enterprise would receive the algedonic
warning and would have the freedom, within a given time frame, to deal with the
problem as he saw fit. However, if the enterprise failed to correct the irregularity
within this time frame, members of the Cyberstride team would alert the next level
of management, the CORFO sector committee (e.g., Comit6 Textil). Beer argued that
this system of operation granted Chilean enterprises almost complete control over
their operations while still permitting outside intervention in the case of more
serious problems. He further believed that this ideal balance between centralized
and decentralized control could be optimized if project engineers selected the correct
period of recovery given to each enterprise before Cyberstride alerted higher
management, ensuring maximum autonomy within the overall viable system.
Once complete, Cyberstride functioned as a predictive tool for mapping the
future behavior of Chilean industries. The programmed algorithm used Bayesian
probability theory to anticipate industrial performance in the short term. It
analyzed the values of the indices collected from the factories, searching for outliers
and identifying trends. This allowed members of the government to identify and
correct problems before they became serious. 69 The suite also generated unitless
measurements for "productivity," "latency," and "performance." These enabled the
untrained eye to grasp the state of factory activity without understanding the
nuances of production.
Cyberstride represented a joint effort between a team of Chilean engineers
headed by Isaquino Benadof, one of Chile's leading computer experts and the head of
69 P.J. Harrison and C.R. Stevens, "A Bayesian Approach to Short-Term Forecasting," Operational
Research Quarterly 22, no. 4 (1971).
231
research and development at ECOM, and a team of British consultants at Arthur
Andersen in London. The British team, led by Alan Dunsmuir, designed and coded a
temporary suite of programs, which they gave to the Chilean team in March 1972 for
final revisions. Meanwhile, Chilean operations research scientists and engineers
from CORFO and INTEC visited plants throughout the country, met with workers
and managers, selected approximately five critical variables of production, created
flowchart models of factory operation, and translated these models into computer
code that was read into the mainframe with punch cards. The scientists and
engineers also determined the optimal amount of recovery time allotted to each firm
before allowing an algedonic signal to percolate up the system hierarchy, a process
that Beer referred to as "designing freedom."70
Generally speaking, the engineers from ECOM and Arthur Andersen worked
well together, although the Andersen team did object to the lack of experience of
several members of the Chilean team and the failure of the Chilean programmers to
document what they were doing.7 ' "What existed in ECOM was very poor," Benadof
confirmed. "The Chilean way [was] go ahead [with] trial and error, trial and error.
They gave us discipline, procedure, and documentation standard[s]. Very good work,
I learned to work with them." When pressed to explain, Benadof described
Dunsmuir, the Andersen team leader, as "a good guy, but too British ...a guy who
needs his distance, he needs his work, just work."72 The British habit of separating
business from pleasure contrasted sharply with Chilean business practices that
regularly interlaced one with the other.
70 Stafford Beer, Designing Freedom (New York: Wiley, 1974).
71 G.E. Hemmings, "Memorandum on status of the Cyberstride Suite," May 12, 1972, box 59, The Stafford
Beer Collection, Liverpool John Moores University, Liverpool, England.
72 Benadof, interview.
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Despite these stylistic differences, the collaboration between Arthur
Andersen and members of ECOM and INTEC represented an important moment in
the history of Chilean computing. Chilean engineers during the 1960s and early
1970s had little experience with computer programming. Computer science did not
exist as a formal course of study in the Chilean universities, and the government
had begun training computer programmers and systems analysts only in 1969.73
Dunsmuir's team introduced such practices as the need to create thorough
documentation for software programs, systematic methods for debugging and
version control, the need to sequentially number punch cards, and how to make a
library of programs. The Andersen team also imparted concepts such as quality
assurance and stressed the need for discipline in a nascent field that still lacked
structure in Chile.
The success of Cyberstride hinged on the work of the ECOM and Arthur
Andersen engineers, as well as the creation of factory production models. Engineers
from CORFO and INTEC visited factories within the social and mixed property
areas, identified the factors most crucial to plant operations, and drafted flow
diagrams detailing the relationship displayed among these indices.7 4 For the
purposes of management, the public and mixed property areas of the Chilean
economy had been divided into a series of sectors, such as textiles, food, fuel and
energy, and steel. Industries within the textile sector were among the first to be
nationalized and the first to be modeled for the Cybersyn system by INTEC
73 Benadof, interview. These ECOM training programs were modeled after those found in Britain's
National Computer Center.
74 Allende divided the Chilean economy into three areas: the social property area (APS) consisting of
industries owned exclusively by the government; the mixed property area (APM), composed of industries
with more than 51% of government ownership; and the private property area that included industries not
owned in whole or in part by the Chilean government (APP).
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engineers. Tomas Kohn drafted many of the initial models for the textile sector,
including the Yarur, Bellavista, and Sumar textile mills. Project notes reveal that
the team planned to have thirty enterprises on line by August 1972, a figure that
would rise to include 26.7% of all nationalized industries by May 1973 (more than
one hundred industries). 75 Skeptics doubted the team's ability to model a system as
complex as the Chilean economy, but Beer believed that a successful manager did
not need to know every production detail and that, in fact such a large amount of
information could impede an individual's management capabilities. Instead,
managers should have access to the most relevant pieces of information-a
restriction that facilitated the process of making informed decisions quickly.
Applying this principle to the nationalized Chilean industries, Beer argued that the
most crucial aspects of production could be collapsed into five to seven indices of
factory activity. By collecting and monitoring this subset of data, the government
could focus and prioritize their efforts, predict and resolve economic crises with
increased speed, and improve the efficacy of state-directed management. Production
indices typically included sources of energy (e.g., oil, coal, or electricity), key raw
materials, and worker satisfaction, as measured by the percentage of employees
present on a given day. The success of this form of management depended on
identifying and accurately collecting these central production indices and the speed
of their transmission from the factory floor to higher levels of government
administration. Beer emphasized that the process of creating factory models should
include input from the workers, thereby increasing their participation in factory
management;. I will explore this observation in greater depth in chapter 6.
75 Mensaje Presidente Allende ante Congresopleno, 21/Mayo '73, (Santiago, Chile: Departamento de
Publicaciones de la Presidencia de la Republica - Chile, 1973), 412-13.
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CHECO
CHECO (CHilean ECOnomy), the third part of the Cybersyn project, constituted an
ambitious effort to model the Chilean economy and provide simulations of future
economic behavior. Appropriately, it was sometimes referred to as "Futuro." The
simulator would serve as the "government's experimental laboratory"-an
instrumental equivalent to Allende's frequent likening of Chile to a "social
laboratory." The bulk of the work on CHECO occurred in England, under the
direction of Ron Anderton, a systems engineer and operations research scientist. The
simulation program used the DYNAMO compiler developed by MIT professor Jay
Forrester, a technology that was said to be one of Anderton's areas of expertise.
However, the Chilean team, headed by a chemical engineer, Mario Grandi, kept
close tabs on Anderton's model, laboriously checking his calculations, asking
detailed questions about the model and the computer tools used in its
implementation, and sending Hernan Aviles, a young Chilean engineer, to study
with Anderton in London. The CHECO team initially used national statistics to test
the accuracy of the simulation program. When these results failed, Beer and the
other team members faulted the time differential in the generation of statistical
inputs, an observation that reemphasized the perceived necessity for real-time data.
CHECO was designed to provide the government with new tools for planning
and critiqued the modeling techniques used by the state planning agency ODEPLAN
as well as those favored by Eastern bloc countries. These "input-output" models
depended on a set of concrete structures and relationships and lacked the dynamic
flexibility needed to model an economy in transition. By September 1972, the
CHECO team had produced a tentative macroeconomic model, but given the
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learning curve of the team, "no-one was anxious to place reliance on the results."76
The severity of the October strike further shifted the focus away from constructing
an experimental economic simulator, although work on the project continued
throughout 1973.
Opsroom
The final of the four components, Opsroom, created a new environment for decision
making, one modeled after a British World War II war room (figure 5.2).77 It
consisted of seven chairs arranged in an inward facing circle and flanked by a series
of projection screens, each displaying the data collected from the nationalized
enterprises. In the Opsroom, all industries were homogenized by a uniform system
of iconic representation, meant to facilitate the maximum extraction of information
by an individual with a minimal amount of scientific training.
The Operations Room created a visual representation of Chilean economic
activities using easy-to-read diagrams, graphs, and flowcharts. Recognizing the
value of color, light, and movement, the Chilean design team produced display
screens and user interfaces that incorporated these aspects in order to increase the
speed of user comprehension and make the room easier to operate and control. Once
complete, the room would open a space for Chilean leaders to summarize the state of
the economy, share ideas, and set priorities.
The design of the Operations Room bore the mark of the Hochschule fir
Gestaltung (HfG), Ulm, one of the more influential design schools within the
76 Beer, Brain of the Firm: The Managerial Cybernetics of Organization, 267. Also in September, the
Chilean CHECO team also solidified to include Eugenio Fourt, Agustin Araya, Juan Francisco Letelier,
Carlos Molina, and Julio Jimenez as well as Grandi and Avil1s. Mario Grandi, "Progress Report No 4,"
September 1972, box 56, The Stafford Beer Collection, Liverpool John Moores University, Liverpool,
England.
77 The idea of war occurs frequently throughout the project notes. Beer invoked the war room analogy as a
means of conveying the importance of visual displays of information in rapid decision-making, but also as
a means of reminding participants that they were fighting an economic war where time was of the essence.
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developing world during the 1960s and 1970s, particularly in regions of Latin
America. Under the HfG Ulm model, design moved beyond art, decoration, or styling
and played an important role in solving industrial problems. Designers trained in
this vein used ideas from science, engineering, and systems theory to analyze the
function of a given product and determine its relationship with the surrounding
environment;.78
The designers gave the room a hexagonal shape, illustrative of HfG
preferences for geometrical order and the need to allocate space for five display
screens and an entrance. The first wall to the immediate right of the entrance
opened up into a small kitchen. Moving in a counterclockwise direction, the second
wall contained a series of four screens exhibiting various representations of
"structural information" (known as Datafeed). The large screen positioned above the
three smaller screens contained instructions for changing the images displayed
below, a mix of flow diagrams, factory photographs, and unitless mappings of actual
and potential production capacities (figure 5.3). Two screens for recording "algedonic
signals" appeared on the third wall. They displayed the overall production trends
within different industrial sectors and listed urgent problems in need of government
attention. A series of intermittent red lights appeared on the right hand side of each
screen and blinked with a frequency indicative of the level of urgency. The fourth
wall held a large reproduction of Beer's viable system model, known affectionately as
"Staffy," and two large screens for back projecting any additional information of use
to the occupants. The presence of a theoretical model within a control designed to
manage day-to-day activity may appear strange at first. The team included the
78 Hugo Palmarola Sagredo, "Productos y socialismo: disefno industrial estatal en Chile," in 1973 La vida
cotidiana de un ano crucial, ed. Claudio Rolle (Santiago de Chile: Editorial Planeta, 2003).
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model in the room's design to facilitate explaining the mechanisms of Beer's viable
system model to outside visitors. Its presence was more pedagogical than practical,
illustrating the room's dual purpose as a public relations vehicle and space for
economic management. A large metal board covered in fabric occupied the final wall.
Here users could change the configuration of magnets cut in various iconic forms,
each simulating a component or function of the Chilean economy. Rather than
bombard users with the numeric data, the designers made a concerted effort to
maximize the use of colors, symbols, and diagrams in order to depict relationships
among inputs and outputs, instead of simply charting raw performance.
User considerations similarly influenced the design of the chairs. The designers
opted to place an odd number of chairs (seven) in the center of the room to enable
democratic voting procedures. Each chair contained an ashtray and space for a drink, but
no table or other area for writing. Beer believed that the use of paper detracted from, or
even prevented, the process of communication; within the room, writing was strictly
prohibited. Buttons found on the armrest of each chair allowed the occupants to control
the material displayed on each of the Datafeed screens, a simplified interface that
replaced the traditional keyboard and opened the user base to those lacking formal
education or typing skills-a design decision that reflected Allende's emphasis on worker
participation.
A prototype of the room was constructed in Santiago during 1972 using
projection equipment primarily imported from England. Budgetary constraints
required sidestepping the high tariffs imposed on imported goods. Beer smuggled
several components of the room into Chile and was later reimbursed for his
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expenses.79 Other pieces of the room were manufactured outside Santiago, including
the seven orange and cream chairs, and their construction reflected the realties of
Chilean life. Cafiete laughed when he arrived to pick up the room's futuristic looking
chairs from a manufacturer based in the Chilean countryside and found them
covered with chickens.80 Although the room never became fully operational, it
quickly captured the imagination of all who viewed it, including members of the
military, and it became the symbolic heart of the project.8 ' "It was a room of the
future, something absolutely outside of the Chilean context," remembered
Mordojovich.. "There was a sensation of unreality [during the UP era], and this was a
great deal removed from reality."8 2
System Operation
An idealized correlation of Cybersyn's intended architecture, CORFO's organization,
and Beer's five-tier viable system model appears in figure 5.4. This diagram outlines
Cybersyn's theoretical design, not its actual level of functionality and
implementation. At this level of recursion, the sector committees collected and sent
production data daily through the telex network, which relayed the information to a
data-processing center located within ECOM (system 2). A staff of computer
technicians processed these data with a single mainframe computer and
Cyberstride's specialized suite of computer programs, which searched for trends in
production performance as well as irregularities. If a sector committee (system 1)
failed to resolve a production irregularity on its own, ECOM engineers alerted
members of CORFO general management (system 3). In the case of a particularly
79 Schwember, interview; Cafiete, interview; Beer, interview.
80 Cafiete, interview.
81 General Carlos Prats, head of the Armed Forces and later Secretary of the Interior, expressed interest in
the Cybersyn Operations Room for its potential military applications.
82 Mordojovich, interview. Emphasis mine.
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difficult or immediate problem, members of CORFO general management would
convene with higher-ranking CORFO officials in the Operations Room (system 4) to
discuss the problem and decide whether to reallocate resources or plan a new
approach for managing the social property area. CHECO also operated at the level of
system 4 and permitted CORFO management to test its ideas before implementing
them. If lower management still could not solve the problem, CORFO senior
management (system 5) then used the data provided by the cybernetic toolbox to
make an informed decision about how to intervene in production activities.
The original plans called for similar management hierarchies at the level of
the individual plants, state enterprises, and sector committees, although these ideas
never came to fruition. Beer also began work on a series of training programs aimed
at presenting the system to workers' committees and training them to use these new
management tools to increase and coordinate their participation in factory
operations. Perhaps the ambitious scope of this "work-in-progress" accounts for the
discrepancies between the model of operations that I have described and the regular
operational practices recounted by Chilean engineers involved with the project. For
example, Benadof recalled that his office received information from the individual
enterprises every afternoon and, after running the numbers through the mainframe
computer, later transmitted the results to the telex control room at CORFO without
notifying the individual interventors or passing through the algodonic processes
outlined by Beer.83 I will discuss this rift between theory and practice in greater
detail in chapter 6.
Despite these inconsistencies, work on each component of the system
advanced rapidly. The preexisting telex infrastructure contributed significantly to
83 Benadof, interview.
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the early operation of the Cybernet network, the first and only Cybersyn component
used regularly by the Allende government. The Cyberstride suite generated its first
printout on March 21, 1972. Beer sent an enthusiastic telex to Anderton:
"Cyberstride suite really works.... The whole thing was impossible and we did it."84
Because of problems in locating a suitable space for construction and delays in
receiving equipment from the British company Electrosonic, the Opsroom prototype
did not reach completion until late December 1972 and even then had very limited
functionality. The economic simulator never left the experimental stage.
However, the system proved instrumental to the UP even in its unfinished
form. The new infrastructure for communication provided by Cybernet proved vital
to the government during the opposition-led October strike of 1972.86 In response to
the strike, which threatened the government's survival, Flores created an emergency
operations center where members of the Cybersyn team and other high-ranking
government officials monitored the two thousand telexes that arrived every day,
reporting on activities from the northern to the southern ends of the country.8 7 The
rapid flow of messages over the telex lines enabled the government to react quickly
to the strike activity and mobilize its limited resources in a way that minimized the
damage caused by the gremialistas. Gustavo Silva, executive secretary of energy
within COR:FO during the strike, credited the network for coordinating the two
84 Telex from Stafford Beer to Ron Anderton, March 21, 1972, box 66, The Stafford Beer Collection,
Liverpool John Moores University, Liverpool, England.
85 Letter from Stafford Beer to Robert Simpson of Electrosonic, October 1, 1972, box 62, The Stafford Beer
Collection, Liverpool John Moores University, Liverpool, England.
86 The Gremialista movement began in protest to government nationalization efforts and gained
considerable momentum in October 1972 after a forty thousand member independent trucking association
tried to prevent the creation of a parallel state-owned equivalent. The resultant gremio strike attempted to
shut down the Chilean economy by mobilizing shopkeepers, professional and economic associations, bank
clerks, truck drivers, and even several student and campesino organizations.
87 Flores, interview.
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hundred trucks loyal to the government.8 8 The successful management of the gremio
strike established Flores as both technical expert and vital contributor to the
survival of the UP, resulting in his promotion to minister of economics. It also
publicly demonstrated Cybersyn's utility to the government, particularly the telex
network. Several weeks after the strike's conclusion, Herman Schwember
announced, 'The growth of our actual influence and power has exceeded our best
imagination."89
After the strike, the telex network permitted a new form of economic
mapping that enabled the government to collapse the data sent from all over the
country into a single report, written daily at CORFO, and hand-delivered to La
Moneda. The detailed charts and graphs filling its pages provided the government
with an overview of national production, transportation, and points of crisis in an
easy-to-understand format that used data generated only days earlier. The
introduction of this form of reporting posed a considerable advance over the six-
month lag formerly required to collect statistics on the Chilean economy, and the
report allowed the UP to track the dips and spikes of national production through
September 1973.90
Flores' s success in the October strike put him in a unique position as the
newly appointed minister of economics. He was relatively unknown to the opposition
and for that reason believed he had a chance of increasing his support by "building a
different personal image" based upon "a certain myth around [his] scientific
88 Gustavo Silva, Interview by the author, 5 September 2003.89 Letter from Herman Schwember to Stafford Beer, 6 Nov. 1972, box 66, The Stafford Beer Collection,
Liverpool John Moores University, Liverpool, England.
90 Comando Operativo Central, "Situaci6n General del Pais," 3 September 1973, private collection of
Roberto Cafiete.
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qualifications." 9 1 However, the new challenges that he confronted as minister in a
situation of extreme and growing economic dislocation convinced him that
technology could play only a limited role in saving Chile from a political and
economic breakdown. As Flores began to distance himself from the project to assume
his new duties in Allende's cabinet, Beer remarked that their relationship, which
"was going great when [Flores] became Undersecretary," had "almost wholly
collapsed." 92
The October strike, moreover, signified a change in the dynamics of the
Cybersyn team. As the team grew, the intimacy and informality that had previously
characterized the working culture gave way to anonymity and a technology-centered
focus. Raul Espejo of CORFO became the overall head of the Cybersyn Project and
later the director of information technology within CORFO. Given his close working
relationship with the original Cybersyn team, Beer intensely disliked not having
contact with the majority of these new team members and even thought of resigning
from the project. Instead, he began directing his energies toward other projects that
could change Chile's participative and administrative organization. This included a
joint project with CEREN to install algedonic meters in a sample of Chilean homes
that would allow Chilean citizens to transmit their pleasure or displeasure with
televised political speeches to the government or television studio in real time.9 3
Beer dubbed this undertaking "The People's Project" and "Project Cyberfolk" because
he believed that the meters would enable the government to respond rapidly to
9' Letter from Herman Schwember to Stafford Beer, 12 Nov. 1972, box 64, The Stafford Beer Collection,
Liverpool John Moores University, Liverpool, England.
92 Letter from Stafford Beer to Herman Schwember, 21 Feb. 1973, box 66, The Stafford Beer Collection,
Liverpool John Moores University, Liverpool, England.
93 Beer did not elaborate much on how these signals would travel from Chilean homes to the Chilean
government, but the effect seems similar to the computerized "instant response" technique used by focus
groups to monitor voter reactions to political speeches, debates, or advertisements second by second in real
time.
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public demands, rather than repress opposing views.9 4 Barely one month later, Beer
wrote to Espejo, "We are only beginning the reformation of the whole process of
government. I do not exaggerate to say that the total concept is of two orders of
magnitude bigger than cybersynergy."'95 By December 1972, one month after the
gremio strike, Beer had completely revised the scope of the project, drawing two
levels of recursion rather than the single viable system that initially characterized
Cybersyn. The original technical project was now eclipsed by a new overarching
project of state regulation that began with the Chilean people and ended with the
Ministry of Economics; in this schematic Cybersyn provided one input rather than a
systematic whole.
Flores similarly redirected his energies toward addressing the immediate
problems of the Chilean nation. His logic was simple: "I knew that we could win a lot
during the October Strike using my room ... [but] the room is not going to stop tanks
and planes and bigger strikes. And an assassination attempt." 96 Building on his
working methods of the past, Flores continued to form teams of engineers and
economists and applied their technical expertise to ameliorating Chile's mounting
financial woes. Consumer shortages had reached severe levels by the end of 1972
and continued to worsen. A survey conducted by the newsmagazine Ercilla reported
that 99% of upper-class Chileans viewed buying essential products for their homes
as difficult, an observation seconded by 77% of the middle class questioned.9 7
Between March 1972 and March 1973, prices increased by 183.3%, a rate of inflation
94 Stafford Beer, "Project Cyberfolk," March 1972, box 61, The Stafford Beer Collection, Liverpool John
Moores University, Liverpool, England.
95 Telex from Stafford Beer to Rail Espejo, 6 Nov. 1972, box 66, The Stafford Beer Collection, Liverpool
John Moores University, Liverpool, England.
96 Flores, interview.
97 Ercilla, 13 September 1972, 10, cited in Valenzuela, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Chile, 59.
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that the government proved unable to curb.9 8 However, the congressional elections
held the same month served to increase the representation of the UP from one third
to almost 45%. Members of the opposition panicked, while the government
interpreted the election results as a sign that it could still survive. At that time
Flores, now minister of finance, transferred Kohn and Barrientos from the Cybersyn
Project to the third floor of the Ministry of Finance, where they applied their
experience in modeling Chilean industries to the management of national finances.99
Despite these efforts, Chile's deteriorating economic and political situation blocked
Allende's plans for peaceful revolution and set the stage for the military coup that
would take place on September 11, 1973. Equating the situation with that of a Greek
tragedy, Radomiro Tomic, the Christian Democratic candidate for the 1970
presidential election, observed that "everybody knows what will happen, everybody
says they do not wish it to happen, and everybody does exactly what is necessary to
bring about the disaster."' 00
Allende continued to support the Cybersyn project throughout his presidency,
and Beer met with the president as late as July 1973. When a second gremio strike
occurred in August 1973, the telex network once again proved vital to keeping the
elected government in power. On September 8, 1973, Allende sent a communication
to the Cybersyn team asking that the Operations Room be moved to the presidential
palace in La Moneda-a mere three days before the military coup that would end his
dream and take his life.
98 Ibid., 65.
99 Kohn, interview.
'00 Cited in Simon Collier and William F. Sater, A History of Chile, 1808-1994, Cambridge Latin American
Studies (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
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Chapter 5: Images
MODELO DE ORGANIZACION DE UNA EMPRESA CUALQUIERA
Figure 5.1: The Chilean State Enterprise drawn as a five-tier viable system model. (Image used with
permission from the Corporaci6n de Fomento de la Producci6n, Santiago.)
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Figure 5.2: The Cybersyn Operations Room. (Image used with permission from Rodrigo Walker.)
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Figure 5.5: Two early sketches of alternative Operations Room designs. (© JMU. Reproduced by
permission of Liverpool John Moores University Learning and Information Services and The School of
Business Information. Originals kept at Liverpool John Moores University, Learning and Information
Services, Special Collections and Archives.)
Figure 5.6: Design drawing of the eventual Operations Room layout. (Image used with permission from
INTEC, Santiago.)
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Figure 5.7: Photograph of Stafford Beer taken by the author in 2001, one year before his death.





OWARD THE end of his life, Stafford Beer donated a large portion of his
private papers to the School of Business Information at Liverpool John
Moores University in England. The collection, which the university archivists refer
to as "ninety-two boxes of Beer," includes seventeen boxes of materials that
document Beer's activities in Chile. Within these boxes, neatly labeled folders
contain written correspondence, telex transmissions, project reports, software
documentation, photographs, computer printouts, and press accounts, sorted by date
and topic. Together, these documents paint a vivid picture of the design and
implementation process for Cybersyn as well as the range of reactions to the project
expressed by Chilean and international actors. In box 63 the curious researcher will
find a folder labeled "Papers Santiago January 1973 Still Current" that contains a
document entitled "Inauguration Speech for the Operations Room." The document,
written in both English and Spanish, was to be President Allende's speech
welcoming visitors to the Cybersyn Operations Room. It reads in part:
My friends - I wish to welcome you personally to this place, because I have
taken a keen personal interest in its development, and because I want to ask
251
you to take an interest in its personal use. What you see around you is the
result of eighteen months hard work by a strong team of our very own
Chilean engineers, who have devoted themselves to problems of industrial
management. They have created for us a totally new set of tools to help us in
our task of controlling the economy.
Modern science, and particularly the electronic computer, offers government
a new chance to deal with its increasingly complex problems. But we have
found that in the so-called advanced countries the power of science to help
has not been widely used.
The speech concluded with the following observation:
We set out courageously to build our own system in our own spirit. What you
will hear about today is revolutionary - not simply because this is the first
time it has been done anywhere in the world. It is revolutionary because we
are making a deliberate effort to hand to the people the power that science
commands, in a form in which the people can themselves use it.'
The inauguration speech provides a good example of the political framing of the
project and an attempt to position the Cybersyn system within the ideological goals
of the Popular Unity platform. Furthermore, the speech shows that the government
planned to present Cybersyn as a technology of both administrative and symbolic
value. Politics merged with technology to create a different idea of revolution, one
that was grounded not only in social change but also in scientific prowess. The tone
of the speech is both nationalist and populist, rhetorical strategies that Allende often
used when speaking before the public, and the text emphasizes the contributions of
Chilean engineers while obscuring the contributions made by their foreign
collaborators. In contrast to Chile's earlier scientific and technological endeavors,
1 Stafford Beer, "Welcome to the Operations Room," box 63, Stafford Beer Collection, Liverpool John
Moores University, Liverpool, England. The archives also contain a Spanish translation of the speech,
"Presentaci6n de la Sala de Operaciones." Judging from the editorial notes made on the English copy, it
appears that Beer drafted the original and had it translated into Spanish for Allende. A number of project
participants saw this document while being interviewed for this dissertation project. While many could
remember Allende's visit to the room, none could recall whether he had delivered or recorded this
message. Several recalled discussing the idea of having Allende record a greeting to welcome workers who
visited the room for the first time. Project participants also remembered that the first time Allende sat in
one of the Opsroom chairs and pushed a button, the whole electrical system shorted -- a moment of great
embarrassment for the team.
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which had been the almost exclusive domain of Chile's small technical elite,
Cybersyn proposed to bring technology to the common people. For the first time
Chileans from working-class backgrounds and with limited education would have
access to one of the most exclusive and costly technologies: the computer. Factory
workers (obreros) would not be programming or maintaining these costly machines,
tasks handled by the white-collar employees (empleados) working for ECOM, the
state computer agency, or perhaps the factory's own "IBM division," but factory
workers could assist in modeling their factories and determining the desired values
for key production indices that would form the backbone of the Cybersyn's
customized software programs. Just as it sponsored the IRT Anti television and the
Citroen-designed YagAn automobile (see chapter 4), the government attempted to
redesign computer systems for popular use and the benefit of the general public. Due
to the expense of importing mainframes, the government could not facilitate popular
access to this technology as it had with smaller microelectronic devices such as
televisions, record players, and calculators. However, it could expand the social
network surrounding the computer to include those who had not been part of these
socio-technical networks in the past. The term "computer system" does not simply
refer to a configuration of hardware and software, but rather the entire web of social
and technical actors required to make the system function. Regarding Cybersyn, the
computer system included the software programs, their programmers, and the
government administrators who benefited from their results; the expanding
communications network that linked the mainframe to the outside world as well as
the telex operators who sent and received messages across these lines; and the
factory managers and workers who provided the requisite production data. The
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Operations Room and its occupants also functioned as part of this system, providing
what was then heralded as a democratic space for viewing the data output by the
system.2 Once completed, the room would expand the reach of Cybersyn system to
include high-level government administrators and, eventually, workers who would
use low-tech versions of the Operations Room on the factory floor. Both stood to
benefit from the realization of this system. The social networks formed by this new
computer system reflected the ideological beliefs of the Chilean government and
echoed the UP commitment to worker empowerment and state economic control.
Cybersyn represented a new form of socialist modernity, one that was
technologically innovative yet socially just. In this new vision of modernity,
enlightened Chilean scientists and engineers leapfrogged over the state-of-the-art
technologies produced in the developed, capitalist world and created "revolutionary"
technologies "in our own spirit." The welcome speech illustrates the ideological
framing of the Cybersyn project, which was not so different from the government's
parallel efforts to direct science and technology toward achieving the social,
economic, and political goals of the Chilean revolution.
Just as relics and artifacts inform archeologists about the beliefs and
practices of societies past, studying the traces left by more recent technologies can
provide information about the hopes, fears, values, and priorities of the women and
men responsible for their design and construction, as well as those who put these
technologies to use. Cybersyn is more than a configuration of hardware, software,
and telex terminals. It is a historical text that documents the goals, contradictions,
2 A recent exhibition at the ZKM Center for Digital Art and Media entitled "Making Things Public:
Atmospheres of Democracy" has further explored the idea of the Cybersyn Operations Room as a
democratic space. See Eden Miller Medina, "Democratic Socialism, Cybernetic Socialism: Making the
Chilean Economy Public," in Making Things Public: Atmospheres of Democracy, ed. Bruno Latour and
Peter Weibel (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, forthcoming 2005).
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and strategies employed by the Chilean government and its detractors. The project
inspired political speeches, folk songs, brochures, training programs, and paintings,
all of which framed the project as a socialist technology capable of transforming the
Chilean economy and correcting class inequalities. The inauguration speech
provides a particularly vivid example of the type of ideologically driven propaganda
that accompanied the system's construction.
However, the system also provided another arena for world actors to duke out
the ideological tensions of the Cold War. While members of the project team equated
Cybersyn with socialist liberation, press accounts from the United States and
Britain described it as a technological "Big Brother" that would sacrifice individual
rights for a more powerful state apparatus. Chilean opposition parties and the
Rightist press generated similar critiques aimed at arousing public feelings of
uncertainty and fear with regard to the project. These hostile readings of the
Cybersyn project reflected anxieties of the Cold War and the all-out struggle
between capitalism and communism in Chile, as well as in other nations of the
developing world.
Like their predecessors and successors in governments around the world,
Chilean officials viewed innovations in science and technology as symbolic of
political success. The significance of Cybersyn was its successful mirroring of the
revolutionary beliefs of the Chilean state. The project also stands as a concrete
example of how the state planned to nurture those beliefs within Chilean society.
Constructing the technological network required that new social networks be formed
and that old networks be dismantled; although it was less certain that these new
social configurations would overcome the old relations of domination, exploitation,
and oppression within Chilean factories.
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Technological systems can contribute to the exercise of state hegemonic
power and have been used historically to engineer ideological change. Through
Cybersyn, ideology and technology became linked through concepts of and plans for
worker participation and the necessity of managing changes in property ownership.
However, the act of writing social theory into technological design highlights the
difference between theory and practice and demonstrates the ambivalences,
ambiguities, and shortcomings of the UP program for socialist change. Allende never
wavered in his faith that socialism would solve the needs of the Chilean people and
create a more just society. Beer professed a similar faith in the abilities of
management cybernetics to implement the ideological changes outlined by the
Chilean revolution. Whether history agreed with either man will be discussed in the
pages that follow.
Cybernetic Socialism
From its early stages the Cybersyn project operated under the joint leadership of a
scientific director, Beer, and a political director, Flores. Beer, however, recognized
the utility of combining the rhetoric of Marxism and modernization to create a
"powerful political instrument" able to garner widespread support, and he often
stepped outside the bounds of his scientific duties.3 His use of the phrase "the
people's science" stressed the antitechnocratic nature of the Cybersyn project, and he
often removed himself and his British colleagues from the picture when discussing
the accomplishments of Chilean scientists and engineers in the area of management
cybernetics. At Beer's request the famous Chilean folksinger Angel Parra composed
3 Stafford Beer, "The Extension of Cybernetic Management Systems to the Enterprises: A Reconsideration
of the Political Context," 14 October 1972, box 57, Beer Collection.
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an original song entitled "Litany for a Computer and a Baby About to Be Born" to
help rally worker support for the project. The "baby" in the title refers to the rebirth
of the Chilean people through socialist transformation. The chorus of the song
similarly conveyed the political intentions of the project:
Hay que parar al que no quiera
que el pueblo gane esta pelea
Hay que juntar toda la ciencia
antes que acabe la paciencia.4
Let us stop those who do not want
the people to win this fight
Let us bring together all of science
Before we exhaust our patience.
As a whole, the song demonstrated the importance of technology in bringing about
social change and its potential for eliminating political corruption. The lyrics issued
a rallying cry as well as a prophetic warning. Parra's folk song was one of several
attempts to link Cybersyn and the interests of the Chilean public. Project notes
suggested that Cybersyn engineers distribute empanadas or huesillos con mote (a
popular Chilean dessert) to workers when making presentations about the project in
order to gain their attention, and their support, for the project. And team members,
including Beer, drew up plans for worker training programs designed to teach
Chileans to use the tools that the government developed for them.
The politics of the project extended beyond propaganda or rhetoric. It shaped
the very design of the system. Understanding the correlation between Cybersyn's
design and Allende's politics requires a closer examination of the president's plan to
transform Chile into a socialist state. Allende's interpretation of Marx's writings
emphasized the importance of respecting Chile's existing democratic processes in
4 Lyrics "Letania para una computadora y para un niflo que va a nacer," box 64, Beer Collection.
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bringing about socialist reform, a possibility that Marx alluded to but never
realized.5 Unlike earlier socialist revolutions, such as those in Cuba and the Soviet
Union, Chile's transition to socialism was to be democratic, including respect for
election results, individual freedoms (such as the freedoms of thought, speech, press,
and assembly, and respect for the rule of law), and public participation in
government decision making through elected representatives. At one point Allende
promised to augment existing freedoms, stating, "We would not be revolutionaries if
we were to limit ourselves to maintaining political freedom. The government of the
Unidad Popular will extend political freedom."6 However, it is crucial to note that
Allende's notion of individual or political freedoms were not the same as
individualism, which he associated with capitalist selfishness. Individualism
therefore detracted from the collective wellbeing of the Chilean nation.7 In contrast
to the centralized planning found in the Soviet Union, Allende's articulation of
socialism stressed a commitment to decentralized governance with worker
participation in management, reinforcing his professed belief in individual freedoms.
He even credited his government with putting "an end to centralism and
bureaucracy." s Yet he also admitted that if forced to take sides the government
would favor the "interest of those who made their living by their own work" and that
revolution should be fomented from above, using a "firm guiding hand."9
5 Karl Marx, "The Possibility of Non-Violent Revolution," in Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, and Robert C.
Tucker, The Marx-Engels Reader (New York: W. W. Norton, 1972), 522-24.
6 Salvador Allende, "The Chilean Road to Socialism: First Annual Message to Congress, May 21,1971," in
Salvador Allende Gossens, Chile's Road to Socialism, ed. Joan E. Garces, trans. J. Darling (Baltimore:
Penguin, 1973),, 149.
7 Regis Debray and Salvador Allende Gossens, The Chilean Revolution: Conversations with Allende, 1st
American ed. (New York: Pantheon, 1972), 87.
8 Salvador Allende, "First Anniversary of the Popular Government, National Stadium, Santiago, November
4, 1971," in James D. Cockcroft, ed., Salvador Allende Reader (Hoboken, N.J.: Ocean Press, 2000), 124.
9 Allende, "Chilean Road to Socialism," 150; Peter Winn, Weavers of Revolution: The Yarur Workers and
Chile's Road to Socialism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 185.
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The tension inherent in Beer's model, between individual autonomy and the
welfare of the collective organism (described in chapter 5), mirrors the struggle
between competing ideologies in Allende's democratic socialism. Just as Allende
promised to preserve individual freedoms while directing the revolution from above,
Beer's "viable system model" allowed the individual components of system 1 to
maintain their autonomy unless an emergency threatened the stability of the overall
organism, government, or firm. In this instance the "chief executive" (system 5)
could intervene in the activities of the lower levels and restore coherence to the
system. Thus the design of the Cybersyn system permitted the nationalized firms to
maintain control of factory operations while allowing the government to intervene
and assist in resolving economic emergencies. This commitment to liberty and
autonomy, as well as the government's willingness to construct a technological
system for decentralized control, set Cybersyn apart from the computer-based tools
that the Soviet Union developed for economic management.' 0
In the late 1950s Soviet scientists and mathematicians began applying
cybernetic principles and computer technology to the optimization of national
economy activity. In contrast to the situation in Chile, the initial push in the Soviet
Union came from cyberneticians working for the military who hoped to create a
national, centralized network of computing centers that could be used primarily for
national defense while dedicating excess processing time to problems of economic
planning. Military cyberneticians encountered strong resistance from the Soviet
state bureaucracy--the bureaucrats feared that the introduction of computer
technology would leave them unemployed. The proposed computer system also left
"' Slava Gerovitch, From Newspeak to Cyberspeak: A History of Soviet Cybernetics (Cambridge, Mass.:
MIT Press, 2002).
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no room for the ideological leadership of the Communist Party and motivated at
least one official within the Chief Political Directorate of the Army to ask, "Where is
the leading role of the Party in your [computing] machine?""
In the 1960s the desire to optimize the Soviet economy by using computers
was known as "economic cybernetics." Gerovitch reports that by 1967, the Soviet
Council on Cybernetics was coordinating research activities at five hundred
institutions, half of which were investigating how to apply cybernetic ideas to
economic management.' 2 Soviet mathematicians, including Viktor Glushkov and
Mstislav Keldysh, envisioned the construction of a technological system that could
optimize production and replace the market by monitoring all labor, production, and
retail activities. Glushkov later teamed with the director of the Central Economic
Mathematical Institute, Nikolai Fedorenko, and together they detailed a complex
three-tiered computer network that would use thousands of local computer centers
to collect "primary information." These local centers would be linked to thirty to fifty
computer centers in major Soviet cities. All the information collected at the midlevel
centers would eventually flow to one central computer in Moscow, dedicated to
government use. The tiered computer network proposed by Glushkov and Fedorenko
represented a system of tremendous complexity. Researchers later realized that this
scheme would require the manipulation of about fifty million variables, vastly more
than the three thousand variables required to manage the Chilean economy with
Cybersyn.' 3 Soviet economists tried to simplify the problem of economic optimization
" Ibid., 267.
'2 Ibid.,269.
'3 At the time of the coup against Allende, the Chilean government had incorporated 420 firms in the public
and mixed property areas. If the Cybersyn system required five to seven index values from each firm to
monitor factory performance, we arrive at a figure of slightly less than three thousand variables in all. This
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by using "indirect centralization," whereby the state set optimal prices and efficiency
levels but otherwise allowed firms to make their own decisions. This approach bears
a striking similarity to the process of decentralized control articulated by Beer's
viable system model and the subsequent design of the Cybersyn system. Yet the
differences in the practice of Soviet communism and that of Chilean socialism were
far greater than any intellectual similarity to their cybernetics. Chilean state
planning, particularly at the level of managing a national economy, was in its
infancy. As a result, administrators like Flores remained open to new ideas for
managing the public sector. The same could be said of Chilean state planning
agencies. In 1971 CORFO, the state development agency, willingly underwent a
series of structural changes that allowed it to grow alongside the public and mixed
property areas and expand its management capabilities. This included creating the
Direcci6n Industrial (Industrial Directorate) and introducing of new layers of
bureaucracy to the preexisting administrative hierarchy.' 4 In the Soviet context,
however, the idea of preserving factory autonomy contradicted Soviet economic
theory and threatened to undermine the absolute power of the State Planning
Committee. In the end the centralist hierarchies of the Soviet bureaucracy proved
stronger than the interventions proposed by economic cyberneticians. Far from being
instruments of change, or even improvement, in the Soviet Union computer
technology and the language of cybernetics emerged as new tools for reinforcing the
existing administrative hierarchies and the politics of centralized control. As
does not account for subsequent levels of recursion, although it does illustrate the tremendous difference in
complexity between the Soviet version of economic cybernetics and the work undertaken in Chile.
14 Luis Ortega Martinez, Corporaci6n de Fomento de la Producci6n: 50 anos de realizaciones, 1939-1989
(Santiago de Chile: Universidad de Santiago Facultad de Humanidades Departamento de Historia, 1989),
229.
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Gerovitch writes, "cybernetics turned into a flexible ideological tool, another
newspeak, only now filled with cybernetic terminology."15
Chilean cybernetics also proved incapable of transforming the Chilean
bureaucracy,, as will become evident later in this chapter. However, the system
never sought to automate managerial tasks, entirely replace the market, or
completely centralize Chilean industrial activities by eliminating factory autonomy.
To the contrary, Cybersyn sought to improve the efficacy of human interventions in
economic management rather than fully automate the process. Similarly, Cybersyn's
ability to promote factory autonomy and encourage worker participation further
conflated the technology and the goals of the Chilean revolution. Beer recalled that
during his first meeting with Allende, the only "snaggy" part of their conversation
concerned the Soviets and their application of computer technology to running the
economy. According to Beer, Allende asked, "Are you going to use the Communist
Party and all the apparatus that the communists have developed in Moscow? And I
said, 'I'm sorry it's all rubbish.' And [Allende] grinned broadly. He was very amused,
because he didn't like them either."' 6
Despite this shared disdain for the Soviet model, neither Allende's political
beliefs nor Beer's viable system model could resolve the fundamental tension
between individual freedom and centralized control. Both men recognized situations
when "the needs of one division must be sacrificed ... explicitly to the needs of other
divisions." 7 Thus the collective welfare of the state or the homeostasis of the system
superseded the mechanisms devised to ensure autonomy, freedom, and liberty.
" Gerovitch, From Newspeak to Cyberspeak, 288.
16 Beer interview.
17 Stafford Beer, Brain of the Firm: The Managerial Cybernetics of Organization, 2nd ed. (New York: J.
Wiley, 1981), 161.
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According to Beer, this conflict of values can be resolved only at the top, a belief
supported by Allende's acknowledgment that the Chilean government would favor
policies protecting the rights and interests of the workers despite the legislative
provisions that granted equal rights to the opposition.l s The similarity between
Allende's articulation of socialism and the cybernetic model guiding Cybersyn's
construction caught Flores's attention from the outset. Flores said:
For me, what socialism meant is how do you combine autonomy of individuals
with community? The classical Marxist idea, they call democratic centralism.
But my impression at the beginning was that this was pure lip service and
nothing concrete. That's what brought Beer to me. He found this relationship
between autonomy of the unit with the intelligence of the whole. And in that
sense there was a connection. I never found anything [like it] in any other
place. 19
The similarity of Cybersyn's design and Chilean socialism was deliberate. Marxist
thinking influenced the selection of Beer's cybernetic model and ultimately the
design of the system. Marxism also provided the essential hegemonic force needed
for Cybersyn to function as it was originally envisioned.
The Marxist slant in Cybersyn's design appears with little subtlety in two
system diagrams drawn by Herman Schwember, a member of the team. Both
illustrate the centrality of worker participation to Cybersyn's operation (figure 6.1).
The first image depicts the nation, the central government, industry (CORFO), and
the individual firms as nested viable systems, each located recursively inside the
other. The figure of a worker appears at the heart of these systems, reinforcing their
18 This tension between centralized and decentralized control also appeared in the practice of oriented
research at the University of Chile. Although the government directed the overall goals of Chile's oriented
scientific endeavors, the individual scientists maintained the freedom to select the questions that they were
interested in pursuing and the appropriate methodologies. Eugenio Yunis Ahuds, Asignaci6n de recursos y
politica de investigaci6n para la ciencia y la tecnologia: El caso de la Universidad de Chile (Santiago,
Chile: Ediciones C. P. U., 1972).
19 Flores interview.
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perceived importance to the Chilean nation. The second diagram in figure 6.1 shows
a modified rendering of Beer's five-tier viable system model with the figure of a
worker inserted in the structures of both system 1 and system 5. Here the worker
contributes both physically and mentally to the production process, an illustrated
response to Marx's critique of alienated labor in capitalist societies, where the
worker "does not develop freely his mental and physical energies but is physically
exhausted and mentally debased."20 The idea of alienated labor appeared frequently
in Cybersyn team discussions and, in Beer's opinion, constituted one of Marx's most
influential ideas.2 '
The correlation of Allende's Marxism and Beer's cybernetics is intentional,
but it would be wrong to classify cybernetics as a Marxist science, just as it would be
wrong to call Cybersyn an inherently Marxist technology. According to Beer,
cybernetics provided a scientific method for uncovering natural laws and remained
neutral in its conclusions. "Proper use of science," Beer wrote, "is really the world's
brightest hope for a stable government . . . with cybernetics, we seek to lift the
problems of organizational structure out of the ruck of prejudice-by studying them
scientifically."22 The strength of cybernetics, therefore, is that it "provides a
language sufficiently rich and perceptive to make it possible to discuss the problem
objectively, without heat."2 3 As a neutral language, cybernetics "should not develop
its own ideology; but it should attest to one."24 This is an important point: Beer
recognized that his cybernetic toolbox could create a computer system capable of
20 Herman Schwember, "Cybernetics in Government: Experience with New Tools for Management in
Chile, 1971-1973," in Concepts and Tools of Computer-Assisted Policy Analysis, ed. Hartmut Bossel,
Interdisciplinary Systems Research (Basel, Germany: BirkhAuser, 1977), 86, 135; Karl Marx, Economic
and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 (New York: International Publishers, 1964), 125.
21 Beer interview.
22 Stafford Beer, Platform for Change: A Messagefrom Stafford Beer (New York: J Wiley, 1975), 425.
23 Beer, Brain of the Firm, 180.
24 Ibid., 260.
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increasing capitalist wealth or enforcing fascist control, a moral dilemma that would
later plague the project team. In Beer's opinion cybernetics made Marxism more
efficient through its ability to regulate social, political, and economic structures.
Marxism, in turn, gave cybernetics a purpose for regulating social action.
From 1971 to 1973 Beer expanded the project's goal from one of economic
regulation to one of political structural transformation. However, the success of the
project depended upon acceptance of the system in its entirety by members of the
industrial sector and the Chilean government. As Beer himself acknowledged,
adopting individual components could prove disastrous and result in "an old system
of government with some new tools ... For if the invention is dismantled, and the
tools used are not the tools we made, they could become instruments of
oppression."25 Nonetheless, observers from within Chile, around the world, and even
within the project team tended to view Cybersyn as an accumulation of its
technological components rather than a synergistic whole-in effect, separating the
technology from the ideology behind its creation. According to Beer, members of
Chile's opposition parties wrote congratulatory letters embracing the Cybersyn
design-minus, of course, its emphasis on worker participation. The centrist Chilean
newsmagazine Ercilla also separated the project from its socialist objectives and
published an article in January 1973 entitled "The Big Brother of Mr. Beer"-an
obvious allusion to the totalitarian world depicted in George Orwell's 1984.26 More
sinister commentary appeared in the Rightist magazine Que Pasa under the
headline "The UP Controls Us by Computation."2 7
25 Stafford Beer, "On Decybernation: A Contribution to Current Debates," 27 April 1973, box 64, Beer
Collection.
26 "El 'hermano mayor' de Mr. Beer," Ercilla, 23-30 January 1973, 11.
27 "Plan secreto 'cyberstride': la UP nos controla por computaci6n," Qu Pasa, 15 March 1973, 7.
265
Internationally, the separation of the technology from the ideology provoked
criticism from the British publications New Scientist and Science for People, both of
which faulted Cybersyn for being overly centralized and abusive of the Chilean
population.28 Similar criticism came from the United States, particularly from the
mainframe computing guru Herb Grosch of the National Bureau of Standards, who
refused to believe that "Beer and his team could put together a major new model, in
a strange and primitive hardware and software environment, in a few months." In a
scathing letter to the editor of New Scientist Grosch wrote, "I call the whole concept
beastly. It is a good thing for humanity, and for Chile in particular, that it is only a
bad dream."29 Throughout 1973 Beer received invitations from the repressive
governments in Brazil and South Africa to build comparable systems. Considering
the political context of each of these nations during the early 1970s, it is easy to
sympathize with Beer's lament: "You can see what a false position I am in."30
According to Beer, the success of the system hinged on its acceptance as a
system, a network of people as well as machines, a revolution in behavior as well as
in instrumental capability. However, in practice quite the opposite occurred. Not
only were the tools not accepted for the uses for which they were designed, but
members of the Cybersyn team failed to fully understand the cybernetic principles
behind their development. Nor were team members able to convey the rationale
behind the system to members of the industrial sector. From the perspective of many
28 John Adams, "Everything Under Control," Science for People, April-May 1973, 4-6. Joseph Hanlon,
"Chile Leaps into Cybernetic Future," New Scientist, 15 February 1973, 363-64.
29 Herb Grosch, "Chilean Economic Controls," New Scientist, 15 March 1973, 626-27. Grosch is a rather
interesting character in the history of computing, known first for his self-coined "Grosch's Law," which
governed the mainframe computing industry during the 1960s and 1970s, and also for his notoriously
cantankerous personality. While the harshness of his commentary in New Scientist may be attributed to the
latter, Grosch had traveled to Santiago during the late 1960s to advise the government of Eduardo Frei
Montalva on ways to improve Chile's computer capabilities. His comments, therefore, cannot be dismissed.
30 Stafford Beer to Rail Espejo, telex, 1 March 1973, box 66, Beer Collection.
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Chilean engineers involved with the project, mastering cybernetic theories took a
backseat to possibly ordering the increasing chaos of the Chilean economy. Contrary
to Beer's view of the project, a number of the engineers described their work as
primarily technical, rather than political, with the end goal of creating a new tool for
economic management. One member of the Chilean team, who was charged with
creating factory models of the textile sector, poignantly summarized the situation:
The final objective, "the revolution in management" is not accepted, nor even
understood.... I haven't seen a single manager really motivated by the
central concept, and what is worse ... [oft the team that has developed the
work only a very few present the concepts involved.... Ultimately your work
is accepted as long as it provides tools to achieve a more effective traditional
management. It is not even a halfway revolution, it is a mixture, which if not
adequately cared for might end up meaning a new increase in bureaucracy. 3 '
To put it another way, instead of bringing about revolutionary change, these new
technologies served to further entrench many of the management practices that had
disempowered workers before Allende's presidency.
Engineering Participation
Both Beer and Allende sought to change the Chilean system of economic governance.
Allende believed that transforming Chile from a capitalist to a socialist country
required structural transformation and a systematic dismantling of former
production practices. Beer's work was designed to provide the tools for transforming
Chile's system of factory control by restructuring the industrial sector to adhere to
his five-tier model, eliminating what he perceived as unnecessary bureaucracy and
granting factory workers a new means of participating in factory regulation. In a
report dated October 1972, Beer wrote, "The target is to transform the whole of
31 TomAs Kohn to Stafford Beer, 19 April 1973, box 63, Stafford Beer Collection. When shown this letter
thirty years later, Kohn exclaimed, "My God, was I an arrogant bastard!" Kohn interview.
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industrial management, and to make Chilean industry fully effective in one year."3 2
Beer wrote these lines around the same time of the October strike, a watershed
moment that many consider the beginning of the end for the UP government and
Allende's presidency. Given this context, Beer's remark seems naively optimistic and
impossible to achieve. The cybernetician's ambitious ideas commanded the respect of
his fellow Chilean team members-they often referred to him as a genius-but he
frequently met resistance from those who claimed that his goals were politically
unrealistic.
This was particularly true with respect to worker participation. Allende and
Beer verbally committed to increasing the levels of worker participation within
Chile's nationalized industries. Allende's presidential platform promised Chilean
workers that they would participate in the management of their factories. While he
refrained from providing an exact plan for worker management, he succeeded in
pushing the long-deferred issue to the forefront of Chilean politics.
Chileans had discussed worker participation as early as the mid-1920s when
President Arturo Alessandri (1920-1925) legalized unions and strike activity.
Members of the FRAP, the Leftist coalition that preceded the UP and that ran
Salvador Allende as its presidential candidate, called for the inclusion of labor in
state planning activities as part of their 1964 election platform. However, after
Allende's opponent, Eduardo Frei's election Montalva, was elected president, the
national labor federation (CUT) pushed for higher wages and economic reforms
rather than for worker participation. According to Espinosa and Zimbalist, the Frei
government supported the idea of worker participation but did nothing to bring
32 Beer, "Extension of Cybernetic Management Systems," 3.
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about changes within the factories, deferring to more immediate concerns such as
the "Chileanization" of copper or the agrarian reform.3 3
Allende made worker participation a central pillar of the Chilean
revolution.3 4 The UP made a clear commitment to participation as part of its
platform, but members of the coalition had radically different ideas about how to
achieve this goal. Some preferred strengthening the existing union representation
within the factories, while others proposed creating a new infrastructure of worker
committees, councils, and assemblies. Members of the MIR, the most radical Leftist
party of the UP, pushed for a direct democracy within the factories that would
include workers and consumer interests.3 5 Members of the MAPU argued against
both the centralization found in the Soviet Union and the ideas of direct democracy
promoted by the MIR. Instead, MAPU members supported new hierarchies of well-
trained workers and managers, each capable of performing the tasks assigned to
them. In the Center, the Christian Democrats advocated the creation of "worker's
enterprises" (empresas de trabajadores) inspired by the Yugoslavian experience:
workers would share ownership of their firms and split the profits-an approach
that provoked disdain from Allende. According to the president, making the workers
"shareholders would be to convert them into pseudo-capitalists and this cannot be
33 Juan G. Espinosa and Andrew S. Zimbalist, Economic Democracy: Workers' Participation in Chilean
Industry, 1970-1973, Studies in Social Discontinuity (New York: Academic Press, 1978). Juan Guillermo
Espinosa played a role in drafting the Christian Left's initiative on worker participation put forward in mid-
1973 to bridge the UP and the PDC programs and help form a Left-Center coalition. In spite of the initial
support shown from both sides, the proposal did not receive congressional approval.
34 This raises the related question of why Chilean interpretations of Marxism emphasized worker
participation while other Marxist revolutions did not. According to James Wilson, Chilean Marxism drew
upon parallel currents in thought, including the humanist tradition of the Christian Democrats and the
sympathies toward workers expressed by the Roman Catholic Church. The addition of the MAPU and the
Christian Left to the UP coalition further illustrates the ideological similarity between Marxist thought and
that of the PDC. James W. Wilson, "Freedom and Control: Workers' Participation in Management in Chile,
1967-1975" (Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1979)
35 The MIR's base of support--poor slum dwellers, intellectuals, students, and middle-class youth, all of
whom were outside the industrial sector--explains this unorthodox position.
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conceived of as a means of transformation in a process such as the one in which we
are living."3 6 Allende, however, lacked a clear position of his own. Wilson describes
the UP program as sketchy with respect to participation and claims that Allende
attempted "to conceal this sketchiness with rhetoric and betray a greater interest in
participation as a means to an end."3 7 The lack of a clear approach inspired
numerous organizational reshufflings within the public sector enterprises, all with
varying degrees of clarity and efficacy.
In June 1971 a collaboraton between the government and the CUT resulted
in the "Normas Bsicas de Producci6n," a first attempt at resolving the issue of
participation. The document proposed a rather complicated hierarchy of committees
at levels ranging from the shop floor to the top management of an enterprise and
included representatives from the blue- and white-collar workforces as well as union
leaders. The "Normas" called for three channels of worker participation in factory
management. At the top level of the management hierarchy, they envisioned an
administrative council with decision-making power similar to that held by a board of
directors. This council would consist of five workers (three from production, one
administrator, and one professional) and six government representatives, including
the state-appointed interventor.3 8 The report also called for the creation of
production committees at the section, department, and division levels, all consisting
of worker representatives elected from general assemblies of their peers. Members of
these worker committees would be able to offer suggestions for improving working
conditions and increasing production but would not exert decision-making power.
36 Wilson, "Freedom and Control", 352.
37 Ibid., 347.
38 By 1973 them ratio of five workers for six government representatives had changed to 5:5 in practice.
Before 1973 workers often enjoyed a majority presence in administrative council meetings. Government
representatives frequently had other commitments and could not attend meetings.
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Worker representatives from both the production committees and the administrative
council would form the coordinating committee, a body that was to serve as liaison
between these two participatory channels. According to the "Normas," labor unions
would maintain their independence. Union delegates would continue to serve as
representatives of working-class interests but would not hold positions within the
production committees or the administrative council. The government made the
"Normas" public on September 1, 1971, but had already applied the plan to
managing the nationalized textile mills Yarur, Progreso, Hirmas, and Fabrilana. By
June 1972 the organizational structure outlined by the "Normas" existed in modified
or complete form within 76% of the public enterprises.3 9
In the 1960s, the International Labor Organization (ILO) of the United
Nations identified three areas of worker participation. 40 These categories provide a
better understanding of the levels of worker participation achieved within the
nationalized firms during Allende's presidency. Chilean workers had considerable
experience in the first area-solving social, administrative, and personnel
problems-through years of union representation. They had considerably less
experience in the second area, which the ILO defined as resolving technical and
production problems. However, the plan outlined by the Normas provided
opportunities for workers to participate in these areas through their elected
representatives to the production committees and the administrative council. The
Normas did not provide a outlet for worker participation beyond the factory level. As
such, workers contributed very little to the third area, which the ILO defined as
participation in the economic and financial management of the firm. Workers
39 Espinosa and Zimbalist, Economic Democracy, 53.
40 Organizaci6n Internacional del Trabajo, La participaci6n de los trabajadores en las decisiones que se
adoptan en las empresas. Geneva: Oficina Internacional del Trabajo, 1969. Cited in Ibid.
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pushed for representation within the sector committees of CORFO but received little
support from the government. While Espinosa and Zimbalist attribute the lack of
worker representation in state planning to the failure of Chilean economic planning
efforts, Pedro Guglielmetti, head of the CUT-government participation committee
until late 1972, offered a more direct explanation. High-ranking members of the
government "from Allende down," including the state-appointed interventors, did not
view participation as a vital issue.4 '
From the outset the creators of Cybersyn considered it a tool for worker
participation. Beer claimed Allende emphasized the importance of participation
during their first meeting in November 1971 as well as during their last meeting in
July 1973. In their July conversation the cybernetician asked the beleaguered
president, "in view of the confusion being generated around the project" what was
the "extent to which [Allende] expected worker control of the social economy?" "El
maximo," the president replied.42 The pages of the 1973 CORFO report "Proyecto
Synco," the Spanish name of the Cybersyn project, further confirm Beer's account.
According to the report, the system's "true results" were derived from "the
construction of a more just society, with effective worker participation, that
organizes itself, operates, and develops itself coherently with the higher politics of
the country."43 The connection between the UP's ideological commitment to worker
participation and the design of the system seems clear. However, like the UP
platform itself, ambiguity arose not in the system's overarching goals but in its
implementation. Beer's project reports about the system contain several suggestions
41 Pedro Guglielmetti, interview by James Wilson, 18 October 1973 and 25 October 1973. Cited in Wilson,
"Freedom and Control", 371-72.
42 Beer, Brain of the Firm, 346.
43 CORFO, "Proyecto Synco conceptos y practica del control; una experiencia concreta: la direcci6n
industrial en Chile," ed. Corporaci6n de Fomento de la Producci6n (Santiago de Chile: 1973), 3..
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for how to insert workers into Cybersyn's operation and expand their role in the
revolutionary process. In a report dated December 1972, one month after the
October strike, Beer wrote:
We have wrestled with the problem of technocracy in Cybersyn. The answer
seems to be that the workers themselves must man the team - with the help
of scientists. I see this relationship in exactly the same light as the
relationship should be between workers and technicians on the shop-floor.
The Operations Room is the shop floor of Total Industry. It is a place for the
workers. 4 4
Beer's reports also include plans to build simplified versions of the Operations Room
within the nationalized industries, creating a space for workers to meet, monitor
production, and contribute to the decisions affecting their factory.4 5 These simplified
rooms used nothing more sophisticated than chalk on a blackboard but would
incorporate the methods of collecting and presenting information developed by the
Cybersyn team. Beer called for workers to contribute their intimate, even tacit,
knowledge of production activities to the process of modeling their factories. In this
plan workers would assist operations research scientists and engineers at INTEC,
an agency affiliated with CORFO, in selecting the key indicators of production as
well as their appropriate threshold values. Beer later urged workers to take an even
greater role in this process. "There is no-one better qualified to model a plant, than
the man whose life is spent working in it," Beer concluded. "He knows."46 Beer had
confidence in workers' ability to master the tools designed by his team-- software,
simulators, flowcharts, and production indices associated with the system. He
compared these tools to automated machinery. Workers did not need to understand
44 Stafford Beer, "One Year of (Relative) Solitude," p. 4, December 1972, box 61, Beer Collection.
45 This proposal did not specify whether the administrative council, coordinating committee, or any of the
production committees would use the room.
46 Beer, "One Year of Relative Solitude," p. 5.
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the complicated inner workings of the system, only how to use the tools it provided
and their benefits to production.4 7 Once workers understood and recognized the
value of the tools, Beer reasoned, they would demand them. Workers, not an upper-
level bureaucrat, would provide the impetus for the system's use. CORFO also
identified workers as key contributors to Cybersyn's operation. Their experience in
dealing with factory bottlenecks and equipment limitations would provide vital
information for assessing the levels of production that a factory could achieve. By
quantifying shop-floor knowledge in factory flowcharts and models, each worker:
knows their interaction with the rest of the parts of the system, and of their
system in relation to other systems. This effort would permit the workers to
understand problems of investment ... as well as problems of production and
its fluctuations through comparisons of what is with what can be.48
CORFO cited promising results within the firms INSA and Muebles Easton, where
the process of defining production indices initiated "a process of general
participation of executives and workers" as well as studies of "organization,
information and participation." From this experience the report concluded that
workers were perfectly able to understand the system but that "there is much more
to do in this area."4 9
How, then, do we determine the value of the Cybersyn Project with respect to
worker participation? According to Patricia Cornejo, a socialist who helped draft the
"Normas," participation not only orients, disciplines, and commits the working
47 Beer's reasoning is questionable here given that automation had led to the deskilling of the workforce,
increased the power of managers over workers, alienated workers from their labor, and in some cases raised
levels of unemployment. From the early 19 thcentury onward, workers vented their frustrations stemming
from the changing nature of their work by attacking the new mechanical technologies arriving in their
factories. In this context, it seems unlikely workers would demand new forms of automation. Studies of
worker resistance to automation can be found in David F. Noble, Forces of Production: A Social History of
Industrial Automation, 1st ed. (New York: Knopf, 1984) and Shoshana Zuboff, In the Age of the Smart
Machine: The Future of Work and Power (New York: Basic Books, 1988).
48CORFO, "Proyecto Synco conceptos y practica del control; una experiencia concreta: la direcci6n
industrial en Chile," 40..
49 Ibid., 47.
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classes but also consolidates the changes brought by the revolution in Chilean
economic, political, and social structures. 50 Therefore, judging the efficacy of
Cybersyn requires evaluating its ability to organize worker participation in a
substantive manner as well as its ability to formalize the goals of the Chilean
revolution within the structure and practice of factory management. To further
explore these aspects of the system, let me now turn to a case example.
Participation in Ex-Yarur
On April 28, 1971, the Yarur cotton textile mill entered the Chilean history books as
the first enterprise to be seized by its workers for incorporation in the public
sector.5' It was the largest and oldest textile mill in the country, with approximately
three thousand workers, but it had not been on the government's original list for
public requisition. The government's decision to acquire the mill illustrated the
strength of the revolution from below that Allende's presidency had unleashed, and
it accelerated the pace of the nationalization process. As 1971 unfolded, workers at
other factories followed the example set by the workers at Yarur and tried to take
control of their destiny. "Ex-Yarur," as the mill was known after its nationalization,
served as the government's test case for requisitioning a firm by using emergency
decree powers rather than offering to purchase the enterprise from its original
owners. Use of this legislation facilitated the nationalization process but provoked
criticism from both the Christian Democrats and the Right.
Yarur provided one of the most suitable test cases for Cybersyn's early
introduction into factory management practices. Allende had identified enterprises
50 Wilson, "Freedom and Control", 350.
51 Winn, Weavers of Revolution
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within the textile sector as priorities for requisition. A CORFO report on the
Cybersyn system similarly pointed to factories within the textile and forestry sectors
as among the first to be modeled and connected to the telex network. Because the
mill was the test case for government intervention and requisition, Ex-Yarur
received the best of everything, including the most qualified state-appointed
interventors and the attention of high-ranking government officials. It seems logical
that the mill would be among the first enterprises considered for an experimental
computer system that improved industrial management.
Ex-Yarur also was among the first to set up the series of participatory bodies
described in the "Normas Basicas de Producci6n," albeit in modified form. Within a
year workers at the mill had made significant gains in leadership and in expanding
the scope of their participatory powers. Winn describes a General Assembly meeting
at Ex-Yarur at which workers rejected the mill's annual financial report because it
was "incomprehensibly technical in some parts, inappropriately political in others,
and delivered orally." They insisted that the report be "drawn up in a form they
could understand" so that they could determine its merit and use the information to
contribute to future decisions at the factory.52 By the time the Cybersyn project truly
got underway in March 1972, the workers at Ex-Yarur had already made significant
strides toward self-organization, increasing worker confidence, and raising the level
of participation in management. Members of the Ex-Yarur workforce in particular
seemed poised to demand the tools of the Cybersyn system if they believed that they
would add to the gains that the workers had already achieved.
52 Peter Winn, "Workers into Managers: Worker Participation in the Chilean Textile Industry," in Popular
Participation in Social Change: Cooperatives, Collectives, and Nationalized Industry, ed. June Nash, Jorge
Dandler, and Nicholas Hopkins (Chicago: Mouton, 1976), 588.
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Ex-Yarur possessed other distinguishing features that made it suitable for
introducing Cybersyn. Union leaders at the mill represented both blue-collar
workers and white-collar employees. For years the technical professionals in
particular, especially those from the data-processing division known informally as
IBM, played a significant role in the mill's history of labor resistance. In 1966 five
employees of the IBM division incited a work stoppage to protest their working
conditions, the first employee-driven stoppage in Yarur's then thirty-four year
history. 53 By the end of 1970 the organized members of the IBM division had found
additional support among the industrial engineers who were working in Yarur's
Division of Production Control and Planning. Together they formed an official
employee union in early 1971. Although workers and employees continued to feel
resentment toward one another and their respective roles in Chile's revolutionary
process, both white-collar employees and blue-collar workers had a history of
organization and resistance at Ex-Yarur. Both groups had drawn strength from
Allende's presidency. If the government wished to unite technical prowess with
greater participation among the rank-and-file, which was necessary for the
Cybersyn system to function properly, it would be hard pressed to find a more
suitable factory than Ex-Yarur. The expropriation of the mill had also attracted the
attention of high-ranking members of the MAPU, including Oscar Guillermo
Garret6n, deputy minister of the economy. The application of computer technology to
economic management had been the brainchild of another MAPU party member,
Fernando Flores. Finally, the owners, the Yarur family, had made significant efforts
to modernize factory production and management during the 1950s and 1960s and
owned one of the few factories that possessed telex machinery and its own computer
53 Winn, Weavers of Revolution, 183.
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system. Technically and politically, Ex-Yarur appeared to offer an ideal setting for
testing the ideological aspects of the Cybersyn system, including its mechanisms for
worker participation.
However, Ex-Yarur managers and INTEC engineers shared a very different
story. Ex-Yarur was one of the first factories connected to the Cybersyn system, but
it does not appear that Ex-Yarur's workforce knew about the system. In bringing the
system to Ex-Yarur, the INTEC engineers responsible for modeling factory
operations hid the system's participatory facets and promoted its technological
benefits. Workers could not demand the tools offered by Cybersyn, as Beer claimed
they would, because workers did not know that the tools existed.
After the government requisitioned the Yarur mill in April 1971, Juan
Francisco Snchez was appointed to serve as one of the mill's three interventors,
charged specifically with managing finances. Like many of the government
administrators working for the Allende government, Sanchez was young. He was
also a recent graduate of the Catholic University in Santiago and a member of the
MAPU - a profile remarkably similar to that of Flores. The two men knew one
another from their time together in the Catholic University and had continued to
travel in the same academic and political circles. Both had played an active role in
the university reform movement of the late 1960s and had contributed to
modernizing the administration of the Catholic University, Flores in the role of
academic director and Sanchez as the subdirector of administration and finances. In
addition, they shared an interest in modernizing the form of management found in
the Chilean industrial sector. "In the School of Engineering," Sanchez recalled, "we
wanted to modernize production, to make this country, that was so traditional, be
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able to advance."5 4 Referring to the technical inclinations of his MAPU colleagues,
Sanchez added that "making a structure of management and modernizing the
management of the [nationalized] enterprises attracted our attention, not only for its
political side but also because it interested us." Through his connections with the
MAPU, SAnchez learned of Beer's cybernetic model and even applied material from
several of Beer's publications in his work as a management consultant after the
1973 military coup.
SAnchez never encountered the Cybersyn system during his time at Ex-
Yarur, although he did become involved with the project once he left the textile mill
and assumed a position within the Division of Finances and Planning of the Textile
Sector Committee at CORFO.5 5 In Sanchez's opinion the cybernetic underpinnings of
the system "generated certain conditions of autonomy and a balance among different
positions or interests. For me it was very satisfactory." However, he described
Cybersyn as "a technological structure" or set of "technological tools." "I separated
all of Project Cybersyn from Beer's model," SAnchez said, a statement that concisely
illustrates the slippage between the model and its implementation. Even the desire
to increase Chilean efficiency by creating new technologies took a backseat to the
daily emergencies that CORFO employees faced. "Our urgencies were brutal,"
Sanchez recalled, describing the everyday struggles to maintain national production.
In this context, he warned, "don't come to me to send papers"-- a statement he made
54 Juan Francisco Sanchez, interview by Peter Winn and Eden Medina, 27 July 2003.
55 Due to his connections with Flores and the MAPU, it seems logical SAnchez would have known of the
project if it had been implemented in Ex-Yarur during his time as the mill's financial interventor. The fact
that he did not encounter the project could be a result of his leaving the factory to work for the CORFO
Textile Committee before the INTEC factory modelers arrived at the mill, or because the project
maintained a low profile in its early stages that made it unknown even to other members of the MAPU. The
first state appointed general manager of the mill, Andr6s Van Lancker, would have been the most likely
person to know of the Cybersyn project within Ex-Yarur. However, he died before the research for this
dissertation project began.
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referring to the daily telex transmissions of factory data demanded by Cybersyn
engineers.56
When Sanchez left Ex-Yarur for his position at CORFO, Patricio Taulis took
over as interventor of finances. Taulis confirmed Ex-Yarur's involvement in the
Cybersyn project and maintained that the system "was absolutely unknown" among
the workers.57 Taulis claimed to have sent all of Ex-Yarur's production indices to
CORFO himself, without the intervention, participation, or aid of anyone else, with
the possible exception of his assistant, Jaime Betancourt. "There was no democracy.
. there was no human evaluation, there was no participation. The data were the
most important, period." Later in our conversation he remarked, "Project Cybersyn,
this project of the social property area, was not realized-not for a lack of desire but
because it was not prioritized." The government, he concluded, "was worried with
other things." Vicente Poblete, the second general manager of Ex-Yarur, also did not
remember the system or its component parts. However, he did describe a number of
other measures that he implemented within Ex-Yarur to encourage worker equality
and participation. 58
Conversations with INTEC engineers further confirmed the limited political
scope of the project's implementation. TomAs Kohn began working for INTEC in
March 1972 after completing his master's degree in mechanical engineering at
Louisiana State University in the United States. He listed his primary interests as
operations research, optimization theory, and modeling. When he returned to Chile,
he wanted to gain practical experience and accepted an offer to work at INTEC for
56 SAnchez interview.
57 Patricio Taulis, interview by Peter Winn and Eden Medina, 28 July 2003.
58 Vincente Poblete, interview by author, 31 July 2003. One of Poblete's favorite accomplishments was
knocking down the wall that separated workers from employees in the mill's cafeteria.
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Jos6 Valenzuela, the vice director. Kohn was assigned to the INTEC Cybersyn team
headed by INTEC engineer Jorge Barrientos. "When this project started rolling,"
Kohn said, "my initial responsibility was modeling one particular sector and
identifying the indices, according to Stafford's model, in the textile industry.... We
focused on production indices, not so much on the financial side. More on the
physical side, production capabilities. We also had some indices that reflected the
man-hour input, absenteeism."59 During 1972 Kohn visited Ex-Yarur, as well as
other textile plants, such as Sumar and Bellavista. He began the modeling process
by contacting the interventor and then approaching people within "the engineering
side of the company." When asked to describe the reaction of the interventors and
plant engineers to the goals of the Cybersyn project, Kohn replied:
Looking back, they must have been really pissed off. We were fairly young at
the time. For most of us it was probably our first job. We were pretty
arrogant, not because of any political position but because we thought we had
a good model, and we firmly believed in this approach to looking at a
company and what it could help in managing a company. We were convinced
that this was a model that really shed new light and gave new tools for
managing.... I remember one particular guy at, I think it was, the Yarur
plant who was an engineer who had spent a couple of years already reaching
the level of plant manager, and he was obviously not fond of the changes that
were taking place in the country. He was difficult to deal with. When it came
to more technical aspects he could work quite openly.
Kohn described the process of modeling the factory as "a fairly technocratic
approach," one that was "top down" and did not involve "speaking to the guy who
was actually working on the mill or the spinning machine or whatever." When asked
about the system's implementing the forms of worker participation described by
Beer, Kohn replied, "Well, I can understand [Beer's] statement, especially given the
59 Tomas Kohn, interview by author, 5 September 2003.
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political circumstances. I don't recall any instance in which one would say that was
actually happening."
Eugenio Balmaceda, the INTEC engineer responsible for modeling
enterprises within the forestry and construction sector, also reported working
exclusively with the directors of the firm, not the workers. Like Kohn, he found it
easier to avoid the political aspects of the project and concentrate solely on the
technical aspects. "We did not get into political themes that much," Balmaceda said.
"We tried to make [our presentations] as technical as possible." Unlike Kohn,
Balmaceda remembered giving a general description of the project to assembled
groups of workers and that "they were totally in favor of the ideas we wanted to
implement." Later in our conversation he added, "the workers could not have many
doubts [about the system] because it was a highly technical subject."60
A Participative Technology?
From the experience at Ex-Yarur we can draw two central conclusions regarding
worker participation. First, the councils and committees outlined in the "Normas
Basicas de Produccion" and adopted in modified form by Ex-Yarur created a series of
structural changes within the mill's management practices. These succeeded at
directing worker participation and broadened the channels through which they could
participate. The introduction of these advisory and decision-making bodies led to
real advances in workers' leadership capabilities and levels of worker awareness,
until the strike of October 1972 changed the Chilean political climate. Afterward,
the severity of the nation's economic and political crisis deflected attention from the
60 Eugenio Balmaceda, interview by author, 28 January 2003.
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issue of participation. Instead, workers, managers, and administrators struggled to
maintain production despite work stoppages, labor strikes, and shortages of spare
parts and raw materials.
Second, it does not appear that Cybersyn contributed to the organizational
changes laid out in the "Normas" or succeeded in implementing parallel mechanisms
for worker participation. In the Ex-Yarur context workers remained unaware that
the Cybersyn system existed. Elsewhere, INTEC engineers used only the most
general terms when explaining the system's functionality to the rank-and-file of the
shop floor. From the perspective of the cybernetic modelers, technocracy regularly
eclipsed ideology on the factory floor. Although INTEC engineers received explicit
instructions to work with worker committees in developing the quantifiable models
that detailed factory production capabilities, often the converse occurred, and the
engineer treated the worker with condescension, or he would ignore the workers
altogether and deal directly with management. Moreover, the engineers frequently
hid or overlooked the political facets of the project in favor of emphasizing its
technological sweetness, thereby avoiding potential labor conflicts. Although the
project team drew up training programs for educating workers about the use these
new management tools, these efforts never came to fruition. We can only speculate
how the Cybersyn system might have functioned within the nationalized factories if
it had been completed. However, these initial experiences suggest that the social and
technical networks of communication created by the system would have further
solidified the channels of communication between the CORFO sector committees and
the upper level of factory management. In their study of worker participation in
Chile, Espinosa and Zimbalist concluded that "effective participation requires both
cooperation from administrators and extensive information dissemination regarding
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the operation of the enterprise." 6' Cybersyn might have physically increased the flow
of information within the factory, but it could not change the attitudes toward
worker participation held by white-collar engineers, factory managers, and
government bureaucrats.
Within the Cybersyn team factory modelers were not alone in their
preference for technical solutions. In response to one of Beer's later reports, Rauil
Espejo, the Cybersyn project director, wrote, "Within the government in the short
term, I think the ideological problems are in a second place.... We can do models
for effective problems of the economy. .... Through them we can dismantle the
bureaucracy."62 Throughout 1973 Beer grew increasingly frustrated with Espejo's
technocratic leanings; this statement is a perfect illustration of Espejo's affinity for
technical, rather than ideological, problems.63 The perceived importance of
technology to the Cybersyn project is perhaps best illustrated in figure 6.2, a
drawing made by the state computer agency ECOM that was used to describe the
Cybersyn's operation during a government-sponsored data processing conference.
Instead of making Chilean workers the central figures of Cybersyn's operation, as in
figure 6.1, the image shows a mainframe computer occupying the place of privilege
at the heart of the system.
Workers recognized the CORFO preference for top-down, technocratic
management and criticized the state agency for not creating participatory channels
for workers within the upper echelons of economic planning. This became especially
clear in July 1972 during the Encuentro Textil, a three-day meeting between the
government and workers' representatives from across the textile industry, where
61 Espinosa and Zimbalist, Economic Democracy, 183.
62 Rafixl Espejo to Stafford Beer, 22 May 1973, box 66, Beer Collection.
63 Beer interview.
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both parties assessed the first year of nationalization. During the meeting workers
called for increased representation in CORFO and openly condemned the
technocratic leanings of the CORFO Textile Committee, which the workers regarded
as ruling from above and failing to invite the participation of the rank-and-file. As
most workers did not know of the Cybersyn project, these criticisms were not leveled
at the system explicitly. However, the frustrations expressed by these textile
workers agree with the observed lack of worker contributions to the development of
this CORFO-sponsored technological system. Worker representatives further argued
that the sector committee's reliance on bureaucrats and technicians limited the
scope of workers' influence and created a system of management that they described
as bureaucratic, undemocratic, bourgeois, and incompetent.64 Given the reported
absence of worker participation in the process of creating factory models, and the
willingness of factory managers and CORFO employees to sacrifice ideological goals
for technical solutions, we can easily imagine similar critiques directed at the
Cybersyn project.
Outside the textile industry, workers remained mostly ignorant of the
Cybersyn system and the management tools that it offered, with one notable
exception.6 5 Raimundo Beca, an interventor assigned to MADEMSA, a maker of
64 These comments were made at the Encuentro Textile, a three-day meeting held in July 1972 between
government officials and worker representatives from the nationalized textile mills. In general, worker
complaints against the government were minimal, except for the criticism about the lack of worker
participation in the Textile Committee (Comitd Textile) and other upper-level administrative bodies. Winn,
"Workers into Managers," 596.
65 I made several attempts to locate workers who either used or remembered hearing about the Cybersyn
project in their factories. Toward this end, I attended meetings at the National Labor Confederation (CUT),
advertised in Chilean periodicals, and contacted labor leaders from the UP era. In the end, not a single
worker could recall hearing of Project Cybersyn, Proyecto Synco, an operations room, a telex network of
communication, or a computerized system of economic management. Of the workers I interviewed, none
knew of government attempts to create cybernetic factory models or participated in their creation.
However, my efforts to locate workers did turn up additional CORFO employees who contributed to the
project in its final months and whose names did not appear in the archive of Stafford Beer's papers.
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electrical appliances, recalled that mapping the vital indices of production provided
a source of motivation for workers, who used the figures as a basis for rewards and
as a means of promoting collective production instead of individual output. 66
However, Beca also served as the director of the state computer agency, ECOM. His
leadership roles at both MADEMSA and ECOM during Allende's presidency may
explain why the Cybersyn system was more visible to MADEMSA workers and why
Beca perceived the system as a noteworthy component of factory production and
participation. But Beca could not address how workers perceived their use of the
system or its significance. Generally speaking, it seems safe to conclude that the
system failed to increase worker participation within the nationalized enterprises.
The experiences recounted by Ex-Yarur interventors and INTEC cybernetic
modelers raise additional questions about the level of government commitment to
implementing the ideological facets of Cybersyn's design.
Instead of promoting social transformation and augmenting worker
participation at every level of government, a principle upheld on paper by Beer and
CORFO, the interactions between Cybersyn engineers and workers in the
nationalized sector reflected Chilean social and cultural hierarchies in general and
reinforced the project's technocratic image. The priority given to technical expertise
within the nationalized factories was later summarized in a paper written by a
member of the project team. According to the author, "The individual [workers]
should have effective and organic feedback channels to all niveaus [levels] of the
system" but at the same time should learn to accept expert advice and even demand
66 Beca interview. Beca, who was both director of ECOM and interventor for MADEMSA during the
government of the UP, noted that the use of the system depended strongly on interventor support. For
example, MADEMSA discontinued all work on Cybersyn's implementation after Beca left the factory.
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it when necessary. This would help them "avoid confusion of their role."67 However,
as the case of Ex-Yarur illustrates, within a year workers had learned to demand
information in a form that they could understand, which allowed them to contribute
to factory planning and management. As the workers saw it, CORFO's reliance on
technical expertise constituted one of the greatest obstacles to their real
participation within the higher levels of government administration.
With regard to participation, the theoretical underpinnings of the system
differed significantly from its implementation. Moreover, the proposed channels for
worker participation that were incorporated in Cybersyn's design were overlooked in
favor of giving factory managers tools for better top-down management. In this
sense the project gave additional power to the upper levels of factory management,
CORFO administrators, and technical experts. Workers criticized this exclusionary
concentration of power and argued that the technocratic and bureaucratic approach
employed by the CORFO sector committees limited workers' opportunities to
participate at the level of national economic planning. Following the October strike,
the telex network became crucial to the government's survival and changed the
project's focus from a means of transforming society to a tool for helping the
bureaucracy to survive. The strike also had a dramatic effect on the nature of worker
participation. Workers from different factories banded together in cordones
industriales (industrial belts) and geographically coordinated their efforts in support
of the government. Within the factory, however, surviving the daily crises of
production siphoned attention away from worker participation efforts and stalled
67 Schwember, "Cybernetics in Government," 88. It is interesting to note that Beer went in another direction
as the project progressed and eventually drafted both a report and a letter to President Allende emphasizing
the importance of the workers' learning to create the models themselves rather than looking to the advice of
technocratic experts.
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the gains that workers had made previously. Ironically, Allende expressed his
greatest commitment to worker participation during his last year in office, perhaps
as a last attempt to maintain his popular base of support. However, as 1973
progressed, the Cybersyn system and the UP government lost their ability to
implement change. Instead, both struggled simply to maintain the status quo.
Gendered Technology
Just as the system's implementation in the factory setting highlighted the
government's ambivalence toward worker participation, the design of the Operations
Room illustrates how gender influenced ideas of participation and the access to
political power. The design positioned seven chairs in an inward-facing circle. Once
seated in these chairs, the occupants of the room could change the information
presented on the various wall displays to suit the topic under discussion. Beer
recognized that the men sitting in the chairs would not possess skills as typists-an
occupation typically performed by female secretaries. Therefore, in lieu of the now-
traditional keyboard, the Operations Room team designed a series of large "big-
hand" buttons that participants could "thump" if they wished to emphasize their
point. Beer felt that this design decision facilitated communication by eliminating
"the girl between themselves and the machinery."68 He was referring to a literal
woman, a typist who would navigate the keyboard interface on behalf of the
bureaucrats or factory workers occupying the seven Operations Room chairs. The
large buttons made this additional operator superfluous and created a more intimate
relationship between the humans and the machine. I argue, however, that this
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68 Beer, Platform for Change, 449.
design decision reflects the gendered history of Chile, as well as of the Left, and
illustrates how technology can embody the politicization of gender.
There is no question that the room was designed, consciously or
unconsciously, as a masculine space.69 Another participant equated the act of
banging on the armrest with "an ejaculation." Most would surely agree that this
form of communication bears a closer resemblance to masculine aggression than to a
form of gender-neutral or feminine expression. See figure 6.370 for a close-up image
of the chair. The ashtray and the space for a drink on the let armrest further convey
the type of environment for control envisioned by the room's designers. Many project
participants cited Winston Churchill's underground cabinet war room as the
inspiration for the Opsroom. It is easy to imagine Churchill smoking a cigar with his
generals while seated in the Chilean reinterpretation of his command center.
The characteristics ascribed to the room's future occupants reveal
assumptions of who would hold power within the Chilean revolution. Generally
speaking, workers and bureaucrats would have the ability to make decisions
affecting the direction of the country; clerical workers, those operating outside the
formal economy, and women would not. As several historians of gender in Chile have
noted, the vast majority of industrial workers and government officials were male.
Most Chilean women held jobs in the service sector or stayed at home.
In interviews project participants described the room as a democratic and
equalizing space, and project notes back these recollections. The designers of the
69 When asked, several participants interviewed did not remember the room as being designed as a male
space. This, however, does not eliminate the importance of gender perceptions in the resulting design,
especially in assigning characteristics to the room's users. In an interview Beer said the decision to
"eliminate the girl" reflected the existing structure of power in the Chilean government and therefore
represented a realistic acknowledgment of the room's likely inhabitants. This raises the question of why the




Opsroom aimed to create an environment for government decision making as well as
a new channel for working-class power. Its design reflected these commitments.
Recognizing the low-level of formal education completed by many Chilean workers,
Beer claimed the big-hand design made the room suitable for workers instead of a
"sanctum sanctorum for a government elite."' Yet Cybersyn scientists focused their
attention to equality and empowerment exclusively on overcoming the injustices
caused by class difference. Why did the designers not direct a similar level of
attention to the inequalities of gender? Instead of creating a truly democratic space,
the gendered assumptions reveal systematic sexism within the Chilean revolution
and the unequal opportunities made available to Chilean men and Chilean women.72
Historians of gender have criticized the UP for its ambivalent attitude toward
women, as well as the Left's focus on the largely male groups of industrial workers
and, to a lesser extent, rural peasants.73 Traditional Marxist narratives and labor
histories have similarly marginalized the experiences of women and the urban poor.
In the pages of the Leftist Cuadernos de la Realidad Nacional, the Chilean social
scientist Ribeiro criticized existing bodies of social theory for failing to address the
experiences of Chilean women and privileging production outside the home over
reproduction and related domestic activities.7 4 She was not alone in her critique.
Years later the historian McGee Deutsch wrote, "Existing studies have stressed the
Left's inability--of which there are numerous examples-to conceive of female
71 Beer, Brain of the Firm, 270..
72 This is especially curious, given the UP's need to grow its base of support among Chilean women.
Although Allende won the 1970 election by popular vote, the majority of his supporters were
overwhelmingly male.
73 This critique has also been leveled at social and labor historians.
74 Lucia Ribeiro, "La mujer obrera chilena. Una aproximaci6n a su estudio," Cuadernos de la realidad
nacional, no. 16 (1973).
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participation in the struggle for socialism."7 5 Chilean organized labor and the
beginnings of' the Socialist Party both emerged from the almost all-male
environment of the nitrate mines during the latter part of the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. The Socialist Party, created in 1933, looked to the labor unions
as a stronghold of its support and thus prioritized workers' needs over those of
others. Moreover, the wage structure supported by the Left and the Center-Left
popular front (1936-48) reaffirmed an ideology of gender that positioned men as
productive and relegated women to dependent and subordinate positions within the
home. As Rosemblatt as shown in her study of gender during the popular front
period, modernization projects educated and disciplined the Chilean popular classes
and promoted "the value of cleanliness, temperance, hard work, sexual restraint,
and, above all, love of the family."7 6 These state programs produced and enforced
gendered identities for Chilean men and women, transforming working-class men
into productive breadwinners and working-class women into attentive wives and
mothers.7 7 Klubock, confirming Rosemblatt's analysis, writes, "The popular fronts,
with the support of labor and the Left, built their political hegemony on the
foundation of a gendered political ideology that defined the rights and benefits of
national citizenship in terms of the male worker and head of household and the
female housewife." 78
In the political sphere women gained the right to vote in municipal elections
as early as 1934. However, they had to wait another fifteen years (1949) to be
75Sandra McGee Deutsch, "Gender and Sociopolitical Change in 20th Century Latin America," Hispanic
American Historical Review 71, no. 2 (1991): 297-98.
76 Karin Alejandra Rosemblatt, Gendered Compromises: Political Cultures and the State in Chile, 1920-
1950 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 3-4.
77 See also Ibid. ; Karin Alejandra Rosemblatt, "Charity, Rights, and Entitlement: Gender, Labor, and
Welfare in Early Twentieth-Century Chile," Hispanic American Historical Review 81, no. 3-4 (2001)
78 Thomas Miller Klubock, "Writing the History of Women and Gender in Twentieth Century Chile,"
Hispanic American Historical Review 81, no. 3-4 (2001): 507.
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allowed to participate in national elections. Although the popular front period
permitted the mobilization of Chilean women, support for these gains also came
from the Right, which felt that women would support its conservative platform.
Even before Allende became president, early Chilean feminists such as Felicitas
Klimpel lamented the lack of commitment shown by the Left toward the promotion
of gender equality. 7 9
Given this history, it is not surprising that women occupied a marginalized
position with the UP and that the UP had difficulty articulating the role of women in
a consistent manner. This does not mean that the UP did not vocally commit to
improving the living conditions of Chilean women and that some of these promises
materialized.. The National Milk Program distributed rations of milk to Chilean
mothers and children. The government also passed laws requiring businesses of a
certain size to provide day-care programs for working mothers. Under Allende the
Centros de Madres (Mother's Centers), a collection of community organizations
begun in the late 1940s and promoted by the Frei administration as a space for
educating women about how to be better wives and mothers, increased their
membership to more than one million and expanded to offer vocational training.
Women became eligible for membership in agrarian cooperatives, and free medical
care in the slums gave poor women greater opportunities to care for their families.
Apart from these gains, the UP platform called for a new Ministry of the Family,
greater pay equity, equal educational opportunities for Chilean men and women,
legalized divorce, and equal rights for legitimate and illegitimate children. The
government even named 1972 the "Year of the Woman." However, the UP never
79 Felicitas Klimpel, La mujer Chilena: el aportefeminino alprogreso de Chile, 1910-1960 (Santiago:
Editorial Andres Bello, 1962).
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implemented the majority of promises directed at its female constituency, a failure
that some attributed to the strength of the opposition parties and others to the
lukewarm support shown by the UP to issues affecting Chilean women.
Since the 1930s workers supported the Socialist Party and served as
protagonists of Chile's proletarian revolution. However, there were very few women
among their ranks. According to the 1970 census, only 20% of all Chilean women
worked outside the home. Of these, only one-fifth worked in the factories -
approximately 4% of Chile's female population of working age.80 Protective
legislation for female workers supported by the Left--such as labor laws that
prohibited women from working nights, legalized maternity leave, and required
employers to provide day-care facilities--often had the opposite effect. Factory
managers frequently regarded female employees as less desirable than their male
counterparts, who could work any one of the plant's three 8-hour shifts without
restriction. Managers often hired women as a last resort or when there was no union
that could force managers to adhere to these labor laws.8 1 Of the small percentage of
women employed by the Chilean factories, most did not have union representation or
access to the participatory mechanisms being implemented elsewhere. The UP
rhetorically encouraged more Chilean women to enter the industrial sector, yet the
Leftist coalition did not provide them with the union support that they needed to
80 Cited in Camilla Townsend, "Refusing to Travel La Via Chilena: Working-Class Women in Allende's
Chile," Journal of Women's History 4, no. 3 (1993), and Ribeiro, "La mujer obrera chilena," Ribeiro notes
that women working outside the home had relatively small roles in industrial production but had a greater,
albeit limited, presence in the service industry, which included the distribution and circulation of goods.
81 At the Yarur mill women constituted the majority of machine operators until the mid-1950s. With the
introduction of protective legislation, the Yarurs refrained from hiring women because hiring them had
become more expensive. By the time Allende became president in 1970, only 10% of the mill's workforce
was female. Winn, "Workers into Managers," 579.
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become part of the workforce. In fact, the majority of programs for women supported
by the UP aimed to create better mothers and family caretakers.8 2
Citing another set of statistics from the 1970 census, Ribeiro notes that the
National Statistics Institute classified only 12.87% of Chilean women as
"economically active," a category that refers to those employed in the formal
economic sector. Of these, only 2.95% contributed to agriculture production, or about
0.38% of the total working female population.83 Economically, women received
minimal benefit from the agrarian reform begun by the Christian Democrats and
continued byr the UP. Tinsman's study of gender relations in the Chilean countryside
during the 1960s and 1970s illustrates how, far from increasing women's rights,
agrarian reform deepened the inequality of the sexes.8 4 Changes in property
ownership expanded the rights and freedoms afforded men and reaffirmed their role
as master of the house. However, these changes also subordinated women,
financially and sexually, and increased their dependence on their husbands. Thus
the two main sites of Chile's socialist transformation --factories and the countryside-
-offered limited benefits to Chilean women and marginalized their opportunities to
participate in the revolutionary process.
The UP commitment to Chilean democracy required growing its base of
electoral support in order to get the changes outlined in its platform written into
law. Allende had won the popular vote, barely, but the vast majority of his
82 The UP publication La mujer en el gobierno de la Unidad Popula (Santiago: 1970) criticized capitalism
for forcing women to work outside the home and abandon their families, while it credited socialism for
liberating women from housework and increasing their integration into activities of national production.
Cited in Deutsch, "Gender and Sociopolitical Change,"
83 Ribeiro, "La mujer obrera chilena," 174.
84 Heidi Tinsman, "Good Wives and Unfaithful Men: Gender Negotiations and Sexual Conflicts in the
Chilean Agrarian Reform, 1964-1973," Hispanic American Historical Review 81, no. 3-4 (2001). Also
Heidi Tinsman, Partners in Conflict: The Politics of Gender, Sexuality, and Labor in the Chilean Agrarian
Reform, 1950-1973, Next Wave (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2002).
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supporters were male. Strategically, the government needed to gain the support of
Chilean women in order to implement the economic and social changes delineated by
the UP. To this end, Allende encouraged his male supporters "to conquer"
(conquistar) their female family members and convince them to follow the Chilean
road to socialism. In a speech celebrating the anniversary of his first year in office,
Allende announced:
Forward, we shall win. We shall win by strengthening our unity. We shall
win by broadening the political and social bases of the Chilean revolutionary
movement. To the youth: we shall win by studying more. To the workers,
technicians, professionals, peasants, and employees: We shall win by
producing more. We shall win when the Chilean woman learns of our appeal
and joins the struggle of her man, her father, her son, and her brother....
Forward, comrades, we must win so that we can live as brothers and without
hate in our homeland, improving the morality with the constructive
revolutionary force of the people. Forward, Chileans, we shall win again for
the homeland and the people.85
This passage clearly demonstrates the centrality of female support to the success of
the Chilean revolution. However, Allende's phrasing does not position Chilean
women as the central protagonists or beneficiaries of socialist change. Instead, the
president urges them to support the struggle of their husbands, fathers, sons, and
brothers. The UP did little to change the access of Chilean women to real political
power. In March 1973 the UP supported seventeen female candidates for the
Chamber of Deputies and two for the Senate, resulting in the successful election of
one female senator and ten female deputies.86 Allende also appointed the communist
Mireya Baltra as his minister of labor, but such high-ranking women constituted the
exception rather than the rule. Furthermore, most senior government women
directed their energies toward issues in health or food areas viewed as traditionally
85 Allende, "First Anniversary of the Popular Government, National Stadium, Santiago, November 4,
1971," in Cockcroft, ed., Salvador Allende Reader, 124-25.
86 There are 120 members of the Chilean Chamber of Deputies and forty-eight senators.
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female.87 This should not imply that the government sought to degrade, devalue,
subordinate, or ignore the contributions of Chilean women. Rather, it illustrates the
legacy of sexism within Chilean society and the inattention of the Chilean revolution
to resolving this problem. As Townsend writes, "[members of the UP] could not help
but shape their ideas at least partially within the molds handed down for
generations."8 8
Other events shaped the construction of gender in Chile during the UP era.
The international attention given to Chile's Marxist government encouraged the
inflow of progressive ideas from all over the world, including those generated by the
struggles of the women's movement in the United States and elsewhere. This, in
turn, brought new levels of attention to the lives of Chilean women. Historians have
also suggested that more of the government reforms proposed for the benefit Chilean
women might have become law had the government completed its full six-year term.
The UP failed to attract widespread female support for its program of
socialist change. In contrast, the Right proved very effective at mobilizing women
from all social classes against the government.8 9 The Right conveyed a simple but
consistent message that honored women for their superior virtue and their role as
wives, mothers, and protectors of family values. Women from bourgeois Chilean
families formed. movements such as Poder Feminino (Feminine Power) and filled the
streets, banging empty pots in protest of the consumer shortages that they had
helped to create by hoarding consumer goods and foodstuffs. Many working-class
87 Deutsch, "Gender and Sociopolitical Change,"
88 Townsend, "Refusing to Travel La Via Chilena: Working-Class Women in Allende's Chile," 55-56.
89 Margaret Power, Right Wing Women in Chile: Feminine Power and the Struggle Against Allende
(University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002); Maria de los Angeles Crummet, "El Poder
Feminino: The Mobilization of Women Against Socialism in Chile," Latin American Perspectives 4, no. 4
(1977).
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and poor women, who experienced the daily frustrations of waiting in long lines to
purchase basic necessities, also threw their lot in with the Right. Rather than
sympathize with their situation, members of the Left viewed these women as class
traitors and saw their actions as proof of female passivity, traditionalism, and
ignorance. 90
The radical Leftist party Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (Movement
of the Revolutionary Left, or MIR) also succeeded in mobilizing members of the
urban poor and encouraged them to improve their communities. Pulling themselves
up by their bootstraps, the men and women living in shantytowns such as Nueva
Habana rebuilt their neighborhoods physically, through the construction of new
homes of better quality, and socially, with programs such as those to combat
alcoholism. These efforts allowed Chilean women to participate in the socialist
revolution and accelerated the pace of social reform. The government, however, did
not view these shantytowns as the primary site of the revolution, nor did it endorse
the radical activities of the MIR. Women succeeded in increasing their activity in the
public sphere from 1970 to 1973. However, as these two examples suggest, women's
greater participation did not equal direct support of the government, nor did it result
from government policies that supported women's rights. While Allende continued to
express an idealistic conviction that socialism would solve all of Chile's problems,
including the oppression of women, the government repeatedly demonstrated a
limited understanding of how its plan for revolution and self-liberation inadequately
90 The Chilean feminist Julietta Kirkwood argues that working-class and poor women joined the opposition
against Allende not from a natural tendency toward political conservatism but from the conditions of
authoritarianism that most women experienced within their households. Klubock agrees, writing that "the
lack of gender democracy within the Left and the labor movement as well as the Left's inability to speak to
women's everyday experiences of patriarchy made women receptive to the Right's efforts to mobilize them
against the UP." Julietta Kirkwood, Ser politica en Chile: los nudos de la sabiduriafeminista, 2nd ed.
(Santiago de Chile: Editorial Cuarto Propio, 1990); Klubock, "Writing the History of Women and Gender
in Twentieth Century Chile," 499.
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addressed the patriarchy that women faced in their homes and workplaces. The
government, moreover, did not treat gender with the same consideration as class in
discussions of inequality and exploitation.
Scott has famously argued that gender behaves as an organizing category
that gives knowledge and meaning to sexual difference. By exploring how gender
constructs politics and how politics constructs gender, women's history transcends
the cataloging of great deeds performed by women, what Scott refers to as "her-
story," and exposes "the often silent and hidden operations of gender that are
nonetheless present and defining in the organization of most societies."91 Applying
Scott's observation to the context of Chilean history, we see how gender constructed
politics through the many ways that men contributed to Allende's victory and
women to his downfall. Moreover, the gender roles described by the government and
the opposition appealed to differing factions within Chile's fractured political
landscape and attracted supporters. Politics also constructed gender. The Chilean
government defined the characteristics appropriate to men and women through
labor legislation, welfare programs, and channels available for accessing power. The
bidirectional relationship between gender and politics, as defined by Scott, has been
explored in greater depth by several historians cited here.
Scott's argument, with a slight modification, can allow us to theorize the
design and function of the Cybersyn Opsroom from a gendered standpoint. Here we
see how gender constructed a political technology and how technology constructs
gender politics. In the case of the Operations Room, gendered perceptions of
communication, style of work, and level of clerical skill shaped the resultant form of
91 Joan Scott, Gender and the Politics of History, rev. ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999),
27.
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a political space designed for economic control. However, we also see that the
resulting design of the room reflected an existing politics that marginalized women's
access to political power and privileged achieving class equality among Chilean men
over other possible power configurations, such as achieving greater equality between
men and women within industry and government. Far from being revolutionary, the
Operations Room represents the limits of Chile's social revolution and the complicit
acceptance that the existing patriarchal power structure would not and did not need
to change.
By deciding to remove the keyboard and "eliminate the girl" between the user
and the machine, as well as by designing the system to reflect and encourage
masculine forms of communication, the Cybersyn team demonstrated a complicit
understanding that state power would remain largely in the hands of Chile's male
population. Through this technological design we see the limits of Chilean socialism
and a concrete expression of abstract concepts such as democracy, worker, and
revolution. The room was designed as a democratic space but only for those who fit a
particular profile, namely, the predominantly male political elite and industrial
workforce that constituted the government's primary base of support. Furthermore,
the category "worker" would continue to refer exclusively to those employed in
factories and would not expand to include those performing clerical tasks, those
working within the home, those working in the factories without union support, or
those employed within the informal sector. Finally, "revolution" would refer to the
restructuring of Chilean society to eliminate inequalities grounded in class
difference while ignoring or deprioritizing other sources of inequality and
exploitation such as those illuminated by gender analysis.
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In the history of technology we see many examples of women using
technologies in ways that are equated with unskilled labor. Here we see an opposite,
but no less interesting, phenomenon. In the Operations Room male workers and
government administrators maintained a privileged, albeit technologically unskilled,
position within this space for control. In contrast, women, defined by their skills,
were asked to leave the room.
Conclusion
When asked about the significance of the Operations Room, Flores remarked, "What
was going on [inside the Allende government] had nothing to do with the room. In
my opinion the emphasis [is] too much on the room [and] hides the real story. [It]
invents a lot of lies or dreams."92 Flores's point is well taken. Apart from the
contributions made by the telex network, the other components of the project never
reached a point where they could assist with the daily challenges faced by the UP
government. As an experimental undertaking, the project was regarded as marginal
within CORFO, and even top members of the administration did not know of its
development;. Several project participants reported that they refocused their
energies elsewhere for much of 1973 in order to tackle more pressing concerns that
threatened to topple the democratically elected government.
As work on the project slowed, Beer became even more convinced that the
system played a vital role in continuing Chile's revolutionary process. On August 2,
1973, he drafted a letter to the president in which he pushed for worker training
programs so that workers might use "the general cybernetic approach that was
prepared for them" rather than invent "their own approach as they go along." Beer
92 Flores interview.
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worried that "unless some of the solutions to these questions [of worker
participation] are adopted fairly soon I think that all that we have achieved may
well be wasted." Not achieving the full political scope of the project, Beer concluded,
"would be a grievous loss for the Chilean process."9 3 Flores took a different position:
"I believe the last year, there were a couple of guys who tried to convince Stafford
and Rafil that they needed to speak to Allende and show how important [the project]
is. I believe in that moment Allende saw us as marginal."9 4 Project participant
Herman Schwember, who was also a close confidante to Flores and Beer, noted that
"Stafford, no matter how clever he is, or how knowledgeable of people he has [sic],
could not have a full understanding of all the political elements in Chile. I think that
he was also very optimistic about Chile, [that] he would not accept that there was
the level of corruption [and] that there was the level of incompetence."9 5 Other
Chilean participants expressed the view that while Beer possessed a firm grasp of
the Chilean situation, he was nonetheless an outsider who could not fully perceive
the many nuances and delicacies of the national state of affairs.
In spite of Beer's attempts to implement the political goals of the project, in
practice, except for its telex network, Cybersyn contributed minimally to the
revolutionary process. However, this is not to say that documenting the history of
the project conflicts with or obscures the "real story" of the UP era. To the contrary,
in this chapter I have shown how this technological experiment generated the same
fears, uncertainties, and dreams as those surrounding Chile's political experiment.
On one hand, critics from Chilean opposition parties or from nations such as the
93 Stafford Beer to Salvador Allende, 2 August 1973, box 55, Beer Collection.
94 Flores interview.
95 Herman Schwember, Inteview by author, 22 June 2002.. According to Schwember, Flores resented Beer
for "interfering with his relationships with Allende and the upper political groups," while Beer believed
that he understood the political situation better than many of his Chilean colleagues.
301
United States or Britain painted the system as a form of control akin to Big Brother.
On the other, prepared government speeches, folk songs, pamphlets, and
government reports positioned the project as a populist experiment and catalyst for
a new form of socialist modernity. This examination of the system's design and
implementation further highlights the unique nature of the Chilean revolution while
still allowing us to discern its limitations and contradictions, as we have seen in
regard to the role of women and the scope of worker participation. This research has
also demonstrated the difficulty of separating the lived experiences and genuine
convictions of those who contributed to or observed the construction of this system
into the categories of lies, dreams, and realities, as Flores suggests.9 6
However, Flores' s comment is perceptive in singling out the seductive power
of the room. As a modernist dream, it presented a clean, colorful, and controllable
vision of the future that obscured the work of disciplining a chaotic, continually
changing, and highly unstable economy. Like Allende's "revolution of empanadas
and red wine," a turn of phrase that the president used to emphasize the
effortlessness of Chile's socialist transformation, the room promised complete
economic control with the push of a button. Creating this impression, however,
required the intense dedication of Chile's best designers and technical experts, as
well as a creative configuration of Chile's limited resources. A series of slide
projectors located behind the far wall created the high-tech simulation of display
monitors. Each armrest button sent a signal to one projector and controlled the
position of the slide carrousel (see figure 6.4). Chilean industrial designers drew
each production flowchart by hand, and then converted the drawings into slide
96 However, Flores' suggestion of such a classification illustrates the contentiousness nature of this moment
in Chilean history.
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images that were projected in the room. Only through this painstaking process could
the room create the illusion of freedom and control that impressed all who entered.
Simplification offered a new form of visibility, captured in only five to seven
production indices and displayed in a series of colorful graphs, flowcharts, and
photographs. However, the wondrous simplicity of "seeing" the economy in this
manner obscured the complex negotiations occurring daily within the industrial
sector and rendered the social aspects of Chile's economic dislocations invisible. Like
the smoke and mirrors used by the Wizard of Oz to mask his human identity, the
Operations Room presented an illusion of socialist modernity and control that
masked the difficulties of Chile's economic transition and the precariousness of
national order,. Similarly, Allende's faith in the Chilean road to socialism did not
account for the actual complexity that the process entailed. Like Allende's platform
for change, the clean, futuristic appearance of the room obscured the vast network of
individuals, materials, expertise, and information required to make economic
management appear so simple.
Cybersyn's success, as described by Beer, hinged on creating a new structure
of economic management that fundamentally altered the relations between workers,
managers, engineers, and public-sector employees. However, reaching a state of
homeostasis, or stability, depended on controlling the number of variables central to
Chile's economic transition. This premise created two immediate problems. First,
making Beer's model a functional reality meant transforming the existing political,
economic, and social structure, a nearly impossible task in Chile's fractured political
context. Revolution through democracy, rather than through violence, restricted the
potential avenues for change and after much frustration caused Beer to wonder,
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"Does it take more courage to be a cybernetician than to be a gunman?" 97 Second,
although members of the project team designed the factory models with a degree of
structural flexibility at the industry level, Cybersyn as a whole did not possess the
capabilities needed to move Chile's economy from a capitalist to a socialist system or
to control the unforeseen events that marked Chile's unprecedented path toward
revolution. Rather than regulate transformation, Cybersyn fell victim to the
onslaught of instability that accompanied Allende's program for socialist reform.
Similarly, project engineers found themselves attempting the impossible: modeling
an economic system that refused to remain constant using only a subset of the
variables needed to understand the system. Production, as gauged by flows of raw
materials and finished goods, constituted only one aspect of the Chilean economy-
one that increasingly paled in comparison to the economic dislocations of inflation,
consumer shortages, political infighting, U.S. foreign policy, black market hoarding,
labor strikes, and increased social unrest. Labor, in particular, did not behave as
just another factor of production but rather as a body of self-conscious individuals
able to criticize and resist state operations. In hindsight Beer wrote, "The model we
were using ... could not adequately represent changes that had come about during
Allende's term . . . because these were changes in economic management that had
nothing to do with ownership in the legal sense."9 8 Rather than transforming Chile's
economy through the massive social restructuring that Beer envisioned, Cybersyn
struggled merely to regulate the status quo, a task that became increasingly difficult
by 1973.
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97 Beer, "On Decybernation," 6.
98 Beer, Brain of the Firm, 323.
However, this is not to say that the system was a complete failure, just as the
ideological congruence of the system and Allende's plan for reform does not qualify it
as a success. Regulation, like transformation, played an important role in keeping
the Allende government afloat and, as Chile's socioeconomic situation slid into
chaos, the necessity for social and political regulation gradually eclipsed the earlier
priority of structural transformation. Although Beer maintained that the system
would function properly only in its entirety, the telex network contributed
significantly to the government's ability to counteract and manage strike activity as
well as its capacity to map complex economic fluctuations using recently generated
data. By May 1973, 26.7% of the 420 industries in the social or mixed property area,
responsible for 50% of the sector's revenue, had been incorporated to some degree
within the Cybersyn system.99
In one of his final reports on the project, Beer summarized his views on the
importance of regulation to Chile's democratic road to socialism:
... envisage our invention as an instrument of revolution. I mean that "The
Way of Production" is still a necessary feature of the Chilean revolution,
but that "The Way of Regulation" is an extra requirement of a complex
world not experienced by Marx or Lenin. 0°°
99 Mensaje Presidente Allende ante congreso pleno, 21/Mayo '73, (Santiago, Chile: Departamento de
Publicaciones de la Presidencia de la Republica - Chile, 1973), 412-13; Espinosa and Zimbalist, Economic
Democracy, 47.
100 Beer, "On Decybernation," 5. Beer spent a considerable amount of time rethinking how Marxist theory
would work in the age of automation. "Allende and I always saw the whole process as the reinvention of
Marxist-Leninist [thought] in the light of modern thinking, whereas what the Russians were doing was
thought of one hundred years ago. And so I still think there is a lot of work there--Marx, and particularly
Engels, was spot on if you adjust it for the times. I mean, Marx was completely absorbed by the proletariat,
meaning the productive workers. And he didn't see it coming that most workers wouldn't be in production
because of automation and that most of them are in the advertising industry now [laughs]. I was trying to
allow for that." During his time in Chile, Beer drafted an unpublished manuscript for Allende titled "Status
Quo" that updated many of Marx's ideas. "'Status Quo' I named because of Das Kapital. I said, well, Marx
called the enemy Das Kapital, so he named his book after the enemy. So I said I would name my book after
the enemy, which is Status Quo. That's the real enemy." Beer interview.
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In light of Beer's experience applying cybernetic principles to the Chilean political
situation, his new interpretation of revolution is understandable. However, it seems
more plausible that this newfound emphasis on regulation did not stem from a
change in world complexity or from an oversight in Marx's philosophy. Rather, it
embodies how science and technology can influence and redefine our
conceptualizations of political order and the tools available for orchestrating social
change. The history of the Cybersyn system further illustrates that political
ideologies not only articulate a worldview but also can contribute to the design and
application of new technologies that politicians, engineers, and scientists
subsequently use to create and maintain these new configurations of state power.
Disagreements about implementation (e.g., the level of worker involvement),
contradictory readings of the system's potential for control, and the politics of
everyday design decisions (e.g., such as whether to use a keyboard in the Operations
Room) did not simply reflect ideas about technological feasibility and soundness.
Instead, they revealed class resistance to economic and social change, the scope of
Cold War ideology, and the limitations of power redistribution within Chile's
socialist revolution. Furthermore, the system provides a concrete articulation of the
UP ideological program for economic transformation.
The history presented in chapters 4, 5, and 6 demonstrates the singular
nature of Chile's socialist experiment. Not only was this project unique in its
manner of applying cybernetic science to economic regulation and state governance,
but its emphasis on decentralized control also resulted in a technology that reflected
the distinguishing features of the UP government. Although we may question the
magnitude of the contribution made by this system in staving off Chile's mounting
political, social, and economic upheavals, the history of Cybersyn does offer a new
306
perspective on the Chilean experience. In contrast to the chaotic images of
shortages, strikes, and protests that have come to characterize the era, Cybersyn
presents an alternative history. Here we see members of CORFO, INTEC, ECOM,
and their British collaborators struggling to realize a different dream of socialist
modernity, technological capability, and regulated order. It would be a dream some
Cybersyn team members continued to pursue until the day the military imposed a
very different form of order on the Chilean people and members the project team fled
CORFO headquarters with project documents tucked innocuously under their
arms. 101
On the morning of September 11, 1973, the Chilean military launched a coup
against the Allende government. It began in the city of Valparaiso and continued to
gather strength as the military traveled south toward Santiago. By 2 p.m. Allende
was dead, his dream incinerated by the flames engulfing the presidential palace.
After the coup the military made several failed attempts to understand the
theoretical and technological aspects of the Cybersyn Project and afterward decided
to dismantle the Operations Room. The neoliberal economic policies of General
Augusto Pinochet left no room for state economic control or worker empowerment.
Almost every project participant who contributed to this study has claimed
that the project changed his or her life. Most have continued to use knowledge
acquired from the project to this very day, and most now hold high positions in
l01 Guillermo Toro, e-mail correspondence with author, 5 June 2004. Toro, who began working as the
Cybersyn Project coordinator in June 1973, vividly recalls risking his life by leaving CORFO headquarters
with Project Director Rafil Espejo the day of the coup in order to save four packages of photocopied
Cybersyn documents that Espejo still holds in his possession. In Toro's words, the documents "must be
saved to tell the tale."
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either universities or tech-related industries. However, despite Cybersyn's
contribution to Chile's technological history, as well as to the political history of this
well-studied moment, until very recently it had all but vanished from wider Chilean




Figure 6.1: Worker participation drawn as a system diagram. (Herman Schwember, "Cybernetics in
Government: Experience with New Tools for Management in Chile 1971-1973," In Hartmut Bossel, ed.,
Concepts and Tools of Computer-Assisted Policy Analysis, 79-138. Basel, Switzerland: BirkhAuser, 1977.
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Figure 6.2: "Our friend ... the computer!" (Image used with permission from the Corporaci6n de Fomento
de la Producci6n, Santiago.)
Figure 6.3: Close-up of the chair from the Cybersyn
Rodrigo Walker.)
Operations Room. (Image used with permission from
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Figure 6.4: Floor plan of the Operations Room. Notice the slide projectors situated behind the top wall, a
configuration that simulated a series of monitors or projection screen. (0 JMU. Reproduced by permission
of Liverpool John Moores University Learning and Information Services and The School of Business
Information. Originals kept at Liverpool John Moores University, Learning and Information Services,





TW ~C ALKING UP Teatinos Street in the center of downtown Santiago, it is
difficult to miss the large glass building that houses Chile's largest
computer company, SONDA (Sociedad Nacional de Procesamiento de Datos). Like a
new kid on the block ostentatiously flaunting his wealth, the modern corporate
building rises above the dingy concrete buildings that flank it on either side (figure
7.1). Inside, the building offers a refuge from the hubbub of the busy Santiago
streets. Light streams through the glass into a large atrium. Caged birds converse
with one another on an upper floor, although the echoes of their chirps and twitters
make it impossible to discern their exact location. Were it not for the guard who told
me to put away my camera, one could easily mistake Chile's most successful
computer corporation for a posh hotel.
SONDA, which claims $300 million in sales for 2001 and has offices throughout
Latin America, stands as a model for Chilean success in the private sector, as does its
founder, Andres Navarro Hauessler--a man often referred to as the Bill Gates of Chile
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(figure 7.2).1 In a large conference room overlooking the city, Navarro shared his
memories of the company that he started in 1974. "When I started with SONDA," he
recounted, "I thought two things: I love technology and I [thought] that technology [was]
the one thing that can make this country progress and change many things."2 He recalled
traveling to the United States while still in high school and being impressed with the
widespread incorporation of technology in everyday life. "I always believed that
technology was needed," Navarro added. "We needed to put much more technology into
our government, into our businesses, into all the processes in this country. I had no doubt
that it was feasible. But I never had a vision that the thing would grow as it did later on."
SONDA's origins have become the stuff of corporate legend. While an
engineering student at the Catholic University, Navarro discovered the world of
informatics and used computer technology to complete his thesis for the industrial
engineering department. In a 1998 interview for a publication put out by Catholic
University's school of engineering, he said, "I arrived at this area by accident, but
[computation] was a lot of fun, it was dynamic, it kept me active."3 After graduation,
the then twenty-five-year-old Navarro convinced his brothers to invest their
$150,000 inheritance check to found one of Chile's first data-processing enterprises. 4
He secured additional funds by negotiating a partnership with the Compaiiia de
Petr6leos de Chile, a private gasoline company, which invested $500,000 and
1 The SONDA public relations representative with whom I spoke quoted the $300 million figure for 2001,
then told me on the sly that the company's revenues had declined since 2001, something it has avoided
publicizing.
Andrs Navarro Hauessler, interview by author, 15 January 2004.
3 "Andr6s Navarro, presidente de Sonda y de la Telet6n: en la escuela descubri el mundo de la informAtica,"
Via directa: boletin de la Escuela de Ingenieria de la Pontificia Universidad Cat6lica de Chile y la
Fundaci6n de Ingenieros de la Universidad Cat6lica, December 1998.
4 According to Navarro, PROCESSAC was Chile's first private computer enterprise, but it went out of
business.
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received a 55% ownership stake in the company in return. 5 SONDA's first computer
was a small NCR 315 machine that bore a closer resemblance to the previous
generation of IBM United Records machines than to a modern mainframe, but
SONDA soon purchased a Burroughs 3700 and grew from twelve employees initially
to 176 in 1981 and 350 employees in 1984, an impressive rate of growth.6 "I must
say my main purpose was to build a company that would be the opposite of IBM,"
Navarro said, referring to the controlling form of management practiced by Big Blue.
"IBM would recruit fifty guys and put them in this training for three months. Half of
them would quit. That [first] half would stay [at IBM] forever, and we'd recruit all
those guys who did not like IBM. They were more informal. They would work hard
with less [direction]." SONDA became the sole Chilean representative for Digital
Equipment Corporation (DEC) just as minicomputers replaced mainframes and the
dominant technology of the computer market. The shift in technology from large,
expensive mainframes to smaller, less expensive minicomputers bolstered SONDA's
business and allowed the company to boast in a 1981 DEC advertisement: "SONDA,
the largest and most reliable private computer company in the country."7
SONDA also survived the political and economic upheavals of the 1970s and
1980s, which included political witch hunts-more than 3,000 Chileans were
disappeared or murdered under the repressive Pinochet dictatorship-as well as
periods of extreme boom and bust. In 1986, the Chilean trade publication
Informdtica quoted Navarro saying, "Businesses last longer than governments and
5 Reported figures vary on the initial amount invested by the gas company. The $500,000 figure appears in
Patricio Donoso I., "SONDA: Impetu, Innovaci6n y Emprendimiento," in Matko Koljatic M., ed., La
nueva empresa chilena: un estudio de casos (Santiago: Eds. Universidad Cat6lica de Chile, 1999)
6 Mr. Chips, "Registros de 15 afios," Sondauta, November 1989; Sonia Cano, "SONDA: una empresa de
servicios que sirve servicialmente," Informdtica, December 1984. According to Sondauta, ("SONDA Por
22 Veces 22," October-November 1996), SONDA originally had eleven employees.
7 "Minicomputadores Digital PDP- 11," Informeitica, September 1981, 7.
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their politics," and indeed SONDA flourished during the military dictatorship and
during the successive governments following Chile's return to democracy in 1990.8
According to press reports, Navarro's long-standing affiliation with the Christian
Democracy Party--he had even run as the PDC candidate for student president of
the Catholic University in 1971--was not "completely accepted" by the military
government. "Everybody will tell you, and it's true, that I [opposed] the military
government," Navarro said, but "I wasn't trying [to make] revolution.... I devoted
all of my time . . . [to] selling and servicing the private sector." SONDA avoided
contracts with the armed forces, and during the 1970s almost all government
business fell to ECOM, the state computer enterprises However, by the late 1970s
and early 1980s, government enterprises such as the railroads and the state mining
agency had started looking to SONDA's technical expertise. The privatization of
government services such as social security also added to SONDA's client base.'0° In
1983, SONI)A President Efrain Friedmann announced in an interview with a
reporter for lnformdtica that "SONDA wants to compete head to head with
ECOM."" Friedmann, ECOM's first director and the original champion of a
centralized state computer agency, remarked, "Today ECOM is . . . an enterprise
without the special function of organizing computation in the public sector. In no
way are we [SONDA] against [ECOM's] continued existence. What we want is that
when [ECOM] competes with the private-sector enterprises, it does so without any
8 Soledad Amenabar, "Andrds Navarro: 'las empresas duran mas que los gobiernos y sus politicas,"'
Informdtica, October 1986, 32.
9 Andrds Az6car, "Recuerdos de plata," Que Pasa, 11 October 1999.
'0 Andres Navarro Haeussler, "Sondauta: 25 afios de vocaci6n de servicio," Sondauta, October-November
1999.
1 Sergio Prenafeta Jenkin, "Efrain Friedman, presidente de SONDA 'queremos competir de igual a igual
con ECOM'," Inform6tica, August 1983.
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special privilege."'2 As the state computer enterprise continued to lose money, the
Pinochet government decided in 1985 to privatize ECOM. Private entrepreneurship
won out over decades of state protectionism. SONDA got its wish; it would be able to
compete with the former state enterprise on a supposed level playing field.'3
However, Navarro felt SONDA had a clear advantage, stating, "It is difficult for an
industry created with government assistance to become a reliable business in
time."'4 By "in time" he meant the accelerated pace of change demanded by Chile's
market-driven economy.
SONDA's success represents a culmination of Chile's neoliberal trajectory
that began after the military coup on September 11, 1973.15 The military junta that
came to power was clear in its desire to rid Chile of Marxism, the political force
12 Sergio Prenafeta Jenkin, "Efrain Friedman, presidente de SONDA 'queremos competir de igual a igual
con ECOM,"' Informdtica, August 1983.
13 Soledad AmenAbar, "Nueva cara de ECOM: casa de software y representaciones de equipos,"
Informdtica, November 1985.
14 Amenabar, "Andrds Navarro," 32.
15 The literature on the Pinochet dictatorship rivals that of the Allende period in volume and ideological
bent. For a critical overview of the Pinochet period see chap. 2 of Peter Winn, Victims of the Chilean
Miracle: Workers and Neoliberalism in the Pinochet Era, 1973-2002 (Durham, N.C.: Duke University
Press, 2004), and chap. 10 of Brian Loveman, Chile: The Legacy of Hispanic Capitalism, 3rd ed. (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2001). An economic perspective appears in Patricio Meller, Un Siglo de
Economia Politica Chilena (1890-1990) (Santiago: Editorial Andrds Bello, 1996); Ricardo Ffrench-Davis,
Entre el neoliberalismo y el crecimiento con equidad: tres dcadas de politica econ6mica en Chile
(Santiago: Dolmen Ediciones, 1999); Juan Gabriel Valdes, Pinochet's Economists: The Chicago School of
Economics in Chile (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Eduardo Silva, The State and Capital
in Chile: Business Elites, Technocrats, and Market Economics (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1996); and
chap. 9 of Ascanio Cavallo, Manuel Salazar, and Oscar Sepfilveda, La historia oculta del rgimen militar:
memoria de una epoca 1973-1988 (Santiago: Grijalbo Mondadori, 1997). The neoliberal program
promoted by the "Chicago Boys" appears in Centro de Estudios Plblicos, "El ladrillo": bases de lapolitica
econ6mica del gobierno militar chileno (Santiago: Centro de Estudios Piblicos, 1992). Joaquin Lavin,
Chile: A Quiet Revolution, trans. Clara Iriberry and Elena Soloduchim (Santiago: Zig-Zag, 1988), contains
progovernment propaganda about the neoliberal "economic miracle." An interview with "Chicago Boy"
Carlos Paut Ugarte appears in Patricia Politzer, Fear in Chile: Lives Under Pinochet (New York: Pantheon,
1989).Firsthand or human centered accounts of the dictatorship, including its human rights abuses, appear
in Sergio Bitar, Isla 10, 3rd ed. (Santiago: Pehuen, 1988); Pamela Constable and Arturo Valenzuela, A
Nation of Enemies: Chile Under Pinochet, 1st ed. (New York: W. W. Norton, 1991); and Mary Helen
Spooner, Soldiers in a Narrow Land: The Pinochet Regime in Chile (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1994). See also Peter Kornbluh, The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and
Accountability (New York: New Press, 2003), for an archive-based account of the clandestine activities of
the Pinochet dictatorship and the role of the United States.
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armed forces held responsible for destroying the country. Apart from a shared
contempt for Marxism, members of the junta, led by Augusto Pinochet, had a
common disdain for politics but lacked a plan for reversing the consumer shortages
and rampant inflation caused by the economic policies of Popular Unity. By 1975,
Pinochet had decided to back the neoliberal "shock treatments" proposed by the
Chicago Boys, a group of economists who had studied either with Milton Friedman
at the University of Chicago or with professors at the Catholic University in
Santiago who were well versed in Friedman's monetarist economic theories. The
plan for the economy called for continuing cuts to public spending, now by an
additional 15% to 25%; freezing wages; privatizing the majority of the firms
nationalized by CORFO; reversing the agrarian reform carried out during the
Allende and Frei administrations; raising income taxes by 10%; and laying off eighty
thousand government employees.
However, which path to take for Chile's economic recovery had been less
certain a year earlier. While the Chicago Boys argued against the inefficiencies of
public spending, protectionism, overregulation, and nationalization, others--
including Fernando Lniz, Pinochet's minister of finance, and Raul Sez, an
economic adviser to the junta--argued for a developmentalist approach similar to
that adopted by the Christian Democrats in the 1960s. They thought that the state
should continue to play an influential role in a mixed Chilean economy and should
protect domestic industries. As the junta debated the benefits and costs of removing
state economic protections, it decided to carry out a short-term experiment. On July
19, 1974, the junta approved Law 1130, which lowered tariffs for approximately 150
imported goods--including computers--to a mere 10% of their purchase price. The
smaller tariff applied to listed goods with "with importation records dated before
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December 31, 1974."16 Law 1130 represented the "government's economic fear," said
Juan Ignacio Cahis, the founder of the Center of Computation at the Catholic
University and a manager at ECOM from 1973 to 1979. According to Cahis,
government officials "realized that they had to do it [lower tariffs], but they were not
completely sure. There was a debate among the ministers who wanted to make it
[lower tariffs] permanent and those who were not yet ready. In the end, they
reached an agreement and said ok, we'll do it for a short period."'7 Tariffs for
imported computers dropped from 120% to 10%, and the number of computers
purchased by Chilean businesses grew to unprecedented levels.'8 These new
machines began to arrive in 1975. Members of the Chilean computer community
estimated that Chileans ordered 120 machines during the four-month window
opened by Law 1130, a tremendous increase, given that there were fewer than fifty
machines in Chile in 1974. Estimates placed spending between $20 million and $40
million. "I would say that what we [IBM] brought [to Chile] from 1962 to 1974
corresponded to what we imported in 1975," observed Hernan Cavallo, general
director of IBM Chile.' 9 As a result of Law 1130, "We [IBM Chile] tripled our
computing capacity."20 On January 1, 1975, the tariffs levied on imported computing
machinery returned to 100%. But Law 1130 proved that Chileans wanted to invest
16 Ministerio de Hacienda, Rebaja derecho ad valorem a bienes de capital que indica, Decreto 1130, 19 July
1974.
17 Juan Ignacio Cahis, interview by author, 2 January 2004.
18 Several individuals whom I interviewed put tariffs at 200% or 300% of purchase price before the junta
instituted Law 1130. The 120% figure stated in the text comes from a letter sent to Jorge Cauas, minister
of finance, describing the effects of Law 1130 and signed by Chile's top computer professionals in
government, industry, and academia nearly a year after the law took effect. Regardless of the exact figure,
the change to 10% was a considerable difference. Letter to Jorge Cauas Lima, 28 May 1975, Box 754 08R-
0101 SECICO 1973 a 1983, Folder "Correspendencia recibida y despachada, memorandos e informes.
CECICO 1974-1979," Archive of the Pontificia Universidad Cat6lica de Chile, Santiago.
19 This comment reflects the one year lag between when Chilean customers placed orders for computer
machinery (1974) and when these machines actually arrived (1975).
20 Sergio Prenafeta Jenkin, "IBM, bastante mas que computaci6n," Informdtica, April 1979, 17.
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in computing technologies. Unfortunately, the need to buy machines within the four-
month period resulted in hasty purchases of inappropriate machines that businesses
were stuck with and created a shortage of those trained to operate the new machines
(members of the computer community put the shortage at about fifteen hundred
computer specialists).2 1
Shutting the window opened by Law 1130 hindered the private sector's
ability to purchase computers but not for long. The more gradual neoliberal program
that the junta practiced at first--it devalued the currency, removed price controls,
canceled scheduled wage increases, freed interest rates, altered the tax structures to
encourage foreign investment, reduced government expenditures, and lowered
tariffs--did not bring the desired results. In mid-1975 Sergio de Castro, a leader of
the Chicago Boys, replaced Fernando L6niz as the minister of economics, and, with
Pinochet's support, the government began pushing the neoliberal program even
further. Tariffs fell once again and Chilean markets opened even wider. The junta's
encouragement of short-term foreign investment led new computer companies to
establish Chilean branch offices for selling machines to the growing private sector.
Competition swelled as IBM, NCR, and Burroughs were forced to share the market
with newcomers such as Digital, Wang, and Honeywell, among others. Computers
became smaller and cheaper, shrinking from the enormous mainframes of the 1960s
to the minicomputers of the 1970s and, finally, to the desktop personal computer
epitomized by the IBM PC, which was introduced in 1981.
As computing machines flooded Chilean markets without government
controls, they also served the repressive politics of the Pinochet dictatorship. On
November 26, 1975, top intelligence representatives from Chile, Argentina,
21 Letter to Jorge Cauas Lima.
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Uruguay, Paraguay, and Bolivia convened in Santiago for the First Inter American
Working Meeting on National Intelligence. Paid for and organized by the Chilean
secret police, DINA, the meeting allowed the region's most powerful intelligence and
police officers to discuss coordinating their intelligence efforts and eliminating their
political enemies. In an eleven-page agenda for the meeting, Col. Manuel Contreras,
the DINA director, wrote:
Subversion ... is present in our continent. ... The situation described does
not know borders, or countries, and the infiltration penetrates all levels of
national life. Subversion has developed a leadership structure that is
intercontinental, continental, regional, and subregional.2 2
In other words, intelligence agents had to eliminate not only the Marxist subversives
and political enemies hiding within their own borders but also those who had sought
refuge or support in other countries. If the enemy could travel from continent to
continent, then members of the intelligence community had to be ready to do the
same. The meeting was slated to conclude on December 1, but on November 28
representatives from the five participating countries signed a resolution in which
they agreed to construct an intelligence-sharing network known as Condor for the
Chilean national bird. Operation Condor was born.2 3
22 Cited in Nilson Mariano, Operaci6n C6ndor: terrorismo de estado en el Cono Sur (Buenos Aires: Ed.
Lohld Lumen, 1998), 16, and John Dinges, The Condor Years: How Pinochet and His Allies Brought
Terrorism to Three Continents (New York: New Press, 2004), 119, 261. The document was part of the
infamous Paraguayan "Archives of Horror" discovered by accident in December 1992. The archives
included an extensive set of documents kept by the Paraguayan secret police. Among its holdings were
records of 8,369 detainees and more than ten thousand photographs, as well as the agenda for the first
Condor meeting. Dinges cites this document as Primera Reunion de Trabajo de Inteligencia Nacional,
Secret, Santiago, October 29, 1975, Paraguay Archive 22:0155-0165.
23 Chile began collaborating with other intelligence apparatuses in the Southern Cone before the creation of
Operation Condor in 1975. As early as September 1973, five Brazilians were captured and killed in
Santiago. Members of the Brazilian police not only taught the Chilean police methods of interrogation and
torture, they also dealt directly with the prisoners detained in Chile's National Stadium. In 1974, DINA
agents executed Allende's former minister of defense, Carlos Prats GonzAlez, in Buenos Aires. In 1975,
DINA agents tried to kill Bernardo Leighton, a leader of the Chilean Christian Democratic Party who was
living in Italy with his wife. The following year Orlando Letelier, Allende's former minister of foreign
relations, was killed in Washington D.C. by a car bomb explosion that also killed one of his companions
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Operation Condor, which had three phases, sought to eliminate subversive
threats to national security. The first phase called for the creation of a central
intelligence-sharing data bank. The second phase targeted subversives living in
member countries. According to an FBI Intelligence Report dated September 28,
1976, the last and most sinister phase called for the "formation of special teams from
member countries who are to travel anywhere in the world to non-member countries
to carry out sanctions up to assassination against terrorists or supporters of terrorist
organizations."2 4 Of the three phases, we have the most documentary evidence for
the data bank, which Contreras envisioned as a South American Interpol. Member
countries would contribute intelligence information to a central data repository
housed in a "Condor Coordinating Center" in Santiago. In a statement before the
Chilean Supreme Court in 1979, Contreras said that the FBI and CIA participated
in the creation of this data bank.2 5 Moreover, an FBI attach6 in Argentina, Robert
Scherrer, confirmed for the journalist John Dinges that the CIA provided the DINA
and severely injured another. All three incidents were later tied to Michael Townley, an explosives expert
working for the DINA who arrived in the United States under a false Paraguayan passport obtained from
Paraguayan intelligence services. U.S. intelligence agencies have subsequently linked the Letelier case to
Operation Condor. In all, nearly eighty Chileans were murdered in neighboring Southern Cone countries;
thirty-three of them were slain in Paraguay and Argentina between 1975 and 1976. Of all Southern Cone
nations, Chile exhibited the greatest tenacity in locating and eliminating its enemies abroad, using
sophisticated assassination techniques. Although it is obvious that the DINA played a large role in
coordinating and implementing the Chilean part of Condor, it is unclear whether the agency formed special
Condor teams or simply hired experts such as Townley. Although the scope of Condor had diminished
considerably by the 1980s, many people believe that the last Condor-related mission occurred in 1992 with
the assassination of the Chilean biochemist Eugenio Berrios Sagredo in Uruguay. For more on Operation
Condor see Dinges, The Condor Years, 121-22; Mariano, Operaci6n C6ndor; Francisco Martorell,
Operaci6n C6ndor, el vuelo de la muerte: la coordinaci6n represiva en el Cono Sur, 1 st ed., Colecci6n
Septiembre (Santiago: Lom Ediciones, 1999); Stella Calloni, Los ahos del lobo: Operaci6n Condor
(Buenos Aires: Ediciones Continente, 1999); and chap. 6 of Kornbluh, The Pinochet File. A journalistic
analysis of the Letelier assassination appears in John Dinges and Saul Landau, Assassination on Embassy
Row, 1st ed. (New York: Pantheon, 1980).
24 FBI Intelligence Report from Attache Robert Scherrer, September 28, 1976. Cited in Kornbluh, The
Pinochet File, 377.
25 Cited in Dinges, The Condor Years. Rend Peralta, director of ECOM in 1974 and 1976, told the author
that ECOM had nothing to do with the Condor data bank. In Peralta's words, "The intelligence community
had their own computer systems; they would not process data in a firm [ECOM] that did not have any type
of security. We never dealt with matters of security. Never." Peralta interview.
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with the computer systems and training that Scherrer believes were used to
construct the Condor database.2 6 Condor also linked intelligence operations among
member nations by using a telex network known as Condortel.2 7 Member countries
received code names--Chile, as operation headquarters, became Condor One,
Argentina was Condor Two, Uruguay Condor Three, and on through to Peru as
Condor Eight--that were used in Condortel messages. Telex messages were
encrypted using an automatic encryption device that was attached to the telex
terminals and reportedly also provided by the CIA.2 8 A radio network provided by
the U.S. military also made it possible for military leaders throughout the continent
to communicate with one another. A diagram found along with the agenda for the
November 1975 meeting maps the data-sharing project in four components: a data
bank, police records, microfilm, and computers. The resolution signed by the
member countries at the conclusion of the meeting also calls for intelligence use of
telex, microfilm, computer, and cryptographic technologies.2 9
In his book The Condor Years Dinges writes, "Computers were almost
nonexistent in South America in the mid-1970s, and Contreras's promise that the
data bank would be computerized was itself a revolutionary step forward."3 0 Given
that in 1975 the Chilean police still used paper filing systems that relied on nothing
more complicated than carbon paper, Dinges's observation holds a degree truth. But
26 Ibid., 121.
27 This raises the question: did the Popular Unity Cybernet network, the telex component of the Cybersyn
project, serve as a precursor for Condortel? I asked John Dinges this at a conference in 2005, and he did
not know the answer. Given the paucity of source materials for Operation Condor and the reticence of
those involved to speak openly, we may never know.
28 Dignes cites Gerardo Irustra, Espionajey servicios secretos en Boliva (La Paz: n.p., 1995), 280, 301.
Information about the existence and origin of the encryption machines was given to Irustra by a Bolivian
security agent, Juan Carlos Fortun.
29 Acta de Clausura de la primera reunion interamericana de inteligencia nacional, November 28, 1975,
personal Condor archive of John Dinges, New York. This document, often referred to as the Condor Act, is
reprinted in Kornbluh, The Pinochet File, 357-360.
30 Dinges, The Condor Years, 121.
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the Chilean government also had a long history of state computing, which began in
the 1920s and became an increasingly entrenched part of the state machinery
during the 1960s and 1970s. The military's decision to apply computers to
intelligence activities and national security was a logical extension of Chile's
technological history rather than a point of revolutionary change. Mainframe
computers had been serving the ideological goals of the Chilean government for close
to ten years by the time Contreras proposed the Condor data bank. From the
perspective of a military dictatorship, it made sense to provide an instrument for the
identification and elimination of those labeled subversives or terrorists, those with
the potential to threaten Chile's new national order. The Condortel network bears a
remarkable similarity to the Cybernet system, the telex component of the Cybersyn
project constructed during the Allende period and may be a perverse
reinterpretation of the technological system originally designed for the daily survival
of a Marxist government. Given the dearth of source materials, drawing a
connection between the two is pure speculation, but it is certainly within the realm
of possibility.
Most treatments of Operation Condor have paid particular attention to the
third phase, wherein intelligence operatives assassinated their political enemies on
foreign soil, but the first phase of Condor also warrants close attention. The creation
of the Condor data bank is not as reprehensible or controversial as the activities
outlined for the second and third phases of Condor, but it constituted more than a
technical system. From the perspective of the member countries, eliminating the
threat of subversion required a network of humans as well as machines and
positioned both in new socio-technical configurations. According to Dinges,
documents from the Condor meeting obliged each country to provide technical staff
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to maintain the Chilean Condor Coordinating Center and its data bank.
Furthermore, the network depended on the collaboration of top military officers and
intelligence agents within member countries, as well as the exchange of information
about subversive activities from intelligence agencies outside of South America.
According to the minutes of the first Condor meeting, member countries decided to
"recommend facilitating the presence of National Intelligence personnel or similar
agents in the Embassies of our countries for direct and personal liaisons."3 ' These
personal liaisons played a vital role in the creation of the network and were
necessary for obtaining content for the data bank and its continued operation.
However, this is only half the story. Just as the network of relationships, the human
liaisons, was necessary for the functioning of the technological network, documents
such as the Condor Act suggest that the military governments in South America
needed the data bank in order to pursue a violent agenda of disappearance and
assassination in the name of national security. Technology furthered the
government goals directed toward these ends. The technology used in the Condor
data bank is significant in another way, too. Like declassified government
documents or participant interviews, machines may serve as the smoking guns of
history. As we learn more about these computer systems, encryption devices, telex
machines, and the radio network provided by the U.S. military, we come closer to
understanding what the U.S. government knew about Operation Condor and to
shedding light on other facets of this clandestine history.3 2 Chile used the Condor
network to extend the scope of its power and to provide an additional layer of secrecy
to the junta's activities of disappearance, torture, and murder while creating
31 Condor Act; translated in Kornbluh, The Pinochet File, 359-60.
32 Studies of technology may also provide a less controversial route for collecting information about U.S.
involvement in the activities of these South American military governments.
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mechanisms for distributing blame and facilitating denial. Perhaps the computer
systems and telex machines used for Condortel and the Condor data bank will one
day help to make these denials impossible.
The End of the State Machine
While the private sector and the military were quick in adapting their uses of
technology to changes in Chile's political and economic landscape, the path of the
public sector was less clear. Patricio LUniz, the brother of Fernando Lniz, the
minister of finance, assumed the helm of ECOM in 1975, following a short tenure by
Italo Bossi and Rene Peralta. ECOM, according to Lniz, desperately needed to be
reorganized to reflect the economic and political changes taking place around it. For
starters, the state enterprise no longer enjoyed the monopolistic position of the
Allende years. But it still did not think of itself as needing to cater to its constituents
or as in competition with the private sector. "When I took over as general director,
we did not have a sales office," Lniz said. "It didn't exist, no one sold ... because
everyone was obligated to buy [from ECOM in the past]."33 Moreover, ECOM, still a
state enterprise, had yet to adjust to the idea of customer service. According to
Lniz, "The big problem . . . was that everyone wanted to buy from anywhere but
ECOM, because of our bad service and our bad attitude in general, which was
characteristic of all government service." He added, "It was hard to change the
spirit of the people [ECOM's employees] so that they would understand we were a
service business, and what it meant to have the vocation of serving and being
pleasant with our clients."
33 Patricio Lniz, interview by author, 23 December 2003.
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Like all of Chile's state agencies and enterprises, ECOM had grown
substantially under Allende as part of government efforts to increase employment
and redistribute wealth. As the government cut public spending, ECOM could no
longer retain all its employees. Layoffs were required. When Lniz took over ECOM,
he recalled, it had five hundred employees. Some decided to leave on their own,
especially given the low wages offered by ECOM--L6niz said he made only $600 per
month as the director. Moreover, new opportunities were opening within the
growing private sector. Some of ECOM's best employees were among the first to go.
Of those who preferred to stay, many turned to teaching as a means of
supplementing their income.
ECOM also made changes to accommodate military intelligence, including
firing employees deemed politically dangerous and undesirable. Lniz said:
I had to talk with various communist leaders and tell them, "Look, Don
Pedro, I am going to ask that you leave the enterprise and I'm going to be
very frank. I am going to ask that you leave to protect yourself, because the
whole world knows that you are a communist and because the whole world
knows that you are a politically important person from the Left who works
here. If something happens to you tomorrow, they are going to imprison you,
torture you, I don't know what will happen. You are a good person and I
cannot protect you because the security people who work here do not report to
me." 34
L6niz recalled having such conversations with two or three individuals who were
"highly visible in politics." However, most lost their jobs simply to downsizing. By
the time L6niz left ECOM in 1976, he had reduced the workforce by two hundred
employees, shrinking the company to approximately 60% of its former workforce.
The simultaneous demand for security and cost efficiency affected the design
of ECOM's new headquarters building. During Allende's presidency the company
34 Leniz interview. Neither Rend Peralta or Juan Ignacio Cahis could confirm that ECOM dismissed people
for their political orientation.
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had been housed in several office buildings. Now the agency began drawing up plans
for a new office building on Santa Maria Avenue that would be large enough to
house ECOM's machines, technical staff, and administration under one roof. But
construction was stalled because Chile didn't have the money to build it. However,
as Lniz tells it, he was able to make several design changes that cut costs. For
example, he decided to place the agency's computing machinery in the basement and
capture the heat that they generated to save on heating costs during the winter
months. "Moreover," Lniz said, in the basement "the computers were more
protected from sabotage. You need to think of the conditions of civil war that we
were living in. Sabotage continued in Chile, guerilla activity continued, these types
of things happened," although he acknowledged that ECOM was never the victim of
any guerrilla activity or sabotage. Putting all of ECOM's computers in the basement
of the new headquarters building solved an immediate problem, but it proved
disastrous in the long term.
In July 1982 heavy rains swelled the Mapocho, a river that cuts through the
center of Santiago, to levels far beyond what its banks could contain. The city
flooded. The ECOM building, which sat along the river, sustained heavy flood
damage. Because almost all its machines were located in the basement, the agency
lost nearly everything. An article for Informdtica, headlined "ECOM: After the Mud
Comes Change," described the situation this way:
It is difficult to describe the spectacle that the employees of ECOM found the
Monday after the flood. The two underground levels of their installation at
6700 Avenue Santa Maria, where not even a speck of dust entered before,
now had a layer of wet mud reaching the ceiling. Obviously, the computers
installed there had disappeared under the stones and mud. The machines
were diagnosed as unrecoverable.35
35 Sonia Cano, "ECOM: despuds del lodo viene el cambio," Inform dtica, July 1982, 4.
327
It was the beginning of the end for the state computer enterprise. Chile had been
dealt a series of blows since the initial economic gains that accompanied Minister of
Finance Sergio de Castro's neoliberal "shock treatments." These policies had
succeeded in lowering inflation, increasing foreign investment, and creating a boom
in consumer spending through the late 1970s. However, by 1982 the Chilean
economy had changed dramatically. Chile sunk into its worst financial crisis since
the Great Depression. The reasons for the crisis were multiple, but most fingers
pointed at the failed economic policies of de Castro and the Chicago Boys. Their
decision to fix the exchange rate from 1979 to 1982 had encouraged foreign
speculation but hid the declining real value of the Chilean peso. Moreover, the
absence of government regulations had increased Chile's vulnerability to
international market fluctuations, which were exacerbated by the rising price of oil,
the falling price of copper, and the mobility of foreign capital. As interest rates began
to rise and the economy showed signs of instability, spooked foreign investors
withdrew their capital from Chilean markets. This, in turn, further swelled Chile's
national debt, which reached $17 billion by 1983-13% more than the GNP.36 In
this context, the magnitude of the loss that ECOM faced was even more devastating.
The agency was never able to recover. In 1982 it reported net losses of 171 million
pesos, a trend that continued in 1983 with reported net losses of 333 million pesos.3 7
ECOM's net worth slipped into the red by more than 100 million pesos.
36 Winn, Victims of the Chilean Miracle, 39.
37 "En 1983: $466 millones perdi6 ECOM," El Mercurio, 11 March 1984.
328
Saddled with a losing investment at a time of extreme economic crisis,
CORFO decided to privatize ECOM in 1985.38 The government sold shares in the
company to its employees, an investment that these Chileans willingly made in
order to save their jobs. National unemployment rates had exceeded 30% at the
height of the crisis, and the value of real wages continued to fall. One employee
recorded the situation in a poem entitled "Memories of ECOM" that was published
in the ECOM magazine Nosotros. The final two stanzas read:
"Mama CORFO" sold one hundred per cent of its shares
And what happens to us? Once again we grin and bear it, yes sirs.
Some take less, others take more from their pockets
A substantial sum, buy at least one share!
In my case, I had to go into debt
Buying a few shares, perhaps you bought more
And if we total these and however many more
It does not matter how many, the debt had to be paid.39
However, these efforts were not enough. The company had been losing its focus and
its raison d'6tre since 1973. By 1985, when the government turned ECOM into a
private sector venture, companies such as SONDA had attracted a significant chunk
of available market business and had more than a decade of experience in catering
to the private sector. After losing its monopoly over state computing needs, ECOM
lacked a clear market and area of expertise that would give it an edge in an
increasingly competitive industry. Navarro blamed ECOM's failure on poor
management and the inefficient use of resources, summed up by his observation that
the new company was "doing stupid things."40 Moreover, colleges and universities
had long since assumed ECOM's mission of training computer professionals. By the
38 The decision to cut ECOM loose was probably reinforced by the massive government bailouts that
occurred throughout 1983 and depleted half the internal reserves of the Central Bank, causing some to joke
about the "Chicago road to socialism."
39
"Recuerdos de ECOM," Nosotros, February 1989.4 0 Navarro interview.
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mid-1980s, new computer science programs at Chilean universities were steadily
churning out the workforce of computer professionals that the new economy
required. Computer technology had also changed dramatically since ECOM's
inception in 11968. Computers were now smaller, less expensive, and easier to obtain.
Juan Ignacio Cahis, ECOM's former director of development, said that while many
blamed the failure of ECOM on the flood of 1982, "I believe that ECOM died because
of the PC [and] the minicomputer . . . a central state mainframe office no longer
made sense."41 Or, as Ren6 Peralta, a former director of ECOM, said, in this new
Chilean landscape "ECOM never found its destiny."4 2
In 1991, two years after democratic elections returned to Chile, ECOM closed
its doors for good. The firm had been decimated by the economic changes that
transformed the Chilean nation and the technological changes that made a central
computer center irrelevant. Their history in Chile as state-controlled and state-
supported technologies notwithstanding, computers now symbolized a new form of
Chilean modernity driven by the private sector. Separated from their past,
computers became yet another commodity acquired by government agencies and
businesses alike in Chile's open markets.
Conclusion
From the 1920s to the 1980s, Chile's history of computing shared a close relationship
with the history of the Chilean state. The state played a vital role in the early
adoption of computing technologies, which required large sums of foreign credit and




activities. And as government t6cnicos entered Chile's public administration in
increasing numbers, they used imported tabulating machines and later mainframe
computers to grow the state administration, coordinate government activities, and
map national resources and populations with increasing detail -- actions that fell in
line with the stated political goals of the administration in power. New data-
processing capabilities made the increasing state intervention outlined by Ibafiez,
Frei, and Allende possible and supported policies of economic planning that
characterized the development discourse of the post-World War II era.
The nature of these computer applications changed over time and supported
different ideological visions of the Chilean nation. In the 1920s and 1930s, the use of
tabulating machines paralleled Ibafiez's abhorrence for liberal politics and his faith
in the rational order offered by scientific methods and technological advancements.
His ideas of modernization extended beyond public works projects and industrial
growth to the creation of a new state apparatus capable of mapping and managing
the Chilean nation and its populations with greater accuracy, detail, and
sophistication. Improved statistical and data collection techniques helped the state
rearticulate the underlying causes of poverty and translate them into manageable
factors such as education, nutrition, unemployment, and, later, development. The
introduction of new techniques and technologies, combined with the greater
employment of engineers and technocrats in Chile's public administration
throughout the 1930s and 1940s, helped create a new form of legitimacy grounded in
a strong state administration that could care for its citizenry and direct Chile's
economic recovery from the Depression.
The Christian Democrats built upon the administrative "tecnificaci6n" begun
by Ibafiez and his successors and continued to expand the size and scope of Chile's
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public administration throughout the 1960s. Christian Democracy's technocratic
vision of state organization and the party's desire to emulate the administrative
techniques used by the industrialized nations of France, Britain, and the United
States motivated the government's purchase of mainframe computers and the
training of Chile's first generation of computer programmers and systems analysts.
The centralized, interventionist state created by the Christian Democrats led to the
centralized use of large, costly mainframe machines; the most visible example of this
parallel was the government's decision to create EMCO. Computers, in turn,
advanced Frei's programs for improving administrative management, using
imported technologies, and securing foreign aid. However, as the 1960s progressed,
Frei's developmentalist approach to Chilean economic policy came under increasing
attack as members of political parties from the Left and Center condemned Chile's
mounting dependence on foreign capital and the government's inability to
implement the social changes outlined in the revolution in liberty. In this
increasingly fraught context, computers and foreign companies such as IBM elicited
feelings of desire as well as resentment and served as conflicting symbols of
modernization and dependency.
Following the election of Salvador Allende, the discourse of development
changed, as did Chile's stance toward the purchase and application of computer
technology. Instead of trying to encourage foreign investment, Chilean economists
and Left-leaning policy makers pushed for Chile to become more autonomous by
decreasing its reliance on foreign capital and by applying science and technology to
meet Chile's specific needs. The nationalization program of the Unidad Popular
vested more power and responsibility in EMCO and led to its transformation into
the state computer monopoly known as ECOM, a maneuver that reflected the new
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role of the state in Chile's directed socialist economy. The U.S.-led decision to deny
foreign credit to Chile and the U.S. trade barriers that prohibited Chile from
obtaining most U.S.-made machinery and spare parts forced ECOM to look beyond
U.S. multinationals for their computing needs and to consider new sources,
including the French company CII. Government nationalization efforts also
motivated new applications for computer technology, such as the Cybersyn system,
which was an instrument for economic regulation as well as a symbol of Chile's
political success and technological might. Instead of simply adopting the
technological systems of the developed, capitalist world, Chile created computer
systems that reflected the goals and constraints of its socialist project and that
helped bring the political aims of the Popular Unity to fruition. However, despite the
coalition's desire to create national technologies, the government continued to rely
on foreign expertise and, in the case of computers, foreign technology. Moreover, the
stated political goals of these technological systems often differed from their actual
manner of operation.
After the military coup in 1973 the Pinochet government used computer
technology in the service of its political repression, surveillance, and disappearance,
policies that were part of Operation Condor. Although we are still uncovering
information on Operation Condor and do not know the full extent of this cooperative
intelligence network, available documents from U.S. and Latin American archives
describe the Condor data bank -- modeled after the police network Interpol, without
its judicial safeguards -- and the encrypted Condortel telex network. According to
recent estimates, close to eighty Chileans were killed in neighboring Southern Cone
countries. Many more were tortured or detained. We may never know the exact
relationship between the Chilean military's use of computers and the acts of violence
333
linked to Condor, but given what we know now there is strong reason to believe that
such a connection existed.
At the same time, neoliberal "shock treatments" to the economy lowered tariff
barriers and opened Chilean markets to foreign investors and a wider range of
imported goods. Foreign-made technologies, including computers, entered Chile in
unprecedented quantities. Moreover, technological advances reduced computers
from hefty mainframes to smaller minicomputers and finally to desktop personal
computers, which reached Chilean markets in the early 1980s. The changes --
technological, economic, and political -- upset ECOM's former monopoly in the public
sector and removed the government protection that the enterprise had enjoyed in
the past. By 1991, ECOM's economic losses and undefined market niche closed the
former state computer enterprise for good. Although ECOM had been run as a
private company for its final six years, its demise signified the inability of state
computing to adjust successfully to Chile's free market economy.
The Chilean state played an important role in Chile's early history of
computing. Its contributions included, but were not limited to, acquiring many of
Chile's first computers and tabulating machines, training a computer literate
workforce almost from scratch, and providing opportunities and resources for
incorporating this technology in the running of the country. Through ECOM the
state helped to establish jobs for Chilean engineers interested in computing, giving
them an alternative to employment in foreign multinationals such as IBM. This
move helped to counteract the brain drain of Chilean scientists and engineers who
were leaving Chile to work with advanced technologies in other countries. Many of
ECOM's early employees now hold top positions in Chilean companies, banks, and
universities and shape the policies of these influential organizations. The same holds
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true for the original participants in the Cybersyn project, who have gone on to
distinguished careers in politics, high-tech consulting firms, and education. Thus we
can say that Chile's flourishing information technology industry has its roots in the
educational programs, technological acquisitions, and administrative policies of the
Chilean state. In Chile, as in the rest of the world, computers have become widely
used tools in the past twenty years and have consequently been linked to Chile's
recent economic changes. However, the widely admired technical prowess of Chilean
computer professionals and the success of Chile's private computer industry is
connected to a history that goes back far longer than twenty years, well beyond the
Pinochet dictatorship and the economic policies of the Chicago Boys.
Computers supported, reflected, and embodied many different approaches to
Chilean modernization, not just the neoliberal restructuring of the 1970s and 1980s.
This practice continues: the Chilean government still frames national computer
capabilities as proof of the country's modernization and a marker that separates it
from other countries in the region. Politicians trumpet policies that require
computer resources in every Chilean school so that all Chilean children have the
opportunity to become computer literate. When Chilean economists and politicians
cast Chile as the "Asian tiger of Latin America," they unconsciously echo the efforts
of Efrain Friedmann almost forty years ago to make Chile a technological center
within Latin America. At the same time, their rhetoric strives to place Chile in the
same league as the United States, Europe, and now Southeast Asia -- the nations of
the developed world -- not that of their South American neighbors. Computers may
have ceased to become state machines, but they retain their power as instruments of
nationalism.
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This study is but a starting point for other examinations of the history of
technology in Latin America. Computers are but one of many technologies whose
early adoption benefited from state support and whose use and/or manufacture
overlapped with ideas of modernity, economic development, or social justice. For
example, histories of automobiles, telephones, televisions, or other consumer
technologies promise to yield new perspectives on Chilean economic policies and the
changing lives and cultural practices of the Chilean men and women who used them.
The same can be said for industrial technologies, particularly in the context of
automation and the subsequent changes to factory work.
Writing the history of technology is a way of documenting history from above
as a well as history from below. Such study contributes to understanding the history
of institutions and elites by shining a light on certain aspects of trade agreements,
the international flow of expertise, and the political and economic policies pursued
by various government administrations and political leaders. Technological history
can also provide a means for understanding the relationship between the state and
its citizenry as well as how policies from above affected the lived experience of
Chileans from all walks of life. New histories of technology could shed light on how
women, members of Chilean popular classes, workers, and even indigenous
populations encountered and incorporated technologies in their lives and used them
to construct new identities and relations with their government. In this light,
technology offers a means for writing a broader and more inclusive range of
histories. Indeed, studies of technology in the Latin American region could prove
relevant to research in a variety of subfields of history, such as those of interest to
labor, social, economic, business, and cultural historians as well as to those studying
political science, economics and development. The wealth of research waiting to be
336
done with respect to technology in Latin America, and its potential for enriching our
knowledge in a range of disciplines, warrants the attention of other scholars.
This dissertation focuses on the role of computer technology in Chilean public
administration rather than in the Chilean armed forces because access to military
archives is quite limited. But we have no reason to think that the Chilean armed
forces did not have an equally interesting and important history of computing,
especially given the number of early computer professionals who emerged from
Chile's military academies and given IBM's habit of recruiting members of the
Chilean navy. A general history of Chilean computing should address the
contributions of the military academies in training Chilean technical experts. It also
should address the changing nature of Chilean military education and its
relationship to the technological and political changes that occurred during the
twentieth century. Historical studies in this vein should also address the changing
relationship of military technical experts, government technocrats, academics, and
multinational companies. One avenue of study might be to compare the
international exchanges of machines and expertise that occurred within Chile's
public administration and those that occurred between members of foreign
governments and the Chilean armed forces. Documenting these relationships will
enrich our understandings of technological development within Latin America and
the influence of foreign nations in Chile's technological and political development.
Scholars within the history of science and technology may wish to pursue
projects that document in greater depth the currents of scientific and intellectual
thought that have been discussed here, including cybernetics, operations research,
systems dynamics, and autopoiesis. Their investigations might examine the origins
of these theoretical framings and methodological approaches in the Chilean context;
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their influence in Chilean scientific, business, and academic communities; and their
adoption elsewhere in South America. While many of these ideas originated outside
South America and arrived in Chile through academic collaborations with the
United States and Europe, others, such as autopoiesis originated in Chile and
subsequently spread throughout the world. It would be valuable to learn more about
both paths of intellectual diffusion.
Many themes addressed by historians of computing in other geographical
contexts may be valuable guides to future work on computing history in Chile,
specifically an examination of the formation of Chile's first university computer
science programs during the 1970s. The emergence of computer science as a
recognized academic discipline paralleled the neoliberal economic changes put in
place by the Pinochet dictatorship that expanded the private sector and demanded a
computer-literate workforce. Preliminary work shows that the government
channeled money to Chile's universities and spurred the creation of a number of
private universities that could assist in creating the technically literate workforce
that the new economy demanded. Documenting this academic history, its tie to
Chile's national economic policies, and its role in creating Chile's successful software
and data processing industries remains a rich vein for future scholarship.
An area of great potential for future work addresses the role that information
technologies have played in violations of civil and human rights. Many of today's
databases, such as those belonging to credit bureaus, health insurance companies, or
even telephone companies, have made headlines and sparked controversy for their
violations of their customers' right to privacy. However, as Operation Condor
suggests, without the proper restraints and safeguards, these same database and
communications technologies can transform a widely accepted technological system
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for law enforcement, namely, Interpol, into a tool for illegal surveillance and
international terrorism. In recent years, legislation such as the U.S. Patriot Act has
come under fire for privileging national security interests at the expense of civil
liberties. The U.S. government is currently waging a war on terrorism against an
omnipresent but unidentifiable threat, a subversive enemy with the ability to cross
national boundaries and the potential to destroy the U.S. way of life. While one can
hardly deny the threat to the United States posed by al Qaeda and other terrorist
organizations, the rhetoric of the Bush administration offers uncomfortable echoes of
the discourse employed by the Pinochet government as it sought to ferret out and
destroy the threat of Marxism thirty years ago. We need to know more about how
governments have used technologies in ways that violated the civil and human
rights of their citizenry and the citizens of other nations. Only then will we learn
how to safeguard our fundamental rights and liberties in the future and better
define the line between freedom and security.
And finally, if technologies serve as symbols of Chilean national success or
national pride, in the past as well as in the present, then technological histories
must play a role of importance within the general history of the Chilean nation. This
dissertation is but a first step toward creating this larger literature and aims to
raise not only academic awareness of Chile's technological contributions but also a
general awareness of the accomplishments of Chilean engineers, scientists,
designers, and their technological systems. In 2003, Chile's aging Museum on
Science and Technology in Santiago's Quinta Normal Park offered a small display on
the history of computing that charted the accomplishments of the pioneering men
and machines that marked the milestones of U.S. and British computing history.
Absent were the names of Chile's computing pioneers and any mention of their
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accomplishments. As knowledge of Chile's technological history begins to reach a
broader public, perhaps some of the people and events that I have discussed will




Figure 7.1: The SONDA headquarters building rises above the older architecture of downtown
Santiago. (Photo by author.)
Figure 7.2: Andres Navarro, general director of SONDA. The first was published in 1984; the
second was taken in 2004. (Left: Photo used with permission from the National Library, Santiago.
Right: Photo by author.)
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Figure 7.3: Today, ECOM's former headquarters on Avenue Santa Maria houses the Santiago
private school Colegio Huel6n. Photograph taken by the author.
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